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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation sets out to trace the political history 
of part of what is now Natal in the period from the third 
quarter of the 18th century to the late 1820s. After 
briefly describing the nature of political organization in 
the region at the beginning of the period, it explains 
how, in the later 18th century, several large 
paramountcies emerged among the small-scale chiefdoms 
which had previously been in exclusive occupation of the 
area. It traces continuities between the conflicts which 
brought about the formation of these larger polities and 
the upheavals which, in the later 1810s and early 1820s, 
totally transformed the region's political landscape. It 
argues that the concept of the mfecane, which portrays 
these upheavals as a product of the violent expansion of 
the Zulu state, is based on colonial-made myths and is 
devoid of analytical usefulness. It shows that A.T. 
Bryant's supposedly authoritative account of the period of 
the upheavals is very largely plagiarized from two minor 
publications produced long before by Theophilus Shepstone. 
It goes on to propose an alternative account which 
demonstrates that the.Zulu state was simply one among a 
number of important political actors in the Thukela-
Mzimkhulu territories in the 1810s and 1820s. Though the 
Zulu were eventually able to establish domination of the 
region, they did not 'devastate' it, as conventionally 
they are supposed to have done, and were unable 
effectively to occupy more than a small part of it. The 
Zulu were still in the process of establishing a hold on 
the region when, in the mid-1820S, its political dynamics 
began to be transformed by the increasing involvement of 
British traders from Port Natal in the affairs of the Zulu 
state. By the end of the 1820s, cape-based commercial and 
political interests were beginning to contest Zulu 
hegemony in the region south of the Thukela, and a new era 
in its history was opening. 
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PREFACE 
The aim of this dissertation is to present an analysis of 
the political history of the region between the Thukela 
and Mzimkhulu rivers, which forms part of what is now 
Natal, in the period from the third quarter of the 18th 
century to the later 1820s. This was a period when 
sweeping social and political changes were taking place 
across an area extending from the northern Transkei 
through Natal, Zululand and Swaziland into southern 
Mozambique and the eastern Transvaal. The forces which 
produced these changes were given their initial impetus, 
and much of their subsequent dynamic, by the rapid 
expansion after about 1760 of an international commerce at 
Delagoa Bay, first in ivory, then in cattle, then in 
slaves. 
Since the rise of Africanist history in southern Africa 
in the 1960s, a number of academic studies have gone a 
long way towards reclaiming the history of the area north 
of the Thukela in the period under study from the 
domination which settler-oriented historiography has 
exercised over it for a century and a half. By contrast, 
the contemporary history of the area south of the Thukela 
has been left largely untouched by academic historians. 
This study essays to establish a new base line for 
research into the topic. The region on which it focusses 
x 
was given a certain historical unity in the period under 
study by its position on the southern periphery of 
territories in which, after 1760, a number of embryonic 
states were competing for supremacy, and in which, by the 
later 1810s, the Zulu chiefdom was emerging as the 
dominant power. The period of study begins with the first 
impact on the polities south of the Thukela of the 
conflicts which were taking place to the northward. It 
ends when, in the later 1820s, an entirely new set of 
forces, rooted in developments in the political economy of 
the Cape colony to the south, was beginning to make itself 
felt in the politics of the region, and new interests were 
beginning to challenge the domination which the Zulu had 
established over it. 
Interpretations of this period of Natal's history are 
still overwhelmingly dominated by notions which were first 
developed by British settler writers in Natal and the Cape 
as far back as the late 1820s and 1830s. The tradition of 
settler writing on precolonial Natal history reached its 
summation in the works of Alfred Bryant, first published 
in the early decades of the 20th century, and still widely 
regarded as authoritative. If an alternative 
interpretation is to be put forward, as this study aims to 
do, the notions entrenched in the literature by Bryant and 
his predecessors need to be identified, and examined in 
detail for their analytical usefulness or otherwise. Much 
of this study, as is reflected in its sub-title, is 
therefore directed towards developing a critique of the 
historiography in order to situate the argumentation 
developed here in a clearer context. 
The representation of the period's history which is put 
forward in this study is based on concepts and approaches 
developed by writers on the precolonial history of 
southern Africa since the 1960s, and on evidence to be 
found in the collection of oral traditions recorded by 
James stuart in the first two decades of the 20th century. 
Like all texts, stuart's notes need to be used with care 
xi 
as sources of historical evidence, but intrinsically the 
process of evaluating them is no different from that used 
in evaluating other forms of documentary evidence. 
Whatever their deficiencies, they provide the essential 
empirical means of moving beyond the established settler 
versions of Natal's pre-1830s history. While many of the 
interpretations of his informants' testimonies made here 
are necessarily tentative, it is to be hoped that they 
will provide a basis for shifting debate about Natal's 
precolonial history onto a new terrain. 
My thanks go to the many people who helped in various ways 
in the production of this dissertation. I would like to 
express my special appreciation to four in particular. 
Philip Bonner was a firmly supportive supervisor. His 
sense of historical judgement was important in giving 
shape to the arguments put forward in this study. Carolyn 
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in equal measure. Many of the ideas expressed in this 
dissertation have grown out of co-operative research and 
writing with her extending over half a dozen years. In 
the later stages of my work, Julian Cobbing praised and 
criticized, encouraged and goaded, and commented 
trenchantly and at length on the drafts of several 
chapters. My wife, Cara Pretorius, tolerated my academic 
preoccupations, initiated me into the mysteries of word-
processing, and, with Joanna, Julia and Catherine, looked 
forward to the day when this dissertation would be 
completed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE LATER 18TH CENTURY 
1. The Thukela-Mzimkhulu region to the early 19th century: 
an outline of the historiography 
The historiography of what is now the Natal-Zululand 
region dates back to the later 1820s, when some of the 
British hunter-traders who had established themselves at 
Port Natal from 1824 onward began to publish acounts of 
their experiences in Cape newspapers. Included in some of 
these were brief notes on the region's history.1 The 
information on which these notes were based would have 
been obtained in the first instance from African 
informants at Port Natal and in the Zulu kingdom, but 
there is nothing in the record about their identity or 
about the circumstances in which they gave their evidence. 
In the late 1820s and 1830s, digests of these historical 
comments began to appear in books written by British 
travellers, missionaries and others who had visited, or 
resided in, the Cape colony.2 From the mid-1830s they 
1. The first of these accounts, written by James King, and 
entitled 'Some account of Mr Farewell's settlement at Port 
Natal •.. ', was published in the South African Commercial 
Advertiser of 11 and 18 July 1826. It was reprinted, with 
a few omissions, the following year by George Thompson in 
his Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa, published 
in London. See the Van Riebeeck Society's edition of 
Thompson's book, vol. 2, Cape Town, 1968, pp. 243-52, esp. 
pp. 248-9. 
2. See for example Thompson, Travels and Adventures, 
vol. 1 (1967, 1st ed. 1827), pp. 172-3; H.B. Robinson, 
ed., Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, 
Arabia and Madagascar Performed ..• under the Direction of 
captain W.F.W. Owen. R.N., vol. 1, Farnborough, 1968 
(repr. of 1st ed., London, 1833), p. 71; S. Kay, Travels 
and Researches in Caffraria, New York, 1834, pp. 341-2; A. 
Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures in the Interior of 
Southern Africa, vol. 2, Cape Town, 1966 (repr. of 1st ed. 
London, 1835), pp. 200-1, 204, 209, 212. 
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were supplemented by jottings of historical information 
included in books written by sojourners in Natal itself. 3 
Two main themes dominated the version of the region's 
history which thus began appearing in print: first, the 
rise of Shaka's Zulu kingdom north of the Thukela, and, 
second, the 'invasions' of the territories to the south of 
the river which were supposed to have been carried out by 
the Zulu a few years before the coming of the first 
traders. It was not until after the establishment of 
British colonial rule over the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
territories in the 1840s that the 'pre-Zulu' period of 
this region's history began to receive any attention from 
literate recorders. In the early 1850s, Lewis Grout, an 
American missionary, and Henry Fynn, one of the first 
whites to have lived at Port Natal, provided a Natal 
government commission with lists of the 'tribes' which, 
according to the testimony of African informants, had 
inhabited the region before the so-called Zulu conquests. 
Accompanying these lists were snippets of information on 
the localities which the various tribes had occupied, and 
on the identities of their chiefs. The evidence of both 
men was made public in 1853 through the medium of the 
Natal Government Gazette. 4 A few years later the essence 
of Grout's evidence on these topics was more widely 
disseminated in Joseph Shooter's well-known work, The 
Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu country.5 
3. See N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in Eastern 
Africa, el. L. Herman & P.R. Kirby, Cape Town, 1970 (1st 
ed. London, 1836), pp. 146-50, 152; A.F. Gardiner, 
Narrative of a Journey to the Zoolu Country, Cape Town, 
1966 (repr. of 1st ed., London, 1836), pp. 90, 98-9. 
4. Grout's evidence to the Commission Appointed to Inquire 
into the Past and Present State of the Kafirs in the 
District of Natal (which will henceforth be referred to as 
the Harding Commission, after its first president) was 
published in Natal Government Gazette (NGG), no. 215, 
18 Jan. 1853. Fynn's evidence was published in NGG, 
no. 220, 22 Feb. 1853. 
5. First published in London, 1857; repro New York, 1969. 
See pp. 375-82 on the 'Tribes of the Zulu-Country and 
Natal'. 
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These publications remained the only generally 
available sources of information on their subject for more 
than thirty years. Though Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary 
for Native Affairs in Natal colony, worked up a set of 
brief tribal histories in 1864,6 these were not published 
until 1888, when they appeared, without attribution, in 
John Bird's influential compilation of historical 
documents entitled Annals of Natal. 7 Shepstone made a few 
general remarks on conditions in Natal before the Zulu 
conquests in a historical article first published in 
1875,8 and also in an official history of the tribes of 
Natal published in 1883,9 but neither work gave much 
attention to the pre-Zulu period. until the appearance of 
the first of Father Alfred Bryant's historical works in 
the early years of the 20th century, Shepstone's set of 
notes remained the most authoritative published source on 
the pre-Zulu history of the region which became Natal 
colony. 
At the same time as Grout, Fynn and Shepstone were 
producing their notes on tribal history, speculations 
about the origins of the African peoples of southern 
Africa began to be published. The first work on Natal to 
touch on this issue seems to have been the Oxford-educated 
Charles Barter's The Dorp and Veld, published in 1852, in 
6. See pp. 101-6 below for discussion of the circumstances 
in which they were produced. 
7. Two vols., Pietermaritzburg, 1888, repro Cape Town, 
1965. For Shepstone's histories see vol. 1, pp. 124-53. 
8. T. Shepstone, 'The early history of the Zulu-Kafir race 
of south-eastern Africa', 'Journal of the Society of Arts, 
29 Jan. 1875, repro in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, 
pp. 155-66. Also published in Cape Monthly Magazine, 
vol. 11 (1875), pp. 95-104. 
9. T. shepstone, 'Historic sketch of the tribes anciently 
inhabiting the Colony of Natal - as at present bounded -
and Zululand,' in Cape of Good Hope Blue Book no. G.4.-
'83, Report and Proceedings. with Appendices. of the 
Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs, part II, 
Cape Town, 1968, (repr. of 1st ed., 1883), pp. 415-20. 
(This source will henceforth be cited as Commission on 
Laws and Customs.) 
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which the author mentioned 'the generally received theory' 
that the ultimate origins of south-eastern Africa's black 
inhabitants lay in south-west Asia. 10 A similar view was 
expressed in the report of the Harding Commission. 11 In 
1857 the missionary J.L. Dehne put forward the notion that 
the African peoples of southern Africa had 'in time 
immemorial' come from Egypt. 12 In the next decade Lewis 
Grout put their point of origin in south-west Asia, as did 
another missionary, William Holden. 13 
By the 1860s, then, a ~hree-phase model of the history 
of Natal before the coming of the first Europeans was 
being developed by the colony's white intellectuals. 
Influenced by the rising interest among contemporary 
social scientists in the question of how different 
cultures and peoples had originated,14 they suggested that 
the ancestors of the African population of Natal had, at 
some unknown period, migrated into the region from further 
north in Africa. The period of migrations had been 
followed, in their view, by a long phase in which the 
people had lived in numerous small 'tribes'. 
Conventionally the tribe was seen as a group of people who 
occupied a specific territory under the political 
authority of a hereditary chief, and which was to a large 
degree united by ties of kinship, culture and language. 
This notion, too, was becoming central to anthropological 
10. C. Barter, The Dorp and the Veld; or six Months in 
Natal, London, 1852, p. 190. 
11. Proceedings and Report of the Commission Appointed to 
Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafirs in 
the District of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, n.d. (1853), 
p. 31. 
12. J.L. Dehne, A Zulu-Kafir Dictionary, Cape Town, 1857, 
p. xiv. 
13. L. Grout, Zulu-land. or Life among the Zulu-Kafirs, 
London, 1863, pp. 62-7; W.C. Holden, The Past and Future 
of the Kaffir Races, Cape Town, 1963 (repr. of 1st ed., 
London, 1866), p. 5. 
14. M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, London, 
1969, ch. 6; T.K. Penniman, A Hundred years of 
Anthropology, London, 1965 ed. (1st ed. 1935), ch. 4. 
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thought at this time. 15 The third phase of Natal's pre-
European history, that of Zulu conquest and domination, 
had begun shortly before the arrival of the first 
Europeans in 1824, and had ended with the defeat of the 
Zulu at the hands of the Boers in the late 1830s. 
This schema was consonant with ideas propounded a 
little later by writers whose focus was on the broader 
southern Africa region. By 1880 George stow had developed 
an elaborate account of how 'negro' people had colonized 
the sub-continent in successive 'waves' of migration from 
the north, with stronger tribes pushing weaker ones before 
them. 16 Similar notions were being disseminated from the 
end of the century onward in the voluminous and immensely 
influential writings of G.M.Theal. 17 On a broader, 
Africa-wide canvas, Johnston was simultaneously 
propounding his theory that the whole continent had 
originally been colonized by migrants from the 
neighbouring regions of Asia. 18 By this time, writers 
were beginning to try to date the period of migrations. 
Johnston saw the southward movement of the 'Bantu' as 
having begun some 2500 to 3000 years before. 19 Theal 
estimated that the vanguard of the Bantu had reached the 
15. M.H. Fried, The Notion of Tribe, Menlo Park, Calif., 
1975, p. 8; P. Skalnik, 'Tribe as colonial category', in 
E. Boonzaier & J. Sharp, eds., South African Keywords: the 
Uses and Abuses of Political concepts, Cape Town, 1988, 
p. 70. 
16. G.W. stow, The Native Races of South Africa, Cape 
Town, 1964 (repr. of 1st ed., London, 1905), pp. 233-5 & 
chs. 21, 22. This work, edited by G.M. Theal, was 
published after the author's death. As the preface makes 
clear, the manuscript had been completed by 1880. 
17. For instance G.M. Theal, South Africa, London, 6th 
ed., 1899 (1st ed. 1893), p. 5; G.M. Theal, History and 
Ethnography of Africa South of the Zambesi, vol. 1, 
London, 1907, pp. 54-73. 
18. H.H. Johnston, A History of the Colonization of Africa 
by Alien Peoples, New York, 1966 (repr. of 1930 ed., 1st 
ed. London (?), 1899), ch. 1. 
19. Ibid., p. 5. 
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Orange and Kei rivers in about AD 1650. 20 
The theory of tribal migration as developed by European 
writers appeared to be underpinned by the oral traditions 
of Africans themselves. Many of these traditions, as 
interpreted by researchers like stow, spoke of movements 
of groups whose structures appeared to match those of the 
anthropologists' tribes. Thus, while writers like Theal 
could dismiss African traditions as containing little 
worthwile historical information,21 they were not led to 
query the general validity of traditions of migration, nor 
of the concept of the bounded tribe as the basic 
organizational unit in African society. 
By the later 19th century, the three-phase model of 
Natal's pre-European history was well entrenched in the 
literature. 22 By this time Bryant was beginning to pursue 
the researches which, between 1905 and 1929, saw him 
produce what are still by far the most detailed and 
influential works on the pre-European history of the 
Natal-Zululand region to have been published. 23 Sixty 
years after its first appearance in 1929, his monumental 
Olden Times in Zululand and Natal remains for many 
researchers the standard work of reference on its subject. 
20. Theal, South Africa, p. 5. 
21. Theal, History and Ethnography, vol. 1, p. 107. 
22. R. Russell, Natal: the Land and Its story, London, 
1891, pp. 111-26. 
23. Bryant's first major historical work was the essay 
entitled 'A sketch of the origin and early history of the 
Zulu people', which was published as a preface to his 
A zulu-English Dictionary, Pietermaritzburg, 1905, 
pp. 12*-66*. (The page numbers of the series of prefaces 
in this work are asterisked to distinguish them from the 
page numbers of the main text.) This was followed by a 
series of articles published in the newspaper Izindaba 
Zabantu in 1910-13; these were reprinted in A.T. Bryant, 
A History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Tribes, Cape Town, 
1964. The article, 'The origin of the Zulus', Native 
Teachers' Journal, vol. 1, no. 1 (1919), pp. 9-16, 
reflected some important developments in the author's 
thinking. His historical magnum opus, Olden Times in 
Zululand and Natal, was published in London in 1929. 
7 
But, if Bryant's work added a mass of detail to the 
published record of the Natal-Zululand region's history 
before the advent of Europeans, it was cast in very much 
the same conceptual mould as earlier writing on the 
subject. It saw the African peoples of the region as 
comparatively recent immigrants from the north. It took 
the evidence in their oral traditions at face value in 
presenting the region's past in the form of discrete 
tribal histories with their focus on origins, migrations 
and chiefly genealogies. It depicted the 'Zulu invasions' 
as having brought the post-migration phase of the region's 
history to an abrupt and traumatic end. And it attributed 
the invasions primarily to the individual volition of the 
Zulu king Shaka. 
Bryant's works in effect served to entrench the 
established European settler view of Natal's pre-European 
history by providing more detailed and apparently reliable 
empirical evidence for it than any previous author had 
done. For reasons which themselves require study, his 
conclusions survived virtually unchallenged for nearly 
half a century after the emergence of liberal academic 
historiography in South Africa in the 1920s, and the 
contemporaneous establishment of social anthropology as an 
academic discipline. 24 In the 1940s and 1950s, Gluckman 
and Wilson, both of them anthropologists, began to move 
away from Bryant's 'great man' notion of historical change 
and to consider the ~ocial and political effects of, 
respectively, rising population pressure and external 
trade. 25 Wilson also suggested that the migrations of 
24. Some of the reasons for the survival of Bryant's 
version of history are touched on in the next chapter: see 
pp. 80 ff. 
25. M. Gluckman, 'The kingdom of the Zulu of South 
Africa', in M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., 
African Political Systems, London, 1940, p. 25; M. 
Gluckman, 'Analysis of a social situation in modern 
Zululand', part B, Bantu Studies, vol. 14 (1940), pp. 148-
51; M. Wilson, Divine Kings and the 'Breath of Men', 
Cambridge, 1959, pp. 23-4. 
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black people into south-eastern Africa had possibly taken 
place by AD 1300 or before. 26 It was not until the rise 
of Africanist historiography in southern Africa in the 
later 1960s, however, that historians like Omer-cooper, 
smith and Thompson began to bring these notions into a 
wider discourse. 27 At the same time, Marks and Atmore 
produced the first studies to argue the need for a 
thorough reassessment of the traditions of origin and 
migration presented forty years before by Bryant. 28 
By this time, too, archaeological evidence was 
beginning to emerge that gave a completely different 
picture of the nature and dating of the process by which 
southern Africa had been settled by African farming 
societies. After the beginning of systematic research 
into the 'Iron Age' of the Natal region in the early 
1970s, the long-established notion that the area had been 
occupied comparatively recently by black immigrants from 
the north rapidly became discredited. By the early 1980s 
it had become clear that the first farming communities had 
emerged in the region by about AD 300 or earlier,29 and 
the notion that they had originated in a process of 
26. M. Wilson, 'The early history of the Transkei and 
Ciskei', African Studies, vol. 18 (1959), p. 178. 
27. J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: a Nineteenth-
century Revolution in Bantu Africa, London, 1966, pp. 25, 
27; A. smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in 
Nguni politics 1750-1835', in L. Thompson, ed., African 
Societies in Southern Africa, London, 1969, ch. 8; L. 
Thompson, 'Co-operation and conflict: the Zulu kingdom and 
Natal', in M. Wilson & L. Thompson, eds., The Oxford 
History of South Africa, vol. 1, Oxford, 1969, pp. 336-41. 
28. S. Marks, 'The traditions of the Natal "Nguni": a 
second look at the work of A.T. Bryant', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies, ch. 6; S. Marks & A. Atmore, 'The 
problem of the Nguni: an examination of the ethnic and 
linguistic situation in South Africa before the Mfecane', 
in D. Dalby, ed., Language and History in Africa, New 
York, 1970, pp. 120-32. 
29. The evidence is summarized in T. Maggs, 'The Iron Age 
sequence south of the Vaal and Pongola rivers: some 
historical implications', Journal of African History, vol. 
21 (1980), pp. 1-15. 
immigration was itself becoming the subject of debate 
among archaeologists. 30 
9 
The results of the archaeological research of the 1970s 
reinforced the emerging view that African oral traditions 
of migration could not be taken at face value, as 
generations of writers had done, as sources of evidence 
about the origins of, and relationships between, 
historically known African communities. 31 In the 1960s 
and 1970s a new understanding was developing among 
Africanist scholars of th~ ways in which oral traditions 
were formed, and of the social and political functions 
which they performed. They were coming to be seen less as 
factual statements than as largely political statements 
which served to legitimize the right of ruling groups to 
occupy particular territories, and to exercise authority 
over subordinate groups in those territories. 32 
Traditions of migration, for their part, were coming to be 
recognized as often constituting not so much records of 
actual movements as 'founding charters' which had little, 
if any, basis in fact. 33 Any lingering opinions, among 
informed researchers, at least, to the effect that 
Bryant's complex schema of migrations might directly 
30. See M. Hall, The changing Past: Farmers. Kings and 
Traders in Southern Africa. 200-1860, Cape Town, 1987, 
ch. 3. 
31. The three paragraphs that follow draw on J. Wright & 
C. Hamilton, 'Olden Times and beyond: conceptualizing the 
pre-documentary history of Zululand-Natal' , unpubl paper, 
University of Natal, Durban, 1985, pp. 3-4, 9; and 
J. Wright & C. Hamilton, 'Traditions and transformations: 
the Phongolo-Mzimkhulu region in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries', in A. Duminy & B. Guest, 
eds., Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910: a 
New History, pietermaritzburg, 1989, pp. 50-52, 55. 
32. See J. Vansina, Oral Tradition: a Study in Historical 
Methodology, Harmondsworth, 1973 (1st French ed., 1961), 
esp. ch. 4; D.P. Henige, The Chronology of Oral Tradition: 
Quest for a Chimera, Oxford, 1974, esp. ch. 1. 
33. J.C. Miller, 'Introduction: listening for the African 
past', in J.C. Miller, ed., The African Past Speaks, 
Folkestone, 1980, pp. 31-4. 
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reflect historical reality eroded rapidly in the face of 
these ideas. 
Another contemporary conceptual development that was of 
the greatest importance in enabling historians to move on 
beyond Bryant's notions was the gradual abandonment from 
the later 1960s onward by the more enlightened Africanist 
academics of the concept of the 'tribe' as the 
characteristic unit of social and political organization 
in Africa. At the time when Bryant was doing his 
researches, this notion had long since become thoroughly 
entrenched in anthropological discourse, and it is hardly 
surprising that he absorbed it uncritically into his own 
work. His predisposition to do so would have been 
reinforced by the fact that, in the African oral 
traditions with which he worked, historical narratives 
were often cast in the form of histories of bounded 
tribes, or 'clans' as he called them, with an objective 
existence of their own. There was nothing in the premises 
of the anti-historical structural-functionalist social 
anthropology which began emerging in about the 1920s to 
challenge the concept of the bounded tribe, and it was not 
until the 1960s and 1970s that a sustained critique of it 
began to be mounted by more historically minded social 
scientists. 
Among many Africanists the term 'tribe' was by this 
time coming to be seen as a pejorative one. Numbers of 
anthropologists, followed a little later by historians, 
were beginning to recognize that it was also a term which 
confused political units, descent groups, and ethnic 
groups, and which failed to distinguish between political 
units of different types. Use of the term, it was coming 
to be seen, effectively prevented analysis of changes in 
basic social and political relationships, and thus 
inhibited production of the kind of history which sought 
to move beyond the descriptions of the 'unrewarding 
gyrations' of tribes (to resituate a phrase from Trevor-
Roper's notorious statement) which had featured centrally 
11 
in the works of writers on African history since the mid-
19th century. In place of the concept of the bounded 
tribe began to emerge the notion of chiefdoms whose 
geographical boundaries, composition, internal 
organization, and cultural and ethnic affiliations were 
fluid and subject to internally and externally induced 
change. 34 
Previously, historians like Bryant had conceived of 
historical change in 'tribal' society almost entirely in 
terms of changes in milit~ry organization and in political 
scale. They had been unable to conceive of the notion 
that changes in the basic social structures of the 'tribe' 
itself were possible. 35 Though writers like Gluckman and, 
later, Omer-Cooper had in some ways edged towards notions 
of structural change,36 it was not until the analytical 
usefulness of the notion of the bounded tribe began to be 
queried that the way was opened for a broader 
understanding of the nature of historical change in the 
precolonial period to be developed. 37 In the 1970s the 
study of this period was comprehensively transformed by 
the work of a dozen or so doctoral researchers, based 
largely at the Universities of London and of California, 
34. For early critiques of the concept of the tribe see 
A.W. Southall, 'The illusion of tribe', in P.C.W. Gutkind, 
ed., The passing of Tribal Man in Africa, Leiden, 1970, 
pp. 28-48; Fried, The Notion of Tribe, passim. Among 
more recent commentaries are A.W. Southall, 'The ethnic 
heart of anthropology', Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 
no. 100 (1985), pp. 567-72; Skalnik, 'Tribe as colonial 
category', in Boonzaier & Sharp, eds., South African 
Keywords, ch. 5. 
35. See the discussion of these issues in Wright & 
Hamilton, 'Olden Times and beyond', unpubl. paper, 
pp. 5-7, 15-16; Wright & Hamilton, 'Traditions and 
transformations', in Duminy & Guest, eds., Natal and 
Zululand, pp. 53, 56-7. 
36. Gluckman, 'The kingdom of the Zulu', in Fortes & 
Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems (1940), 
pp. 25-45; Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath (1966), pp. 24-37. 
37. See for example Thompson, ed., African Societies, 
where, in some of the studies, the notion of the tribe 
survives uneasily alongside newer concepts. 
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Los Angeles, who for the first time made it a respectable 
field of research for historians as well as for 
archaeologists and anthropologists. 
Several of these researchers produced work which bore 
directly or indirectly on the history of the territories 
north of the Thukela river in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, but only one, Henry Slater, gave attention to 
the region south of the river. 38 Like a number of his 
contemporaries, Slater was strongly influenced by the 
materialist notions of history which were emerging from 
the revival of marxist studies in western Europe in the 
1960s and 1970s. More explicitly than any of his 
colleagues, he incorporated the materialist concept of 
mode of production into his work. His doctoral thesis was 
in essence an exposition of how a number of different 
modes of production had manifested themselves in south-
eastern Africa in a succession of social epochs, and of 
how the transition from one epoch to the next had taken 
place. 
Slater's work marked a radical departure from 
established approaches to the writing of the Natal-
Zululand region's precolonial history. He was the first 
historian in half a century to reveal in detail that the 
region actually had a precolonial history worth studying. 
He was also the first to propose a comprehensive 
theoretical framework which broke decisively with the 
tribally focussed mo~el which had been dominant since the 
mid-19th century. But the rigidity of his framework, 
together with serious flaws in his handling of empirical 
evidence, prevented his ideas from being taken up with any 
enthusiasm by other historians. His schema of social 
epochs, which was derived from structuralist marxist 
analyses of the history of Europe, could be applied to the 
history of south-eastern Africa only be stretching the 
38. H. Slater, 'Transitions in the political economy of 
south-east Africa before 1840', unpubl. D. Phil., 
University of Sussex, 1976. 
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evidence to breaking-point. And, by omitting any 
systematic consideration of the nature and political 
significance of subjective consciousness among the various 
social categories which he identified in his successive 
epochs, he ended up by presenting a strongly evolutionist 
conception of historical change in which the role of 
conscious human agency was minimized. 
David Hedges's thesis, which was rooted in a more 
flexible version of materialist theory, succeeded in 
providing a more empirically based and therefore 
convincing explanation of historical change in the Delagoa 
Bay-Thukela region in the later 18th and early 19th 
century. 39 Though, like Slater, he did not specifically 
confront Bryant's notions, his hypothesis that political 
change in the region was linked to the expansion of 
international commerce at Delagoa Bay at one stroke 
rendered much of Bryant obsolete. As will become clear 
later in this chapter, his findings had major implications 
for an understanding of the causes of contemporary 
political changes in the area south of the Thukela. 
Hedges's argumentation was greatly strengthened by his 
use of two sources of evidence which had been left 
virtually untapped by previous writers on the Natal-
Zululand region. One consisted of assemblages of 
unpublished official documents in Portuguese archives. 40 
The other was the copious collection of oral traditions 
which had been recorded in Natal and Zululand in the first 
two decades of the 20th century by James Stuart, a 
colonial official, and which had been housed in a library 
in Durban since the late 1940s. A number of these 
39. D.W. Hedges, 'Trade and politics in southern 
Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of 
London, 1978. 
40. Alan smith had previously shown that these sources 
could be used to throw light on the history of the 
Zululand region (see note 27 above). The focus of his 
work was, however, on southern Mozambique. 
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traditions had been published in Zulu by stuart in the 
1920S,41 and had been drawn on by Bryant in his researches 
towards the writing of Olden Times. But these works do 
not seem to have been taken seriously as possible sources 
by later historians, and it was not until 1976 that 
stuart's collection began to become more generally known. 
In that year was published the first of a series of 
volumes, edited by Colin Webb and the present author, in 
which translated and annotated renderings of the oral 
testimony recorded by stu~rt became available to a wider 
audience. 42 
In the early 1980s, using stuart's records in detail, 
and armed with an understanding of the ideological 
functions performed by oral traditions which moved beyond 
the notions that had become established in the 1970s, 
Carolyn Hamilton developed the most comprehensive and 
penetrating analysis so far produced of the nature of the 
political struggles which had taken place in the Thukela-
Mfolozi region in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. 43 An unpublished paper which she wrote in 1982 
constituted the first empirical study to advance beyond 
Bryant's treatment of the history of the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region in this period. 44 The first published study to do 
so, co-authored by Andrew Manson and the present writer, 
appeared the following year;45 this too drew heavily on 
41. In five Zulu readers published in London. These were 
uTulasizwe (1923), uBaxoxele (1924), uHlangakula (1924), 
uKulumetule (1925), and uVusezakiti (1926). 
42. C. de B. Webb & J.B. Wright, eds., The James stuart 
Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History 
of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples, vols. 1-4, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1976-86. Three more volumes in the 
series are planned. 
43. C.A. Hamilton, 'Ideology, oral tradition and the 
struggle for power in the early Zulu kingdom', unpubl. 
M.A. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986. 
44. C.A. Hamilton, 'The amaLala in Natal, 1750-1826', 
unpubl. paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1982. 
45. J. wright & A. Manson, The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand-
Natal: a History, Ladysmith, 1983, ch. 1. 
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testimony originally recorded by stuart. At much the same 
time, Hamilton and the present writer were producing the 
first studies which were concerned explicitly to confront 
some of the notions central to Bryant's conception of the 
history of the Natal-Zululand region before the 19th 
century. 46 Most recently, Julian Cobbing's radical 
critiques of mfecane theory have carried this process a 
long step further. 47 
The studies produced in the last fifteen years or so 
have paved the way for an account of the history of the 
Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the later 18th century which 
moves on from Bryant's 'clan' histories to attempt to 
delineate broader patterns of change. In the next section 
of this chapter, a review of the evidence on the nature of 
• 
political organization in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in 
the mid-18th century will be presented. The third section 
will seek to identify the forces which, in the second half 
of the century, were making for far-reaching political 
change across a broad sweep of territory to the north, 
south and west of Delagoa Bay, including the area south of 
the Thukela. The fourth section will present new evidence 
on the impact which these forces had on the polities of 
this region. 
46. J. Wright, 'Politics, ideology and the invention of 
the "Nguni"', unpubl. paper, University of the witwaters-
rand, 1983 (this paper was published in virtually 
unaltered form in T. Lodge, ed., Resistance and Ideology 
in Settler Societies, Johannesburg, 1986, pp. 96-118); 
C. Hamilton & J. Wright, 'The making of the Lala: 
ethnicity, ideology and class-formation in a precolonial 
context', unpubl. paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 
1984 (a revised version of this paper is due for 
publication in 1990 in the South African Historical 
Journal); Wright & Hamilton, 'Olden Times and beyond', 
unpubl. paper, University of Natal, Durban, 1985. 
47. See especially J. Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane 
(with perestroika) " unpubl. paper, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1988, esp. pp. 10-15; J. Cobbing, 'The 
mfecane as alibi: thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', 
Journal of African History, vol. 29 (1988), pp. 487-519, 
esp. pp. 503-7. 
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2. The polities of the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the 
mid-18th century 
The main source of evidence on the history of the Thukela-
Mzimkhulu region before the beginnings of its more or less 
connected documentation in the later 1820s is the body of 
oral traditions which survives in the records made by a 
number of researchers during the period c.1850-c.1920. 
The brief notes on tribal history produced in the 1850s 
and 1860s by Grout, Fynn and Shepstone have already been 
mentioned, as have the rich collection of oral testimony 
made by stuart in the early 20th century, and the syn-
theses of individual 'clan' histories produced by Bryant 
at much the same time. To this list should be added an 
annotated list of tribes compiled in the early 1850s by 
James perrin,48 and a synthesis of oral traditions 
published in 1922 by Magema Fuze. 49 The notes made by 
Grout, Fynn, Perrin and Shepstone pertain essentially to 
the early 19th century. The traditions recorded by 
stuart, together with those which can be extracted from 
Fuze's and Bryant's works, reflect events which took place 
as far back as about the mid-18th century. 
Between them these" sources indicate that in the mid-
18th century the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region was occupied by 
several dozen or several score separate chiefdoms. 50 
48. Robert Garden Papers (Natal Archives), 'Aboriginal 
tribes residing in the District of Natal at the time of 
the Zulu invasion, and destroyed by Chaka', pp. 826-83. 
The list is unattributed, but there is little doubt that 
it was the work of Perrin: see pp. 104-5 below. 
49. M. Fuze, Abantu Abamnyama Lapa Bavela Ngakona, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1922. An English translation by H.C. 
Lugg, edited by A.T. Cope, was published in 
Pietermaritzburg in 1979 under the title The Black People 
and Whence They Came. 
50. Much the most detailed of the sources is Bryant's 
Olden Times. His brief notes on the histories of 
individual 'clans', or chiefdoms, in the later 18th 
century are synthesized from the previously published 
notes and records of Grout, Fynn, Shepstone, Fuze and 
stuart, and from his own researches into chiefly 
genealogies. The main references to the chiefdoms of the 
mid- and later 18th century to be found in Olden Times, 
are, on a region-by-region basis, as follows: northern 
Natal, pp. 347, 353; middle Thukela valley, pp. 364, 520-
17 
Bryant put the number of clans in Natal in 'pre-Shakan' 
times at fifty.51 Perrin's list of 'aboriginal tribes' 
supposedly destroyed by the Zulu contained fifty-four 
names. 52 Fynn listed fifty-six tribes which had inhabited 
Natal before Shaka's time, Grout seventy, and Shepstone 
ninety-four. 53 There is no clear indication in the 
sources as to how many of these entities constituted 
independent polities. The terms 'clan' and 'tribe' as 
used by the various authors fairly certainly refer to 
political groupings of different sizes and different 
levels of organization. Some may have been independent 
chiefdoms, others may have been sections of chiefdoms, 
still others may have been clusters of largely autonomous 
chiefdoms under a paramount chief. 
Whatever the differences in size and level of 
organization between these groups, the evidence from oral 
tradition strongly suggests that the polities of the 
region were all relatively small and relatively loosely 
structured. Bryant estimated the population of Natal in 
the early 19th century as 100 000,54 and while this figure 
represents only the roughest of estimates, it has not been 
3; lower Thukela valley, pp. 507, 510, 512; lower Mvoti 
valley, pp. 524-32, 534, 545; northern midlands, pp. 253-
4, 548-52; Mngeni valley, pp. 373-4, 553-6; southern 
Natal, pp. 256-7, 268-70, 561. 
There is comparatively little in the traditions 
recorded by Stuart that pertains to the period under 
discussion. See JSA~ vol. 1, evidence of Dabula, p. 88; 
vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 98, 108; vol. 2, evidence 
of Mahaya, pp. 110-34 passim; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana 
pp. 274, 276-8; vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 54; vol. 
3, evidence of Stephen Mini, pp. 133-5; vol. 4, evidence 
of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 10. 
51. Bryant, OT, p. 236. 
52. Garden Papers, list of 'Aboriginal tribes', 
pp. 826-83. 
53. Fynn's evidence to Harding commission, NGG, no. 221, 
I March 1853; Grout's evidence to Harding Commission, 
NGG, no. 215, 18 January 1853; Shepstone's notes on tribal 
histories in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 124-53. 
54. Bryant, OT, p. 236. 
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challenged by later writers. Even if it is too low, the 
larger polities of the region in the mid-18th century are 
unlikely to have numbered more than a few thousand people, 
or to have extended over more than a couple of thousand 
square kilometres. There is no indication in the 
traditions that groupings larger than this emerged before 
the later 18th century. 
This picture is consistent with the evidence from two 
other sources on the nature of social organization in the 
Thukela-Mzimkhulu region before the 19th century. One is 
the information yielded by archaeological research into 
the later phases of the Iron Age in Natal, i.e. the period 
from c.1500 to c.1800. This evidence is significant in a 
negative rather than a positive sense. Comparatively 
little research has been undertaken on this period, and 
such as has been done has focussed almost entirely on 
investigating subsistence patterns, and settlement type 
and distribution. 55 There has as yet been no attempt to 
conceptualize political structures in the way done by 
researchers like Denbow and Huffman in other parts of 
southern Africa. 56 Nevertheless, the research findings so 
far published on SUbsistence and settlement patterns in 
Natal during the later Iron Age do not contradict the 
argument that in the mid-18th century, and for an unknown 
55. See the following survey articles: T. Maggs, 'The Iron 
Age sequence south of the Vaal and Pongola rivers: some 
historical implications', JAH, vol. 21 (1980), pp. 11-15; 
T. Maggs, 'The Iron Age south of the Zambezi', in 
R.G. Klein, ed., Southern African Prehistory and Paleo-
environments, Rotterdam & Boston, 1984, pp. 354-60; 
T. Maggs, 'Iron Age settlement and SUbsistence patterns in 
the Tugela river basin, Natal', in M. Hall et al., eds., 
Frontiers: Southern African Archaeology Today, Cambridge 
Monographs in African Archaeology 10, Oxford, 1984, 
pp. 200-206; T. Maggs et al., 'Spatial parameters of Late 
Iron Age settlements in the upper Thukela valley', Annals 
of the Natal Museum, vol. 27 (1986), pp. 455-79. 
56. J. Denbow, 'A new look at the later prehistory of the 
Kalahari', JAH, vol. 27 (1986), pp. 3-28; T.N. Huffman, 
'Iron Age settlement patterns and the origins of class 
distinction in southern Africa', Advances in World 
Archaeology, vol. 5 (1986), pp. 291-338. 
period before, political groupings in the region were 
small in scale. 57 
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The other major source of evidence on the history of 
the region before the later 18th century is the body of 
documented accounts of journeys made through the region by 
parties of shipwreck survivors, and of visits made by 
traders. The evidence on the nature of political organ-
ization that can be gleaned from these accounts is meagre, 
but nevertheless illuminating. The first recorded journey 
through the area by a gro~p which included literate 
observers was made by the survivors of a Portuguese ship, 
the Sao Joao, which was wrecked near the mouth of the 
Mthamvuna river in 1552. 58 The party of Portuguese and 
slaves, which initially numbered about five hundred, 
struggled northward along the coast to Oelagoa Bay. There 
is very little in the record of their march by way of 
description of the societies through whose territories 
they passed. One clue as to the nature of local political 
organization is provided by the fact that early in its 
journey, possibly before it crossed the Thukela, the Port-
uguese party fought several skirmishes with groups of 
inhabitants. 59 That even in its debilitated state it was 
able to beat off opposition and push its way forward, 
suggests that the polities of the region were not of great 
57. Supporting evidence comes from archaeological research 
conducted in the region north of the Thukela: see M. Hall, 
Settlement Patterns in the Iron Age of Zululand: an 
Ecological Interpretation, cambridge Monographs in African 
Archaeology 5, Oxford, 1981. 
58. For bibliographic information on Portuguese accounts 
of the journey, see E. Axelson, Portuguese in South-East 
Africa 1488-1600, Cape Town, 1973, p. 207n. An English 
translation of one of these appears in G.M. Theal, ed., 
Records of South-Eastern Africa, vol. 1, Cape Town, 1964 
(repr. of 1st ed., London, 1898), pp. 128-49. On the site 
of the wreck, see T. Maggs, 'The Great Galleon Sao Joao: 
remains from a mid-sixteenth century wreck on the Natal 
South Coast', Annals of the Natal Museum, vol. 26 (1984), 
pp. 173-86. 
59. Theal, ed. Records of South-Eastern Africa, vol. 1, 
p. 137. 
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size or strength. This conclusion is supported by the 
acount of the journey made through the same region by the 
survivors of another shipwreck, that of the Sao Bento, in 
1554. 60 It also emerges clearly from this source that the 
economy of the region was based on the production of grain 
and livestock, and that 'village' organization was well-
established. 
Much more informative on political organization is the 
account written about the journey made by the survivors of 
the Santo Alberto in 1593. 61 After being shipwrecked at a 
point which, Bell-Cross argues in a well-researched essay, 
was a little way to the north of what is now East 
London,62 the Portuguese party followed an inland route on 
their walk northward. Recent commentators agree that it 
would have passed somewhere through East Griqualand and 
the Natal midlands. 63 South of the 'vchugel' or 'Uchugel' 
60. This account was written by Manuel Perestrglo, one of 
the survivors. For bibliographic information on the 
Portuguese versions of it, see Axelson, Portuguese in 
South-East Africa 1488-1600, p. 210n. An English 
translation of part of one of these versions appears in 
Theal, ed., Records of South-Eastern Africa, vol. 1, pp. 
218-85. On the site of the wreck of the Sao Bento at the 
mouth of the Msikaba river in what is now the northern 
Transkei, see C. Auret & T. Maggs, 'The Great Ship Sao 
Bento: remains from a mid-sixteenth century Portuguese 
wreck on the Pondoland coast', Annals of the Natal Musuem, 
vol. 25 (1982), pp. 1-39. 
61. This account was edited by Joao Lavanha, and published 
in Lisbon in 1597. ~nglish translations appear in 
C.R. Boxer, ed., The Tragic History of the Sea 1589-1622, 
Cambridge, 1959, pp. 107-86; and in G.M. Theal, ed., 
Records of South-Eastern Africa, vol. 2, Cape Town, 1964 
(repr. of 1st ed., London, 1898), pp. 283-346. On the 
circumstances in which Lavanha's account was produced, see 
Boxer, pp. 42-6. 
62. G. Bell-Cross, 'Portuguese shipwrecks and 
identification of their sites', in E. Axelson, ed., Dias 
and His Successors, Cape Town, 1988, pp. 59-60. 
63. R. Derricourt, 'Early European travellers in the 
Transkei and Ciskei', African Studies, vol. 35 (1976), 
pp. 283-4; Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa 1488-
1600, pp. 222-6; A.R. Willcox, Shipwreck and Survival on 
the South-East Coast of Africa, Winterton, Natal, 1984, 
pp. 22-3. 
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river, which is accepted by commentators to have been the 
Thukela, the party of more than two hundred proceeded for 
several weeks through a well-populated country where the 
agricultural economy was productive enough to enable it to 
purchase all the food it needed. (The party was fortunate 
to have made its journey during the harvest season.) The 
inhabitants lived in small villages, and were ruled by 
chiefs whose territories were some two days' march across. 
The chiefs, several of whom are named in the account, had 
retinues of up to a hundred armed men. Their authority 
extended as far as their being able to exercise control 
over trade between their adherents and the members of the 
Portuguese party. The existence of some degree of social 
hierarchy is attested by a reference to a group of 'young 
nobles'. Nowhere, though, is there any indication of the 
existence of a level of authority superordinate to that of 
the chiefs whom the Portuguese encountered. 64 
Later accounts add little to this general picture of 
political organization as it was in the later 16th 
century. The survivors of the Sao Joao Baptista, wrecked 
in 1622, possibly near the mouth of the Bushman's river in 
the eastern Cape, reported on the importance of what would 
now be called ideologies of kinship and descent among the 
inhabitants of what were probably the coastlands of 
Natal. 65 The survivors of the Stavenisse, some of whom 
64. Boxer, ed., Tragic History, pp. 148-62. 
65. The experiences of the party were recorded in a first-
hand account written by Francisco d'Almada and published 
in 1625. For bibliographic information on this account, 
see Boxer, ed., Tragic History, p. 48. English 
translations appear in Boxer, pp. 190-271, and in G.M. 
Theal, ed., Records of South-Eastern Africa, vol. 8, Cape 
Town, 1964 (repr. of 1st ed., London, 1902), pp. 71-137. 
The possible site of the wreck is discussed in Bell-Cross, 
'Portuguese shipwrecks', in Axelson, ed., Dias and His 
Successors, p. 63. There is a broad consensus among 
commentators on what part of d'Almada's account applies to 
the party's journey along the Natal coast: see E. Axelsen, 
Portuguese in South-East Africa 1600-1700, Johannesburg, 
1969, p. 199; Boxer, ed. Tragic History, pp. 238n, 241n; 
Derricourt, 'Early European travellers', African Studies, 
vol. 35 (1976), p. 285. For the comments on kinship and 
descent referred to, see Boxer, ed., Tragic History, 
p. 239. 
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spent a year living on the Natal coast in 1686-7, 
confirmed that the local inhabitants lived in well-
organized communities under the overall rule of chiefs. 66 
A captain Rogers, who traded several times at the Bay of 
Natal (later the site of Durban) at the end of the 17th 
century, wrote a brief description of the region in which 
he mentioned the existence of differences of wealth in 
cattle among the inhabitants, and the authority which male 
elders exercised over women and young men. 67 
Several other account of journeys made in Natal in the 
17th century and the first half of the 18th serve to 
confirm the points which emerge from the sources cited 
above. Overall, this body of documentation suggests that, 
for at least two hundred years before the mid-18th 
century, the typical polity in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region was the small-scale chiefdom. At least two levels 
of authority can be discerned, that of the chief and that 
of the homestead or 'village' head. The subordination of 
women to men,' and of younger people to older, is attested, 
as is a degree of social differentiation between 'nobles', 
66. D. Moodie, ed., The Record, or a Series of Official 
Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the 
Native Tribes of South Africa, Amsterdam & Cape Town, 1960 
(repr. of papers first published in Cape Town, 1838?-
1842?), part I, documents on wreck of Stavenisse, 
pp. 415-18, 419-20. 
67. Rogers's account was originally published in 
w. Dampier, ed., Voyages and Discoveries, vol. 2, London, 
1699. Slightly variant versions were reprinted in S. 
Bannister, Humane Policy; or Justice to the Aborigines of 
New Settlements, London, 1830, appendix; Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, pp. 56-9; and C. Graham Botha, ed., 
Collectanea, Cape Town, 1924, pp. 129-32. The last-
mentioned seems to be the most faithful to the original. 
J.D. Buttner's 'Korte beschrijving van terra de Natal', 
written in c.1716, and reprinted, together with an English 
translation, in G.S. Nienaber & R. Raven-Hart, eds., Johan 
Daniel Buttner: Accounts of the Cape/Natal/East Indies 
1716/1721, Cape Town, 1970, pp. 123-8, is nothing more 
than a translation of Rogers. 
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by which was presumably meant members of the chiefly 
house, and commoners. As in the oral traditions, there is 
no indication of the existence of sharply stratified and 
highly centralized polities in the region. 
The term 'chiefdom', however, does not by itself 
adequately capture the nature of the organizational forms 
in which political authority was exercised among the 
societies of the region. The word tends to convey the 
notion of a discrete political entity with a more or less 
stable membership subordinate to an independent and 
clearly located centre of power. A close reading of the 
traditions which surface in Olden Times suggests, though, 
that political authority was more diffuse, and political 
organization more fluid, than this meaning allows for. 
In many parts of the region were to be found clusters 
of chiefdoms whose chiefly houses were, at least as Bryant 
represents them, related by ties of kinship. Some of 
these clusters, for example those formed by the Bhele, 
Zizi and Wushe chiefdoms respectively, were headed by what 
Bryant calls a paramount chief. 68 Whether the authority 
associated with this office was real or merely nominal, 
Bryant does not indicate. Other clusters, such as that 
formed by the Dlamini chiefdoms, are not described by 
Bryant specifically as having had a paramount. The heads 
of the component chiefdoms, though, all claimed to trace 
their descent from a common ancestor, and recognized one 
of their number as g~nealogically senior to the rest. 69 
It may be that it was this type of figure whom Bryant had 
in mind when using the term 'paramount'. In a third 
category of clusters, it seems from Bryant's text, the 
chiefs could not always establish descent links with a 
68. On the Bhele, see OT, pp. 347, 354; on the Zizi, OT, 
pp. 353, 355; on the Wushe, OT, p. 374. 
69. On the Dlamini, see OT, pp. 364-8. 
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common ancestor, but nevertheless regarded themselves as 
genealogically related. 70 
There is not enough evidence in Bryant or elsewhere to 
indicate the particular circumstances in which clusters of 
these different kinds came to be formed, or whether they 
had any political significance. The possibility needs to 
be kept in mind, though, that some of them had originally 
been formed to protect or advance interests which the 
dominant groups in their component chiefdoms had in 
common, and that the claims made by the chiefs to be 
related might have been a product of the need to establish 
closer ideological links with one another in specific 
political circumstances rather than a reflection of 
genealogical reality. In this case these clusters would 
constitute another level of political organization, though 
one which acquired significance only under particular 
conditions and probably for comparatively limited periods 
of time. A central feature of the political process in 
clusters of this sort would have been that authority would 
constantly have been contested, in ways subtle and 
unsubtle, between the paramount and his largely autonomous 
subordinate chiefs. The degree of power exercised from the 
centre by the paramount, never very great, would have 
fluctuated widely over time. 
A well-recognized feature of the political organization 
of the chiefdoms of the Natal-Zululand region as it is 
thought to have been before the widespread emergence of 
more centralized polities, or states, in the later 18th 
century was the propensity for sections of these chiefdoms 
to hive off and set up as independent chiefdoms, or else 
give their allegiance to another chief. 71 Less well-
70. In this category were, for example, the clusters 
formed by the Nxamalala, Zondi and Mpumuza (OT, pp. 520-
23), by the Hlongwa, Maphumulo and related chiefdoms (OT, 
pp. 524-33), and by the Nyamvini, Dunge and Bombo (OT, 
pp. 548-52). 
71. Gluckman, 'The kingdom of the Zulu', in Fortes & 
Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems, p. 25; 
M. Gluckman, 'The rise of a Zulu empire', Scientific 
American, no. 202 (April 1960), pp. 160-1; Omer-Cooper, 
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recognized for this period is the converse process, that 
by which chiefdoms incorporated groups of outsiders which 
came to give their allegiance. That the former process 
has received more attention in the anthropological and 
historical literature than the latter in part reflects the 
nature of the oral record, particularly as found in 
Bryant's Olden Times, which gives much more attention in 
the 'pre-Shakan' period to cases of fissioning than to 
cases of incorporation. 72 
This asymmetry, in turn, is partly the product of 
Bryant's concern to elaborate in detail the theory that 
the Natal-Zululand region had been populated through a 
process of group migration and fissioning. But it is also 
in part a reflection of the inherently ideological nature 
of the traditions themselves. New political entities 
which were formed in the process of hiving off had a 
vested interest in maintaining the collective memory of 
how they had originally come into being. By contrast, in 
the pre-state period, when incorporation very often took 
place through the voluntary tendering of allegiance, as 
distinct from processes of conquest, both the dominant 
group and the incorporated groups had a vested interest in 
establishing ideological links with one another,73 and 
Zulu Aftermath, pp. 19-20. 
72. On cases of hiving off which took place, it seems, 
before the early 19th century, see Bryant, OT, pp. 256, 
346, 356, 363-4, 365, 368, 374, 510, 524, 527-9, 531-2, 
534, 548, 549, 550, 552; also JSA, vol. 1, evidence of 
Dabula, p. 88; vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 98; vol. 2, 
evidence of Mahaya, pp. 111, 116, 119, 120-1, 126, 131, 
132, 134; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 277. 
On cases of incorporation, see Bryant, OT, pp. 347, 
490, 511, 521, 525, 550; also JSA, vol. 2, evidence of 
Mabhonsa, p. 11; vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, pp. 112, 120, 
129, 130; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 278. 
73. Detailed empirical evidence in support of this point 
is presented in detail in Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 112-15, 155-61. See also pp. 33-4, 35-6 
below. 
thus with suppressing the memory that the latter had 
previously given their allegiance elsewhere. 
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There is not enough evidence in the sources to allow 
patterns of political conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region to be traced before the later 18th century. The 
region's political history becomes visible only from the 
beginning of the period covered by the testimony from 
recorded oral traditions. The available sources indicate 
that in the later 18th century the main forces making for 
change south of the Thukela were emanating from an 
increase in political conflict in the territories to the 
north of the river. The next section of the chapter turns 
to an examination of those forces and of their origins. 
3. Political centralization and expansion north of the 
Thukela 
Evidence from the traditions suggests that until the later 
18th century the Thukela river did not constitute a 
significant social or political boundary. North of the 
river, the pattern of social and political relationships 
was similar to that described above for the region to the 
south of it. But in about the third quarter of the 
century, it seems that a decisive shift towards new 
patterns of relationships began to take place in a region 
which extended from the Thukela northwards to Delagoa Bay 
and beyond. 74 As synthesized in several recent studies, 
the evidence indicates that at a number of different 
locations in these territories the ruling groups of 
certain chiefdoms began to expand both the scope and the 
geographical span of the political authority which they 
exercised. East of the Maputo river, in what is now 
southern Mozambique, the Mabhudu chiefdom was gradually 
separating from the Thembe paramountcy which had hitherto 
74. The passages which follow draw on Wright & Hamilton, 
'Olden Times and beyond', unpubl. paper, pp. 17-21; and 
Wright & Hamilton, 'Traditions and transformations', in 
Duminy & Guest, eds., Natal and Zululand, pp. 59-66. 
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dominated the region south of Delagoa Bay.75 To the 
south-west, the intrusive Dlamini were taking control of 
what is now southern Swaziland. 76 Across the Phongolo to 
the south, the region round Magudu was becoming the focal 
point of an expanding chiefdom dominated by the Ndwandwe, 
who, like the Dlamini, seem to have migrated from the area 
near Delagoa Bay.77 still further south, between the 
lower Mfolozi and Mhlathuze rivers, the Mthethwa chiefdom 
was rising to prominence. 78 
The causes of this process of expansion have in recent 
years been the subject of debate among historians. In 
place of Bryant's 'great man' theory of change, several 
alternative hypotheses have emerged. One is the idea that 
the growth of these chiefdoms was a product of intensified 
conflict over resources consequent on the growth of the 
region's human population. This idea was first 
articulated by Gluckman, and uncritically adopted and 
popularized by Omer-Cooper in his influential The Zulu 
Aftermath. 79 But, as other commentators have pointed out, 
there is no firm evidence on which demographic 
explanations of this nature can be based,80 and the 
75. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 134-41. 
76. P. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires: the 
Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi 
state, Johannesburg, 1983, pp. 9-12. 
77. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 155-8; Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, 
pp. 10-11; P. Bonner, 'Early state formation among the 
Nguni: the relevance of the Swazi case', unpubl. paper, 
University of London, 1978, pp. 6-10. 
78. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 178-83; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 110-19. 
79. Gluckman, 'The kingdom of the Zulu', in Fortes & 
Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems, p. 25; 
and 'Analysis of a social situation', part B, Bantu 
Studies, vol. 14 (1940), pp. 148-51; Omer-Cooper, Zulu 
Aftermath, pp. 25, 27. 
80. Thompson, 'Co-operation and conflict', in wilson & 
Thompson, eds., Oxford History of S.A., vol. 1, p. 341; 
J.J. Guy, 'Ecological factors in the rise of Shaka and the 
Zulu kingdom', in S. Marks & A. Atmore. eds., Economy and 
Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, London, 1980, 
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argument remains speculative. A variation of it, which 
has been argued in its most sophisticated form by Jeff 
Guy, sees the causes of intensified conflict over 
resources as lying not so much in an increase of 
population as in a decline in the productivity of grazing 
and agricultural land resulting from centuries of 
unscientific farming practices. 81 In opposition to this 
line of thinking, Martin Hall has argued on the basis of 
his archaeological researches that there is no evidence 
that the natural environment in the region would have been 
subject to ecological strains of the kind postulated by 
Guy.82 In any case, like the 'demographic' argument, the 
'environmental' argument is not based on firm evidence, 
and cannot by itself explain why conflict over resources 
should have begun when and where it did, nor why it should 
have produced the particular political effects that it 
did. 
This is not to argue that no thought need be given to 
the social and political implications of processes such as 
the spread, possibly in the 18th century, of maize 
production in south-east Africa,83 or to the impact of 
environmental factors such as the changes in patterns of 
climate in the region postulated by Hall for the later 
pp. 112-13; D.S. Chanaiwa, 'The Zulu revolution: state 
formation in a pastoralist society', African Studies 
Review, vol. 23 (1980), p. 5. 
81.< Guy, 'Ecological factors', in Marks & Atmore, eds., 
Economy and Society, pp. 102-18. See also J. Gump, 
'Revitalization through expansion in southern Africa, 
c.1750-1840: a reappraisal of the "mfecane"', unpubl. 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Nebraska, 1980, chs. 1-3. 
82. Hall, Settlement Patterns, chs. 5-9, esp. pp. 177-8. 
83. See S. Marks, 'The rise of the Zulu kingdom', in 
R. Oliver, ed., The Middle Age of African History, London, 
1967, pp. 86-7; M. Hall, 'Dendroclimatology, rainfall and 
human adaptation in the later Iron Age of Natal and 
Zululand', Annals of Natal Museum, vol. 22 (1976), 
pp. 701-2. 
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18th and early 19th centuries. 84 It is, though, to insist 
that historians need to avoid determinist explanations 
about the historical effects of forces of this kind by 
foregrounding the specific social and political contexts 
within which they were played out. 
The most persuasive arguments so far put forward to 
explain the political changes which were taking place 
north of the Thukela in the later 18th century are based 
on the hypothesis that the initial dynamic, at least, was 
provided by the impact of international trade. That the 
effects of this commerce could in particular circumstances 
precipitate political conflict which led certain chiefdoms 
to extend their domination over neighbouring polities is 
well attested in the literature on the history of pre-
colonial Africa. 85 Several studies indicate that at 
Delagoa Bay, as at other points on the coast of south-east 
Africa, a spasmodic trade in ivory had been conducted by 
visiting European merchants, mainly Portuguese, from the 
mid-16th to the early 18th century. Though it had a 
marked impact on the politics of the region round the bay, 
it was too intermittent and too small in scale to have any 
lasting effect on chiefdoms further afield. From the mid-
18th century onward, however, the ivory trade expanded 
over a period of perhaps thirty years to attain an 
84. Hall, 'Dendroclimatology', Annals of Natal Museum, 
vol. 22 (1976), pp. 693-703. 
85. See C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Research on an African 
mode of production', in M. Klein & G.W. Johnson, eds., 
Perspectives on the African Past, Boston, 1972, pp. 33-51; 
and 'The political economy of the African peasantry and 
modes of production', in P.C.W. Gutkind & I. Wallerstein, 
eds., The Political Economy of contemporary Africa, 
Beverly Hills, 1976, ch. 3; R. Gray & D. Birmingham, eds., 
Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and 
Eastern Africa before 1900, London, 1970, esp. pp. 15-22; 
E. Terray, 'Long-distance exchange and the formation of 
the state: the case of the Abron kingdom of Gyaman', 
Economy and Society, vol. 3 (1974), pp. 315-45; M. Mason, 
'Production, penetration and political formation: the Bida 
state, 1857-1901', in D. Crummey & C.C. Stewart, eds., 
Modes of Production in Africa: the Precolonial Era, 
Beverly Hills, 1981, ch. 8. 
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unprecedented volume. This development co-incided closely 
in time with the process of political expansion, as 
outlined above, which took place in the territories to the 
south. 
Over the last twenty years a number of writers have 
sought to establish connections between the growth of 
trade at Delagoa Bay and the contemporaneous expansion of 
certain chiefdoms in the bay's hinterland. The pioneering 
studies in this field were produced by Alan Smith. 86 His 
suggestion was that the growth of conflict between the 
chiefdoms of the region may have been underlain by the 
marked increase which took place in the trading of ivory 
at the bay to European and Indian merchants in the second 
half of the 18th century. In this view, the growth of 
trade led to increased rivalry between chiefs for control 
of trade routes and for resources, with competition 
between them spilling over into a spiral of violence which 
eventually ended with the emergence of a single dominant 
power in the· region. Slater took this argument a 
significant step further when he made the point that the 
expansion of external trade would also have provided an 
incentive for the rulers of African chiefdoms to seek to 
reorganize relations of production within their polities 
in a direction which gave them more control over the 
production of trade goods. This would have led to an 
increase in internal political conflict. 87 
Hedges's contribution to the debate was to put these 
arguments into a firmer historical context. 88 He saw the 
Delagoa Bay trade in the later 18th century as falling 
86. Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies', ch. 8: 'Delagoa Bay and the trade of 
south-east Africa', in Gray & Birmingham, eds., Pre-
Colonial African Trade, ch. 13: 'The struggle for control 
of southern Mocambique, 1720-1835', unpubl Ph.D. thesis, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1970, chs. 5, 6. 
87. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, ch. 9. 
88. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
chs. 3, 6. 
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into two distinct phases. The first, lasting from the 
1750s to about 1790, was marked by the growth of the trade 
in ivory, most of it apparently produced in the regions 
south of the bay. This period saw the beginnings both of 
political centralization and of territorial expansion on 
the part of certain of the chiefdoms in the territories to 
the south well beyond the vicinity of the bay. The main 
agencies in both processes were the men's amabutho (sing. 
ibutho) organized and controlled by the ruling chiefs. 
Originally functioning as young men's circumcision sets, 
the amabutho were gradually allocated more and more tasks 
in the sphere of production for the chiefs, particularly 
in hunting ivory. Over time they also took on more and 
more military and police functions. 
In the second phase, the ivory trade went into decline, 
but was replaced by a trade in cattle, as, in the late 
1780s and 1790s, Delagoa Bay increasingly became a 
provisioning base for American and British whalers. The 
region about Delagoa Bay is not good cattle country, and 
within a short while the trading chiefdoms at the bay 
would have been importing cattle from the ecologically 
more favoured regions to the south. The switch from 
exports of ivory to those of cattle had far-reaching 
social and political effects. Where ivory was a 'luxury' 
item whose production and exchange involved relatively few 
people, cattle by contrast played a pivotal role in the 
life of every househ9ld. Exports of cattle therefore 
constituted a potentially serious drain of socially 
necessary resources. 
The development of the export trade would therefore 
have been accompanied by the growth of strong incentives 
for chiefdoms engaged in it to seek to replace exported 
livestock by using their increasingly militarized amabutho 
to raid other chiefdoms. Cattle raiding had no doubt been 
frequent in these societies before this time, but from the 
1790s it may well have begun to increase in frequency and 
scale. As the importance of cattle as export commodities 
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increased, so raids began to turn into wars of territorial 
conquest aimed at bringing regions of good grazing under 
the permanent control of chiefdoms involved in the trade. 
The overall political consequence was a marked increase in 
violent conflict between the chiefdoms of these 
territories, and a strengthening of the forces which were 
making for the emergence of larger and more centralized 
chiefdoms. 
Hedges's argument is often thin on empirical detail, 
but it is nevertheless the first to have been put forward 
which explains the processes of political change which 
were taking place in the Delagoa Bay-Thukela region in the 
later 18th century in historical rather than evolutionist 
or determinist terms. Bonner draws on some of the notions 
advanced by Hedges to argue that the Delagoa Bay trade was 
an important factor in the events which led to the 
expansion of the Dlamini chiefdom. 89 Delius has suggested 
that this trade may also have played a role in stimulating 
the extension of Maroteng domination over the chiefdoms of 
what became the Pedi polity of the eastern Transvaal. 90 
More recently, Cobbing has criticized Hedges for entirely 
failing to consider the evidence that there may have been 
a significant trade in slaves at Delagoa Bay by the later 
18th century,91 but his points do not affect the overall 
thrust of the 'trade' hypothesis: if anything, they serve 
to strengthen it. Unlike the arguments based on notions 
of population pressur,e or of environmental crisis, this 
hypothesis is historically rooted: that is, it is able to 
explain why the processes of political centralization and 
expansion described above should have begun in the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland rather than anywhere else in south-eastern 
89. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, 
pp. 20-3. 
90. P. Delius, The Land Belongs to Us: the Pedi Polity. 
the Boers and the British in the Nineteenth-Century 
Transvaal, Johannesburg, 1983, pp. 13-19. 
91. J. Cobbing, 'The myth of the mfecane', unpubl. paper, 
University of Durban-Westville, 1987, pp. 17-18. 
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Africa, and in the later 18th century rather than at any 
other time. 
Documentary evidence supports the notion that the 
expansion of the Mabhudu chiefdom in the later 18th 
century was linked to its control of trade routes which 
led southwards from Delagoa Bay.92 Though no direct 
evidence survives to indicate that the emerging states 
further south, like those of the Dlamini, Ndwandwe and 
Mthethwa, were trading to Delagoa Bay at this time, by the 
early 19th century the Mthethwa were certainly doing so 
(see pp. 157, 160, 178 below). So, less certainly, were 
the Ndwandwe (see p. 158 below), and it is probable that 
in both cases direct or indirect commercial links with the 
bay dated back several decades earlier. Centrally 
controlled amabutho existed in both the Mabhudu and 
Mthethwa polities by at least the later 18th century, and 
in the Dlamini and Ndwandwe polities by at least the early 
19th. 93 If the development of this institution can be 
taken as an index of the increasing capacity of ruling 
groups to extract tribute in the form of labour-power from 
subordinate groups, then it seems that in the case of 
these chiefdoms external expansion was accompanied by 
significant internal social and political reorganization. 
Linked to the centralization of the amabutho system and 
the concomitant growth in the coercive power of 
politically dominant groups in all these chiefdoms was 
very probably the development of more pronounced social 
92. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 141-3. 
93. On the Mabhudu amabutho see Hedges, 'Trade and 
politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 153-4: JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Mahungane & Nkomuza, p. 147. On those of the 
Mthethwa see Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 116-19. On those of the Dlamini see Bonner, Kings. 
Commoners and Concessionaires, p. 24: JSA, vol. 1, 
evidence of Giba, pp. 152-3: Bryant, ~, p. 317. On those 
of the Ndwandwe see JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 
186: vol. 1, evidence of Luzipho, p. 354: vol. 2, evidence 
of Madlebe, p. 45: vol. 3, evidence of Mkhando, p. 146: 
vol.3, evidence of Mmemi, pp. 270, 271. 
34 
stratification, and of the power of rulers to extract 
other forms of tribute from their adherents. The evidence 
for this is clearest in the case of the Mthethwa chiefdom. 
Hamilton's close study of the traditions of groups which 
were subordinated by the Mthethwa reveals that, in the 
early stages of the chiefdom's expansion, newly subject 
communities were incorporated into it through manipulation 
of their traditions of origin in a way which enabled them 
to claim to be kinsfolk of the ruling house. By the end 
of the 18th century, however, newly subjected groups were 
being prevented from making such claims, and were coming 
to form a stratum within the Mthethwa polity which was 
politically and socially quite distinct from, and 
subordinate to, the core of groups linked to the ruling 
house. 94 A similar pattern can be discerned in the 
development, as analyzed by Bonner, of the Dlamini 
chiefdom. 95 Though there is very little evidence on the 
subject, this pattern is likely to have been a feature of 
the expansion of chiefdoms like those of the Ndwandwe and 
Mabhudu as well. 
These developments reflected the expansion of a cluster 
of budding states which were much larger and more powerful 
than the polities which had previously existed in the 
region. While the expansion of these states, and the 
sharpening of conflict between them, are subjects which 
have received much attention from historians, very little 
has been written on the question of what impact their 
emergence had on the polities on their peripheries. It is 
suggested here that one effect was to stimulate political 
expansion among the chiefdoms in the regions to the south 
and west, along the line of the Thukela and Mzinyathi 
rivers. This development was not so much a response to 
the growth of the Delagoa Bay trade as an essentially 
defensive reaction to the expansion of the trading states 
94. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 112-31. 
95. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, 
pp. 24-37. 
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to the north. This difference was reflected in the 
relative looseness of their political structures and in 
the existence of a less clearly defined distinction 
between dominant and subordinate groups. Among the 
polities in this category were those of the Qwabe, Ngcobo, 
Mkbize, Chunu and Hlubi. 
Hedges has argued that the Qwabe chiefdom was already 
expanding southwards from the Mhlathuze in the first half 
of the 18th century;96 if so, the process seems to have 
been further promoted after the middle of the century by 
the rise of the Mthethwa power on the Qwabe northern 
borders. By the end of the century, if not before, the 
Qwabe dominated the region between the lower Mhlathuze and 
the lower Thukela. There is some evidence that Khondlo, 
who ruled the Qwabe in the late 18th and first few years 
of the 19th century, formed amabutho: 97 this suggests that 
political centralization in his chiefdom was to some 
extent proceeding along the same lines as in polities like 
those of the· Mthethwa, Mabhudu and Dlamini. However, 
Hamilton's researches indicate that historical 
circumstances operated to set a limit to the degree of 
power which the Qwaba ruling house sought to exercise over 
subordinate groups. Unlike the rulers of the expanding 
Mthethwa and Dlamini polities, she argues, the dominant 
group among the Qwabe had a direct interest in closely 
assimilating the groups which it subordinated. This was 
because its prime concern was not so much to extract 
tribute from them as to obtain their co-operation in 
defence against the 'increasingly militarized and 
predatory trading states' to the north. Where the core 
groups in the Mthethwa and Dlamini chiefdoms were 
concerned to prevent subordinate groups from claiming 
kinship links with them, the Qwabe rulers were concerned 
96. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 169-73. 
97. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Khambi, p. 210; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mmemi, pp. 252, 254, 260; Bryant, OT, p. 185. 
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to incorporate subordinate groups by allowing them to 
claim such links. The practical effect was that the Qwabe 
chiefs did not exercise the same degree of power over 
their adherents as did the rulers of the more northerly 
chiefdoms. 98 In contrast to these aggressively expanding 
polities, the Qwabe chiefdom remained a loose defensive 
coalition of groups which recognized the genealogical and 
ritual seniority of the ruling house but which retained a 
good deal of autonomy from it. The chiefdom as a whole 
was held together more by outside pressures than by the 
coercive capacities of its rulers. 
On the western borders of the Qwabe chiefdom, about the 
Mamba and lower Nsuze rivers, another polity of the same 
kind seems to have been emerging in the later 18th 
century. This was the Ngcobo chiefdom, with the Nyuswa as 
the senior group. Bryant's synthesis of the traditions of 
origin of the various Ngcobo sections is highly confusing, 
but it indicates that their polity was even more loosely 
knitted together than that of the Qwabe. 99 It too 
probably came into being in response to the expansion of 
the Mthethwa and other chiefdoms to the north. 
Further up the Nsuze river were the Mkhize and Chunu 
chiefdoms, which may also have been engaged in expanding 
at this time. According to one of James stuart's 
informants, Mbokodo kaSikhulekile, the Mkhize chief, 
Gcwabe, who ruled in the later 18th century, formed four 
amabutho. 100 In his,praises as given by Mbokodo he is 
remembered as a fighter who attacked other chiefs. 101 
Mbokodo was himself a descendant of Gcwabe's,102 and 
possibly prone to exaggerating the extent of Mkhize power 
in his time, but his evidence is consistent with 
98. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 155-61. 
99. Bryant, OT, pp. 479-97. 
100. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, p. 15. 
101. James stuart Collection (JSC), file 58, nbk. 23, 
pp. 30-31. 
102. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, p. 1. 
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indications in other sources that in the early 19th 
century, during the reign of Gcwabe's son and successor, 
Zihlandlo, the Mkhize chiefdom was expanding at the 
expense of its neighbours (see pp. 168-70 below). The 
evidence that the neighbouring Chunu were also expanding 
at this time is less clear. Macingwane, chief of the 
Chunu in the early 19th century, is said to have had five 
amabutho and eight chiefly imizi, or homesteads. 103 He 
apparently exercised authority over a number of Chunu sub-
groups, and defeated several neighbouring chiefdoms in the 
course of his reign. 104 On the basis of this evidence 
Hamilton has argued that in the early 19th century the 
Chunu chiefdom was 'large and politically diverse,:105 
the likelihood is that it was already expanding in the 
later 18th century. 
The evidence that the Hlubi chiefdom, whose core 
territory lay about the upper Mzinyathi river, was also 
extending the area under its control at this time is 
somewhat firmer. 106 According to a set of praises 
published by Henry Ndawo, Nsele, the chief who ruled the 
Hlubi in the later 18th century, was remembered as a 
conqueror of other chiefs. 107 In either his reign or that 
of his successor, Bhungane, the Hlubi ruling house, the 
Hadebe, extended its domination over most of the upper 
Mzinyathi basin. According to Mabhonsa kaSidlayi, another 
of stuart's informants, Nsele was buried near what is now 
Alcockspruit. Bhungane's chief homestead was in the same 
area, while that of his chief son, Mthimkhulu, was near 
Utrecht, and that of Mpangazitha, the chief son in 
103. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Magidigidi, p. 86. 
104. Fuze, The Black People, pp. 52, 53. 
105. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 258. 
106. For a recent survey of the evidence see Wright & 
Manson, Hlubi Chiefdom, pp. 3-10. 
107. H.M. Ndawo, Izibongo Zenkosi zama-Hlubi nezama-Baca, 
Mariannhill, 1928, p. 9. 
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Bhungane's left-hand house, was near Newcastle. 108 A 
section of the Hadebe was established in the far north of 
the Hlubi teritory near Majuba mountain, and another in 
the west under the Drakensberg. 109 Two others, the Gumbi 
section under Mkhungela kaPhisholo, and the Madakane 
section under Ntanzi, were situated near the Ncome river 
in the chiefdom's eastern borderlands. 110 On its north-
eastern border, near what is now Vryheid, were the Zwana 
people under Hawane. 111 
The picture given by Mabhonsa is of a polity in which 
Bhungane maintained Hadebe domination of the upper 
Mzinyathi region by placing sections of the chiefly house, 
each under one of his male relatives, at strategic 
locations in the territories over which he claimed 
suzerainty. Though the chiefdom which he ruled was 
relatively large in area, the authority which he exercised 
remained ritual and managerial rather tha·n coercive. 
Mabhonsa states specifically that Bhungane did not form 
any amabutho~ He did, though, have a special knowledge of 
the medicines of chiefship and a wide reputation as a 
rainmaker. 112 Annually, at the beginning of the 
harvesting season, he"held an umkhosi ceremony at which 
the chiefs who recognized his authority formally received 
permission to start harvesting their new crops.113 
Overall, the Hlubi polity at this time seems to have been 
a loose agglomeration of partly autonomous groups more 
like the Qwabe chiefdom than the relatively centralized 
and stratified Mthethwa chiefdom. Though it has sometimes 
----------------
108. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, pp. 13, 16, 21, 
28. 
109. Ibid. , p. 24. 
110. Ibid. , pp. 16, 19. 
11l. Ibid. , pp. 18, 25, 27. 
112. Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 14, 21, 22. See also W. von 
Fintel, 'Traditions and history of the Amahlubi tribe', 
Native Teachers' Journal, vol. 11 (1932), p. 231. 
113. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, p. 21. 
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been characterized as an important 'trading state',114 it 
is unlikely to have been such in Bhungane's time. As far 
as the evidence goes, it did not reveal the structures 
typical of the trading states of the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland. Nor did it have the resources of ivory which 
seem to have been important in the emergence of polities 
like those of the Mabhudu and the Mthethwa: as indicated 
by Mabhonsa, the open grasslands of the upper Mzinyathi 
basin would not have been good elephant country.11S Like 
the Qwabe chiefdom and others in the lower Thukela-
Mzinyathi region, the expansion of the Hlubi polity is 
likely to have been a response more to political 
developments in the territories towards Delagoa Bay than 
to the penetration of new forms of long-distance trade. 
The relatively rapid expansion of several chiefdoms in 
a nearly unbroken rank from the mouth of the Thukela to 
the sources of the Mzinyathi is likely to have had 
widespread political effects among the chiefdoms to the 
south and west. Unfortunately for the historian, there is 
no evidence which enables developments in the interior 
regions of what is now Natal to be assessed. There is 
clear evidence, however, that the emergence of large 
chiefdoms north of the lower Thukela was directly 
instrumental in setting in train far-reaching political 
transformations in the coastlands south of the river. In 
the later 18th century, first the Thuli and then the Cele 
migrated southward aqross the Thukela and, in place of the 
numerous small chiefdoms which had previously occupied the 
area, proceeded to establish two large paramountcies which 
dominated the coastal region to the Mzimkhulu and beyond. 
The emergence of these polities forms the subject of the 
next section of the chapter. 
114. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 191. 
115. JSA, vol. 2, p. 30. 
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4. Intrusions into the coastlands south of the Thukela 
Recorded traditions indicate that, immediately prior to 
its removal to the south, the Thuli chiefdom had been 
located at the sources of the Matikhulu river. From this 
region, according to both Thuli and Qwabe traditions, it 
was pushed across the Thukela by the Qwabe. 116 On the 
basis of evidence given to him by Maziyana kaMahlabeni, 
stuart calculated that this event had taken place in 
perhaps 1750. 117 without giving his sources, Bryant dated 
it to somewhere about 1760. 118 Maziyana states 
categorically in his testimony that the Thuli migration 
took place when the senior section of the Thuli was ruled 
by Myebu, and the subsidiary amaZuba section by Dole. 119 
Evidence from Maziyana and from Mcothoyi kaMnini indicates 
that Myebu reigned one generation before his son, Ntaba, 
who was killed in the time of the Zulu king, Shaka. 120 As 
is well known, the latter had been reigning for some years 
before 1824, when literate British observers first visited 
his kingdom. Both Myebu and Ntaba had long reigns, 
according to Maziyana,121 but is seems unlikely that Myebu 
would have been rUling as early as 1750. As for Dole, 
both Maziyana and Mcothoyi indicate that he ruled two 
generations before his grandson Mabona (or Manti), who 
died not long before Ntaba did. 122 
The best that can be said about the dating of the Thuli 
migration is that it probably took place some time towards 
116. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 282, 300; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, pp. 30, 33, 41; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 53, 58; Bryant, OT, p. 499. 
117. JSA, vol. 2, p. 301. 
118. OT, p. 499. 
119. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 275, 282, 300. 
120. Ibid., evidence of Maziyana, pp. 265, 283; JSA, 
vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 53, 59. 
121. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 282. 
122. Ibid., pp. 265, 285, 293; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of 
Mcothoyi, p. 60. 
41 
the end of the third quarter or beginning of the last 
quarter of the 18th century. At this time, according to 
Hedges's reading of Qwabe traditions, the latter were 
actively expanding from the Mhlathuze lowlands southward 
and westward along the Ngoye range towards the upper 
Matikhulu river. 123 It is highly likely, then, that the 
growth of the Qwabe chiefdom was the prime factor in 
sending the Thuli migrating across the Thukela. 
But explanation of the Thuli move cannot simply be 
attributed to pressures exerted by the Qwabe. statements 
that a stronger group 'drove out' a weaker are very common 
in traditions which bear on the history of the Thukela-
Mzimkhulu region in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. Historians are to apt to treat such statements 
unproblematically, and to assume that they mean either 
that the weaker group was physically ejected from its 
territory, or at the very least that it had no option but 
to move off. This perspective tends to cast the weaker 
group simply as the victim of superior force: it fails to 
consider that political submission was very often a 
feasible option to migration, and, concomitantly, that 
migration was very often the consequence of a deliberate 
decision on the part of leaders of the weaker group rather 
than simply the automatic consequence of defeat in war. 
There is nothing in the recorded traditions to suggest 
that there was any actual fighting between the Qwabe and 
Thuli, and, as far as the evidence goes, it indicates that 
the Thuli moved not as a group of refugees but as a 
cohesive political entity. The people remained under 
their established chiefs, and according to Mcothoyi, 
remained in possession of their cattle. 124 The 
implication is that they left their territory on the 
Matikhulu not so much because they were 'driven out' by 
the Qwabe as because their leaders felt that removal was a 
123. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 172-5. 
124. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 58. 
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preferable alternative to submission to the Qwabe chief. 
In support of this interpretation is the absence of any 
evidence to the effect that the Qwabe ruling house was 
concerned to drive out any of the other groups in the 
territories which it was then bringing under its 
domination. If anything, as Hamilton has argued, far from 
wanting to exclude subordinated groups from the Qwabe body 
politic, the ruling house was at this time seeking to 
incorporate them into it so as to strengthen the chiefdom 
against the powerful states to the north. 125 
Why the Thuli leaders chose to remove the chiefdom 
rather than remaining in situ and submitting to the Qwabe 
is a more difficult question to answer. Removal was in 
many ways a drastic step to take. It entailed the 
abandonment of a known resource-base, the disruption and 
perhaps the severing of marriage and trade links with 
neighbouring chiefdoms, and the desertion of the graves of 
the ancestors, which were sites where socially and 
politically important rituals were conducted. It also 
involved the potentially hazardous exercise of having to 
contest occupation of new territories with the established 
inhabitants. There is no evidence which allows the 
factors which were weighed up by the Thuli leaders in 
reaching their decision to migrate to be identified with 
any precision. Important among them, though, must have 
been the perception that the Thuli chiefdom was 
politically and militarily stronger than any of the 
chiefdoms which lay to the south across the Thukela. In 
chosing to move away in this direction, they were 
following the line of least resistance. To the north and 
east were the Qwabe, to the west was the expanding Ngcobo 
chiefdom, and, beyond it, the Mkhize and Chunu chiefdoms. 
To the south, by contrast, the way was barred by 
relatively small and weak polities. 
It is likely that the body of people which migrated 
under the overall leadership of the Thuli chiefly house 
125. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 161. 
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was numerically larger than that to be found in most of 
the chiefdoms across the Thukela, for with the Thuli went 
a number of other groups which seem to have recognized at 
least the nominal authority of their chiefs. The main 
ones were the amaMbili, who seem to have been related to 
the Thuli, and the amaKhomo. 126 Others were the 
amaKhwela, a section of the Cele, and possibly a section 
of the amaNdelu. 127 Whether these groups had previously 
been subordinate to the Thuli, or whether they made their 
submission at the time of the migration, is not indicated 
in the evidence. 
In the accounts of the Thuli migration which they gave 
to stuart, both Maziyana and Mcothoyi played up the 
leadership role of Dole, who was chief of a section of 
Thu1i genealogically junior to that headed by the senior 
chief, Myebu. In assessing the testimony of these 
informants it is important to bear in mind that Mcothoyi 
was himself a chief in a line descended from Dole, and 
that Maziyana, a man of the Nde1u people who was descended 
from Dole through his mother, was closely associated with 
Mcothoyi's section of Thu1i. 128 Though Dole tends to 
feature in their evidence as a chief more or less equal in 
status to Myebu, it is possible that this depiction is a 
126. On the Mbi1i see JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, 
p. 98; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 275, 281; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mbovu, pp. 30, 33, 41; vol. 3, evidence of 
Mcothoyi, pp. 54, 64~ On the amaKhomo see JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 275; vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, 
pp. 33, 41; vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 54, 64. 
127. On the Khwe1a see JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, 
pp. 33, 41. On the Ce1e see JSA, vol. 2, evidence of 
Maziyana, pp. 275, 300. On the Nde1u see JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 264. Bryant, OT, pp. 531-2, 
draws on a variant set of Nde1u traditions. 
128. For Mcothoyi's position in the Thu1i chiefly 
genealogy see JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 264, 
265, 283, 285, 286; vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 53, 
59, 60. On Maziyana's descent, see his evidence in JSA, 
vol. 2, pp. 285, 287. On his association with Mcothoyi's 
Thu1i see his evidence in JSA, vol. 2, pp. 264, 266; and 
Mcothoyi's evidence in JSA, vol. 3, pp. 61, 64. 
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reflection less of historical reality than of the 
particular biases of the informants. When Mcothoyi states 
of the migration over the Thukela, 'We Tulis all crossed 
over together,,129 it is probably safe to read this as 
meaning that the Thuli migrated as a united body under the 
leadership of the senior chief, Myebu. Moving as they 
presumably were into hostile territory, it would have been 
poor tactics for them to have done otherwise. 
Whatever the precise circumstances of their migration, 
the evidence indicates th~t the Thuli pushed across the 
Thukela not as refugees but as invaders. According to 
both Maziyana and Mcothoyi, the passage of the Thuli 
across the river was strongly resisted by the local 
peoples, and the Thuli leaders had to play a trick on 
their opponents in order to secure the crossing. 130 Even 
if this is a metaphor rather than a reference to an actual 
event that took place on the banks of the Thukela, it 
indicates that their passage was marked by violence. 'We 
must in some way have forced our way through,' Mcothoyi 
remarked to Stuart. 131 As the Thuli fought their way 
along, Maziyana stated, they stabbed their opponents at 
close quarters rather than throwing assegais at them as 
was the practice in more restrained forms of warfare. 132 
More than a hundred years after these events, the Thuli 
were still remembered by their own and other oral 
historians as ferocious fighters who had gone along 
impaling women and children on posts. 133 By these 
accounts they were hardly the 'exceptionally tame dogs' of 
129. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 54. 
130. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 282; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 64. 
131. JSA, vol. 3, p. 54. 
132. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 282. 
133. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 275, 282, 298; 
vol. 3, pp. 54, 84; also J.W. Colenso, Zulu-English 
Dictionary, 4th ed., Pietermaritzburg, 1905, p. 599, 
under 'Tshaba'. 
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Bryant's characterization. 134 This was drawn from the 
descriptions given of the Thuli in the 1820s by British 
traders who were deliberately exaggerating the destructive 
effects on Thuli society of Zulu raids a few years before 
(see below, pp. 291-2). 
Heading south along the coastal plain, the Thuli and 
their associates proceeded to subjugate the pre-existing 
polities in a region that extended from the Thukela 200 
kilometres southward to the Mzimkhulu. Maziyana's 
statements that the inhabitants of the region either fled 
or were driven out should not be taken too literally.135 
Thuli policy was very probably to destroy or drive out the 
ruling groups of the chiefdoms which they subordinated or 
which submitted to them, and no doubt numbers of 
individuals from these groups ended up, as Maziyana 
claims, as refugees in the Mpondo country south of the 
Mzimkhulu,136 as well as in polities in the interior. But 
it is unlikely that the mass of the population was 
expelled, for the Thuli would simply not have had the 
physical capacity to drive out large numbers of people, 
and were in any case probably much more concerned to 
incorporate them under their authority as tributaries. 
Given that a chiefdom's power depended very largely on the 
size of its population, there was every incentive for the 
Thuli leaders to leave established populations largely in 
situ once they had tendered their submission. 
Such evidence as exists suggests that this is precisely 
what they did. According to Maziyana, while some Khanyawo 
fled from the Thuli, others remained under their rule. 137 
Numbers of Thembu who lived near the bay of Port Natal 
khonza'd (gave allegiance) to the Thuli, and established 
good relations with Dole's section. 138 According to 
134. OT, p. 503. 
135. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 275, 276, 282. 
136. Ibid., pp. 274, 282. 
137. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 274, 276. 
138. Ibid., pp. 276, 277. 
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Theophilus Shepstone's informant, Funwayo, the Vangane, 
who lived near the Mzinto river, also became tributary to 
the Thuli. 139 Numbers of the groups which had inhabited 
the coastlands north of Port Natal still occupied the 
region when it came to be dominated by the Cele sometime 
after the advent of the Thuli (see below, pp. 52 ff.). 
For their own part, the Thuli proceeded to settle in 
the region about the lower Mngeni and Mlazi rivers near 
Port Natal bay. The senior section, headed by Myebu, 
established itself some thirty kilometres from the sea in 
the vicinity of what is now Pinetown. 140 Dole's section 
occupied what is now Durban Bluff and the area to the 
south of the bay, from which it had ejected the Mpofana 
people. 141 'The Tulis ... built where they fancied best,' 
Maziyana told stuart,142 and in the case of the senior 
section, at least, there were good ecological reasons for 
its leaders' choice of habitat. The region where Myebu's 
people settled would have straddled the belts of dry 
valley thornveld which run inland along the valleys of the 
Mngeni and Mlazi from within a few kilometres of the 
coast, and would have extended to the spur of well-watered 
higher ground between the two rivers which reaches an 
altitude of 600 to 700 metres near what is now Hillcrest. 
This region embraced a variety of cUltivation zones and of 
grazing types, and was well suited for an economy based on 
cereal production and livestock raising. In its broad 
139. Funwayo's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Vangane 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 141. On 
Shepstone's authorship of these notes, see the discussion 
on pp. 101 below. Funwayo is identified as his informant 
on Vangane history in T. Shepstone Papers (Natal 
Archives), vol. 89, p. 135. 
140. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 264, 275, 298; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 53-4. 
141. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 117-18; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 275; vol. 3, evidence of 
Mcothoyi, pp. 54, 56, 57. 
142. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 282. 
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features it was not dissimilar to the environment which 
the Thuli had occupied on the upper Matikhulu. 143 
The choice of habitat made by Dole's section contrasted 
strongly with that occupied by Myebu's group. It was well 
suited for cultivation, for it comprised the lands known 
as ifenya, 'wet or damp or moist country', as Mbovu 
kaMshumayeli told Stuart, 'lands where crops are easily 
grown,.144 But lying as it did within the belt of coastal 
forest, it would not have been particularly good cattle 
country. On the other hand, it gave access to the fishing 
grounds of the bay of Port Natal, which, according to 
Maziyana and Mcothoyi, had previously provided a good 
living for the Mpofana and Thembu. The Mpofana were 
remembered as having been eaters of fish which they caught 
with tidal traps made of reed fences in the rich fishing 
grounds on the southern and eastern sides of the bay.145 
The Thembu had fished the northern side, and had 
apparently had a trade in smoked fish with neighbouring 
groups. 146 Possibly because of the relative wealth which 
their access to good fishing resources gave them, the 
Mpofana had exercised political dominance in the region 
round the bay. 'They were the strongest tribe then 
existing here,' Maziyana told stuart,147 and it may well 
have been this same resource base which attracted Dole's 
Thuli to the region. Though, having lived inland, they 
had not previously had much knowledge of fish, once 
settled at the bay they quickly adopted the fishing 
practices of the Mpofana. 148 
143. Faculty of Agriculture, University of Natal, 'The 
agricultural regions of Natal', unpubl. student handout, 
n . d., pp • 1-3, 10 . 
144. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mbovu, p. 43. 
145. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 275; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 54, 56, 57. 
146. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 276. 
147. Ibid. , p. 278. 
148. vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 56, 57. 
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From their new base in the lower Mngeni-Mlazi region, 
the Thuli leaders set out to establish domination of the 
territories round about. Presumably to avoid encroaching 
too far towards the Qwabe chiefdom's sphere of influence 
to the north, the main direction of their expansion seems 
to have been southwards towards the Mkhomazi river. 
Within a short time, the chiefs of the two main Thuli 
sections were colonizing this area with homesteads headed 
by members of their own immediate families. Though the 
record does not say so, these homesteads no doubt 
functioned as centres from which Thuli control over the 
newly subordinated chiefdoms of the region could be 
maintained. Ntaba, Myebu's chief son, remained resident 
in the heartland of the new Thuli territory near pinetown, 
with the district under his authority said to have 
extended north to the Mngeni and twenty kilometres inland 
to the Ntshangwe (Inchanga) area. 149 Another son in 
Myebu's main house, Thusi, was established on the seaward 
side of Ntaba. 150 Others whose names survive in the 
record were Ndlebende, who settled north of the mouth of 
the Mngeni, Nguqe, who was on the Mlazi, Nongwadi, the 
chief son in the ikhohlo or left-hand house, further south 
at Mbumbulu, Ncwane (Mnciwane) at the Manzimtoti river, 
and Xoki (Cogi) at the Mkhomazi on the southern periphery 
of Thuli-dominated territory.151 
A similar, if less extensive, pattern of expansion was 
followed by Dole, chief of the coastal section of the 
Thuli. The direction of this group's expansion is not 
made clear in the record, but was presumably southwards 
from the bay of Port Natal along the coast, and inland as 
far as the lands dominated by the homesteads of the senior 
149. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 282, 298, 302~ 
vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 41~ Bryant, aT, p. 502. 
150. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 264, 298, 302~ 
Bryant, aT, p. 502. 
151. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 264, 281, 282, 
298~ Bryant, aT, pp. 502-3. 
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section. Maziyana names eight of Dole's sons as having 
formed separate establishments,152 although the localities 
where they settled cannot be precisely identified. 
To the west and south of the expanding core of Thuli 
settled the groups which had migrated with them. Inland 
of Myebu's section were the Khomo, who occupied the 
territory from what is now Camperdown southwards to the 
Mkhomazi. 153 South of the lower Mkhomazi, in a region 
which had already experienced the intrusion of a number of 
groups pushed out by, or moving away from, the Thuli,154 
were the Mbili. They seem to have been divided into 
several sections under autonomous or semi-autonomous 
chiefs. 155 Further south, near the lower Mzimkhulu, was 
the uGwayi group, sometimes referred to in the sources as 
the uShaba (uTshaba), which seems to have been an offshoot 
of the Mbili. 156 Driven out or subordinated by the Gwayi-
Shaba chiefdoms were groups like the imiThwana, the 
Ntshangase, and the amaCi. 157 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
Thuli exercised any authority over the Mbili and the 
Shaba: if they did, it was probably of brief duration. 
From the time of their settlement, to all intents and 
152. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 285, 299. 
153. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 275; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 54, 64. 
154. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, p. 129; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, pp. 275, 276, 278, 282. 
155. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 275, 281; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 64; Garden Papers (Natal 
Archives), list of 'Aboriginal tribes', p. 871. 
156. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 275; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mbovu, pp. 30-1; vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, 
p. 54; Garden Papers, list of 'Aboriginal tribes', 
p. 872. The designation uShaba (uTshaba) as used in the 
sources is confusing, as it is sometimes used to refer to 
the Thuli and associated groups generally: see JSA, 
vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, p. 116; vol. 3, evidence of 
Mcothoyi, p. 54; Garden Papers, list of 'Aboriginal 
tribes', pp. 862 ff. 
157. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, pp. 114, 116, 121, 
132; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 276, 278. 
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purposes, they constituted autonomous chiefdoms. So too, 
in effect, did the coastal section of Thuli under Dole and 
his successors. Stuart's informants, Maziyana and 
Mcothoyi, were quite explicit about this, and though, as 
descendants of Dole, they no doubt had an interest in 
playing down the degree of authority which had been 
exercised by the senior chief, Myebu, and his successor, 
Ntaba, over the Thuli as a whole, the evidence which they 
provide on the structures of the Thuli polity indicates 
clearly that this authority would have been little more 
than nominal. There was nothing in Thuli society 
resembling the amabutho system through which chiefs in a 
number of the expanding polities north of the Thukela 
sought to exercise a more centralized control over their 
subjects. Men were organized by amabandla or local 
assemblies. 158 Nor, apparently, did the senior house 
exercise the degree of ritual authority over junior 
sections which the Qwabe and Hlubi paramounts were able to 
do, for among the Thuli, according to Mcothoyi, there was 
no centralized umkhosi ceremony.159 In so far as the 
chiefs of the junior section formally acknowledged the 
genealogical seniority of the main house, they did so 
through their izinceku, or stewards, rather than in 
person. 160 'We heads of sections lived almost 
independently of the principal chief ... ', Mcothoyi stated, 
with reference to the Thuli chiefdom of the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries. 'We considered our chief was "far 
off" •.. ' .161 
The Thuli polity, then, as established in the Mngeni-
Mkhomazi region, was much more loosely structured than the 
expanding chiefdoms to the north. That it held together 
at all was a product less of the power wielded by the 
158. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 266, 292; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 65. 
159. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 65. 
160. Ibid. 
161. Ibid. 
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senior chief than of the need to maintain at least a 
minimum unity in the face of possible aggression on the 
part of chiefdoms like those of the Qwabe and the Ngcobo, 
and, later, the Cele. To what extent the weakness of the 
central authority was inherited from the pre-migration 
period is impossible to say, but it is clear from the 
evidence that whatever power the main house had at the 
time of the Thuli resettlement came to be seriously 
undermined by endemic internal quarrels. Tensions within 
it may have begun to emerge in Myebu's lifetime, as his 
senior sons, each established in his own homestead, sought 
to establish their own power bases, but it was in the 
reign of his successor, Ntaba, that open conflict broke 
out. 
The first major ruction was a consequence of a dispute 
over the succession between Ntaba and his brother Thusi. 
The latter was also of Myebu's main house, and so had a 
strong genealogical claim to the chiefship.162 The 
quarrel between them was intensified by the intervention 
of Mzoywane, who had succeeded his father Dole as chief of 
the coastal section of the Thuli. In a move calculated to 
undermine the status of Ntaba as senior Thuli chief, 
Mzoywane tendered his allegiance to Ntaba's rival, 
Thusi. 163 The result was that Ntaba attacked Thusi, burnt 
his homestead, and drove him into Mzoywane's territory. 
Ntaba was himself then attacked and driven back by 
Mzoywane, who then assisted Thusi to rebuild his 
homestead. 164 Henceforth, according to Maziyana, Thusi 
was 'practically an independent chief, and ruled over his 
own section,.165 Though Ntaba had beaten off Thusi's 
challenge to his position, he was unable to prevent him 
from emerging as a semi-autonomous ruler in his own right. 
162. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 298. 
163. Ibid., p. 292. 
164. Ibid. 
165. Ibid., p. 298. 
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other sons of Myebu - Nongwadi and Xoki - were also 
remembered by Maziyana as having fought each other. 166 In 
the next generation, Mabona, Mzoywane's son and his 
successor as chief of the coastal Thuli, intervened in a 
quarrel between two sons of Ncwane, a brother of Ntaba. 167 
The internal quarrels of the Thuli in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries were well remembered in later years. 
In the 1860s, Shepstone noted the Thuli had 'very much 
weakened themselves by domestic quarrels on questions of 
succession and rank,.168 Possibly drawing in part on 
Shepstone, Bryant commented on the 'serious intertribal 
ructions' which had taken place among the Thuli, though 
there is nothing in other sources to support his 
assertion that the various Thuli chiefdoms had largely 
'disintegrated' and their members dispersed by the early 
19th century.169 As Maziyana saw it, the fighting between 
the various factions of Thuli was characterized by a low 
level of violence. 'In those days there was no killing 
off or eating up of cattle as was the fashion in later 
times', he commented. 170 Such depictions of the pre-
Shakan period as a 'golden age' in which warfare was 
generally conducted with restraint, though common in the 
traditions recorded by Stuart and, in synthesized form, by 
Bryant, need to be treated with caution. It is likely, 
however, that in polities like those of the Thuli, where 
there was no centralized control over the means of 
violence, fighting was less intense than in the emergent 
states to the north of the Thukela. 
166. Ibid. 
167. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 298, 300-1. 
168. Shepstone's unattributed notes on Thuli history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 130. His informant was 
probably the Funwayo mentioned in the text. 
169. Bryant, QT, p. 503. 
170. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 301. See also 
his comments on p. 298. 
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Very little survives in the record about the nature of 
relations between the Thuli and neighbouring chiefdoms, 
whether those tributary to them or those on the margins of 
their sphere of influence. This dearth extends to 
evidence on the nature of the relations which came to 
exist between the Thuli and another invading group from 
north of the Thukela, that of the Cele under Mkhokheleli 
kaLanga and his successors. According to their recorded 
traditions, the Cele had formerly lived on the Mhlathuze 
river, and, like the Thuli, had migrated southwards to 
escape mounting pressure from the expanding Qwabe 
chiefdom. 171 Mkhokheleli, who is said to have led the 
migration,172 ruled two generations before Magaye,173 who 
is known to have become chief a little before or after 
1820 (see p. 257 below). On this evidence, the incursion 
of the Cele across the Thukela would have taken place 
sometime in the later 18th century, a little after that of 
the Thuli, who, Cele and Thuli informants are agreed, had 
preceded them. 174 
Like the Thuli, the Cele seem to have managed to 
retain their group cohesion in the course of their 
movements southward, first to the Ngoye region and then 
over the Thukela. 175 Like the Thuli, they faced 
resistance to their intrusion into the coastlands south of 
that river from established chiefdoms. 176 But there are 
171. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza, p. 69; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mbovu, pp. 30, 41, 74; Bryant, OT, pp. 537-8. 
172. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, pp. 68, 
69; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 74. 
173 • For Mkhokheleli's position in the Cele chiefly 
genealogy see JSA,vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, 
p. 68; vol. 2, evidence of Maquza, pp. 232, 233; vol. 2, 
evidence of Mvakwendlu, p. 309, vol. 3, evidence of Dinya 
and Melaphi, p. 90; vol. 4, evidence of Mtshebhwe, p. 158. 
174. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69; 
vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 300, 302; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 54. 
175. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 74. 
176. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69. 
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no traditions in the record that make mention of anything 
like the violence which seems to have accompanied the 
passage southward of the Thuli. The difference is 
probably to be acounted for by the fact that the Cele were 
moving into a region which had already been subordinated 
to Thuli overrule, however lightly felt it was, and were 
able to sUbsitute themselves as the dominant group in the 
northern part of the coastlands without having to resort 
to force on the same scale. This scenario is congruent 
with the picture given by Maziyana, who relates that the 
Cele found the land open to them, the Thuli having chased 
off the previous inhabitants. 177 What he means in effect 
is that the Cele occupation was carried out with little 
resistance; that the region had remained inhabited after 
the Thuli invasion is attested by Mageza kaKwefunga, who 
names a number of groups which gave their submission to 
the Cele. 178 
A puzzling feature about the traditions relating to the 
intrusion of the Cele into territories which had 
previously lain within the Thuli sphere of influence is 
the failure of stuart's informants, Cele and Thuli alike, 
to comment on the confrontation which must have taken 
place at this time between the two chiefdoms. It is 
unlikely that the Thuli, even though distracted and 
weakened by internal disputes, would have given way to the 
Cele without some kind of resistance. The absence of 
statements on the subject may be a function of the state 
of relations between the Cele and Thuli ruling groups in 
the early 20th century at the time stuart conducted his 
interviews, though this hypothesis would need to be 
confirmed by research into the history of these chiefdoms 
during the period of colonial rule. 
In the event, the Cele were able to extend their 
overlordship as far south as the Mdloti-Thongati 
177. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 302. 
178. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69. 
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region,179where their sphere of influence shaded into that 
of the Thuli. Their ruling house, under Mkhokheleli, 
established itself in the lower Mvoti valley in what is 
now the Stanger-Groutville area. 180 Like his Thuli 
counterparts, Mkhokheleli proceeded to establish effective 
control of the territory under his suzerainty by setting 
up homesteads under his sons at a number of strategic 
points: Mageza kaKwefunga identifies half a dozen of 
these. 181 The process continued under Mkhokheleli's son 
and successor, Dibandlela, nine of whose homesteads and 
fifty-odd of whose sons are named by stuart's 
informants. 182 Mkhokheleli is said to have been buried 
near the lower Mvoti,183 and-Dibandlela near the 
Mhlali,184 some twenty kilometres to the south. This may 
indicate that the main direction of Cele expansion was to 
the south, and that over time the chiefdom's political 
centre of gravity shifted accordingly. 
In the qeneration after Mkhokheleli a certain amount of 
quarrelling is said to have taken place among his sons,185 
a result, it seems of his failure to fix the succession 
with any certainty. The Cele ruling house, however, seems 
to have remained more"cohesive than that of the Thuli. In 
part this may have been a function of a relatively greater 
degree of centralization of authority in the chiefdom, 
itself a product of the fact that the Cele had been 
179. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maquza, p. 235; Shepstone's 
unattributed notes on Cele history in Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, p. 124; Bryant, OT, p. 538. 
180. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69; 
Bryant, OT, p. 538. 
181. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 73. 
182. For the names of his homesteads see JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 73. For the names of 
his sons see JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maquza, p. 233; vol. 
2, evidence of Dinya, p. 310; vol. 3, evidence of 
Melaphi, p. 90. 
183. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69. 
184. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 74. 
185. Ibid., p. 76. 
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engaged longer than had the Thuli in the political 
conflicts which attended the expansion of a number of 
large chiefdoms north of the Thukela. In part it may also 
have been a function of the geo-political position of the 
Cele chiefdom, sandwiched as it was between the Qwabe 
polity to the north and that of the Thuli to the south. 
According to Mageza kaKwefunga, the coastal section of 
the Thuli at some stage khonza'd to the Cele ruling 
house. 186 Mageza was himself of high rank in the Cele 
ruling house,187 and may well have had an interest in 
portraying this section of the Thuli as having been 
historically subordinate to the Cele. Not surprisingly, 
there is nothing in the traditions of the coastal Thuli, 
as given by Maziyana and Mcothoyi, to sUbstantiate 
Mageza's assertion. On the contrary, Mcothoyi's opinion 
was that the Thuli (by which he presumably meant the 
chiefdom as a whole, and not simply the coastal section) 
had occupied a more "extensive territory than had the 
cele,188 a claim which a glance at the map would confirm. 
If in fact the leaders of the coastal Thuli did at any 
stage khonza to the Cele, it was probably a tactical move 
to enable them to assert their independence of the Thuli 
senior section rather than a real submission to Cele 
authority. 
The evidence leaves no doubt, however, that the Cele 
were on good terms with the coastal section of the Thuli. 
Mkhokheleli took as ~is chief wife a woman named Mathu, 
who was a sister of Dole, chief of these Thuli. 189 From 
this union was born Dibandlela, Mkhokheleli's successor. 
The connection between the Cele and the coastal Thuli was 
important enough for the latter to speak of themselves as 
186. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69. 
187. Ibid. 
188. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 54. 
189. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 30; vol. 3, evidence of 
Mcothoyi, p. 54; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, pp. 75-6. 
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the abalanda of the Cele, that is, as belonging to the 
'wife's family,.190 Dibandlela himself is said to have 
grown up among his mother's people, and, when he later 
became chief of the Cele, to have imposed the Thuli 
dialect on his people. 191 At a later stage, the then 
chief of the coastal Thuli, Mabona kaMzoywane kaDole, sent 
his so~ Mnini, who, it can be estimated, was born in the 
early years of the 19th century,192 to be brought up among 
the Cele. 193 
Given the closeness of the relationship between the 
Cele and the coastal Thuli, it is signficant that when 
Dibandlela proceeded to take a chief wife, he did so not 
from a group associated with these Thuli but from the 
ruling house of the Qwabe, his most powerful neighbours to 
the north. 194 This probably indicates that by the time of 
this marriage the establishment of good relations with the 
Qwabe was becoming an important issue for the Cele 
leadership. Qwabe pressures on the Cele were increasing 
in the last years of the 18th century and first years of 
the 19th, for at that time, the Makhanya, an offshoot of 
the Qwabe chiefly house, pushed across the Thukela under 
190. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 30; also p. 33. 
191. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 107; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 56-7; vol. 3, evidence of 
Melaphi, pp. 75-6. 
192. Mnini had not yet come of age when, a little before 
or after 1820, Shaka's forces mounted a number of raids on 
the Thuli: see below, p. 262-3. 
193. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69. 
194. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 115, 119; vol. 3, 
evidence of Melaphi, p. 74; vol. 4, evidence of Mtshebhwe, 
p. 159. Dibandlela would presumably not have been allowed 
to take a wife from within the ruling house of the Thuli, 
as they were his mother's kin, but there would have been 
nothing to stop him from marrying a woman of an unrelated 
group within the Thuli chiefdom. On ethnographically 
recorded prohibitions against a man's marrying into his 
mother's kin group among the 'Zulu' peoples, see 
E.J. Krige, The Social System of the Zulus, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1936, p. 156; Bryant, Zulu People, 
p. 584. 
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their chief, Mnengwa, and established themselves in the 
coastlands as far as the Nonoti river, a dozen kilometres 
to the south. 195 The evidence does not make completely 
clear whether the advent of the Makhanya constituted a 
colonizing move on the part of the central Qwabe 
leadership, or an attempt on the part of Mnengwa and his 
adherents to establish themselves as an autonomous 
chiefdom. That the former was the case is suggested by 
Mmemi's statement to the effect that the Cele did not 
resist the intrusion of the Makhanya, as they would not 
have dared to fight with the Qwabe. 196 For their part, 
the Makhanya probably saw it to their own advantage to 
remain at least nominally subordinate to the Qwabe chief, 
as by themselves they would probably not have been able to 
overawe the Cele as they did. 
The intrusion of first the Thuli and then the Cele in 
the later 18th century completely transformed the 
political map of the coastlands between the Thukela and 
the Mzimkhulu. In place of the numerous small chiefdoms 
which had previously occupied the region were now two 
large, if loosely structured, paramountcies, that of the 
Cele in the north and that of the Thuli in the south. 
Further south, between the Mkhomazi and Mzimkhulu,'smaller 
new polities had been formed by the Mbili and the Shaba 
groups, which seem to have been offshoots of the Thuli. 
Throughout the coastlands, the rulers of the pre-existing 
chiefdoms had either submitted to the authority of the 
intruders, or had fled or had been deposed or put to 
death. Most of their people had stayed put, and, under 
old chiefs or new, had become tributary to the new 
overlords. 
195. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, pp. 55, 62, 69; 
vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 282, 302; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mbovu, p. 26; vol. 3, evidence of Mmemi, pp. 
261, 262; Bryant, OT, p. 187. For Mnengwa's position in 
the Qwabe chiefly genealogy, see JSA, vol. 3, evidence of 
Mbovu, p. 25; vol. 3, evidence of Mmemi, pp. 250, 251, 
255; Bryant, Qr, p. 187. 
196. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mmemi, p. 262. 
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In both the Thuli and Cele paramountcies, the ruling 
group maintained domination over subordinate ones not 
directly through centralized institutions of control but 
indirectly through regionally dispersed homesteads 
established by the paramount chief and headed by members 
of his house. The power exercised at the centre by the 
paramount was comparatively weak. In the case of the 
Thuli, at least, the main challenges to it came not from 
tributary chiefs but from some of the paramount's male 
relatives with their own territorial bases of power. As 
far as the coastal section of Thuli was concerned, it 
operated as an autonomous chiefdom within the paramountcy. 
That it refrained from casting off its allegiance 
altogether was due probably to the need perceived by its 
leaders to maintain a degree of unity with the senior 
section in the face of possible threats from the large 
chiefdoms to the north. 
That political pressures emanating from north of the 
Thukela remained a real threat for the new paramountcies 
was demonstrated by the intrusion of the Makhanya section 
of the Qwabe into the northern part of the Cele domain a 
little before or after 1800. In the first two decades of 
the 19th century, pressures from the northward increased 
markedly, climaxing with a further series of intrusions by 
groups from north of the Thukela in the years before and 
after 1820. These developments, their causes, and the way 
in which they have b~en presented in the literature form 
the subjects of the next three chapters of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE 'DEVASTATIONS' OF THE 1810s AND 1820s: EXPOSING THE 
STEREOTYPE 
1. Introduction 
During a period which is difficult to define precisely, but 
which probably extended over the later 1810s and 1820s, the 
territories south of the Thukela river experienced a series 
of political and social upheavals which completely 
transformed the political map of the region. 1 These 
upheavals are unproblematically regarded in the literature 
as having been caused by 'invasions' of zulu armies from 
across the Thukela. They are seen as part of a series of 
wars and migrations, allegedly set in motion by the 
explosive expansion of the Zulu kingdom, which disrupted 
life over a much wider area of south-east Africa. Since 
the late 1960s, these wars and migrations have almost 
universally come be labelled as the 'mfecane' or 
'difaqane'. The notion of the mfecane is now deeply 
entrenched as an organizing concept round which much of the 
history of southern Africa in the first half of the 19th 
century is written. 
In a series of papers and articles written since 1983, 
Julian Cobbing has formulated a radical and sweeping 
critique of the whole concept of the mfecane. 2 While not 
1. This chapter is a revised and expanded version of a 
paper, entitled 'Political mythology and the making of 
Natal's mfecane', which was presented at seminars at the 
University of the Witwatersrand in 1988 and the University 
of Cape Town in 1989. My thanks go to a number of 
colleagues, particularly Julian Cobbing, for their critical 
comments. 
2. J. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane' , unpubl. 
paper, University of Cape Town, 1983; 'The case against the 
mfecane', unpubl. paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 
1984 (a slightly modified version of the UCT paper); 'The 
myth of the mfecane', unpubl. paper, University of Durban-
Westville, 1987; 'Jettisoning the mfecane (with 
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denying that the history of African societies in the early 
19th century was marked by a rising level of violence, he 
rejects the particular significance which white writers 
since at least the mid-19th century have ascribed to this 
phenomenon. He argues that it was a continuation of 
conflicts which had begun long before the 1810s, conflicts 
whose primary causes are to be sought not in the expansion 
of the Zulu kingdom but in the intersection of forces 
emanating from two other epicentres of upheaval. These 
were the eastern Cape, where first Dutch then British 
settlers and imperialists were engaged in persistent 
attempts to seize land and labour-power from neighbouring 
African societies from at least the 1760s onward; and the 
Delagoa Bay region, where an export trade in ivory, cattle, 
and slaves was developing from much the same time. 
In Cobbingls view the role attributed in the literature 
to the Zulu is not based on historical evidence: rather it 
is a product of the search made by imperialist and settler 
ideologues for a plausible alibi for the colonial- and 
imperial-based interests whose aggressions were ultimately 
responsible for the violence and social disruptions of the 
period. For their own various ideological reasons, 
subsequent generations of historians, including that of the 
present, have either been concerned to maintain the alibi, 
or, at the very least, have done nothing to demonstrate its 
falsity. From this perspective the notion of the mfecane 
is nothing but an interest-serving myth. Historians, 
Cobbing argues, urgently need to abandon not just the term 
itseif, but the whole set of interlinked assumptions, 
distortions and falsehoods which it embodies, and to 
address themselves to the business of developing an 
entirely new analysis of southern African history in the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
perestroika) I, unpubl. paper, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1988; IThe mfecane as alibi: thoughts on 
Dithakong and Mbolompol, Journal of African History, vol. 
29 (1988), pp. 487-519. 
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For historians currently doing research in this period, 
Cobbing's critique of mfecane theory raises a host of 
fundamental issues. Whether one agrees with him or not, it 
is impossible to sidestep the import of his arguments. In-
stead of being taking completely for granted, mfecane 
theory now has to be directly confronted, examined in depth 
on a region-by-region basis, and either reasserted, 
modified, or rejected. Against the background of the 
debates which are beginning to emerge in response to 
cobbing's critique, this chapter undertakes a survey of the 
historiography of the upheavals which took place south of 
the Thukela in the 1810s and 1820s. Its purpose is to 
investigate the basis of the established notion that these 
upheavals were the consequence of Zulu invasions. 
2. The stereotype created 
Soon after the arrival of the first party of British 
hunters and traders at Port Natal in 1824, some of them 
were begining to report that the neighbourhood of the bay 
was largely empty of population,3 and to develop and 
pUblicize an explanation for this phenomenon. This 
explanation, to the effect that the previous inhabitants 
had either been killed or driven out by the Zulu under 
Shaka a few years before, was beginning to appear in Cape 
Town newspapers in 1825 and 1826, and in prin~=d books by 
1827. 4 At the same time, specific literary images of the 
3. See the letter from Farewell to Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, 
in B.J.T. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, 1823-
August 1828, South African Archival Records, Important Cape 
Documents, vol. IV, Pretoria, 1984, p. 37. This letter 
also appears in J. Chase, ed., The Natal Papers, Cape Town, 
1968 (1st ed. Grahamstown, 1843), part I, p. 18; & in Bird, 
ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 192. 
4. See the extract from the Cape Town Gazette and African 
Advertiser of 4 June 1825 published in Leverton, ed., 
Records of Natal, vol. 1, p. 51; and the passage from the 
article by James King, entitled 'Some account of Mr 
Farewell's settlement at Port Natal', originally published 
in the South African Commercial Advertiser of 18 July 1826, 
and reprinted in Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol. 2, 
p. 249. The relevant extract also appears in Chase, ed., 
Natal Papers, part I, p. 21; and in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 
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Zulu and of Shaka were beginning to take shape, with the 
Zulu being described by writers like King and Thompson as 
the warlike and bloodthirsty agents of Natal's devastation, 
and Shaka as the ferocious and savage leader who directed 
them. 5 Over the next decade these ideas were consolidated 
by a number of other writers - Owen, Pringle, Kay, Boteler, 
Steedman and, in particular, Isaacs - into literary forms 
which in their essence have survived to the present day.6 
Few of these writers had actually set foot at Port 
Natal, and none of them had been eyewitnesses of the 
processes of destruction which they adumbrated. The 
evidence on which they based their descriptions was derived 
directly or indirectly from African informants, but nowhere 
in their works is there any mention of the identity of 
these people, or of the circumstances in which their 
testimony was obtained and recorded. Most of the 
historical information which found its way into published 
accounts was probably collected from members of the groups 
which the traders found living about Port Natal and in the 
neighbouring coastal regions. It is germane to make the 
point here that Port Natal was situated precisely in the 
one region of Natal which had in fact been overrun by Zulu 
forces (see pp. 253 ff. below), and it is likely that the 
generalized depictions of the destruction of Natal which 
were noised abroad by the traders were a reflection of the 
particular experiences of informants from this region. 
1, p. 93. Both Chase and Bird erroneously give the author 
as Francis Farewell. 
5. Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol.1, pp. 172, 174-5, 
vol. 2, pp. 248, 249. 
6. Robinson, ed., Narrative of Voyages ... under the 
Direction of captain W.F.W. Owen, vol. 1, p. 71; T. 
Pringle, African Sketches, London, 1834, p. 362n; Kay, 
Travels and Researches, pp. 281, 341, 343, 344; T. Boteler, 
Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia, 
vol. 2, London, 1835, p. 303; Steedman, Wanderings and 
Adventures, vol. 2, pp. 200-201; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures,esp. ch. 18. See also the discussion in S.J.R. 
Martin, 'British images of the Zulu, c.1820-1879', unpubl. 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1982, pp. 22-37. 
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As a Zulu-centric version of Natal's recent history took 
root among the traders, so the groups of Africans which 
were drawn to the bay to seek their protection came to 
shape their accounts of their own experiences accordingly. 
The process of reworking their recent history would in many 
cases have entailed only minor amendments, often involving 
simply the sUbstitution of the Zulu for other agents of 
destruction. Another factor in the making of the image of 
the Zulu as the general destroyers of the region was very 
probably filtering of information on the part of the 
'coloured ' interpreters whom the traders had brought with 
them, and whom they had ~o use in communicating with the 
local inhabitants until they had themselves learnt the 
language. As servants and dependents, the interpreters very 
likely had their own particular interest in communicating a 
version of history palatable to their masters. It is 
likely, then, that a history which attributed the 
devastation of Natal to the Zulu under Shaka gelled 
comparatively quickly, both among the traders and among the 
various categories of their clients and adherents. In the 
discourse of the Zulu themselves with the traders there 
would have been nothihg, one imagines, to dispel the notion 
of Shaka and his armies as conquerors and overlords of the 
regions south of the Thukela. 
For their own part, the traders would have had no 
incentive to be critical of this notion, and every interest 
in formulating and propagating the idea that Natal was 
largely empty of inhabitants, and that Shaka and the Zulu 
had been the agents of their dispersal or destruction. From 
the very first, the leading traders at Port Natal were 
concerned not only to open up commerce with the Zulu but 
also to try to establish rights to large tracts of 
territory round Port Natal. 7 In the face of the express 
7. H.F. Fynn, The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn, 
ed. J. stuart & D.McK. Malcolm, Pietermaritzburg, 1950, 
pp. 86-8; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 142, 180-1; 
Leverton, Records of Natal, vol. 1, letter from Farewell to 
Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, pp. 37-40, and notarial deed signed 
by J.A. Chabaud, 29 July 1828, pp. 247-8. 
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reluctance of the Cape government to sanction the 
acquisition of territorial possessions,8 they attempted to 
minimize possible objections to their proceedings by 
asserting the claim that the land in question was virtually 
uninhabited. 
If the Port Natal traders had a direct material interest 
in propagating the 'myth of the empty land', so too did the 
Cape merchants who in large part financed their early 
trading ventures. 9 In the late 1820s and early 1830s the 
rising commercial class and its associates in both the 
eastern and the western Cape were beginning to exert 
pressure on the British authorities in Cape Town and London 
to annex Natal and establish it as a colony of British 
settlement. This class's spokesmen used the notion of a 
depopulated Natal to underpin their arguments for the 
desirability of annexation. 10 
Propagation of the myth of the empty land thus served a 
clear material purpose. So too did the fostering of the 
image of Shaka as the cruel and despotic leader of a 
warlike Zulu nation. Though in writing of Shaka and the 
Zulu in lurid detail, writers like King and Isaacs clearly 
had an eye on their reading public, they and others also 
wrote to publicize and propagate the pro-annexationist 
cause. By depicting the Zulu and their king as a potential 
threat to the security of the Cape's eastern frontier 
region, or alternatively as the potential allies of rival 
powers, they hoped tq influence the British authorities 
8. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, letter from 
Brink to Farewell, 5 May 1824, p. 36. 
9. On the financing of these expeditions see Fynn, Diary, 
ch 3; B. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, London, 1974, pp. 8-19, 
75-6, 78-81. 
10. Bannister, Humane Policy, appendices 1, 6 & 7; Chase, 
ed., Natal Papers, pp. 23-30, citing a letter from 
Bannister to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 
May 1829; Chase, ed., Natal Papers, pp. 30-1, citing the 
Graham's Town Journal of 3 August 1832; P.R. Kirby, ed., 
Andrew smith and Natal, Cape Town, 1955, pp. 5-7, 145-6; 
Roberts, The Zulu Kings, pp. 222-5. 
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into annexing Natal and thereby paving the way for the 
extension of British trade and settlement. 11 Some 
scepticism was voiced in the Cape Town press about the 
reality of the image of Shaka put about by the Natal 
traders,12 but the idea that the 'numerous and warlike' 
Zulu were a potential 'threat' to the colony rapidly 
entered its public discourse. 13 
By the mid-1830s the notion that the territories south 
of the Thukela had been devastated by the Zulu shortly 
before 1824 was becoming firmly fixed into a literary 
stereotype. This notion was essentially the product of 
Cape merchant interests and their associates. Of the 
writers so far cited as mainly responsible for fixing it in 
print, Farewell, King and Isaacs had all traded at Natal, 
while Farewell and Isaacs had close personal connections 
with Cape Town's business community.14 Thompson and 
Steedman were Cape Town merchants; Bannister, though 
motivated in his writings partly by humanitarian concerns, 
was an associate of Farewell's and possibly one of his 
financial backers, and was later an active memb~r of the 
South African Land and Emigration Association; Godlonton 
was 'a man of substance' in the rising eastern Cape 
11. King, 'Some account of Mr Farewell's settlement at Port 
Natal', in Thompson, ed., Travels and Adventures, vol. 2, 
p. 249; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 339. 
12. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, pp. 154, 177, quoting the 
South Africa Commercial Advertiser of 15 November 1828 and 
27 December 1828. This 'negrophilist' newspaper was 
frequently critical of European settler attitudes to, and 
treatment of, people of colour: see B.A. Le Cordeur, The 
Politics of Eastern Cape separatism 1820-1854, Cape Town, 
1981, pp. 43, 66. 
13. Chase, ed., Natal Papers, p. 27, citing a letter from 
S. Bannister to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 
May 1829; R. Godlonton, Introductory Remarks to a Narrative 
of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes, Cape Town, 1965 (1st 
ed. Grahamstown, 1836), pp. 162-8, 172; Kirby, ed., Andrew 
Smith in Natal, pp. 149-51, 153-4, 166-8, 171-2. 
14. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, p. 18; Herman & Kirby, 
'Nathaniel Isaacs: a biographical sketch', in their edition 
of Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. xi. 
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business community.15 Owen had played an important role in 
stimulating interest among the merchants of Cape Town in 
the commercial potential of Natal in 1822, and in 1823 
seems to have provided Farewell with a chart of the Natal 
coast, a product of his survey of the previous year. 16 
All these authors directly or indirectly propounded the 
virtues of the regions beyond the borders of the Cape 
colony as fields for the expansion of Cape and British 
commerce. This intention was most explicitly stated by 
Isaacs in his Travels and Adventures, the last few pages of 
which formed an encomium to the commercial prospects of 
Natal. He wrote the book, he stated, partly to meet his 
readers' interest in 'novelty', but also so that 'the 
merchant, the speculator, and the capitalist will perceive 
new sources in which commercial enterprise may be 
successfully attempted; and new vents for the consumption 
of the manufactures of the United Kingdom, of which it is 
desirable to have some clear and unquestionable 
information,.17 
From the later 1830s what will from now on be referred 
to as the devastation stereotype began to be taken up and 
disseminated by members of another influential body of 
opinion-moulders and image-builders, the missionaries who 
were active in southern Africa. Though there might be wide 
differences of opinion between them as to the benefits or 
15. V.S. Forbes, 'Biographical sketch of George Thompson', 
in Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol. 1, pp. viii-xiii; 
Dictionary of South African Biography, vol. 2, entry for 
Andrew Steedman, p. 706; Bannister, Humane Policy, passim; 
Chase, ed., Natal Papers, p. 23; A.F. Hattersley, 'Francis 
George Farewell, and the earliest Natal settlers', Africana 
Notes and News, vol. 14 (1960-61), pp. 317-18; DSAB, 
vol. 1, entry for Saxe Bannister, p. 50; Le Cordeur, 
Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, pp. 64-5. 
16. DSAB, vol. 1, entry on Francis Farewell, p. 286; DSAB, 
vol. 2, entry on William Owen, p. 529; Roberts, The Zulu 
Kings, pp. 7-8, 10, 12. 
17. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 339. For a 
comprehensive analysis of Isaacs's literary style and an 
assessment of his book's public impact, see Martin, 
'British images of the Zulu', unpubl. thesis, pp. 37-58. 
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otherwise of the extension of European settlement, they 
were united in wanting to promote 'civilized' European 
government. Many aligned themselves with the merchants' 
call for the 'opening up' of the interior, and at the same 
time used much the same kind of historical rationale to 
justify it. 18 
3. The stereotype appropriated 
In the 1840s the hopes of merchants and missionaries for 
the opening up of Natal at last began to be realized. In 
1843 Britain annexed the region between the Thukela and the 
Mzimkhulu, and in 1849-51, several thousand British 
settlers were established in the new colony to help speed 
up the process of 'civilizing' it. But, with its 
progenitors having achieved some of their main goals, the 
devastation stereotype did not wither away. On the 
contrary, over the next few decades it was vigorously taken 
up, embellished and propagated by numerous writers in the 
service of a new cause - that of the Natal colonists. 
Though there were often strong differences of opinion 
between officials, settlers and missionaries over the 
appropriate mode of ruling the colony's African population, 
they were by and large united in the notions that the 
safeguarding and expansion of their various newly acquired 
estates required the subordination of Africans, who formed 
the vast majority of the colony's population, to the 
political tutelage of Europeans. 
18. Kay, Travels and Researches, pp. 281, 341, 343, 344; D. 
Kotze, ed., Letters of the American Missionaries 1835-1838, 
Cape Town, 1950, p. 97; G. Champion, Journal of the 
Reverend George Champion 1835-1839, ed. A. Booth, Cape 
Town, 1967, pp. 15, 62; W. Boyce, Notes on South African 
Affairs, Cape Town, 1971 (repr. of 1st ed., Grahamstown, 
1838), pp. x, 171, 173-4; B. Shaw, Memorials of South 
Africa, Cape Town, 1970 (1st ed. London, 1840), pp. 44-5; 
T. Arbousset & F. Daumas, Narrative of an Exploratory Tour 
to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 
Cape Town, 1968 (repr. of 1s7 English ed., Cape Town, 
1846), ch. 17, esp. p. 148. 
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Like colonizing groups everywhere, the Natal colonists 
sought to justify to themselves and to others both their 
occupation of lands formerly inhabited by other people, and 
their status as overlords or would-be overlords of the 
indigenous peoples. The devastation stereotype was well 
suited to the version of Natal's history which they 
proceeded to develop. It justified the presence of 
European colonists in Natal on the grounds that they had 
established themselves in a largely empty land. It 
justified their attempts - ultimately successful - to 
establish domination over the African population on the 
grounds that the coming of white rule had put an end to the 
ravages of the Zulu and inaugurated an era of peace and 
stability. It justified their continual demands for an 
increase in the size of the British garrison to defend them 
against the threat posed by the savage Zulu kingdom across 
the Thukela. 
Probably the first work to be published specifically to 
propagate the cause of the Natal settlers was J.C. Chase's 
The Natal Papers, which appeared in Grahamstown in the year 
of Natal's annexation. 19 Chase was an eastern Cape 
businessman who, when·living in Cape Town, had played an 
active role in a move initiated in 1833-4 by the merchants 
of that town to establish a British settlement at Natal. 20 
His express purpose in putting the volume together was to 
defend the settlers of Natal, Boer and British alike, 
against what he saw as misrepresentations on the part of 
'philanthropic' interests. 21 It consisted of a selection of 
documents relating to the history of Natal from the late 
17th century to the British annexation in 1843. Its 
importance for the present discussion lies in the fact that 
19. J. Chase, The Natal Papers, parts 1 & 2, Grahamstown, 
1843, repro Cape Town, 1968. 
20. DSAB, vol. 1, entry for John Chase, pp. 165-7; Le 
Cordeur, Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, pp. 126-8. 
21. Chase, ed., Natal Papers, p. iii; DSAB, vol. 1, entry 
for John Chase, p. 166. 
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for the first time it made readily available to the reading 
public, both in Britain and in the South African colonies, 
a body of texts which served to reinforce the devastation 
stereotype. It drew on Farewell, King, Bannister, and 
Godlonton to confirm the by then standard literary view 
that in the 1820s the Zulu had largely exterminated Natal's 
population. 22 A novel addition, was a statement on the part 
of H.F. Fynn, in which he estimated that 'not less then 
1,000,000 human beings' had been destroyed by Shaka in the 
course of his wars,23 a figure which was to be reproduced 
over and over in the literature. 
In the 1850s the newly arrived Natal settlers and would-
be settlers themselves began to take up the task of 
producing a version of the regions's history that was 
appropriate to their enterprise. As early as 1852 Charles 
Barter was setting up Isaacs as an authority on the 
region's pre-European history.24 The following year a 
forceful statement of the devastation stereotype appeared 
in the report of the Harding Commission. The commission 
was dominated by representatives of the settlers: its 
declarations on the precolonial history of Natal were of 
the kind that became common in the literature over the next 
seventy years. After Shaka had become king, the 
commissioners reported, the Zulu became 'a desolating 
scourge to all the surrounding tribes and nations within a 
circle of 500 miles'. He 'completely conquered the Natal 
tribes with immense s,laughter, devastated the whole country 
and added it to his dominions, from the Itongati down to 
st. John's River'. The survivors were carried off and 
incorporated in small groups into the Zulu people. 'The 
Natal tribes then ceased to have any separate national 
existence ... ,.25 
22. Chase, ed., Natal Papers, pp. 16-32. 
23. Ibid., p. 20. 
24. Barter, The Dorp and the Veld, pp. 64, 190-1. 
25. Proceedings and Report of the Commission Appointed to 
Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafirs in 
the District of Natal, p. 6. 
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stated in these sentences was an important part of the 
historical creed of an emerging settler society. The last 
sentence was perhaps the most significant. For intruding 
settlers, thrown together from disparate backgrounds and 
attempting to establish, first, a social existence and 
identity in territory previously inhabited solely by 
African communities, and second, political domination over 
the indigenous inhabitants, it was important to minimize in 
their own eyes the rights to land of the people among whom 
they settled. The notion that the African societies which 
had formerly occupied Natal no longer had any coherent 
existence was clearly convenient to their purpose. 
The accounts of Natal's history which emerged from the 
pens of colonial-based writers like Holden, Shooter and 
Grout in the 1850s and 1860s served to codify views such as 
those expressed by the commission. 26 But these writers did 
not simply reproduce the existing stereotype: they also 
placed it in a more elaborate historical context. The Cape 
and British-based originators of the devastation thesis had 
been concerned primarily to expand the geographical orbit 
of the cape's commerce, and had had little interest in 
investigating Natal's history beyond what was necessary for 
constructing the thesis in bare outline. The settlers, on 
the other hand, needed a more elaborate - and denigratory -
history of African societies in pre-European Natal: one 
which spelt out in unmistakable terms that the history of 
independent African societies was mostly one of wars and 
destruction. civilization in Natal had begun with the 
coming of Europeans: for its impact to be more fully 
apparent, the barbarism and savagery of 'Zulu' society had 
to be revealed in detail. 
Colonial historians therefore used the snippets of 
tradition which had been reported to the Harding Commission 
26. W.C Holden, History of the Colony of Natal, Cape Town, 
1963 (reprint of 1st ed., London, 1855), pp. 55-7; and The 
Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, pp. 9-16, 20-28; 
Shooter, The Kafirs of Natal, ch. 8; Grout, Zulu-land, chs. 
7, 8. 
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by Lewis Grout and Henry Fynn to help create a context for 
the devastation thesis that extended back into the 18th 
century and forwards to the Boer victories over the Zulu in 
the late 1830s and the British annexation in the 1840s. 27 
The sequence of themes which they put forward - the rise 
and fall of Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa, the rise of Shaka, 
his military and social innovations, his campaigns and 
conquests, his dealings with the Europeans, his 
assassination and succession by Dingane, the latter's 
dealings with the Europeans, the advent of the Boers and 
the defeat of the Zulu - became fixed into a formula for 
the writing of early 'Zulu' history which is still being 
used by some authors in the present. 28 
The circumstantial detail added to the devastation 
thesis by the first generation of colonial historians 
served to make it look yet more plausible. 29 So too did 
the outline history of pre-European Natal-Zululand compiled 
in 1864 by Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary for Native 
Affairs in Natal. 30 Shepstone's account was based on 
information which he had personally obtained from African 
informants, and was much the most detailed statement of its 
kind that had yet been drawn up. It was the first to 
provide evidence for the point first put in print by 
27. The first author to have developed a detailed account 
of this history seems to have been Shooter: see his Kafirs 
of Natal, pp. 249-60. 
28. J.D. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, London, 
1987, pp. 54-09, 78-81; C. Ballard, The House of Shaka: the 
Zulu Monarchy Illustrated, Durban, 1988, pp. 13-37. 
29. Russell Martin discerns the beginning of a shift in the 
early colonial period from the notion of 'Shaka as Attila' 
to the notion of 'Shaka as Napoleon' (see his unpublished 
thesis, 'British images of the Zulu', pp. 140-7). This had 
no material effect on the notion of Shaka as the destroyer 
of Natal. 
30. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in commission on Laws 
and Customs, part II, pp. 415-20; also in CorresDondence 
Relating to Granting to Natives in Natal of Documentary 
Titles to Land, Sessional Papers nos. 22 & 23 of the Natal 
Legislative Council, 1890, Pietermaritzburg, n.d. (1890), 
pp. 118-29. 
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steedman some thirty years before that Shaka's armies had 
been preceded in Natal by a number of other invading 
groups.31 But the significance of this evidence was lost to 
Shepstone, or else he deliberately chose ,to play it down, 
for the thrust of his account was once again to place on 
Shaka and the Zulu the responsibility for the 'universal 
terror' which had swept Natal. 32 
Shepstone's 1864 outline was, as far as is known, not 
published until the 1880s, and then only in obscure 
government publications. Much more influential on other 
writers was a rather differently weighted account which he 
published in 1875. 33 In this second version he eliminated 
much of the background detail to be found in the first, and 
focussed more on the careers of Dingiswayo and Shaka. The 
effect was that Shaka appeared even more strongly as 'the 
universal enemy,.34 It was this second account, rather than 
the first, which was taken up in the next decade by John 
Bird and reprinted in his influential compilation, The 
Annals of Natal. 35 Through this medium, Shepstone's 
account fed into numerous subsequent works. 36 The effect 
was the affirmation of the devastation thesis by the man 
who, in his own times and long after, was regarded by 
31. Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures, vol. 2, p. 200. 
32. Commission on Laws and Customs, part II, p. 417. 
33. In the form of an article entitled 'The early history 
of the Zulu-Kafir race of south-eastern Africa', which 
appeared in the Journal of the Society of Arts, 29 January 
1875, and was reprinted in the Cape Monthly Magazine, vol. 
11 (1875), pp. 95-104; and also in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 
1, pp. 155-66. 
34. Bird, ed., Annals of Natal, vol. 1, p. 158. 
35. See note 33 above. 
36. For example J.Y. Gibson, The story of the Zulus, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1903, p. 8; R. Russell, Natal: the Land 
and Its Story, Durban, 1972 (reprint of 12th ed., 
Pietermaritzburg, 1911, pp. 127-35; W.S. Ferguson, 'The 
Zulus and Spartans: a comparison of their military 
systems', Harvard African Studies, vol. 2 (1918), p. 219; 
E.H. Brookes & C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1965, pp. 7-8. 
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European settlers and officials as the foremost authority 
on 'Zulu' custom and history. 
Of the long list of authors who wrote on Natal's pre-
settler history in the period from the 1850s to the 1920s, 
only two have been found in this study to have gone counter 
to the devastation thesis. Both, perhaps significantly, 
were non-Natalians. A. Wilmot, a member of the Cape 
Legislative Council, wrote very much against the current of 
his time in describing Shaka as a 'proud monarch,.37 Even 
more unusually, J.C. Voigt, a Cape-born doctor and writer 
and a strong opponent of British imperialism,38 made a 
point of arguing that the image of Shaka as he was commonly 
depicted was overdrawn, and that the Zulu king had been no 
worse a despot than many other African rulers before and 
after. As an administrator he had been a 'genius'; he was 
as much the Alexander as the Attila of his age. Sixty years 
before the term became fashionable, Voigt went so far as to 
describe Shaka's system as one of 'nation-building,.39 
But the few notes of dissonance struck in works like 
these went almost unheard in the chorus of settler voices, 
made all the more strident as the century drew to a close 
by the rising influences of European pseudo-scientific 
racism, nationalism, and imperialism. In the late 19th 
century, as an alliance of British imperial interests and 
white settler interests in southern Africa set out to bring 
the sub-continent's African societies once and for all 
under white domination, the stereotype began to penet!ate 
more widely. The events of the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879, 
particularly, awakened a wide metropolitan interest in the 
'Zulu', and stimulated the publication of a number of books 
and articles which touched on Zulu history, including the 
37. A. Wilmot, The story of the Expansion of Southern 
Africa, Cape Town, 1895, p. 126. 
38. DSAB, vol. 3, Cape Town, 1977, entry for J.C. Voigt, 
p. 823. 
39. J.C. Voigt, Fifty Years of the Historv of the Republic 
in South Africa (1795-1845), vol. 1, Cape Town, 1969 
(reprint of 1st ed., London, 1899), pp. 185-92. 
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supposed events of Shaka's reign. 40 From this time onward 
the stereotype moved beyond the accounts of colonial 
historians and local travellers to become established in 
reference works ranging from Natal schools text books to 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica,41 and to become almost 
universally accepted in literary discourse on southern 
Africa. 
As Natal's white settlers moved towards obtaining 
'responsible government' in the period after the Anglo-Zulu 
war, so their political leaders saw fit to support the 
production of a compilation of historical documents which 
was in effect a charter to underpin white claims to the 
region. This was the two-volume work, The Annals of Natal, 
edited, as mentioned above, by John Bird. A century later, 
this is still a much used source-book on the history of 
Natal before the establishment of British colonial rule. 
Several of the early literary expressions of the 
devastation thesis, including virtually the whole of a 
vituperative chapter by Isaacs on Shaka, were reprinted in 
this work. 42 Lengthy excerpts from the hitherto unpublished 
papers of H.F. Fynn also appeared in it,43 as did a set of 
brief notes on the histories of the 'tribes' of Natal 
written in the 1860s by Theophilus Shepstone, but published 
by Bird without attribution. 44 The whole served to 
entrench many of the settler myths about the processes by 
which they had come to be established in the colony. In 
his editorial introd~ction, Bird himself provided a 
40. On British images of the Zulu at this time see Martin, 
'British images of the Zulu', unpubl. thesis, ch. 6. 
41. H. Bryan, Our Country: an Elementary History of Natal, 
London, n.d. (1909), pp. 28-31; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
9th ed., vol. 24, Edinburgh, 1888, p. 828; and 11th ed., 
vol. 28, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 1051-52. 
42. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1. See esp. pp. 93, 103-5, 
155-83, 191-3. 
43. Ibid., pp. 60-71. 
44. Ibid., pp. 124-53. On the circumstances in which these 
notes were produced, see pp. 101-6 below. 
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particularly neat example of the ideological function 
served by the devastation thesis in late-19th-century 
Natal. The depopulation of Natal by the Zulu, he wrote, 
was destined to become a few years later the direct 
cause of its being sought as a settlement by the 
African Dutch and, eventually, by British colonists: 
the remnants of the aboriginal inhabitants did not 
return to it, until their land had passed into the 
possession of the white race. 45 
In the mid-19th century the stereotype had been 
appropriated by newly arrived white settlers for 
essentially defensive purposes while they sought to 
establish themselves in what they perceived as a hostile 
social environment. In the late 19th century, it served 
equally well in their ideological offensive against the 
African communities whose remaining political and economic 
autonomy they were seeking to destroy. 
4. The stereotype reinforced 
until this time the stereotype had remained based on meagre 
and tenuous empirical evidence, and set mainly in the 
context of the history of the Natal region. It existed 
very much as a formula reproduced by rote rather than as 
scientifically argued history. In the late 19th and early 
20th centuries it was for the first time given powerful 
intellectual underpinning. On the one hand, the voluminous 
writings of George McCall Theal rooted it firmly in the 
wider context of southern African history. On the other, 
the works of Father Alfred Bryant on 'Zulu' history served 
to broaden its purportedly factual base. 
Except for his very earliest work, Theal's histories 
were strongly pro-settler in their slant. 46 Like other 
45. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
46. For assessments of Theal's career and influence as a 
historian, see C. Saunders, 'George McCall Theal and 
Lovedale', History in Africa, vol. 7 (1981), pp. 155-64; C. 
Saunders, 'The making of an historian: the early years of 
George McCall Theal', S.A. Hist. Jnl., no. 13 (1981), pp. 
3-11; C. Saunders, The Making of the South African Past: 
Major Historians on Race and Class, Cape Town, 1988, chs. 
1-4; L.M. Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid, 
New Haven, 1985, pp. 54-7, 133-8, 182-3; D. 
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settler historians before and after him, he made no changes 
to the essentials of the stereotype, but an immensely 
important innovation on his part was to detach it from the 
history of the Natal region and set it in a new context. 
Most previous writers had treated the pre-European history 
of Natal as part of the overall history of that region: it 
formed part of a chronological sequence that began with the 
career of Dingiswayo, went on through the career of Shaka, 
the reign of Dingane, the coming of the Boers, and ended 
with establishment of British colonial rule. In Theal's 
works, by contrast, the upheavals in Natal before and after 
1820 were treated as part of the history of the African 
societies of southern Africa in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries. In his main work, this history was covered 
in a block of chapters which broke into a sequence of 
chapters of the history of European settlerdom and 
officialdom at the cape. 47 
with hindsight it can be seen that this structuring 
established the preconditions for the emergence of mfecane-
theory. By sharply segregating the histories of African and 
European societies in southern Africa, it allowed the 
impact of pre-1820s European settler and imperial 
influences on African societies largely to be side-stepped, 
and the violence of the 1820s to be attributed to purely 
'African' causes. By linking the history of the Zulu 
kingdom in this period ethnically with that of other 
African societies across southern Africa rather than 
regionally with that of neighbouring societies, both 
African and European, in eastern southern Africa, it 
allowed the rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom to be 
portrayed as the spark which touched off a holocaust of 
Schreuder, 'The imperial historian as "colonial 
nationalist": George McCall Theal and the making of South 
African history', in G. Martel, ed., Studies in British 
Imperial History: Essays in Honour of A.P. Thornton, 
London, 1986, pp. 95-158. 
47. G.M. Theal, History of South Africa since 1795, vol. 1, 
London, 1908, chs. 14, 15. 
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intra-African violence across the whole sub-continent. 
Where, in the earlier literature, the devastations 
supposedly caused by Shaka had often been projected as 
having been confined to the eastern coastal regions, from 
Theal's time onward they were universally seen as having 
affected much of the interior as well. The devastation in 
Natal now came to be seen as simply one aspect of a wider 
series of wars and migrations. 
Schreuder has suggested that Theal's sUb-continent-wide 
perspective on history was rooted in the movement towards 
the creation of a common anti-imperial colonial identity 
which was beginning to emerge among the English-speaking 
commercial classes and Afrikaner rural interests in the 
Cape in the last two decades of the 19th century.48 In 
Theal's view, the central theme of southern African history 
was the march of European civilization, carried by Boer and 
British colonists together, across the sub-continent in the 
face of resistance from barbaric African tribes and of 
'meddling' on the part of the British imperial 
government. 49 The vision that he projected was that of a 
united 'South Africa' as 'a great dominion of European 
settlement, served by black labour from the tribal 
reservations, and ruled by a white elite drawn from both 
Anglo-Saxon and Dutch traditions,.50 As Schreuder puts it, 
'It was Theal, in fact, who historically invented white 
"South Africa"',51 and his history provided an important 
element in the emergence of an ideology of colonial 
nationalism and white supremacy.52 
Theal's treatment of the history of African societies, 
it is suggested here, was a necessary counterpart of his 
48. Schreuder, 'The imperial historian as "colonial 
nationalist": in Martel, ed., Studies in British Imperial 
History, pp. 98, 114-15. 
49. Ibid., pp. 97-8, 19-33, 138-47. 
50. Ibid., pp. 98 (emphasis in original) . 
51. Ibid., p. 97. 
52. Ibid., p. 96. 
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concern with the white colonial civilizing mission. If 
white colonists were to be seen as the bearers of 
civilization, then, in a pioneering colonial nationalist 
historiography that was emerging when the process of 
bringing African people under the control of white settlers 
was by no means over, its was important to demonstrate in 
some detail that the culture of African peoples was 
barbaric, and their history largely one of war and 
destruction. The 'Zulu devastations' posited by Theal thus 
formed a convenient backdrop to what he saw as the 
essentially civilizing mission of the Great Trek. 
If Theal provided the devastation stereotype with a new 
context, he added nothing to it by way of new detail. The 
first author to go much beyond the sketchy descriptions of 
it contained in the settler literature was Father A.T. 
Bryant, whose career as a writer of history overlapped with 
the latter part of Theal's. The historical works which he 
published from 1905 onward on the pre-European history of 
the Natal-Zululand region were far more detailed than any 
previous work on the subject, and established him as the 
leading authority in the field. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, aft~r its publication in 1929, his Olden 
Times in Zululand and Natal rapidly became, as it still 
largely remains, a standard source of reference. 
Like Bryant's other works, Olden Times is universally 
regarded as being based on the oral traditions which, the 
author indicates in its preface, he collected over a 
period of some forty years. In fact, as far as his account 
of the upheavals of the 1810s and 1820s is concerned, 
detailed analysis of his sources reveals that it was almost 
entirely derived from other published sources. 53 Though it 
gave a much more elaborate account of the upheavals than 
any previous work had done, there was virtually nothing 
original in it by way of information or insights. This was 
not, however, apparent at the time, and the overall impact 
53. The analysis is presented in the following chapter. 
of Olden Times was to cement the stereotype ever more 
firmly into the literature. 
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Though Bryant was well aware that several non-Zulu 
groups had in fact been responsible for much of the 
disruption which took place in Natal in the 1810s and 
1820s, and that Zulu incursions south of the Thukela had 
been confined to a comparatively small area, he all but 
submerged the role played by these other groups in favour 
of an emphasis on the doings of the Zulu. His dramatized 
and often hyperbolical description of Shaka's wars and 
conquests, one inherited directly from the settler stereo-
type, underscored the idea that Shaka and his 'Zulu 
murderers' were the main destroyers of Natal. 54 In 
addition, Bryant's method of presenting the region's 
history through a recital of the individual histories of 
the numerous chiefdoms of Natal had the effect of 
repeatedly bringing Shaka and the Zulu into the narrative 
in the role of conquerors, exterminators, and tribute-
takers. In short, in adding a considerable amount of new, 
if repetitive, detail to the stereotype, Bryant's 
apparently authoritative account served to give it an 
empirical respectability which helped it to lodge itself 
firmly in the works of later writers. 
5. The stereotype sanctified 
By the 1920s, settler historiography was beginning to be 
challenged on many fronts by the work of liberal academic 
historians based in the country's English-language 
universities. These historians showed little interest, 
however, either in regional history or in the history of 
autonomous African societies. In consequence, the writings 
of authors like Theal and Bryant on these subjects were 
allowed to survive as standard sources, and the devastation 
stereotype became firmly incorporated, even if in 
attenuated form, into the growing corpus of liberal 
academic historiography. 
54. The phrase ~ccurs in his 'Sketch', Dictionary, p. 49*. 
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The explanation for this needs to be sought in the 
nature of the problems with which liberal intellectuals in 
south Africa were grappling at this time. The emergence of 
liberal historiography in the post-World War I era was 
taking place against the background of the erosion of the 
bases of the old agrarian-commercial order in southern 
Africa, the spread of poverty in the African reserves, the 
large-scale migration of Africans to the urban areas and 
the resultant problems of social control, and the formation 
of potentially formidable, if unstable, political alliances 
between sections of the exploited African proletariat and 
frustrated and militant elements of the emerging African 
petty bourgeoisie. For liberal intellectuals these 
developments posed a profound dilemma. 55 On the one hand 
they were concerned about the possible political 
consequences of increased legal entrenchment of 
discrimination against Africans, and of the increasing 
suppression of the material and political aspirations of 
the African 'elite'. On the other, they were fearful about 
the threat which, to their minds, the processes of African 
urbanization and proletarianization presented to 'civilized 
values' (read 'capitalist order') in South Africa. The 
response of the historians among them was two-fold. 56 In 
55. On the nature of South African liberalism between the 
wars see P. Rich, White Power and the Liberal Conscience: 
Racial Segregation and South African Liberalism, 
Johannesburg, 1984, chs. 1-3; s. Dubow, '"Understanding the 
native mind": the impact of anthropological thought on 
segregationist discourse in South Africa, 1919-1933', 
unpublished conference paper, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1984', pp. 1-22; s. Dubow, 'Race, 
civilisation and culture: the elaboration of segregationist 
discourse in the inter-war years', in S. Marks & S. 
Trapido, eds., The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism 
in Twentieth-Century South Africa, London, 1987, ch. 2. 
Less critical studies are R. Elphick, 'Mission Christianity 
and interwar liberalism', in J. Butler et al., eds., 
Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and 
Prospect, Middletown, Conn., & Cape Town, 1987, ch. 3; and 
J. Butler, 'Interwar liberalism and local activism', in 
Butler et al., eds., Democratic Liberalism, ch. 4. 
56. On liberal historiography from the 1920s to the 1950s 
see M. Legassick, 'The frontier tradition in south African 
historiography', in S. Marks & A. Atmore, eds., Economy and 
Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, London, 1980, ch. 
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reaction against the racism of settler historiography, they 
turned their attention to the history of 'race relations' 
in South Africa, and, to enable liberals the better to 
grapple with the complex ramifications of the 'native 
problem', they began to focus on the nature of the 
historical forces which, as they saw it, had drawn Africans 
and whites into a common society. Those fields of history 
which offered little or nothing by way of an explanation of 
these issues tended to be neglected. 
As a result, research i~to precolonial history, whether 
locally focussed as in Bryant's works, or broadly focussed 
as in those of Theal, virtually died out. This meant that 
the devastation stereotype escaped the critical scrutiny of 
the first generation of academic historians to emerge in 
South Africa. with their main fields of interest lying 
elsewhere, these historians were content to absorb Theal's 
generalized view of the 'Zulu devastations' into their own 
work, even if in the process they were concerned to strip 
it of its more racist forms of expression. Thus in the 
works of writers like Walker, Agar-Hamilton, Macmillan, 
Hattersley, De Kock, De Kiewiet and others, the notion 
remained quite unchallenged that Natal had been swept 
almost clear of inhabitants during wars of extermination 
waged by Shaka and the Zulu. For many of these writers, 
the history of these upheavals was simply an appendage of 
the history of the Cape eastern frontier; for others it was 
a preface to the Great Trek. 57 
2; C. Saunders, 'Liberal historiography before 1945', in 
Butler et al., eds., Democratic Liberalism, ch. 7; J. 
Butler & D. Schreuder, 'Liberal historiography since 1945', 
in Butler at al., eds., Democratic Liberalism, pp. 148-
56; Saunders, Making of the South African Past, chs. 5-9. 
57. E. Walker, A Modern History for South Africans, Cape 
Town, 1926, p. 225; E. Walker, A History of South Africa, 
London, 1928, pp. 182-3; J. Agar-Hamilton, The Native 
Policy of the Voortrekkers, Cape Town, n.d. (1928), pp. 
2-3; W.M. Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton: the Making of 
the South African Native Problem, London, 1929, pp. 13-14; 
A.F. Hattersley, South Africa 1652-1933, London, 1933, p. 
75; M.H. de Kock, The Economic Development of South Africa, 
London, n.d. (1936), p. 32: C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of 
South Africa Social and Economic, Oxford, 1941, pp. 49-50. 
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The stereotype did not survive in early liberal 
historiography simply by default. Part of the neglect of 
African history by liberal historians from the 1920s onward 
must also be put down to their elitist attitude to the 
culture of the African underclasses, and to their 
ambivalence on the issue of what political rights to accord 
to Africans. 58 Even if liberals rejected the notions put 
forward by racial theorists in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries to the effect that the African 'race' was 
incapable of 'catching up' with the civilization of the 
European race, until at least the 1950s many of them still 
thought of cultural differences in strongly evolutionist 
and hierarchical terms. Africans were expected to 'adapt' 
their own cultures in the direction of European culture, 
and, in effect, to reject their own past, which had little, 
if anything, to do with 'progress'. From the 1920s, 
African history was largely discounted by liberal 
intellectuals, and the study of African societies was' 
increasingly seen as belonging to the emerging discipline 
of anthropology rather than to history. 
For their part, the social anthropologists who were 
being appointed to posts in South Africa at this time were 
by and large much more concerned with the nature and 
operation of African 'social systems', and with the 
interaction between different 'cultures', than they were 
with history.59 The result was a marked dehistoricizing 
of what by the 1920s was coming to be called African 
58. On this ambivalence see Rich, White Power, passim; 
Saunders, 'Liberal historiography before 1945', in Butler 
et al. eds., Democratic Liberalism, pp. 139, 145; Butler & 
Schreuder, 'Liberal historiography since 1945', in Butler 
et aI, eds., Democratic Liberalism, pp. 154-6; D. Irvine, 
'The Liberal Party, 1953-1968', in Butler et al., eds., 
Democratic Liberalism, pp. 117-19, 125-30. 
59. Rich, White Power, ch. 3; Dubow, '''Understanding the 
native mind"', unpubl. paper, pp. 2-9; Dubow, 'Race, 
civilisation and culture', in Marks & Trapido, eds., The 
Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism, pp. 80-88. 
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studies, and the entrenchment of the ahistorical 
sociologies of African societies which had begun to emerge 
early in the century.60 Now that autonomous African 
societies had been thoroughly subjugated, their versions of 
history did not have to be contested as fiercely as had 
been the case in the era of white settlement; to a large 
extent their new overlords could simply disregard their 
history altogether. 
In the years between the two world wars, one of the 
central concerns of South African liberal intellectuals was 
to try to identify the 'problems' in white-black 'race 
relations' which were seen as preventing orderly social 
evolution towards the 'civilized' society which they 
ardently hoped for. Liberal historians were concerned to 
look for the historical roots of those problems as one 
means of working towards their solution. After the 
National Party's electoral victory of 1948, and the further 
entrenchment of racial discrimination and repression, the 
problem for these historians came to be to explain why 
whites had taken the 'wrong road' and refused to share 
power with blacks. The focus of their work swung further 
towards white political and constitutional history, with a 
concomitant further decline in the attention paid to the 
histc~y of African societies. 61 
If early liberal historiography showed little interest 
either in the history of African societies, or in the 
history of Natal before the advent of Europeans, these 
subjects received even less attention in the Afrikaner 
nationalist historiography that was emerging from the early 
years of the 20th century onwards. Whether it was in 
60. In works such as D. Kidd, The Essential Kafir, London, 
1904; D. Kidd, Kafir Socialism, London, 1908; S. Olivier, 
White Capital and Coloured Labour, London, 1906, ch 9; M. 
Evans, Black and White in South-East Africa, London, 1911. 
61. Saunders, 'Liberal historiography before 1945', in 
Butler et al., eds., Democratic Liberalism, p. 147; Butler 
& Schreuder, 'Liberal historiography since 1945', in Butler 
et al., eds., Democratic Liberalism, pp. 151-4, 160-1. 
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popular histories or in the works of the professional 
historians who were becoming established in the Afrikaans-
language universities after World War I, the focus of this 
historiography was overwhelmingly on the history of Dutch-
Afrikaner societies from the Great Trek to the South 
African war of 1899-1902. So far as it touched on the 
history of pre-Trek Natal, it simply reproduced the 
stereotypes entrenched by Natal settler historiography and 
by Theal and other contemporary writers, though now placing 
them in the context of Voortrekker history rather than in 
the context of Natal's history or the history of African 
societies. In this context, the devastation stereotype 
served conveniently to portray Natal as having been emptied 
of population before the coming of the Voortrekkers. 62 
Together with contemporary liberal historians, then, 
Afrikaner nationalist historians carried the devastation 
stereotype, set in the context of settler history, from the 
early 20th century through into the 1960s. 
6. The stereotype africanized 
It was not until the 1960s that there was a revival of 
interest in the writing of the history of the African 
societies of southern Africa. The main stimUlUS to this 
development was the revolution in African historiography 
which accompanied the political decolonization of most of 
the continent north of the Zambezi in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. 63 The emergence of African nationalist 
62. S. Gie, Geskiedenis vir suid-Afrika, vol. 2, 
Stellenbosch, 1928, p. 306; E. Jansen, Die Voortrekkers in 
Natal: Opstelle, Cape Town, 1938, p. 1; A. du Plessis, 'Die 
republiek Natalia', Archives Year Book for South African 
History, 1942, part I, Cape Town, 1943, ch. 1; A. van der 
Walt, 'Die Groot Trek tot 1838', in A. van der Walt et al., 
eds., Geskiedenis van suid-Afrika, vol. 1, Cape Town, 1951, 
p. 264. 
63. On the development of Africanist historiography see 
P.D. Curtin, African History, American Historical 
Association publ. no. 56, New York, 1964, pp. 1-8; T. 
Hodgkin, 'Where the paths began', in C. Fyfe, ed., African 
Studies since 1945: a Tribute to Basil Davidson, London, 
1976, pp. 6-16; I. Wallerstein, 'The evolving role of the 
Africa scholar in African studies', Canadian Jnl. Afr. 
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movements and the ending of colonial rule outside the 
white-dominated states and colonies of the south generated 
an eager demand among African political activists and 
students, and among sympathizers in Europe and North 
America, for a 'decolonized' African history, one which 
would rescue Africans from the virtual oblivion to which 
they had been consigned by colonial historiography, and one 
which emphasized African 'achievements'. In the 1960s, an 
alliance of African nationalist and metropolitan liberal 
historians made the writing of this kind of history 
something of a growth industry at universities in Europe, 
North America and in black-dominated Africa. 
The tendency in much of this history was to romanticize 
'traditional' African culture, and to emphasize the 
continuities in African history between the precolonial 
past and the postcolonial present, with the period of 
European colonial rule being seen as a period of corruption 
and disruption of African culture and 'development'. 
Favourite themes were the emergence of great states in 
precolonial Africa, the mounting of resistance to European 
conquest and colonial subjugation, the growth of African 
nationalism, and the role of leaders, past and present. 
within this context there was published in 1966 the 
first work since Theal's to attempt a broad synthesis of 
the history of the upheavals 'hilich had taken place in 
south-east Africa in the 1820s and 1830s. This was J.D. 
Omer-Cooper's full-l~ngth study, The Zulu Aftermath: a 
Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa. In 
important respects Omer-Cooper's account was similar to 
Theal's. It saw the violence of the period as having 
emanated from a single epicentre, the Zulu kingdom, and as 
having radiated outward across much of southern and central 
Africa. Drawing on ideas previously put forward by writers 
studies, vol. 17 (1983), pp. 9-16; C. Neale, Writing 
'Independent' History: African Historiography, 1960-1980, 
Westport, Conn., 1985, ch. 1. 
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like Gluckman,64 Omer-Cooper attributed the ultimate causes 
of the upheavals to a build-up of population pressure in 
south-east Africa in the later 18th century, rather than to 
the personality of Shaka, as Theal had done. He went 
beyond Theal in seeing the effects of the violence as 
having extended over wide areas of Central Africa, and as 
having persisted into the latter half the 19th century. 
But, as the title of his book indicates, like Theal he was 
looking for a compendium explanation to cover what he saw 
as a single historical phenomenon. 65 
In two respects, though, Omer-Cooper introduced major 
innovations into the treatment of the subject. In the first 
place, in sharp contrast to Theal, who had emphasized the 
violence and bloodshed that had accompanied the upheavals 
in order to portray them as an indication of African 
barbarism and savagery, Omer-Cooper depicted them in 
positive terms as marking 'one of the great formative 
events of African history', as an episode of 'nation-
building' on the part of 'a galaxy of great leaders,.66 In 
the second place, he gave the upheavals a single label, one 
which has stuck both in academic and in popular usage ever 
since. This was the term 'mfecane', which he gave as 
meaning 'the wars and disturbances which accompanied the 
rise of the Zulu,.67 The word had been used sporadically in 
the literature since the 1920s, though without a clearly 
defined meaning. 68 Omer-Cooper both standardized its 
meaning and project~d it into general usage. In The Zulu 
Aftermath the compendium concept which had emerged in 
Theal's works in the late 19th century, and which in 
attenuated and sanitized form had been incorporated into 
64. Gluckman, 'The kingdom of the Zulu', in Fortes & Evans-
Pritchard, eds., African Political Systems, p. 25. 
65. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, introduction & pp. 19-27. 
66. Ibid., pp. 4-7. 
67. Ibid., p. 5n. 
68. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane', unpubl. paper, 
University of the Witwatersrand, p. 5. 
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liberal historiography from the 1920s onward, was greatly 
amplified, given a positive gloss, and labelled for 
convenient usage. 
In his treatment of the region south of the Thukela, to 
which he devoted a chapter, Orner-Cooper drew heavily on 
Bryant's Olden Times in Zululand and Natal to produce a 
much more detailed account than Theal had been able to 
do. 69 His was the first academic history to indicate 
clearly that Shaka's armies had been preceded into Natal by 
'waves' of non-Zulu invaders (Bulpin, also drawing on 
Bryant, had previously done the same thing in a popular 
account70 ), but the paradigm within which he was working 
prevented him from using the evidence at his disposal to 
break with the devastation stereotype. With his main focus 
on the 'building' of great states by great leaders, he was 
little concerned to look at the separate histories of the 
societies that became subject to them. By his own account, 
Orner-Cooper was not interested in trying to unravel the 
history of Natal before the period of upheavals. 71 The 
result was that he ended up, as Bryant had done, by making 
the Zulu his main actors, and leaving the societies of 
Natal, together with their non-Zulu assailants, as all 
alike the victims of the mighty, all-conquering Zulu state. 
The Zulu Aftermath served to give the devastation 
stereotype further academic respectability, and, by 
presenting it as an integral part of the long-established 
and now revamped notion freshly packaged as the 'mfecane', 
to publicize it more widely than ever. From this time on, 
the history of the stereotype was closely intertwined with 
that of mfecane-theory. 
Few works on southern African history have had so 
immediate and widespread an effect as The Zulu Aftermath. 
As Cobbing has pointed out, within a few years of the 
69. Orner-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, ch. 10. 
70. T.V. Bulpin, To the Shores of Natal, Cape Town, n.d. 
(1953), pp. 40-7. 
71. Orner-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, p. 33n. 
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book's publication both the term mfecane (or difaqane) and 
the notion that the mfecane was one of the central events 
of southern African history had become embedded in 
Africanist discourse outside South Africa. 72 It was widely 
established in general histories of Africa,73 in academic 
articles and monographs,74 in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,75 and in university and schools text books. 76 
In South Africa, the emergence of an academic Africanist 
historiography lagged some years behind its development 
elsewhere. In the 1960s liberal and Afrikaner nationalist 
historians alike remained primarily concerned with white 
political and, to a lesser extent, social history. The 
devastation stereotype lived on in their works in much the 
same forms as it had been cast by academic historians in 
the 1920s. Thus the first general history of Natal to be 
published since Russell's work early in the century, 
Brookes and Webb's History of Natal, which appeared in 
1965, drew uncritically on Bryant for its interpretation of 
72. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane', unpubl. paper, 
University of the Witwatersrand, pp. 5-7; Cobbing, 'The 
myth of the mfecane', unpubl. paper, pp. 8-9. 
73. For example R. Hallett, Africa to 1875: a Modern 
History, Ann Arbor, 1970, pp. 239-40; R.W. July, A History 
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Gailey, History of Africa from 1800 to Present, New York, 
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p. 281. 
76. For example, R. Oliver & A. Atmore, Africa since 1800, 
2nd ed., Cambridge, 1972, p. 55; J.D. Omer-Cooper et al., 
The Making of Modern Africa, vol. 1, London, 1968, ch. 8; 
G.S. Were, A History of South Africa, London, 1974, ch. 5; 
G. Parker & P. Pfukani, History of Southern Africa, London, 
1975, ch. 5. 
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the regime's precolonial history.77 So too did the 
popularizers, such as Bulpin, Ritter, Binns, Becker and 
Morris who in those years were helping to revive interest 
in the history of Natal and Zululand, and who, in advance 
of local academics, were tackling topics in the history of 
African societies. 78 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s South African 
academics began to catch on to the notion of the mfecane. 
The first to do so were Afrikaner nationalist historians, 
who were quick to spot the support which mfecane-theory 
lent to the ideologically important notion that the first 
white settlers in the interior of southern Africa had moved 
into a land largely depopulated by inter-African warfare. 79 
A little later, under the influence of overseas 
Africanists, liberal writers began to incorporate the 
mfecane into their work as the fons et origo of the 
processes of African 'state-formation' (another term for 
'nation-building') round which they wrote the history of 
African societies in south-eastern Africa in the first half 
of the 19th century.80 They were followed by some African 
77. Brookes & Webb, History of Natal, pp. 7-14. 
78. T.V. Bulpin, Shaka's Country, Cape Town, 1952, and To 
the Shores of Natal, Cape Town, n.d. (1953); E.A. Ritter, 
Shaka Zulu: the Rise of the Zulu Empire, London, 1955; C.T. 
Binns, The Last Zulu King: the Life and Death of Cetshwayo, 
London, 1963, and Dinuzulu: the Death of the House of 
Shaka, London, 1968; P. Becker, Rule of Fear, London, 1966; 
D.R. Morris, The Washing of the Spears, London, 1966. 
79. C.F.J. Muller, 'The period of the Great Trek, 1834-
1854', in C.F.J. Muller, ed., Five Hundred Years: a History 
of South Africa, Pretoria & Cape Town, 1969, p. 125; D. 
Ziervogel, 'The natives of South Africa', in Muller, ed., 
Five Hundred Years, pp. 445-8; F.A. van Jaarsveld, Van Van 
Riebeeck tot Verwoerd 1652-1966, Johannesburg, 1971, ch. 7; 
J.P. van S. Bruwer, article on Shaka in Standard 
Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, vol. 9, Cape Town, 1973, 
p. 598; C.F.J. Muller, Die Oorsprong van die Groot Trek, 
Cape Town, 1974, esp. pp. 74-83. 
80. For example, the present author's Bushman Raiders of 
the Drakensberg 1840-1870, Pietermaritzburg, 1971, pp. 15-
17; several of the articles in C. Saunders & R. Derricourt, 
eds., Beyond the Cape Frontier, London, 1974; C. de B. 
Webb, 'Of orthodoxy, heresy and the difaqane', unpublished 
paper, University of the Witwatersrand, 1974, and 'The 
Mfecane', in Perspectives on the Southern African Past, 
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nationalist writers, particularly those sympathetic to Zulu 
ethnic nationalism, for whom the 'nation-building' aspects 
of the mfecane were an obvious attraction. 81 
By the later 1970s the mfecane was an established 'fact' 
of southern African history. Though by then a reaction 
against the more uncritical assumptions and assertions of 
Africanist history was manifesting itself among liberal and 
radical-revisionist historians alike,82 the mfecane lived 
on in South A~rica and abroad virtually unchallenged. 83 In 
1983 mfecane-theory was reproduced in standardized form in 
the first academic dictionary of South African history to 
be published. 84 In 1986 it achieved coffee-table status,85 
and in 1987, some twenty years on from The Zulu Aftermath, 
it was re-invigorated by Omer-Cooper himself in a new text 
book on South African history.86 In the late 1980s 
Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, 1979, 
ch. 9; T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: a Modern History, 
1st ed., Johannesburg, 1977, pp. 10-17. 
81. E.g. J.K. Ngubane, 'Shaka's social, political and 
military ideas', in D. Burness, ed., Shaka King of the 
Zulus in African Literature, Washington, D.C. 1976, 
pp. 140, 147. 
82. T.O. Ranger, 'Towards a usable African past', in Fyfe, 
ed., African Studies since 1945, pp. 17-30; A. Triulzi, 
'Decolonizing African history', in R. Samuel, ed., People's 
History and Socialist Theory, London, 1981, pp. 286-97; A. 
Temu, & B. swai, Historians and Africanist History : a 
Critique, London, 1981, passim; Neale, Writing 'Indepen-
dent' History, passim; D. Newbury, 'Africanist historical 
studies in the united states: metamorphosis or meta-
stasis?', in B. Jewsiewicki & D. Newbury, eds., African 
Historiographies: What History for Which Africa?, Beverly 
Hills, 1986, ch. 12. 
83. Besides Cobbing's work, the only critique so far to 
have been published is a derivative article by V.E. satir 
entitled 'The Difaqane: fact vs. fiction', Educational 
Journal, vol. 55, no. 2 (1983), pp. 6-10. 
84. C. Saunders, Historical Dictionary of South Africa, 
Metuchen, N.J., & London, 1983, pp. 107-8. 
85. R. Edgecombe, 'The Mfecane or Difaqane', in T. Cameron 
& S.B. spies, eds., An Illustrated History of South Africa, 
Johannesburg, 1986, ch. 9. 
86. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, ch. 4. 
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liberals, radicals, African nationalists, and Afrikaner 
nationalists continued in an unlikely, if unwitting, 
alliance, some propounding, some merely accepting, but 
virtually none challenging the validity of the notion of 
the mfecane. 
Mfecane-theory emerged at a time when historians outside 
southern Africa were seeking to break away from racist and 
patronizing colonial cliches about African culture and 
African history. It is easy to understand why the notion of 
the mfecane as a period of African nation-building caught 
on so rapidly among them, and why it survives today in the 
uncritically Africanist histories that continue to be 
produced. It is easy, too, to understand the continuing 
attraction of mfecane-theory's 'depopulation' thesis for 
the ideologues of apartheid. 
More problematic is the failure of contemporary critical 
liberal and radical-revisionist scholarship to challenge 
mfecane-theory. At a superficial level this failure can be 
explained in terms of the general decline of interest among 
scholars abroad in African history since about the mid-
1970s. 87 Researchers are thinner on the ground than they 
used to be in the days of the Africanist boom, and they 
have had little incentive to tamper with what appears to be 
a coherent and firmly grounded set of notions which puts 
the precolonial African states of southern Africa firmly on 
the historical map. In South Africa itself, after a brief 
flowering in the 1970s, interest in the region's 
precolonial history has waned as liberal and radical 
historians have increasingly focussed their research and 
debates on the effects of capitalist penetration in 
southern Africa from the late 19th century onward. Partly, 
then, mfecane-theory survives today by default. 
87. Ranger, 'Towards a usable African past', in Fyfe, ed., 
African Studies since 1945, p. 17; P.O. curtin, 'African 
History', in M. Kammen, ed., The Past before Us: 
contemporary Historical writing in the United States, 
Ithaca & London, 1980, p. 115. 
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But, at a deeper level of explanation, it survives, as 
Cobbing has argued, largely because it functions to obscure 
the processes by which whites came to be politically 
dominant and in possession of most of the land south of the 
Limpopo river. 88 By omitting the role of white agency in 
the upheavals of the 1820s and 1830s, and by attributing 
them ultimately to the rise of the Zulu kingdom, mfecane-
theory is able to portray them as a consequence of 
internecine African conflict. African agency thus becomes 
responsible for opening the way for the penetration of 
white settlers into a largely 'empty' interior, and the 
land-grabbing of whites later in the century can be down-
played. Cobbing's argument perhaps overstresses the 
strength and cohesion of white settler societies in the 
19th century, but its central point seems essentially 
correct. For liberal defenders of the capitalist order in 
South Africa, as well as for the ideologues of the 
country's bantustan policies, mfecane-theory helps to 
provide a convenient explanation of the historical basis of 
South Africa's present-day patterns of land distribution. 
Among radical historians too mfecane-theory survives 
today partly for ideological reasons. The structuralist 
theories which were dominant among radical writers in South 
Africa in the 1970s did not encourage detailed scrutiny of 
historical evidence. While the reaction on the part of 
many contemporary radical historians against the often 
reductionist analyses that were generated by their 
predecessors has made for the production of a far more 
textured and nuanced kind of history, it has also meant a 
loss of much of the political punch which radical history 
carried a decade ago. with their focus often on 
microstudies, and with their tendency to be suspicious of 
schematizing and generalization, present-day radical 
historians are often less overtly concerned than the 
88. cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, 
University of the Witwatersrand, pp. 1, 7-8, 16, and 'The 
myth of the mfecane', unpublished paper, pp. 1, 9-10, 30. 
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previous generation was to identify and hammer away at the 
ideological props, such as mfecane-theory, which help 
sustain the current racial and social order in South 
Africa. 
7. Conclusion 
A hundred and sixty years after it first surfaced, the 
devastation stereotype lives on, embedded now in mfecane-
theory. Cape merchant interests created it in the 1820s 
and 1830s on the basis of hearsay evidence. Natal settlers 
from the 1840s onward, the first South Africanists in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, and Afrikaner 
nationalist historians from the early 20th century onward 
all had a common vested interest in keeping it alive. 
Early liberal historians in South Africa, with their 
attentions elsewhere, incorporated it as an element in what 
they saw as the not very important history of the country's 
African underclasses. Later liberal historians, first 
outside and then inside South Africa, helped resuscitate 
and reconstruct it in a way that made it acceptable to 
emerging African nationalist elites. After a brief period 
of concern with developing new approaches both to pre-
industrial history and to the macrohistory of southern 
Africa, the majority of radical historians turned away 
towards the more recent past and towards a less 
deliberately politicized social history, leaving the 
stereotype intact. Present-day writers of all shades of 
opinion continue to pick it up from the previous literature 
and to incorporate it into their own work without 
attempting to seek empirical verification for it. Natal's 
mfecane exists today by virtue not of historical 
argumentation but of uncritical repetition of a colonial-
made myth. 
The primary evidence on which the stereotype is based is 
minimal in extent: a few sentences in tendentious accounts 
written by traders at Port Natal in the 1820s; the brief 
notes on 'Shaka's wars' recorded by colonial ideologues -
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Grout, Fynn, Shepstone - in the 1850s and 1860s. 
Traditions on the subject published in Zulu by Fuze and 
stuart in the 1920s (see pp. 13, 16 above) were fed into 
the version of the stereotype produced by Bryant in his 
Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, but the original texts 
remained quite outside either the ken or the field of 
interest of the academics who dominated the production of 
South African history from this time onward. 
The writings of materialist historians since the mid-
1970s on the emergence of the Zulu state, together with the 
evidence available in the James Stuart Collection, provide 
the basis for an entirely new rendering of the history of 
the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the 1810s and 1820s. But 
before this can be put forward, the process of exorcising 
the devastation stereotype has to be taken a step further. 
So long as Bryant's magisterial and apparently 
authoritative account of the 'Zulu devastations' of Natal 
is allowed to stand unchallenged, so long will the 
stereotype be able to survive alongside any new 
interpretation put forward. Bryant is far too deeply 
entrenched as an authority simply to be brushed aside: his 
account has to be confronted in detail. The next chapter 
therefore moves on to a critical analysis of Bryant's 
treatment of the upheavals which took place south of the 
Thukela in the 1810s and 1820s. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE 'DEVASTATIONS' OF THE 1810s AND 1820s: A CRITIQUE OF 
BRYANT'S ACCOUNT 
1. Bryant's account: an outline 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Bryant presents his 
account of the upheavals of the 1810s and 1820s mainly 
through the medium of numerous individual 'tribal' 
histories. Nowhere in Olden Times does he put forward a 
coherent narrative history of the period: an integrated 
account therefore has to be recovered from numerous 
different points in the text. A reconstruction of his 
exposition indicates that between about 1818 and 1822 or 
1823 most of the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region was laid waste 
by four successive 'waves' of invaders fleeing from 
political turmoil north of the Thukela caused primarily by 
the aggressive expansion of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka. 
These waves were followed by a series of campaigns mounted 
into Natal by Zulu armies. By about 1823-4, according to 
Bryant's reckoning, most of the region was a desolate 
waste. 
The first wave was set in motion by the Ndwandwe, who, 
for reasons which Bryant does not explain, fell upon the 
nearby Ngwane and 'drove them in headlong panic' out of 
their territory in what is now the Vryheid area. 1 Under 
their chief, Matiwane kaMasumpa, the Ngwane fled south-
westward into the territory of the Hlubi, killed their 
chief, and scattered his people. Turning to the south, 
the Ngwane then cut their way through the Bhele chiefdoms, 
and made their way to the upper Thukela region. Here, 
after expelling the zizi inhabitants, they proceeded to 
1. OT, P . 138. 
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re-establish themselves. 2 In front of them, numbers of 
displaced Hlubi, Bhele and zizi made their way southwards 
through upland Natal and across the Mzimkhulu, in turn 
ejecting peoples like the Tholo whom they found in their 
way.3 Some of these refugees remained in the Mzimkhulu-
Mzimvubu region; others continued southward to find 
protection among the Gcaleka Xhosa. 4 
The second wave of 'slaughter and devastation' was 
begun in about 1820 by the Thernbu of the lower Mzinyathi-
Thukela region. 5 After repelling a Zulu attack, the 
Thembu, under their chief Ngoza kaMkhubukeli decided to 
seek safety in flight. Crossing the Thukela, the Thembu 
'horde' swarmed southwards through the Natal midlands, 
killing and plundering and destroying. It then made its 
way through what is now East Griqualand, and crossed the 
Mzimvubu into the territory of the Mpondo. After an 
initially hospitable reception, the Thembu were attacked 
by the Mpondo, who killed Ngoza and scattered his people. 
Some remained in the vicinity; others eventually made 
their way to the Zulu chiefdom and gave the: allegiance 
to Shaka. 6 
The third trail 'of blood and ruin and miseries 
inexpressible' was drawn across Natal in about 1821 by the 
Chunu under Macingwane kaJama. 7 The Chunu territory 
bordered on the east the region abandoned by the Thembu, 
and, soon after the flight of the latter, the Chunu too 
decamped southwards en masse to escape a threatened Zulu 
attack. ' (F)uriously driving before them their wealth of 
cattle, murdering, plundering, capturing anything and 
anybody, as opportunities offered or occasion compelled',8 
2. Ibid. , pp. 138-9, 150, 253, 347-8, 357, 368-9. 
3 . Ibid. , pp. 150, 347, 357-8. 
4. Ibid. , pp. 150, 347, 358. 
5. Ibid. , p. 253. 
6. Ibid. , pp. 253-8. 
7. Ibid. , p. 267. 
8. Ibid. , p. 268. 
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the Chunu crossed the Thukela and forced their way through 
the chiefdoms of the midlands along a route which took 
them a little to the east of that followed by the Thembu. 
On reaching the Mzimkhulu river in the vicinity of what is 
now Creighton, they halted and began to settle themselves 
into a new 'Eden'. A season later they were attacked by a 
Zulu army, pursued to Nsikeni hill near what is now 
Swartberg, and cut to pieces. Macingwane himself, with a 
small following, managed to escape, but, while making his 
way back to the Zulu kingdom, where he intended to cast 
himself on Shaka's mercy, he was killed by cannibals. A 
number of his adherents, including some of his sons, 
eventually reached the Zulu country and submitted to 
Shaka. 9 
The fourth wave was composed of a 'confederacy' of the 
Dunge, Fuze, Nyamvini and, for a while, Bombo chiefdoms 
from the upper Mvoti region, together with two Nhlangwini 
chiefdoms from the middle Thukela and the Memela from the 
Ndaka (Sundays) river. Left exposed to Zulu attacks by 
the flight of the Thembu and Chunu, these chiefdoms had 
made an alliance in order to force their way through the 
chiefdoms which barred their way to the south. Shortly 
after the flight of the Chunu, the confederates struck out 
along a nearly similar route. After fighting their way to 
the Mkhomazi river, they split up, with the Nhlangwini and 
Memela continuing southwards across the Mzimkhulu, while 
the rest retraced their steps to the territories which 
they had formerly occupied. 10 
The ravages of the Ngwane, Bhele, Thembu, Chunu and 
confederacy between about 1818 and 1821 left most of 
inland Natal a howling wilderness. '(I)n pursuit of all', 
according to Bryant, 'came the armies of Shaka, roaming 
and ravaging wherever human beings or cattle presented 
9. Ibid. pp. 267-72. 
10. Ibid., pp. 376-80, 409, 491, 551. The word 
'confederacy' first occurs on p. 377. 
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themselves for capture or attack,.ll In about 1821 a Zulu 
force worked its way up the south bank of the Thukela from 
Ntunjambili mountain (near what is now Kranskop) to about 
the confluence of the Thukela and Mpofana (Mooi). It 
broke up some of the chiefdoms of this region, drove out 
others, and forced the rest to give their allegiance to 
Shaka. 12 At much the same time another force destroyed 
the chiefdoms of the lower Mngeni region. 13 What was 
possibly the same force broke up the Thuli chiefdom 
between the Mngeni and Mkhomazi. 14 In 1822 Shaka launched 
an expedition to attack the Ngwane under Matiwane who had 
established themselves on the upper Thukela some four 
years before, and drove them over the Drakensberg onto the 
highveld. 15 In the same year the Zulu attacked the Fuze 
on the mid-Mvoti, and, possibly in a separate campaign, 
devastated most of the lower Mvoti valley.16 In 1824 the 
Cele on the lower Mvoti were subjugated, and the 
neighbouring Ndlovu broken up. Also in that year, the 
Bombo south of the middle Mvoti were dispersed. 17 By the 
time the first white traders arrived on the scene in 1824, 
the devastation of Natal was complete. 
2. The theory of the 'four waves' 
Bryant's account as outlined above has remained virtually 
unchallenged for sixty years, and, on an uncritical 
reading, seems as if it must remain the last word on its 
subject. Embedded as it is in the volume's nearly 700 
pages of apparently authoritative text, and presented in 
chapters with such resounding titles as 'The battles and 
11. Ibid., p. 555. 
12. Ibid., pp. 409, 507, 510-14,520-3. 
13. Ibid., pp. 555-7. 
14. Ibid., p. 503. 
15. Ibid., pp. 139-40, 557. 
16. Ibid., pp. 254, 491-2, 525, 530, 532, 535. 
17. Ibid., pp. 537,538-40, 545, 552-3, 554. 
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barbarities of the redoubtable Matiwane', 'The Cunus flee 
from the wrath to come', 'Tribal anarchy in Natal', and 
'Pandemonium in No-Man's-land continued', it has all the 
appearances of being based on established fact. The 
paucity of references to source material leaves the reader 
with the impression that most of it, like the volume as a 
whole, is firmly grounded in the oral testimonies which, 
the author indicates in his preface, he collected over a 
period of forty-five years of work in 'the Zulu domain,.18 
Systematic investigation of the structure and sources 
of Bryant's account in fact reveals a very different 
picture. A simple count shows that the core descriptions 
of the 'four waves' and of the 'Zulu campaigns', 
references to which abound in the text, are contained in a 
total of less than thirty pages, many of which are replete 
with Bryant's own inimitable effusions. An initial 
comparison of the account in Olden Times with the one in 
his 'Sketch' of 1905, and with the one contained in the 
articles which appeared in Izindaba Zabantu in 1910-13, 
turns up some significant differences. The sequence of 
'waves of destruction' which Bryant postulated differs 
from one work to the next, as does the dating of the 
sequence as a whole. The account which appears in Olden 
Times begins to look not so much like a definitive 
statement as like the last in a series of interpretations 
and re-interpretations of evidence that is rather more 
meagre and contradictory than the author makes out. 
This assessment is confirmed by a probe into the 
sources of the notion of the 'four waves' which Bryant 
used as the conceptual framework for his account. Though 
he nowhere acknowledges it, the notion was not original to 
his work: it was in fact derived directly from a document 
researched and written by Theophilus Shepstone as far back 
as 1863-4. This document, entitled 'Historic sketch of 
the tribes anciently inhabiting the Colony of Natal - as 
18. Ibid., p. vii. 
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at present bounded - and Zululand', was, as far as can be 
ascertained, first published in the report of a Cape 
government commission in 1883. 19 It was reprinted in at 
least two other source-books before the pUblication of 
Olden Times,20 and by Bryant's own account he used it in 
the course of his researches. 21 
Shepstone's 'Historic Sketch', together with its 
accompanying tables and maps, originally formed one of two 
enclosures in a despatch on the subject of African land 
rights in Natal sent by the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, 
John Scott, to the Secretary of State in London in 
February 1864. 22 The other enclosure was a document 
entitled 'Tribes which occupied the territory now forming 
the Colony of Natal during the time of Dingiswayo's father 
Jobe, and before they were broken up by Chaka's wars,.23 
This consisted of outline histories, ranging in length 
from a single line to the equivalent of two printed pages, 
of ninety-four 'tribes'. Though, unlike the 'Historic 
sketch', it did not carry a signature, Scott in his 
despatch identified the author as Shepstone. 24 This 
19. Commission on Laws and Customs, part II, pp. 415-20. 
The succession of what Shepstone was the first to call 
'waves' of devastation is outlined on pp. 416-17. 
20. Correspondence Relating to Granting to Natives in 
Natal of Documentary Tribal Titles to Land, (1890?), pp. 
118-29; F. Brownlee, ed., The Transkeian Native 
Territories: Historical Records, Lovedale, 1923, pp. 82-
91. 
21. OT, p. 91. 
22. The despatch (no. 34, Scott to Newcastle, 26 February 
1864) and its enclosures (minus maps) were published as 
Sessional Paper no. 23 of the Natal Legislative Council, 
1890, in Correspondence Relating to ... Tribal Titles to 
Land, pp. 52-136. 
23. The document appears in Correspondence Relating to ... 
Tribal Titles to Land, pp. 95-117. It was first published 
under a slightly different title in 1888 in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, pp. 124-53. 
24. Scott to Newcastle, 26 February 1864, in 
Correspondence Relating ... to Tribal Titles to Land, pp. 
54, 91. 
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collection of tribal histories formed the main empirical 
basis on which the 'Historic sketch' was written. 
scott stated that both documents had been researched 
and written at the behest of the Natal colonial 
government. They had been prepared in order to provide 
the government with a fuller and more accurate picture of 
the historical basis of African claims to land in Natal 
than was available in the report of the Harding Commission 
of 1852-3. 25 According to the Lieutenant-Governor, the 
historical information recorded in the two documents had 
been acquired from African informants summoned to 
Pietermaritzburg specifically to give evidence on the 
region's history. Recording and collating it had taken 
Shepstone 'many months' of 'tedious work,.26 
Very little information on the identities of the 
informants or on the circumstances in which Shepstone's 
interviews with them were conducted can be gleaned from 
the collection of tribal histories. More informative is a 
hand-written draft of the ninety-four tribal histories 
which is to be found in Shepstone's surviving private 
papers in the Natal Archives. 27 In this document, forty-
one of the histories are accompanied by the names of what 
appear to be Shepstone's original informants, together 
with brief biographical notes, and the dates - all falling 
in September 1863 - on which their testimony was given. 
The total number of informants named is eleven. Elsewhere 
in this document app~ars a list, entitled 'Names of 
persons in presence of whom and by whom information was 
given upon which the sketches dated the 7th September were 
made,.28 This list contains fourteen names, including the 
eleven whose names appear with the histories. All of them, 
according to Shepstone, were 'actors in the scenes 
25. Ibid., pp. 54-5. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Natal Archives, T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 89-
154. 
28. Ibid., p. 149. 
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described,.29 Most of them he gives as being between 50 
and 65 years of age. The oldest of them would thus have 
been born in the last years of the 18th century, and the 
youngest early in the second decade of the 19th century. 
Hence at the time of the events which Shepstone describes 
they would have been young children or youths. 
Even allowing for the fact that in the case of fifty of 
the ninety-four histories the informant is not identified, 
and that Shepstone's informants could well have numbered 
more than fourteen, it is clear that his information base 
was very shallow. In the case of thirty-one of the 
histories where the informant is known, he seems to have 
relied for each history on statements made by a single 
informant; in nine cases, that of two informants; and in 
one case, that of three. 30 The evidence as to the degree 
of his own intervention in drawing up the histories is 
contradictory. According to Shepstone himself, they 'were 
written down from the lips of the narrators, and, as near 
as possible, in their words,.31 Scott, on the other hand, 
commented in his covering despatch that 'These sketches 
might have been made much fuller and more interesting, 
but, as they have been made for a special purpose, they 
have been purposely abridged as much as possible,.32 
Either way, the important point is that Shepstone had not 
been conducting research specifically into the history of 
the upheavals supposedly caused by Shaka. His main 
purpose was to establish the geographical location before 
the advent of European settlers in Natal of the 'tribes' 
which were to be found in Natal at the time his interviews 
were conducted. Information on the upheavals was a by-
product of his historical enquiry. 
29. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in commission on Laws 
and Customs, vol. 2, p. 420. 
30. See his attributions of individual histories in T. 
Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 103-46. 
31. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 153. 
32. Correspondence Relating to ... Tribal Titles to Land, p. 
54. 
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In drawing up his outline histories, Shepstone had 
available to him at least one and probably two other 
similar documents. These had been produced by Lewis Grout 
and James Perrin respectively. Grout's collection, as 
presented to the Harding Commission of 1852-3, and 
published in its proceedings, was, by his own account, put 
together from testimony obtained from thirty or more 
African informants, and from records obtained from 'other 
sources', by which he probably meant records made over the 
years by fellow missionaries. 33 He names thirteen of his 
informants and gives biographical information on nine of 
them, six in some detail and three more briefly. His 
evidence formed the basis of the list of tribes and their 
former locations which was published in 1857, with 
acknowledgement to the author, by Joseph Shooter in his 
The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country.34 
Perrin's undated collection consisted of very brief 
historical notes on fifty-four tribes, mostly from 
southern Natal. 35 In the manuscript copy which is to be 
found in the Garden Papers, he gives the names of nineteen 
of his informants, three of whom, including Lewis Grout, 
were missionaries, and one of whom, H.F. Fynn, was a 
government official. Of the fifteen Africans whom he 
identifies, four are also named in Grout's list of 
informants. Perrin, who later made something of a name 
for himself as a lexicographer,36 had arrived in Natal in 
1849,37 and an annotated list of the tribes of Natal based 
33. Grout's evidence to the Harding Commission was 
published in NGG, no. 215, 18 January 1853. It includes 
information on his sources. See also the comments in 
L. Grout, The Autobiography of the Rev. Lewis Grout, 
Brattleboro, vt., n.d. (1905?), pp. 26-7. 
34. London, 1857, pp. 376-82. 
35. Garden Papers, list of 'Aboriginal tribes', pp. 826-
83. 
36. DSAB, vol. 2, entry on James Perrin, pp. 540-1. 
37. My thanks to Shelagh Spencer for this information: 
personal communication, 4 Oct. 1989. 
105 
on his researches was published in 1856: 38 his notes on 
tribal histories were therefore produced at some stage 
between these two dates. certainly by 1853 he had 
produced a map of tribal locations in Natal, 39 and it may 
be that his historical notes had been produced by this 
date as well. As far as is known they remained 
unpublished, but as the author was appointed to a 
clerkship in Shepstone's office in 1853,40 it is likely 
that Shepstone would have known of them and had access to 
them. 
In addition to the historical notes produced by Grout 
and Perrin, Shepstone had available to him a list of 
fifty-six Natal tribes and their individual locations 
before the upheavals of the early 19th century compiled by 
H.F. Fynn and presented by him in his evidence to the 
Harding Commission. 41 To what extent he drew on these 
sources is impossible to say. A comparison between the 
historical notes written by Grout, Perrin and Shepstone 
reveals a sufficient number of differences between them to 
suggest that Shepstone did not draw directly on the work 
of his two predecessors. His coverage extended to ninety-
four tribes, as against the seventy of Grout and the 
fifty-four of Perrin, and paid much more attention than 
either had done to the tribes of inland Natal. Where 
Shepstone's accounts overlapped with those of the other 
two, he tended to emphasize different points of detail. 
None of his fourteen identified informants is among those 
named by Grout or by Perrin. 
38. In Petermann's Geoqraphische Mittheilungen, part x, 
1856. See the reproduction of part of this list in W.H.I. 
Bleek, Zulu Legends, ed. J. Engelbrecht, Pretoria, 1952, 
between pp. 40 & 41; also W.H.I. Bleek, The Natal Diaries 
of Dr W.H.I. Bleek 1855-1856, ed. O.H. Spohr, Cape Town, 
1965, pp. 41-6. 
39. Garden Papers, p. 23, letter from Perrin to Garden, 
11 March 1853. 
40. Garden Papers, p. 1198, letter from Perrin to Garden, 
9 September (1853); Natal Blue Book, 1854, p. 150. 
41. Fynn's evidence was published in NGG, no. 221, 1 March 
1853. 
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In sum, Shepstone's histories were the product mostly 
of the testimony given him by his own informants. 
certainly, though, he used the published evidence of Grout 
and Fynn as checks on these histories. In the covering 
despatch previously referred to, Lieutenant-Governor Scott 
commented that Grout's historical sketches were overall 
'surprisingly correct' and that they were in accordance 
with Fynn's evidence,42 which, in turn, he saw as having 
been 'a valuable statement of facts,.43 It is unlikely 
that Scott himself was in a position to make independent 
judgements of this kind: almost certainly his comments 
were echoing the opinions of Shepstone. 
In producing his histories, Shepstone was, as indicated 
above, working to an official agenda. As Scott's despatch 
makes abundantly clear, his research was motivated 
primarily by the need to disprove white settler arguments 
that most Africans in Natal had no valid claims to 
permanent occupation of land in the colony. To this end 
he was no doubt glad to make the fullest possible use of 
those of Grout's and Fynn' statements which assisted his 
purposes, to the extent, it seems, of glossing them 
without too much criticism. Perrin, for his part, had 
rather different opinions. Grout's list of tribes, he 
wrote to an acquaintance, contained numerous omissions and 
inaccuracies, and his sources of information had been 
limited and imperfect. 44 
The lineage of the 'four waves' theory can now be 
reconstructed. It was based on historical information 
given in the latter months of 1863 by at least eleven and 
possibly more African informants to Theophilus Shepstone 
in his capacity as Secretary for Native Affairs. All his 
informants apparently had first-hand knowledge of at least 
42. Correspondence Relating to ... Tribal Titles to Land, 
p. 88. 
43. Ibid., p. 87. 
44. Garden Papers, p. 25, letter from Perrin to Garden, 11 
March 1853. 
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some of the events of which they spoke. There are no 
records of the circumstances in which their testimony was 
collected, and thus no way of determining how far they 
were led by Shepstone's line of questioning. Shepstone 
was working with an official briefing to collect 
information that would enable the colonial administration 
to assess the rights of the various 'tribes' of Natal to 
occupy land in Natal: he was not specifically 
investigating the conflicts of the early 19th century. In 
a context in which tribes had long since come to 
constitute the basic units in which Africans were 
administered in Natal, Shepstone set out his findings in 
the form of brief outlines of ninety-four separate tribal 
histories. On the basis of these histories, many of which 
were written up from testimony given by a single 
informant, he proceeded to produce his sketch of the 
history of the Natal region from the late 18th century to 
the 1840s. 
Shepstone's researches indicated to him that the 
established notion of the tribes of Natal as virtually all 
having been dispersed or annihilated by Shaka's Zulu 
armies needed a certain degree of modification. The 
testimony which he collected from some of his informants 
suggested that many of the tribes had been broken up, or 
at the very least disturbed, not by the Zulu but by one or 
other of at least four non-Zulu groups of 'refugees' from 
north of the Thukela~ and one from the Natal midlands. 
When he wrote up this information in his 'Historic 
sketch', in keeping with the well-established settler 
stereotype which saw the Zulu as having been the 
devastators of Natal, he depicted these groups as 
successive 'waves' of refugees - in order, the Ngwane, the 
Chunu, the Thembu, and what Shepstone called a 
'confederacy' of small chiefdoms - from actual or 
threatened Zulu attacks in the time of Shaka. Hence the 
chronology which he developed had Shaka as becoming chief 
of the Zulu in c.1810, the flight of the first three waves 
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as taking place in c.1812-13 (the date of c.1819 given on 
p. 416 of his account is a misprint), and the flight of 
the fourth in 1814. 45 How Shepstone arrived at these 
datings is not known. The processes by which he worked 
out the particular sequence of 'waves' which he described 
is somewhat clearer. The flight of the Ngwane had 
supposedly taken place when Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa was 
still alive;46 obviously it should stand first. The 
flight of the Chunu and Thembu, according to one of his 
informants, had stimulated the flight of the confederacy, 
so logically this belonged at the end of the sequence. 
Shepstone's 'Historic sketch' was first published in 
1883. Five years later his collection of tribal histories 
was put into print in Bird's Annals of Natal. 47 These two 
sources, though unacknowledged, formed the main basis of 
the account of the upheavals in the Natal region in the 
early 19th century given by Bryant in his 'Sketch of the 
origin and early history of the Zulu people', published in 
1905. 48 In this account Bryant adopted Shepstone's notion 
of 'waves of violence' having rolled through Natal, 
although in presenting the sequence as Ngwane-Thembu-
Chunu-' confederacy' (the term itself was lifted from 
Shepstone49 ), he inverted the order of Shepstone's waves 
two and three. His dating of these events was 
contradictory. When describing the first wave, which, 
following Shepstone, he dated to 1812, he indicated that 
Shaka had already commenced his reign. At a later point 
he stated that Shaka had begun to rule eight years before 
the coming of white traders to Port Natal in 1824, which 
45. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in commission on Laws 
and Customs, pp. 416, 417, 418. 
46. Ibid., p. 416. 
47. See note 23 above. 
48. In his Dictionary, pp. 12*-66*, esp. pp. 39*-49*. 
49. For Shepstone's use of the term 'confederacy' see 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 131, 132, 136, 146, 147, 
149; Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in commission on Laws 
and Customs, p. 417. 
would have put the date of the chief's accession at 
1816. 50 
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In his next important historical work, constituted by 
the articles which he published in Izindaba labantu in 
1910-13, Bryant presented a different sequence of waves 
and a different chronology. The first wave was composed 
of the Chunu, and was dated to about 1816. 51 In the same 
year followed the flight of the confederacy,52 and some 
two years later, in about 1818, the flight of the 
Thembu. 53 The fourth wave consisted of the Ngwane, and 
was dated by Bryant to about 1819. 54 
By the time Bryant came to write Olden Times he had 
rethought his ideas, for in this work he reverted to the 
notion that the Ngwane had constituted the first wave, 
with the Thembu, Chunu, and confederacy following in that 
order. The dating of the sequence shifted yet further 
forward in time. The flight of the Ngwane was now dated 
to c.1818, that of the Thembu to c.1820, that of the Chunu 
to c.1821, and that of the confederacy also to c.1821. 55 
The table that follows summarizes the history of the 
placing and dating of the four waves by Shepstone and 
Bryant. 
50. Bryant, Dictionary, pp. 39*, 48*. 
51. HZ, pp. 35, 81. 
52. Ibid., pp. 40, 41, 69. 
53. HZ, p. 45. 
54. Ibid., p. 25. 
55. In Olden Times the flight of the Ngwane is dated on 
pp. 136, 150, 347, 368, 377; that of the Thembu on 
pp. 253, 369, 376, 419, 555; that of the Chunu on pp. 267, 
376, 519, 548; and that of the confederacy on pp. 380, 
409, 551, 552. 
110 
Shepstone Bryant Bryant Bryant 
(1883) (1905) (1910-13) (1929) 
1st wave Ngwane Ngwane Chunu Ngwane 
1812-13 1812 1816 1818 
2nd wave Chunu Thembu Confed. Thembu 
1812-13 1816 1820 
3rd wave Thembu Chunu Thembu Chunu 
1812-13 1818 1821 
4th wave Confed. Confed. Ngwane Confed. 
1814 1819 1821 
In sum, Bryant's notion that four successive waves of 
devastation had passed through the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region was not based on his own researches into African 
oral tradition: it was derived directly from Shepstone. 
The latter had conceived it some sixty-five years before 
the publication of Olden Times on the basis of an exiguous 
body of information derived from brief interviews with a 
handful of informants who, quite possibly, had been led by 
their interlocutor's particular line of questioning. He 
had interpreted this information in a way which harmonized 
with, and served to reinforce, the established devastation 
stereotype. Operating within the same broad tradition of 
settler-created history, Bryant appropriated without 
acknowledgement not only the framework but also the 
content of Shepstone's interpretation. To it he made some 
minor modifications and additions, drawn for the most part 
from other published works. The next four sections of the 
chapter will demonstrate in detail the extent to which 
Bryant's narrative of each of the four 'waves' of violence 
which he recognized was based on previously published 
sources, of which much the most important was Shepstone's 
collection of tribal histories. 
3. The first wave 
In writing his account of the history of the Ngwane in the 
1810s and 1820s, Bryant had available to him published 
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sources which were unusually numerous by comparison with 
those that were available on the histories of other 
contemporary chiefdoms in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region. 
This was because the destruction of the chiefdom by 
British and Cape colonial forces, in alliance with Thembu, 
Gcaleka and Mpondo contingents, at the battle of Mbholompo 
in what is now the Transkei in 1828 had generated a 
colonial mythology which produced numerous printed texts 
on this event and on the supposed history of the Ngwane. 56 
In his account, which forms chapter 16 of Olden Times, 
Bryant cited fifteen published sources. A number of 
others, which he did not cite, were also available at the 
time when he wrote the book. 
In keeping with his usual practice, Bryant did not 
footnote his account except to acknowledge direct 
quotations, but it is clear that it was based almost 
exclusively on research into published material rather 
than into oral tradition. His most important source on 
the first phase of the Ngwane migration was Ayliff and 
Whiteside's History of the Abambo, published in 1912, 
which in turn drew heavily on an article published by W.C. 
Scully in The State in 1909. 57 This, in turn, by Scully's 
own account, was based largely on statements taken in 1895 
from Dick Simanga, a half-brother of Matiwane, the Ngwane 
chief in the early 19th century.58 Bryant added snippets 
from Shooter's The Kafirs of Natal, Holden's The Past and 
Future of the Kaffir Races, and Ellenberger and 
Macgregor's History of the Basuto, the last-named of which 
56. For a critical analysis of this mythology see Cobbing, 
'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), pp. 490-2, 
500-503. 
57. J. Ayliff & J. Whiteside, History of the Abambo, Cape 
Town, 1962 (reprint of 1st ed., Butterworth, 1912), 
pp. 7-10; W.C. Scully, 'Fragments of native history. IV. 
The Amahlubi and the Amangwane. I', The State, vol. 2 
(1909), pp. 284-92. 
58. Scully, 'Fragments ... IV', The State, vol. 2 (1909), 
p. 284. 
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drew in part from Theal's Basutoland Records. 59 Theal, 
writing on Ngwane history in the early 1880s, had had 
three recently published testimonies of African informants 
to draw on: it is likely that he used them all. These 
were the statements of Platje Mhlanga, Mehlomakhulu, and 
Moloja, all of whom had participated personally in the 
events which they described. 60 In addition, Bryant 
included an anecdote drawn from James stuart's Zulu reader 
uBaxoxele, the narrator of which (in 1903) had been 
Mashwili kaMngoye. 61 
Comparison of these sources reveals an altogether 
fuzzier and more contradictory picture of the displacement 
of the Ngwane and the first stages of their migration than 
Bryant gave out in Olden Times. Though all the sources 
which locate where the Ngwane lived before their expulsion 
agree that they occupied territory in the north-west of 
what is now the Natal-Zululand region, and that they were 
ejected from it in the course of an attack by another 
group or other groups, they differ markedly as to the 
identity of these assailants. Bryant himself presented 
three different views in his successive historical works. 
In his 'Sketch' he stated that the Ngwane were driven out 
by Shaka and the Zulu either with the sanction or on the 
express orders of their overlord Dingiswayo of the 
Mthethwa. 62 In his article in Izindaba Zabantu, he had 
the Ngwane ejected by Zwide's Ndwandwe, who were in flight 
59. Shooter, Kafirs of Natal (1857), p. 216; Holden, Past 
and Future (1866), p. 21; D.F. Ellenberger & J.C. 
Macgregor, History of the Basuto Ancient and Modern, 
London, 1912, pp. 119, 130; G.M. Theal, ed., Basutoland 
Records, vol. 2, Cape Town, 1964 (reprint of 1st ed., Cape 
Town, 1883), pp. vi, vii. 
60. An Aged Fingo (Platje Mhlanga), 'A story of native 
wars', Cape Monthly Magazine, Jan.-June 1877, pp. 248-52; 
Mehlomakhulu, 'Statement of Mathlomahulu', Cape Monthly 
Magazine, July-Dec. 1880, pp. 163-4; Moloja, 'The story of 
the "Fetcani horde"', Cape Quarterly Review, vol. 1 
(1882), pp. 267-75. 
61. J. Stuart, ed., uBaxoxele, London, 1924, pp. 30-1. 
62. Bryant, Dictionary, p. 39*. 
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after having been defeated in battle by the Zulu. 63 In 
Olden Times, as indicated above, it was still the Ndwandwe 
who were immediately responsible for ousting the Ngwane, 
but they were not in flight from the Zulu and the reason 
for the attack was not given. 
Bryant's contradictory accounts reflected the lack of 
consensus in the primary published sources and in the 
secondary accounts which were based on them. Some of the 
primary sources claimed that the Ngwane had been driven 
out by the Ndwandwe: 64 another, by a combination of 
Ndwandwe and zulu: 65 another, by a combination of Mthethwa 
and Zulu: 66 another, by a combination of Mthethwa, Zulu 
and other chiefdoms: 67 others, by the Zulu alone. 68 The 
authors of early 20th-century histories picked on one or 
other of these accounts and, usually without further 
explanation, incorporated them into their own works as 
uncontested fact. Thus Theal had the Ngwane expelled by 
the Zulu: Ellenberger and Macgregor had them expelled by 
the Ndwandwe: and Ayliff and Whiteside, following Scully, 
had them expelled by the Mthethwa and others. 69 Bryant's 
63. HZ, pp. 14, 25, 33, 35. 
64. Moloja, 'Fetcani horde', Cape Quarterly Review, vol. 1 
(1882), p. 268. See also South African Library, Cape Town, 
G.W. stow Collection, undated ms. entitled 'The intrusion 
of the stronger races', p. 206 (information given by Dick 
Timango/Simango, who was very probably the same person as 
Scully's informant: see p. 111 above). 
65. Mhlanga, 'Story of native wars', Cape Monthly 
Magazine, Jan.-June 1877, p. 249. 
66. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in Commission on Laws 
and Customs, vol. 2, p. 416. 
67. Simanga, in Scully, 'Fragments ... IV', The State, vol. 
2 (1909), pp. 285-6, 290. 
68. Mehlomakhulu, 'Statement', Cape Monthly Magazine, 
July-Dec. 1880, p. 163; Khawulela's statement in 
Commission on Laws and Customs, vol. 1, p. 166; Nombiba, 
Mnguni and Mhlelwana in Shepstone's notes on history of 
the Bhele in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 142 (the 
informants are identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p. 137); Fuze, The Black People, pp. 16, 23, 50-1. 
69. Theal, History of S.A. since 1795, vol. 1, p. 379; 
Ellenberger and Macgregor, History of the Basuto, p. 119; 
Ayliff & Whiteside, History of the Abambo, p. 7. 
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account of the expulsion and flight of the Ngwane in Olden 
Times represented an attempt to resolve the contradictions 
in the existing literature: it was not based on research 
into oral tradition. There is nothing in his account to 
suggest that his version is more firmly grounded in 
empirical evidence than any other: it has to be read not 
as a definite statement but as one derived account among a 
number of others. 
While there was little unanimity in Bryant's sources as 
to the causes of the displ~cement of the Ngwane, there was 
a somewhat greater measure of agreement among them about 
what occurred in the first stage of their flight. A 
number of informants stated that after being ejected from 
their territory, the Ngwane had attacked their Hlubi 
neighbours to the south-west and in turn driven them 
out. 70 Some claimed that the Ngwane had then proceeded to 
establish themselves in the newly vacated territory.7l 
Others stated that they had continued southwards and 
eventually established themselves in the region of the 
upper Thukela, in the process ejecting groups like the 
Bhele and Zizi.72 Like Bryant, most sources were of the 
70. Timango, in stow, 'Intrusion of the stronger races', 
unpublished ms., pp. 196, 206; Mhlanga, 'Story of native 
wars', Cape Monthly Magazine, Jan.-June 1877, p. 249; 
Mehlomakhulu, 'Statement', Cape Monthly Magazine, July-
Dec. 1880, p. 163; Moloja, 'Fetcani horde', Cape Quarterly 
Review, vol. 1 (1882), p. 268; Simanga, in Scully, 
'Fragments •.. IV', The State, vol. 2 (1909), pp. 288-9; 
anonymous informant or informants in Shepstone's notes on 
history of the Hlubi, in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, 
p. 141. 
71. Timango, in stow, 'Intrusion of the stronger races', 
unpublished ms., p. 206; Simanga, in Scully, 
'Fragments ... IV', The State, vol. 2 (1909), p. 289. 
72. Moloja, 'Fetcani horde', Cape Quarterly Review, vol. 1 
(1882), p. 268; Khawulela's statement in Commission on 
Laws and Customs, vol. 1, p. 166; Nombiba, Mnguni & 
Mhlelwana, in Shepstone's notes on history of the Bhele in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 142 (informants identified 
in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 137); Ntulo, in 
Shepstone's notes on history of the zizi in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 142 (informant identified in T. 
Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 138). 
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opinion that after an interval the Ngwane had been driven 
over the Drakensberg onto the highveld by the Zulu. 73 
As for the peoples supposedly displaced by the 
retreating Ngwane, several sources stated, like Bryant, 
that many Hlubi also crossed the Drakensberg onto the 
highveld. 74 There is much less information on the Bhele 
and zizi. Three of Shepstone's informants stated, 
according to his gloss, that most of the Bhele had 'found 
their way to the Cape frontier,.75 Another stated that 
the zizi had also 'migrated towards the Cape Colony,.76 
Another Zizi source stated that after being attacked by 
the Ngwane, the Zizi had submitted to Matiwane and 
accompanied him on his move to the highveld. 77 
Secondary accounts published before the appearance of 
Olden Times had developed a broad consensus as to the 
course of Ngwane history in the period under review. The 
Ngwane had been driven out of their territory, for reasons 
that were not described, by a powerful antagonist, if not 
the Zulu then perhaps the Mthethwa or Ndwandwe. The 
Ngwane had then fallen on the Hlubi and driven them over 
the Drakensberg. A little while later the Ngwane had been 
73. Timango, in stow, 'Intrusion of the stronger races', 
unpublished ms., pp. 197, 207; Mehlomakhulu, 'Statement', 
Cape Monthly Magazine, July-Dec. 1880, p. 163; Moloja, 
'Fetcani horde', Cape Quarterly Review, vol. 1 (1882), p. 
268; Simanga, in Scully, 'Fragments ... IV', The State, vol. 
2 (1909), pp. 290-1. 
74. Timango, in stow, 'Intrusion of the stronger races', 
unpublished ms., pp. 196-7; Mhlanga, 'Story of native 
wars', Cape Monthly Magazine, Jan.-June 1877, p. 249; 
Mehlomakhulu, 'Statement', Cape Monthly Magazine, July-
Dec. 1880, p. 163; Moloja, 'Fetcani horde', Cape Quarterly 
Review, vol. 1 (1882), p. 268; anonymous informant or 
informants in Shepstone's notes on history of the Hlubi in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 141. 
75. Nombiba, Mnguni & Mhlelwana, in Shepstone's notes on 
history of the Bhele in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 142. 
76. Ntulo, in Shepstone's notes on history of the zizi in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 142. 
77. Khawulela's statement in commission on Laws and 
Customs, p. 166. 
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attacked by the Zulu in the territory which they had newly 
occupied under the Drakensberg, and in turn had been 
forced to retreat onto the highveld. 78 If Bryant's account 
varied in minor details, in its general thrust it was very 
much in line with the published sources on which it was 
based. 
4. The second wave 
Bryant's account of the destructive migration of the 
Thembu through the Natal midlands was based almost 
entirely on two previously published sources: Shepstone's 
tribal histories as they appeared in Bird's Annals of 
Natal, and the account of the flight of the Thembu under 
their chief, Ngoza kaMkhubukeli, which appeared in James 
stuart's Zulu reader uHlangakula, published in 1924. 79 
This latter account was drawn virtually verbatim from the 
record which stuart had made of testimony given to him by 
Lugubhu kaMangaliso in 1916. 80 Though he acknowledged his 
use of stuart, Bryant nowhere indicated that he had used 
Shepstone as a source. 
Both Shepstone, who did not name his informant or 
informants on Thembu history, and Lugubhu gave broadly 
similar accounts of the nature of the processes which sent 
the Thembu pushing their way southward from the region of 
the lower Mzinyathi (Buffalo) river. According to 
Shepstone, before their migration most of the Thembu had 
lived on the left bank of the river and were tributary to 
the Buthelezi. When Shaka overcame the Buthelezi, the 
78. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in commission on Laws 
and Customs, p. 416; Theal, History of S.A. since 1795, 
vol. 1, pp. 379-80; Ellenberger & Macgregor, History of 
the Basuto, pp. 119, 124, 130; Ayliff & Whiteside, History 
of the Abambo, pp. 7-10. 
79. stuart, uHlangakula, pp. 13-19. 
80. stuart's orginal notes of Lugubhu's evidence on this 
topic are to be found in JSC, File 57, nbk. 14, pp. 31-46. 
A translated and annotated rendering appears in JSA, 
vol. 1, pp. 284-7. 
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Thembu retreated across the Mzinyathi into the country of 
the Khuze. They defeated the Khuze, killed their chief, 
and occupied their territory. In response to entreaties 
from the Khuze, Shaka sent a force to drive the Thembu 
out. The latter succeeded in repulsing the Zulu army, 
but, anticipating a further attack, retreated southwards 
across the Thukela and so began their career of 
destruction. 81 
According to the account recorded by stuart from 
Lugubhu, Shaka's attack on the Thembu was a response to a 
challenge made to him by Ngoza. In this version of the 
story, the Zulu were also driven back, but succeeded in 
making off with the Thembu cattle. The Thembu then 
retreated, fell upon the Khuze, and defeated them. After 
this they took to flight to the southward. 82 
Though Bryant had mentioned the flight of the Thembu in 
his 'Sketch' of 1905, he did not go into details. In the 
account which he published in Izindaba Zabantu, he 
reproduced Shepstone's explanation as to why the Thembu 
had taken to flight,83 but in Olden Times he began the 
story slightly differently. In this work the Thembu were 
still regarded as having been tributaries to the Buthe-
lezi, but were seen as having lived on the south side of 
the upper White Mfolozi river. After Shaka's defeat of 
the Buthelezi, the Thembu had made off to the left bank of 
the Mzinyathi and settled there. Bryant did not identify 
the previous inhabitqnts of the territory which the Thembu 
thus occupied. After a while, fearful of Shaka's ever-
growing power, the Thembu moved across to the right bank 
of the river. They were opposed by the Khuze, but 
defeated them in a battle (Bryant's account of which was 
drawn directly from uHlangakula84 ), and settled in their 
81. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 143-4. 
82. Stuart, uHlangakula, pp. 13-17. 
83. HZ, pp. 44-5, 48-9. 
84. OT, p. 247; Stuart, uHlangakula, pp. 16-17; JSA, vol. 
1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 286. 
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territory. 85 
Bryant's description of this initial phase of the 
migration of the Thembu was basically an amalgam of 
Shepstone's and stuart's accounts. His account of the 
flight of the Thembu through Natal was pieced together 
from a number of the histories recorded by Shepstone, with 
a few snippets incorporated from stuart. (The title of 
chapter 31 of Olden Times, 'The trail of the Tembus', was 
a translation of the final words of Lugubhu's testimony as 
published in uHlanqakula, ' ... umkondo wa ba Tembu,.86) 
After having the Thembu cross the Thukela, Bryant had them 
attacking and breaking up the Ncwabe chiefdom. 87 This, 
according. to Shepstone's informants, Thethwa and Nyandeni, 
lived near the lower Mpofana (Mooi) river and was 'driven 
by Ngoza in his escape from Shaka,.88 Then, at the 
headwaters of the Mpanza, the Thembu attacked the 
Xesibe,89 who were given by Shepstone's informant Magwaza 
as also having been 'driven by Goza,.90 Bryant followed 
Magwaza in having the Xesibe go off to seek sanctuary from 
the Fuze near what is now Greytown. 91 In his Izindaba 
Zabantu article, like Magwaza, he had the Xesibe remaining 
with the Fuze; in Olden Times, however, he had them 
returning to their own territory once the Thembu had 
passed by.92 According to Magwaza, the Xesibe had taken 
refuge with the Fuze on a previous occasion when attacked 
85. OT, pp. 242, 246-8, 249-50, 253. 
86. OT, p. 252; stuart, uHlangakula, p. 19. 
87. OT, P . 253. 
88. Bird, ed. , Annals, vol. 1, p. 145. The informants 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 14l. 
89. OT, p. 254. 
90. Bird, ed. , Annals, vol. 1, p. 135. The informant 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 115. 
91. Ibid.; OT, p. 254. 
92. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 135; HZ, p. 61; OT, 
p. 254. 
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by Shaka. Bryant repeated this story in Izindaba Zabantu, 
but omitted it from his account in Olden Times. 93 
Next, according to Bryant, the Thembu fell on the Wushe 
chiefdoms which occupied the Karkloof-Dargle-Howick 
region, and uprooted them. Most were broken up, though 
one, under the Wushe paramount, proceeded to give its 
allegiance to Ngoza. 94 Here again Bryant's source was 
Shepstone. 95 At this point in the construction of his 
narrative, Bryant encountered a problem, in that his two 
sources differed on the de~ails of what had happened after 
this attack. According to Shepstone's notes on the 
history of the Khuze, numbers of Khuze and other Dlamini 
had joined Ngoza after he had defeated the.~.96 On his 
arrival in what is now the Pietermaritzburg region, these 
Dlamini proceeded to attack the Nkabane and the Nqondo, 
who lived in the country between Pietermaritzburg and 
Richmond. 97 Bryant could not have the whole of Ngoza's 
party moving in this direction, for, according to stuart's 
account, Ngoza had taken a different route, going up-
country from the Howick region towards Mpendle, and then 
through the Bulwer area to to the region across the 
Mzimkhulu and eventually to the Mpondo country.98 He 
solved the problem by splitting Ngoza's following. 'After 
crossing the Mngeni, the Tembu-Dhlamini partnership was 
for the nonce dissolved', the reader is told. One group, 
93. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 135; HZ, p. 60. 
94. OT, P . 2 56 • 
95. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 140, 141. Shepstone's 
informants are identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
pp. 128, 129, 132, as Thethwa and Nyandeni. 
96. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 143. The informant is 
identified as Gayeni in T. Shepstone Papers, vol 89, 
p. 139. 
97. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 146. The informant is 
identified as Nyandeni in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
pp. 143, 144. 
98. stuart, uHlangakula, p. 18; also JSA, vOI.1, evidence 
of Lugubhu, p. 287. 
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consisting of the Dlamini, moved through the Pietermaritz-
burg-Richmond area and was then conveniently lost to view. 
The other, under Ngoza, parted from the Dlamini 'above the 
Howick Falls' and took the up-country route postulated in 
Stuart's account. 99 
It is not clear where Bryant obtained his evidence on 
the career of the Thembu once they had crossed the 
Mzimkhulu river. shepstone's notes on Thembu history 
stated that on his arrival in the country of the Mpondo 
Ngoza had proceeded to attack them. In the battle that 
followed, Ngoza's force was overcome and the chief himself 
was killed. His following then broke up, with numbers 
eventually making their way back to the Zulu kingdom and 
giving their allegiance to Shaka. 100 Although without 
depicting Ngoza as the aggressor, the account published by 
Stuart in uHlangakula also stated that the chief had been 
killed by the Mpondo and that his following had 
dispersed. 101 In Izindaba Zabantu, Bryant, following 
Shepstone, had also cast Ngoza as the aggressor. Ngoza's 
'wandering multitude' had come up against the 'large and 
formidable' Mpondo tribe under Fakui he aspired to conquer 
the Mpondo, but was killed in battle with them. 102 In 
Olden Times, by contrast, it was the Mpondo who were the 
aggressors. At first they received the Thembu hospitably, 
but after or three years Faku's suspicions of Ngoza's 
intentions began to grow, and in about 1822 or 1823 the 
Mpondo attacked the Thembu and drove them off. After 
wandering about in the region south of the Mzimkhulu for 
some years, many Thembu returned northwards to submit to 
the Zulu monarch. 103 In Izindaba Zabantu Bryant put their 
return as having taken place about the time of Dingane's 
99. OT, pp. 256-7. 
100. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 144. 
101. Stuart, uHlangakula, p. 18i also JSA, vol. 1, 
evidence of Lugubhu, p. 287. 
102. HZ, pp. 45-6. 
103. OT, p. 258. 
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accession, i.e. 1828; in Olden Times he dated it to about 
1826-7. 104 
overall, Shepstone's and stuart's (i.e. Lugubhu's) 
accounts of the flight of Thembu were broadly in accord. 
Bryant's narative in Olden Times brought in certain minor 
idiosyncracies, but did not diverge from its two major 
sources to any marked extent. There is nothing in his 
version to suggest that much by way of oral tradition 
independently collected by himself went into it. 
5. The third wave 
As in his account of the Thembu migration, Bryant relied 
primarily on Shepstone's histories for his description of 
the movement of the Chunu through Natal. Less clear, 
though, are the sources of his information of how and why 
they were initially propelled over the Thukela river. 
Probably drawing in the first instance on a statement in 
Fuze's Abantu Abamnyama, Bryant in Olden Times had the 
Chunu as 'a clan of considerable size' which lived in the 
region of the Thaleni mountain near the Nsuze river. 105 
In his earlier historical accounts, possibly using 
information obtained personally from Fuze, with whom he 
was on good terms,106 Bryant claimed that the Chunu had 
fled after having been attacked and defeated in battle by 
the Zulu. 107 But by the time he came to write Olden 
Times, he had changed his position. There was, he stated 
explicitly, no record in tradition of the Zulu having 
invaded Chunu territory or having fought the Chunu. The 
removal of the Chunu stemmed from fear on the part of 
their chief, Macingwane, that he was about to suffer 
retribution for having harassed Shaka's father, Senzanga-
104. HZ, p. 46; OT, p. 258. 
105. Fuze, Black People, pp. 15, 23, 52; OT, pp. 262, 264. 
106. OT, p. 498. 
107. Bryant, Dictionary, p. 42*; HZ, p. 35. See also the 
statements in Fuze, Black People, pp. 23, 52. 
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khona, and for having refused asylum to Shaka and his 
mother during Shaka's childhood. The factor which precip-
itated his flight was the Zulu attack on the neighbouring 
Thembu and the retreat of the latter to the southward. 108 
Bryant's assertion that Macingwane had been 'a constant 
persecutor' of Senzangakhona is probably based on a 
statement in Fuze to the effect that the two had fought on 
a number of occasions. 109 The notion that Shaka had 
sought asylum among the Chunu may be based on a statement 
to this effect in Holden's Past and Future of the Kaffir 
Races. 110 Why Bryant should have changed his mind about 
the causes of the Chunu migration is not clear. 
In the course of their flight southwards, wrote Bryant, 
the Chunu forced their way successively through the 
territories of the Bomvu, and then, once they were across 
the Thukela, through those of the Nadi, Dunge, Shinga, 
Nyamvini and Bombo. 111 The basis for this account was 
probably Shepstone's brief statement, reflecting 
information given to him by Nombiba, that when the Chunu 
fled they had passed through the Nyamvini country on the 
middle Mvoti before passing through the region of what is 
now pietermaritzburg. 1l2 There is no mention of the Chunu 
in Shepstone's notes on the histories of the other five 
chiefdoms named above. Bryant presumably listed them 
because their territories, as located by Shepstone in his 
histories, lay on the line of march which he felt the 
Chunu would have taken from their home territory, via the 
middle Mvoti, to the Pietermaritzburg region. In his 
'Sketch', Bryant had had the Nyamvini being driven out by 
the Chunu;113 in Olden Times he reverted to Shepstone's 
108. OT, pp. 266-7, 403. 
109. Fuze, Black People, p. 52. 
110. Holden, Past and Future, pp. 11-12, 26. 
111. OT, p. 268. 
112. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 131. The informant is 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 105. 
113. Bryant, Dictionary, p. 42*. 
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statement that the Chunu had merely 'passed through' their 
territory. 114 
'We next hear of the Cunu horde in Wusheland', Bryant 
continued. 115 Since the dispersal of the Wushe chiefdoms 
by the Thembu the previous year, he told his readers, the 
middle Mngeni region had been dominated by the Zelemu, who 
lived near otto's Bluff on the northern outskirts of what 
is now Pietermaritzburg. On the advent of the Chunu, the 
Zelemu allied with them (elsewhere in Olden Times Bryant 
stated that whether the Zelemu did this willingly or 
unwillingly is not clearl16 ), and accompanied them as far 
as the Lovu river, some fifty kilometres to the south. 
This scenario was different from the one described in 
Izindaba Zabantu, where the flight of the Chunu did not 
affect the Zelemu. The latter were subsequently driven 
south by the confederacy, and only after this event were 
the Wushe chiefdoms broken up by the Thembu. 117 In Olden 
Times the Zelemu remained on the Lovu, while the Chunu 
swung inland towards the Drakensberg. After destroying a 
section of the Tolo, they returned to the upper Lovu-
Mkhomazi region, where they broke up the Yobeni and the 
Ntambo. A section of the Chunu here split off to settle 
in the Lufafa region, but the main body pressed on to the 
south. After driving the Nxasane from their territory in 
what is now the Creighton area, it halted and proceeded to 
settle there. 118 
Bryant's statement that the Zelemu, or Bhaca as he 
calls the composite group which came to be formed under 
the chief Madikane, lived at otto's Bluff derived from 
Shepstone. 119 Where the rest of his information on this 
114. OT, p. 268. 
115. Ibid. 
116. OT, p. 374. 
117. HZ, pp. 41, 45. 
118. OT, pp. 268-70. 
119. Bird., ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 136. The informant is 
identified as Nombiba in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 
119. 
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group came from is not clear, for Shepstone had it 
'(f)irst driven by the confederacy', i.e. Bryant's fourth 
wave, which passed through the area some time after the 
Chunu. 120 possibly drawing from Shepstone, an article by 
Scully on Bhaca history, to which Bryant would have had 
access, said much the same thing. 121 On the other hand, 
the statement that the Bhaca had gone off with Chunu 
receives some support in the evidence given by two of 
Stuart's informants;122 it may be that Bryant had 
independently picked up similar information. His 
statement that the Zelemu/Bhaca had remained in the region 
of the Lovu may have been adopted from Scully, who had 
described the Bhaca as having halted near the Mkhomazi. 123 
The career of the Chunu from the Lovu-Mkhomazi region 
to the Mzimkhulu as described by Bryant was put together 
from Shepstone's histories. There was nothing, though, in 
Shepstone to justify Bryant's assertion that the Chunu had 
changed course towards the Drakensberg, destroyed a 
section of the Tolo, under a chief named Nomabunga, which 
lived near Mount Erskine, and then returned to the 
Mkhomazi area. 124 Mount Erskine overlooks the upper 
Mpofana (Mooi) river, and a diversion of this nature would 
have taken the Chunu on a two-hundred-kilometre trek at 
right angles to their previous line of march and over 
broken, hilly country. Shepstone in fact did not identify 
Nomabunga's group as Tolo, and he located it not near 
Mount Erskine but in ~he region of the upper Mkhomazi,125 
which is where Bryant had the Chunu in the first place. 
120. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 136. 
121. W.C. Scully, 'Fragments of native history: the 
Amabaca', The State, vol. 1 (1909), p. 674. 
122. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, p. 60; evidence of 
Magidigidi, p. 85. 
123. Scully, 'Fragments: the Amabaca', The State, vol. 1 
(1909), p. 675. 
124. OT, p. 268. 
125. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 147. 
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The subsequent attacks made on the Yobeni, the Ntambo and 
the Nxasana (whom Shepstone calls the Cekwana) were all 
mentioned in Shepstone's histories. 126 
Bryant was not the first to use Shepstone's histories 
to reconstruct the flight of the Chunu. The brief account 
in Holden's Past and Future of the Kaffir Races, first 
published in 1866, also seems to have used Shepstone as a 
source. In this case, though, the reference would have 
been to a copy of Shepstone's unpublished notes, and not 
to his histories as published in Bird's Annals of Natal, 
which appeared only in 1888. 127 The name of Holden's 
'Kalipinombuya' tribe is derived from the names Mkhaliphi 
and Boyiya, who are given by Shepstone as chiefs of the 
Nyamvini and Dunge respectively. Holden's 'Ngwanavizi' is 
Ngcwanikazi, chief of a section of the Ntambo; 'Umcabesa' 
is Machibise; 'Umabutyana' is Mabutshana, chief of the 
Yobeni; and 'Unomatiti' is Nomathithi, chief of another 
section of the Ntambo. All these groups and personages 
feature in Shepstone's histories. 128 
In his newly acquired domain near the Mzimkhulu, Bryant 
went on, the Chunu chief Macingwane began to make 'further 
additions to the already considerable multitude amassed on 
the journey down,.129 The only group that he actually 
mentions by name as having given its allegiance to Maci-
ngwane was the Dlanyoka; the information on this he 
derived from Shepstone. 130 In the process of expanding 
his chiefdom Macingwane also drove out a group of Shwawu; 
again Bryant's information came from Shepstone. 131 Bryant 
126. Ibid., pp. 147-8. 
127. Holden, Past and Future, pp. 26-7. 
128. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 131, 132, 137, 147, 
148. 
129. OT, p. 270. 
130. OT, 561; Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 140. 
Shepstone's informant is identified as Nombiba in T. 
Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 126. 
131. OT, p. 270; Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 148. 
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also suggested that at this time Macingwane's strength was 
further augmented by a renewed alliance with the Bhaca, 
who, he maintained, had been left behind at the Lovu, and 
had subsequently been pushed further southwards by the 
confederacy which formed his fourth 'wave'. His 
presentation left room for doubt that such an alliance was 
actually established, for he said nothing at all about it 
in his account of Chunu history, and brought it in only 
obliquely in his discussion of the history of the Bhaca, 
who were presented as hav~ng become junior allies of the 
Chunu. 132 Again his information was derived from 
Shepstone, who had recorded that the Bhaca had been driven 
south by the confederacy, and that they had settled across 
the Mzimkhulu. Here they had 'to some extent' come under 
the authority of Macingwane. 133 
The growing power of Macingwane, according to Bryant, 
soon attracted the attention of Shaka. In his account, a 
Zulu army chased the Chunu up the Mzimkhulu and across it 
to Nsikeni mountain in what is now East Griqualand. Here 
the Zulu caught up with the Chunu, massacred their women 
and children, and seized their cattle, thus effectively 
destroying the chiefdom. Macingwane himself, with some of 
his sons, escaped, and then resolved to make his way back 
to the Zulu kingdom and submit to Shaka. To avoid the 
peoples whom the Chunu had attacked during their passage 
through Natal, he took an upland route, but was killed by 
cannibals on the way. Numbers of his adherents, including 
two of his sons, eventually reached Shaka's country and 
become subject to him. 134 
The sources of Bryant's information on this section of 
Chunu history are not clear. Shepstone, whose concern was 
with the chiefdoms that had inhabited the region which 
132. OT, pp. 270, 377-8, 380, 383. 
133. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 131-2, 136. The 
informant is identified as Nombiba in T. Shepstone Papers, 
vol. 89, pp. 105, 119. 
134. OT, pp. 270-1. 
127 
became the colony of Natal, did not collect information 
specifically on the history of the Chunu. Fuze had 
several snippets in his Abantu Abamnyama which were 
consistent with Bryant's account,135 and Holden, without 
indicating his sources, wrote of a great battle on the 
Mzimkhulu in which Macingwane was killed. 136 Other than 
these, no published sources on Chunu history have been 
found which Bryant could have used. 
The historicity of the initial phases of Bryant's third 
wave rests on minimal evidence. The sources on the 
reasons for the Chunu migration are contradictory, and the 
evidence for the first stages of their movement virtually 
non-existent. For his description of the later stages, 
Bryant relies primarily on Shepstone, who seems to have 
derived most of his information from a single informant, 
Nombiba. This is not to argue that the migration of the 
Chunu through the midlands of what is now Natal did not 
take place, but the way is clearly wide open for a 
different interpretation based on a wider range of sources 
than those used by Bryant. 
6. The fourth wave 
If Bryant's accounts of the second and third wave draw 
heavily on Shepstone, his description of the fourth wave 
is based almost entirely on that single source. The 
notion that after the flight of the Chunu a 'confederacy' 
of small chiefdoms formed in order to force its way 
through the Bhaca who barred their way to the south again 
seems to rest on the testimony of Nombiba alone. In 
outlining to Shepstone the history of the Nyamvini, he 
identified the members of the confederacy as the Bhele, 
two sections of Nhlangwini, three sections of Dunge, the 
Nyamvini and the Fuze. These, he claimed, were groups 
which had been left exposed to Zulu attacks by the flight 
135. Fuze, Black People, pp. 19, 23, 52-3. 
136. Holden, Past and Future, p. 27. 
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of the Chunu. Their initial attack on the Bhaca was 
repulsed, but with the assistance of the Gwenyane people, 
they returned to the attack and succeeded in forcing their 
way through. 137 Shepstone obtained further information on 
the histories of the Fuze and of the Khuze-Nhlangwini from 
two other informants, Magwaza and Gayeni respectively, but 
in his notes on these histories there is no mention of any 
of the events spoken of by Nombiba. 138 Nor are they 
mentioned in his notes on the history of the Bhele as 
obtained from Nombiba, Mnguni and Mhlelwana. 139 
A number of confusing variations emerge as between 
Bryant's successive accounts of the fourth wave. In his 
'Sketch' of 1905, the flight of the Chunu was followed, as 
in Shepstone's record of Nombiba's testimony, by that of 
the confederacy, which had been formed to ensure a 
successful escape to the south 'out of the way of the Zulu 
terror impending from the north,.140 In his Izindaba 
Zabantu article, though, the factor precipitating the 
flight of the confederacy is the flight of the Ngwane and 
the Bhele, which is seen as having taken place some time 
after that of the Chunu and Thembu. 141 
More confusion emerges from Bryant's treatment of the 
confederacy's attack on the Bhaca. Where Shepstone had 
the first attack on the Bhaca beaten back, and the second, 
made with the aid of the Gwenyane, successful, in his 
'Sketch' Bryant mentioned only the second, with the 
Gwenyane appearing as original members of the con fed-
eracy.142 In Izindaba Zabantu, he at one point followed a 
137. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 131-2. The informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 105. 
138. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 135-6, 143, 152. The 
informants are identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
pp. 116, 139. 
139. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 142. The informants 
are identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 137. 
140. Bryant, Dictionary, p. 42*. 
141. HZ, pp. 35-6. 
142. Bryant, Dictionary, p. 42*. 
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similar line. He had the confederacy, including the 
Gwenyane as a later addition, pushing 'unscathed' through 
the Wushe (i.e. Bhaca) forces, with no mention of a 
previous defeat. 143 At another point, however, he 
reverted to Shepstone's accounts: the confederacy was 
first driven back (this time by the Zelemu, another of the 
component groups of the Bhaca), then enlisted the support 
of the Gwenyane and drove the Zelemu before it. 144 In 
Olden Times Bryant kept to this latter variant, though in 
this account the confederacy was faced by a 'Zelemu-Wushe 
combine', and the Gwenyane were renamed the Bombo. 145 He 
had the confederacy driving the Bhaca back not from the 
otto's Bluff region north of pietermaritzburg, as in 
Shepstone's account, but from the region of the Lovu 
river, to which, in his view, they had previously been 
pushed by the flight of the Chunu. 146 
The identities of the Gwenyane/Bombo and their chiefs 
are a further source of confusion in Bryant's accounts. 
Much of it derived from his reading of Shepstone. In the 
latter's notes the chiefdom was called the Gwenyane and 
its chief Noqandambedu. A section of it was called the 
Mbedu, with Manyonyo as chief. Shepstone also identified 
two Bombo tribes, one under Ndelu and the other under 
Manyonyo. He gave no indication that either was in any way 
linked with the Gwenyane. 147 In his 'Sketch', Bryant 
mentioned only the Gwenyane under their chief 
Nocandambedu, and saiQ nothing about the Bombo. 148 In one 
of his Izindaba Zabantu articles he gave the Gwenyane 
under Noqambedu (sic) as members of the confederacy,149 
----------------
143. HZ, p. 36. 
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145. OT, p. 377. 
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and then in another he made an identification between the 
Gwenyane and the Bombo. In this, the chief of the Bombo, 
Mbedu, was dead by Shaka's time, and his two sons, 
Manyonyo and Magwenyane, divided his people between them. 
Magwenyane's section was the one called in by the 
confederacy to help defeat the Wushe. 150 In Olden Times, 
Mbedu, or Noqandambedu, was portrayed as still alive and 
chief of the Bombo, and it was he who assisted the 
confederacy. 151 The Gwenyane, for their part, did not 
feature at all in the book. 
After the confederacy's defeat of the Bhaca, Shepstone 
had the Gwenyane (together with Nyamvini and Dunge) 
returning to their territories near the Mvoti, while the 
rest of the confederacy moved on to the south. 152 In his 
'Sketch' Bryant said nothing of the return of the 
Gwenyane: the implication was that they remained members 
of the confederacy.153 In Izindaba Zabantu they remained 
in the confederacy until it broke up, upon which they 
returned home. 154 In Olden Times, Bryant had the Bombo 
acting like Shepstone's Gwenyane, and leaving the 
confederacy after its victory over the Zelemu-Wushe, or 
Bhaca. 155 
Bryant's account of the career of the confederacy after 
the defeat of the Bhaca was taken straight from Shepstone. 
In Olden Times, as the confederacy moved on from the 
Pietermaritzburg-Richmond area, it successively attacked 
and drove out the Njilo, the Cindaneni, and the 
Ntshele. 156 In Izindaba Zabantu it also drove out the 
Ntshangase or shangase. 157 All four of these groups were 
150. Ibid., pp. 80-1. 
151. OT, pp. 377-8. 
152. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 131-2. 
153. Bryant, Dictionary" p. 42* 
154. HZ, p. 42. 
155. OT, pp. 378, 552. 
156. OT, pp. 378-9. 
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given by Shepstone as having been 'driven' or 'dispersed' 
by the confederacy.158 Bryant added nothing of substance 
to Shepstone's brief comments. Then, when, in Olden 
Times, the confederacy reached the Mkhomazi river, it 
broke up. Yearning for 'the peace and plenty they had so 
foolishly relinquished', the Dunge, Fuze and Nyamvini 
returned 'along the bloody trail of their own wanton 
slaughter'. The Nhlangwini and Memela, having 'no 
homeland to look lovingly back to, no flesh-pots but those 
of wild-beasts and cannibalism', continued their weary 
march southward to the Mzimkhulu and beyond. 159 
In describing all this, Bryant was once again able to 
fill several pages on the basis of a few lines of 
information obtained from Shepstone. His account of the 
break-up of the confederacy rested on a single sentence in 
Shepstone's notes on the history of the Dunge, as obtained 
from Nombiba and Funwayo, to the effect that the Dunge 
'was one of the tribes which returned from the Umkomazi, 
and attempted to occupy their own country,.160 None of 
Shepstone's histories of the other tribes of the 
confederacy mentioned any such event. 
Bryant's description of the subsequent histories of the 
former member-chiefdoms of the confederacy derived partly 
from Shepstone and partly from his own attempts at recon-
struction. An inconsistency emerged in his treatment of 
the movement of the Nhlangwini and Memela southwards to 
the Mzimkhulu. At one point in Olden Times they proceeded 
together as far as the 
proceeded to settle. 
Bryant's text is that 
Mzimvubu, where, it seems, they 
Two pages later, the implication of 
they travelled separately, before 
158. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 146, 147, 149. The 
only informant identified is Nombiba for the Njilo 
history: see T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 145. 
159. OT, pp. 379-80. The quotations are all from p. 380. 
160. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1"p. 132. The informants 
are identified in T.Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 106. 
they began 'plundering, capturing, murdering' in the 
region between the Mzimkhulu and the Msikaba. 161 
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There is nothing in Shepstone about the career of the 
Nhlangwini and Memela in southern Natal-East Griqualand. 
It is not clear where Bryant obtained his information on 
the latter group. His information on the Nhlangwini 
almost certainly came from brief notes on their history 
recorded by Gardiner in 1835. 162 For the history of the 
other members of the confederacy - the Dunge, Nyamvini and 
Fuze - after its break-up he once again reverted to 
Shepstone. In the latter's account, the Dunge returned 
from the Mkhomazi to their home territory, only to be 
attacked by Zihlandlo of the Mkhize, upon which many of 
them became cannibals. Bryant's account added very little 
to this. 163 In Shepstone's notes, the Nyamvini returned 
home and gave their allegiance to Zihlandlo, who had come 
under Zulu rule. In Bryant, they returned, were attacked 
by a Zulu force, and then went off to subject themselves 
to the Mkhize chief. 164 As far as the Fuze were 
concerned, Shepstone said nothing about either their 
flight or their return. In Shaka's time they were 
attacked by a force of Zulu and forced to take refuge in 
the Karkloof forests. They were then allowed to re-occupy 
their former territory as Shaka's tributaries, but, when a 
violent succession dispute broke out among them, the were 
once again driven out. 165 All this, with further details 
161. OT,. pp. 380, 382-3. 
162. A. Gardiner, Narrative of a Journev to the Zoola 
Country, Cape Town, 1966 (repr. of 1st ed., London, 1836), 
pp. 276-7, 312. 
163. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 132 (the informants are 
identified as Nombiba and Funwayo in T. Shepstone Papers, 
vol. 89, p. 106; OT, pp. 380, 551-2. 
164. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 132 (the informant is 
identified as Nombiba in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 
105); OT, pp. 380, 409, 548. 
165. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 135-6 (the informant 
is identified as Magwaza in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p. 116). 
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of the succession dispute, was taken by Bryant and added 
to his account of the return of the Fuze from the Mkhomazi 
after the break-up of the confederacy. 
In writing his account of the fourth wave, Bryant may 
also have used Scully's account of Bhaca history, in which 
the Bhaca were pushed out of the Pietermaritzburg region 
by the Nhlangwini. 166 Theal's similar account, which was 
very probably another source used by Bryant, was probably 
also derived from Scully.167 It is possible that this 
statement may itself represent a reworking by Scully of 
information derived from Shepstone's histories. 
Bryant's account of the fourth wave is thus seen to 
rest on very meagre evidence. The displacement of groups 
like the Nhlangwini, Memela and Bhaca from the Natal 
midlands seems historically well grounded (see pp. 249 ff 
below), but whether it took place in the way in which 
Bryant described is an open question. That such a thing as 
the confederacy was formed, and that the Dunge, Nyamvini, 
Fuze and Bombo were involved in it, cannot be regarded as 
historical fact. Bryant's account of it in the end rests 
on the testimony given to Shepstone by a single informant, 
Nombiba. Even if his evidence had a factual base, it is 
impossible to tell to what extent it was reworked by 
Shepstone. In addition, there are too many 
inconsistencies in Bryant's successive versions of the 
history of the confederacy for its historical existence to 
be taken as established fact. 
7. The 'Zulu invasions' 
The basis of Bryant's account of the Zulu invasions of the 
region south of the Thukela which he saw as having taken 
place after the passage of the four waves of 'refugees' is 
once again to be found in Shepstone's histories. Of the 
166. Scully, 'Fragments: the Amabaca', The State, vol. 1 
(1909), p. 674. 
167. Theal, History of S.A. since 1795, vol. 2, p. 358. 
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ninety-four tribal histories which he recorded, fifty-one 
indicate that the tribe concerned had been driven out or 
destroyed by Shaka. Mostly ignoring the fact that the 
other forty-three histories did not record Zulu attacks, 
and in some cases pointed to a different interpretation of 
the region's history, Bryant used the information which he 
found in Shepstone's histories to develop further the 
long-established notion that in the reign of Shaka Natal 
had been devastated by marauding Zulu armies. 
In his sucessive historical accounts, Bryant organized 
this information in rather different ways. In the 
'Sketch' published in his Dictionary he gave no details at 
all about Zulu operations south of the Thukela. Rather, 
he wrote in generalized and exaggerated terms of the waves 
of destruction which had 'rolled from the Zulu country 
over the face of Natal, obliterating in their course all 
signs of human life'. In similar vein he stated, 'Then, 
to make the destruction complete, organized bands of Zulu 
murderers regularly patrolled the waste, hunting for any 
stray men and running them down like wild-pig. Thus, 
struggling in the flood, the hundred Lala clans were borne 
off to the south and got lost among the Kafir tribes 
between the Mzimkulu and the Great Fish River .•. ,.168 In 
tones reminiscent of Nathaniel Isaacs at his most vituper-
ative, Bryant thus continued, with hardly a historical 
fact to leaven his outpourings. 
In his Izindaba Zabantu articles, Bryant was much more 
concerned to base his diatribes on apparently empirical 
foundations. He structured his accounts of clan history 
round the notion that Shaka had mounted four campaigns in 
the region south of the Thukela. The first, undertaken in 
about 1817, was mounted in order to bring under his sway 
the large number of small clans along the Thukela which 
lay beteen the Zulu and the Thembu, as a preliminary to an 
attack on the latter. It was a mostly bloodless campaign, 
168. Bryant, Dictionary, pp. 48*-49*. 
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consisting of a succession of minor victories, 'each 
withal bringing its increment of territory and power,.169 
In the course of it, the Cube, Mkhize (Mbo), Ngcolosi, 
Nxamalala, Zondi and Mpumuza submitted to Shaka without 
resistance. The Somi fled south to join a related group 
on the Mvoti river, the Xesibe took refuge with the 
neighbouring Ngongoma or Fuze, and the Khabela took to the 
bush and, though they lost their cattle, were able to 
avoid Zulu rule. The Phephetha alone offered resistance, 
and were duly attacked and broken up. Thus easily did the 
southern bank of the Thukela from about Ntunjambili 
mountain near what is today Kranskop village upstream to 
about the Mpanza river come under Zulu domination. 170 
In the details of his account, Bryant closely followed 
Shepstone, whose information was obtained from five 
identified informants and perhaps others as well. 171 He 
even dealt with the individual chiefdoms in the same order 
in which Shepstone did. There was nothing, however, in 
Shepstone to suggest that the Zulu attacked all these 
chiefdoms in the course of a single campaign: this was 
Bryant's own gloss. 
Shaka's 'second Natal campaign' took place, according 
to Bryant, in about 1819. The target on this occasion was 
the section of Ngongoma or Fuze which lived on the upper 
Mvoti, and which had recently returned to its home 
territory after having for a while made off southwards 
with the confederacy., Leaving their cattle to the Zulu, 
the Ngongoma fled south to take refuge in the forests of 
what is now the Karkloof-Boston region. A while later 
they were permitted to return to their country as 
tributaries to Shaka. Soon afterwards a violent dispute 
169. HZ, pp. 48-9. The quotation appears on p. 49. 
170. Ibid., pp. 49-61. 
171. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 128, 133-5. 
Shepstone's named informants were Mnguni, Sibetshe, 
Hlephuhlephu, Nombiba and Magwazai they are identified in 
T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. pp. 107, 109-15. 
over the chiefly succession broke out among them, and 
again the Zulu drove them out, this time for good. 172 
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This case provides a particularly graphic example of 
how, in constructing his narrative, Bryant was apt to set 
about elaborating on his sources of information in an 
attempt to dramatize the story. Shepstone's account of 
the migrations of the Ngongoma/Fuze, which was based on 
information obtained from Magwaza, reads as follows: 
Driven by Chaka, who took their cattle, they took 
refuge in the forests under the Karkloof range, and as 
far as their present residence in the forests of the 
sources of the Umhlazi. They then got permission from 
Chaka to occupy their old country, as his people; but 
they were constantly harassed by his armies, and driven 
out of it for having entered without his sanction upon 
a war among themselves on a question of succession; 
they then moved along the mountain ranges to the 
Imhlozane Mountain, above the Dargle, and eventually 
took up their residence where they are at present, at 
the head of the Umlazi river ... ,.l73 
In his article in Izindaba Zabantu Bryant recast 
Shepstone's terse notes to read, 
still a season, and the unsparing Zulu army forded the 
Tukela for the second time, and the doom of the Ngo-
ngomas of Mahawule was therewith decreed. In vain did 
Mahawule and his handful of warriors try to stay the 
onslaught of so insuperable a host. Wisely they took 
the safe course, and, sacrificing their cattle, found 
escape for themselves in flight to the forests away to 
the south at the Karkloof and upper Mlazi. 
with submission and spoils any conqueror should be 
satisfied. Shaka having helped himself to the one, 
Mahawule soon after tendered him the other, and was 
thereupon graciously permitted to return with his 
people and reoccupy his former country. True, resi-
dence there was no longer enjoyable. All that was 
beautiful in life, all its pristine tranquillity and 
sunshine, had suddenly vanished, and the whole pandem-
onium of evil spirits had been seemingly let loose on 
each and driven mankind morally mad. The Zulu armies, 
debauched with blood and every species of devilry, 
constantly crossed and recrossed Ngongomaland, 
172. HZ, p. 69. 
173. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 135-6. The informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, Vol. 89, p. 116. 
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ruthlessly killing and destroying as they went. Then 
in this supreme moment of their distress, as though 
~heir cup were not yet full, t~ese pi~iable Ngongomas, 
1ncapable even now of controll1ng the1r racial vice, 
must needs set to and fight among themselves over such 
an obvious inanity as their already demolished 
chieftainship! The impropriety of waging war in the 
very presence of his own army, and the presumption of 
settling their political disputes without reference to 
him, their suzerain, amounted in Shaka's eyes to an 
intolerable contempt of court, if not indeed to an 
actual lese majeste. Whereupon he sent down a strong 
force which drove the whole quarrelsome clan from the 
country for good and all. Henceforth, these Ngongomas, 
even as their relatives in the Tukela bush, led the 
'simple life' of wild beasts, ranging the hills about 
the upper Mngeni and Mlazi and living on such fare as 
the veld and forest could supply.174 
The attack on the Ngongoma/Fuze was all that 
constituted Shaka's second campaign as seen by Bryant. 
The basis for his distinguishing it as a separate campa~;n 
seems to have been simply the statement made by Shepstone 
in his notes on the history of the Xesibe that the latter 
had taken refuge with the Fuze in the course of Shaka's 
first campaign, the implication being that the Fuze had 
not then been attacked. 175 
Shaka's third campaign, as described by Bryant in 
Izindaba Zabantu, also took place in 1819. After having 
feasted for a while on cattle taken from the 
Ngongoma/Fuze, the Zulu returned to make war on other 
chiefdoms of the mid-Mvoti region. The Mapumulo were 
broken up, and the Ngangeni, Hlongwa and Bombo/Gwenyane 
driven out of their territories as refugees. 176 The 
history of the Nyamvini was treated by Bryant in 
conjunction with these others; the reader has to 
scrutinize it carefully to learn that the Nyamvini were 
not actually attacked by the Zulu, though to a reader 
skimming the pages of Bryant's account it could easily 
174. HZ, pp. 69-70. 
175. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 135. 
176. HZ, pp. 74-82. 
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appear that they were. Again Bryant's information came 
directly from Shepstone;177 again there was nothing in the 
latter to indicate that the chiefdoms mentioned were 
attacked by the Zulu in the course of a single campaign. 
The fourth Zulu campaign as described by Bryant was 
premised in the same way as he seems to have premised the 
others. He took a number of chiefdoms which, according to 
Shepstone, were located within a particular geographical 
area - in this case the coastal regions and hinterland 
from the Thukela to the Mkhomazi - and had been attacked 
by Shaka, and portrayed them as having been the victims of 
a single Zulu campaign. The fourth campaign, according to 
Bryant, began with Shaka's intervening in a succession 
dispute among the Cele on the lower Mvoti. A few weeks 
later the Zulu force broke up the nearby Ndlovu chiefdom. 
At much the same time, it destroyed the somi, the Lumbi, 
the Zelemu, and the Nkulwini. Moving south, it broke up 
the Thuli chiefdom between the Mngeni and Mkhomazi, and 
then, turning up the Mngeni valley, drove out another 
group of Ndlovu, the Dlanyawo, the Nyamvu and the 
Dlanyoka. 178 Only in the case of the Thuli did Bryant add 
information which he had obtained from sources other than 
Shepstone; for the rest he drew almost entirely on the 
latter's histories. 179 Shepstone also gave the Dangela, 
Gwayi, Mbomvane, Nomandla, Shobeni and Vundle, all of 
which were located on the coast south of the Mkhomazi, as 
having been destroyed, by Shaka. 180 Bryant followed him in 
simply listing these names, together with those of the 
Bangane, Mbenge and Mbili, as those of chiefdoms which had 
177. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 127-8, 130, 131, 132, 
149. Three informants, Funwayo, Mnguni and Nombiba, are 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 103-6. 
178. HZ, pp. 84-95. 
179. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 124-5, 128, 129, 130, 
137-8, 139, 140, 141, 146. 
180. Ibid., pp. 148, 149. 
been so totally dispersed by the Zulu as to leave 
virtually no trace of their history. 181 
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In Olden Times Bryant did not present his account of 
the Zulu campaigns systematically as he did in his 
Izindaba Zabantu articles, but essentially the same 
conception informed his discussion. The order and dating 
of the Zulu campaigns were somewhat different, but 
otherwise the picture of Zulu operations which he 
presented was very much the same as that in Izindaba 
Zabantu. Thus in about 1821-22 the Zulu army scoured the 
Thukela valley, subjugated the Ngcolosi, the Nxamalala, 
and the Nadi/zondi, drove the Khabela into the bush, and 
broke up the Phephetha. A difference was that the Xesibe 
were not attacked in the course of this campaign; they 
remained in situ until driven out by the passage of the 
Thembu. 182 
The second Zulu campaign (although Bryant does not call 
it such) in Olden Times was the equivalent of the fourth 
campaign in Izindaba Zabantu. In 1821-22, i.e. in the 
same period as the first campaign, a Zulu force ~nvaded 
the Mngeni valley region and broke up the Dlanyoka, the 
Njilo, the Nkulwini, the Ndlovu, the Nyavu and the 
Dlanyawo. 183 Also in 1821, Bryant had the Zulu attacking 
the Thuli, although he did not specifically make this part 
of the second campaign. 184 
There was something of a contradiction in Bryant's 
dating of this and the following campaign in Olden Times. 
Logically it could be expected that the Zulu would have 
subjected the Mvoti region before proceeding further south 
to campaign in the Mngeni area. This was how Bryant had 
it in Izindaba Zabantu, but in Olden Times he inverted the 
order of campaign. In 1822-23 he had the Zulu invading 
181. HZ" p. 95. 
182. aT, 254, 507, 510, 511 , 512, 513, 52 1, 52 3 . 
183. Ibid., pp. 555-6. 
184. Ibid., p. 503. 
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the lower Mvoti area in what was effectively their third 
campaign in Natal and the partial equivalent of the third 
campaign as described in Izindaba Zabantu. As in the 
latter work, the Zulu drove out the Hlongwa and broke up 
the Maphumulo. 185 For the rest, his account was somewhat 
different. The Bombo, who were attacked in the third 
campaign in Izindaba Zabantu, were, in Olden Times, 
attacked separately at a later date of 1824-25. 186 The 
Nyamvini, who, as indicated above, escaped a Zulu attack 
in the pages of Izindaba Z~bantu, fell victim to one in 
Olden Times. 187 This latter account added two further 
names to the list of chiefdoms attacked in the course of 
the third campaign: the shinga, who were not mentioned in 
Izindaba Zabantu, and the Somi, who in Izindaba Zabantu 
were attacked during the fourth campaign. 188 
In Izindaba Zabantu, the Zulu attack on the Ngongoma, 
or Fuze, counted as their second campaign across the 
Thukela. In Olden Times the Fuze were also attacked 
separately, but by 'a roaming band of plunderers' under 
the orders of the Zulu king rather than by a 'Zulu 
army,.189 A final difference which may be noted is that 
where in Izindaba Zabantu the Cele on the lower Mvoti were 
subordinated to the Zulu at the beginning of the fourth 
campaign, in Olden Times this took place in what appears 
to have been a separate expedition dated to about 1823 or 
1824. 190 Apart from the attack on the Bombo mentioned 
above as having taken place in 1824-25, this in Bryant's 
view, was the final act in the Zulu subjugation and 
devastation of Natal. 
Bryant was not unmindful in Olden Times of the fact 
that the history of the Zululand-Natal ~egion could be 
----------------
185. Ibid., pp. 525, 530. 
186. Ibid., p. 552. 
187. Ibid., p. 548. 
188. Ibid., pp. 532, 535. 
189. Ibid., pp. 254, 491. 
190. Ibid., pp. 537, 538-40. 
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seen from a broader perspective. In the earlier 19th 
century, he wrote, 'a wave of political animosity, panic, 
fear, or general unrest' had 'invaded the South African 
native mind'. As he saw it, 'this distemper had entered 
upon its earlier stages even prior to the days of Shaka 
and Dingiswayo,.191 By his own account Bryant was aware, 
too, as Shepstone in writing his 'Historic sketch' had 
been aware,192 that 'the doleful state of chaos and panic' 
into which Natal had fallen was due not simply to the 
'invasions' of the Zulu but also to the passage of the 
groups of non-Zulu which he had been at pains to 
describe. 193 But, like Shepstone, he chose to ignore or 
downplay these perspectives, and to present his historical 
argument in a way which reinforced the entrenched view 
that Natal had been devastated by Shaka's armies. 
Shepstone had used three literary devices to do this. In 
the first place he had presented Shaka as either an 
accomplice (in the case of the first wave) or as the main 
aggressor in the events which had set the waves of 
destruction in motion. In the second place, as was by the 
mid-19th century a standard practice, he had described the 
persona of the Zulu king in lurid and emotive terms. 
Shaka, he wrote, was a 'dreaded chief', the cause of 
'universal terror', the exterminator of men, women and 
children. In the third place, without adducing any firm 
evidence, he had asserted that after the passage of the 
four waves of destruction, Natal had 'annually been 
traversed by Zulu armies', to the point where organized 
community life had ceased to exist, and starvation and 
cannibalism were the order of the day for the handfuls of 
refugees who clung on in forests and other hiding 
places. 194 
191. Ibid., p. 147. 
192. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in Commission on Laws 
and Customs, p. 417. 
193. OT, p. 376. 
194. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in Commission on Laws 
and Customs, pp. 417-18. 
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Bryant used the same techniques in his own work. In 
Olden Times Shaka was seen as the fons et origo of the 
'cataclysmic political upheaval' in Zululand from which 
great waves of destruction 'radiated out and spread to 
every point of the compass throughout Bantuland,.195 
Though his main account of the displacement of the Ngwane 
quite clearly placed the responsibility for this event on 
the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe,196 at another point he was 
nevertheless able to implicate Shaka by listing this event 
as the first in a series of 'disastrous experiences' which 
emanated from Shaka's 'stirring up the forces of evil,.197 
The man who caused this havoc was, in Bryant's terms, a 
bloodthirsty tyrant, a savage genius, 'the Timur and 
Attila of his race,.198 Olden Times, which is in some 
ways a political biography of Shaka, is studded with 
accounts of atrocities which he is supposed to have 
committed. 
Anything more than a cursory reading of Shepstone's 
histories reveals that, according to this source, at 
least, the incursions of the Zulu into the region south of 
the Thukela were for the most part confined to the 
territory lying between the lower and mid-Thukela and the 
Mngeni. When the areas which Bryant described as having 
been invaded by the Zulu are actually located on the map, 
the same picture emerges from the pages of Olden Times. 
But thanks to the absence of a connected narrative, this 
fact is not clear to ~he ordinary reader: the impression 
which the book leaves is that the Zulu looted and murdered 
over the entire region. That this was very much the 
impression which Bryant wanted to create was clear from 
the way in which he inserted generalized descriptions of 
Zulu raiding into the narrative. Thus in a series of 
195. OT, pp. 252, 376. 
196. Ibid., pp. 137-9. 
197. Ibid., p. 252. 
198. See esp. ch. 64 of Olden Times. The quotation is 
from p. 171. 
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chapters on the clans of the Natal region, he mentioned 
the successive invasions of the Thembu, Chunu and 
confederacy, and then went on, ' •.. and in pursuit of all 
came the armies of Shaka, roaming and ravaging wherever 
human being or cattle presented themselves for capture or 
attack,.199 In similar unspecific vein he asserted that 
'whichever way the roaming Zulu army moved, clan was 
driven upon clan, each in turn annihilating the other in 
their common struggle to escape ..• ,.200 
Through repetition of this kind, the idea was 
reinforced that the Zulu were the devastators of Natal, 
when, except in two instances,201 no firm evidence 
whatever was put forward to sustain the view that they 
were active anywhere outside the easternmost parts of the 
region. By Bryant's own account, the notion of the 
general 'Zulu invasions' is baseless. It is a product of 
a projection of the devastation stereotype rather than of 
a historical enquiry. 
8. The problem of chronology 
The final issue considered in this chapter is the validity 
of the chronology which Bryant projected as established 
fact in Olden Times. Given the absence of contemporary 
documentation of the events which he was describing, the 
question becomes salient of how he arrived at his datings, 
and how reliable his estimates were. This is all the more 
so because, as already noted, his estimates changed over 
time. In his 'Sketch' he had placed the period of the 
upheavals south of the Thukela as beginning in 1812; in 
Izindaba Zabantu he had placed it in the period c.1816-
1819; and in Olden Times he moved it still further forward 
to the years c.1818-1821. 
199. OT, p. 555. 
200. Ibid., p. 551. 
201. These two instances concern the expeditions 
supposedly sent in the early 1820s against the Chunu on 
the Mzimkhulu and against the Ngwane on the upper Thukela: 
see below, pp. 284-6. 
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Bryant's development of the chronology which he used in 
his early work needs to be understood against the 
background of previous attempts to date the 'wars of 
Shaka'. The earliest writers on the subject provided very 
few absolute datings in their accounts, partly no doubt 
because of the difficulty of making accurate estimates, 
but also because most of them had little sense that 
African societies had much of a history to record and were 
therefore not particularly concerned to establish a 
clearly dated chronology of events. The earliest attempt 
at dating Shaka's reign seems to have been the statement 
published in 1826 by J.S. King, one of the traders 
operating at Port Natal, to the effect that Shaka had then 
been ruling for about eight years. This originally 
appeared in an article which he published anonymously in 
the South African Comercial Advertiser, and was reprinted 
in 1827 in Thompson's Travels and Adventures. 202 In 1835 
Gardiner recorded a statement from Nhlangwini informants 
that their people had been driven away from the region of 
the Thukela river during 'the devastating wars of Charka' 
about fifteen years before. It was probably this 
statement, as published in Gardiner's Narrative the 
following year,203 which formed the basis of the 
assertions made by Holden and Shooter in the 1850s that 
Shaka's forces had invaded Natal in about 1820. 204 
In his 'Historic sketch', drawn up in 1864, Shepstone 
adopted a rather earlier chronology. He must have known 
of King's estimate, for, besides having appeared in 
Thompson's book, it appeared in an extract from King's 
article which had been reprinted in Chase's well-known 
Natal Papers in 1843. 205 For reasons which are not clear 
202. Thompson, Travels and Adventures, pp. 248-9. 
203. Gardiner, Narrative, p. 312. 
204. Holden, History of the Colony of Natal (1855), pp. 
41, 56; Shooter, Kafirs of Natal (1857), p. 260. 
205. Chase, ed., Natal Papers, p. 21. Chase erroneously 
attributed the article to Farewell. 
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Shepstone pushed the date of Shaka's accession back to 
about 1810. 206 The ensuing upheavals in Natal he dated to 
the period 1812-1814,207 an estimate which he adhered to 
in the article on the pre-European history of Natal which 
he published in 1875. 208 The influence of Shepstone's 
dating on subsequent works can be seen in Russell's well-
known textbook on the geography and history of Natal, 
which first appeared in 1891 and went through numerous 
subsequent editions. Russell combined Shesptone's 
estimates for the beginning of Shaka's reign in 1810 and 
for the beginning of the wars in Natal in 1812 with the 
date of 1820, presumably derived from Holden and Shooter, 
for the end of the wars. 209 
In his earliest historical account, the 'Sketch' of 
1905, Bryant adopted Shepstone's dates for the beginning 
of Shaka's reign and for the beginning of the period of 
upheavals south of the Thukela. 210 Apparently without 
realizing the contradiction, later in the same narrative 
he stated that the arrival of British traders at Port 
Natal in 1824 had taken place eight years after Shaka's 
accession, which he thus implicitly placed in 1816. 211 
Bryant also adopted shepstone's notion that the flight of 
the Ngwane and of the confederacy had respectively 
constituted the first and fourth 'waves' of refugees set 
in motion through Natal. For reasons which are not clear, 
he reversed Shepstone's second and third waves, and had 
the Thembu making off southwards before rather than after 
the Chunu. 212 
206. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in Commission on Laws 
and Customs, vol. 2, p. 416. 
207. Ibid., pp. 417, 418. 
208. Shepstone, 'Early history of the Zulu-Kafir race', in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 158, 164. 
209. Russell, Natal (1st ed.), pp. 130, 131, 135. 
210. Bryant, Dictionary, pp. 38*, 39*. 
211. Ibid., p. 48*. 
212. Ibid., pp. 41*-43*. 
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The uncertainties and contradictions inherent in 
Bryant's chronology emerge more clearly still in his 
series of Izindaba Zabantu articles. At one point early 
in the series he had the Chunu as the first wave, the 
Thembu as the second, the Ngwane as the third, and the 
confederacy as the fourth. 213 More generally, though, in 
this work, the dating which he assigned to the individual 
waves gave the sequence as Chunu-confederacy-Thembu-
Ngwane. The revision of the sequence from that used in 
the 'Sketch' seems to have hinged on a single piece of 
evidence, whose source was not given. This was a 
statement to the effect that the flight of the Ndwandwe 
from the Zulu, an event which was seen as having in turn 
precipitated the flight of the Ngwane into Natal, took 
place 'seven summers' before the battle of Ndololwane. 214 
Nathaniel Isaacs, whose book was well known to Bryant, 
recorded that this battle had taken place in 1826;215 by 
Bryant's reckoning, the flight of the Ngwane had thus 
taken place in c.1819. 216 In accepting this dating, 
Bryant created a problem for himself. If the Ngwane had 
in fact formed the first wave, as he had maintained in his 
'Sketch', then the latter waves would have to be dated to 
the early 1820s, a dating which, at that stage in his 
thinking, Bryant appears to have regarded as too late in 
time. He therefore shifted the flight of the Ngwane to 
the last place in the sequence, and, so as not to have too 
large a time-gap between this wave and the others, shifted 
the rest of the sequence from the early to the late 1810s. 
The flight of the Chunu and of the confederacy was now 
placed in 1816, and that of the Thembu in 1818. 217 Why 
the 'Sketch's' sequence of Thembu-Chunu-confederacy now 
213. HZ, pp. 35-6. 
214. Ibid., p. 15. 
215. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 60. 
216. HZ, pp. 25, 33, 35. 
217. Ibid., pp. 40, 45, 81. 
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became Chunu-confederacy-Thembu is not indicated. 
This revised dating created anomalies in Bryant's 
chronology of which he was not always aware. Though he 
had shifted the dates of 'Shaka's wars' forward in time, 
he still saw Shaka's reign as having begun in C.1810. 218 
There was thus a gap of half a dozen years between his 
accession and the first wave. An even longer gap emerged 
between, on the one hand, his accession, and on the other, 
his first campaign across the Thukela and his attack on 
the neighbouring Qwabe, which Bryant dated to c.1817 and 
c.1818 respectively.219 This stood in contrast to the 
picture of Zulu expansion which Bryant described in his 
'sketch',220 and which, for that matter, had emerged in 
much of the previous literature. In these works the 
impression had been given that no sooner had Shaka come to 
power than he had begun his career of conquest of other 
chiefdoms. 
Another problem which emerged from Bryant's fixing the 
date of the flight of the Ngwane at c.1819, a problem of 
which he was aware, had to do with the identity of the 
group which had displaced them. In his 'Sketch' Bryant 
had had the Ngwane driven out in c.1812 on the orders of 
Dingiswayo, chief of the Mthethwa, who, the reader was 
told, had died in c.1818. 221 In Izindaba Zabantu, the 
date of Dingiswayo's death was given as 1817. 222 It was 
logically impossible to caste him as the main agent in an 
event which Bryant n9w saw as having taken place two years 
later, so Bryant had to invoke another agency. In the 
event, for reasons that he did not explain, he proceeded 
to have the Ngwane driven out by the Ndwandwe, who in turn 
were in flight after defeat at the hands of the Zulu. 223 
218. Ibid., p. 84. 
219. Ibid., p. 61. 
220. Bryant, Dictionary, pp. 41*-46*. 
221- Bryant, Dictionary, pp. 39*, 43*. 
222. HZ, p. 48. 
223. Ibid. , pp. 14, 25, 33, 35. 
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By the time he came to write Olden Times, Bryant had 
modified his ideas on the chronology of the Shakan period 
yet again. There were two key changes that need to be 
noted. One was his acceptance of a date of c.1816 for 
Shaka's accession. This, by his own acknowledgement, 
derived from an undated excerpt, published in Bird's 
Annals of Natal, from the previously mentioned article 
written by J.S. King, to the effect that at the time of 
its writing Shaka had been reigning for about eight 
years. 224 Bryant assumed that the original piece had been 
written in 1824, when the first British traders had 
arrived at Port Natal: as indicated above (see p. 144), it 
had in fact been written by King in 1826. 
The other important change of chronology as reflected 
in Olden Times had to do with the both the sequence and 
the dating of the four waves. This change was 
necessitated by Bryant's reversion to the view that the 
Mthethwa chief Dingiswayo had been instrumental in causing 
the flight of the Ngwane. This switch of opinion was in 
turn most probably due to the pUblication in 1924 of new 
information on the life of Dingiswayo in James stuart's 
uBaxoxele, a book which Bryant acknowledged as one of his 
sources. 225 Among Dingiswayo's campaigns, as described in 
some detail by stuart's informant, Mashwili kaMngoye, was 
one against the Ngwane. 226 Logic~.ly this campaign had to 
be placed in time before the death of Dingiswayo at the 
hands of the Ndwandwe, an event which itself logically had 
to precede the destruction of the Ndwandwe chiefdom by the 
Zulu. This latter event, according to Bryant's account in 
Izindaba Zabantu as mentioned above (p. 146), could be 
absolutely dated to c.1819. In Olden Times Bryant 
224. OT, p. 93. The extract is in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 
1, p. 93. It was presumably lifted by Bird from Chase's 
Natal Papers, for it repeats Chase's erroneous attribution 
)f the extract to Francis Farewell. Bryant reproduces 
Bird's and Chase's mistake. See also note 205 above. 
225. OT, p. 137. 
226. Stuart, ed., uBaxoxele, pp. 29-31. 
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retained this date, and, working back from it, dated the 
death of Dingiswayo to C.1818,227 and his defeat of the 
Ngwane and their flight into Natal to the same year. 228 
Having fixed the date of Shaka's accession at c.1816 
and the flight of the Ngwane at c.1818, Bryant then had to 
decide where to fit in the other three waves. To keep to 
the dating of 1816-1818 which he had used in Izindaba 
Zabantu would have meant compressing the events which 
surrounded Shaka's accession, together with the movement 
of all four waves, into th~ space of two years. It would 
also have meant having Shaka beginning his career of 
conquest at a time when he had only just succeeded to the 
chiefship and would hardly have had the opportunity to 
organize and mobilize the necessary force. Bryant's 
solution was to revert to the sequence of waves which he 
had postulated in his 'Sketch', so that the flight of the 
Ngwane in c.1818 now marked its beginning instead of its 
end, and to shift the rest of the sequence further forward 
in time. The flight of the Thembu was now placed in 1820, 
the year after the Zulu-Ndwandwe conflict, that of the 
Chunu in 1821, and that of the confederacy in the same 
year. An important factor in Bryant's decision to go back 
to placing the flight of the Thembu before that of the 
Chunu was probably the publication in 1924 of Stuart's 
uHlangakula. In a detailed account, which Bryant used as 
one of his sources,229 the Thembu were described as having 
moved off to the south before the Chunu. 230 
The best that can be said of the chronology developed 
by Bryant through his successive accounts is that it is 
highly uncertain. It is based largely on guesswork rather 
than argumentation from evidence, and remains full of 
ambiguities and inconsistencies. His apparently arbitrary 
227. Ibid., pp. 158, 166. 
228. Ibid., pp. 136, 139. 
229. OT" p. 247. 
230. Stuart, ed., uHlangakula, pp. 13-19. 
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alteration of the sequences of 'waves', and of the dates 
which he assigned to them, marks his whole working method 
as suspect. There is nothing in is various accounts to 
indicate that anyone of his estimates is more reliable 
than another, and his attribution of dates to specific 
events cannot be taken as evidence that those events 
actually happened. All in all, his attempts to strengthen 
his narrative's appearance of authenticity by placing it 
in a dated chronological framework should be treated with 
the greatest caution. 
9. Bryant's account: a general assessment 
The most significant finding of the investigation 
conducted above is that Bryant's account of the upheavals 
which took place south of the Thukela in the early 19th 
century was almost entirely derivative. Far from being 
based on oral traditions collected by Bryant himself, as 
most readers of Olden Times have probably assumed ever 
since the book was published, it was drawn mainly from 
previously published sources. The most important of these 
were Shepstone's 'Historic sketch', from which Bryant took 
the conceptual framework which he used, and Shepstone's 
brief histories of the 'tribes' of Natal, from which, 
without acknowledgement, Bryant obtained most of the 
empirical information which went into his account. In 
effect, his treatment of the upheavals was largely 
plagiarized. 
Shepstone's histories were based on testimonies which 
he had collected from a dozen, perhaps more, African 
informants. He recorded very little by way of 
biographical detail about them or of the circumstances in 
which his interviews with them took place. It is thus 
difficult to assess the worth of his histories as primary 
source material, but, even if they are accepted as useful, 
it is clear that Bryant's account was grounded in very 
meagre evidence. 
Much more problematic than the nature of the sources 
which Bryant used is the nature of the conceptual 
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framework which gave his narrative shape. The notion that 
in the late 1810s and early 1820s Natal was largely 
devastated by waves of refugees set in motion by Zulu 
aggression, followed by a series of Zulu campaigns, leaves 
too many questions unanswered, and in fact is contradicted 
in important respects by Bryant's own account. There is 
little doubt that at various stages groups like the 
Ngwane, Thembu and Chunu pushed their way through parts of 
the territories south of the Thukela in order to escape 
from an arena of intensifying conflict. But precisely 
what role was played by the Zulu in these conflicts, why, 
when and how these and other groups migrated, and what 
impact their movements had on the region, are questions 
which Bryant, with his fixation on 'great man' and Zulu-
centric explanations of historical change, and on the 
colonial-made devastation stereotype, could hardly begin 
to ask, let alone to answer. 
As far as the 'Zulu invasions' are concerned, there is 
enough evidence in the pages of Olden Times itself to 
contradict the notion, which Bryant was at pains to 
foster, that Zulu armies murdered and pillaged across the 
length and breadth of·Natal. A close reading of his 
account makes clear that the Zulu military activities of 
which he spoke were concentrated mainly in the 
comparatively small area between the middle and lower 
Thukela and the lower Mngeni or perhaps the lower 
Mkhomazi. Similarly, Bryant's own account indicated that 
neither the Zulu nor any other group 'depopulated' the 
region south of the Thukela. It is likely that in many 
locations there was at particular times a sudden and 
sUbstantial drop in population as the inhabitants fled 
from threatened destruction at the hands of the Zulu or 
other enemies. But Bryant's deliberate focus on events of 
this kind prevented him from making more of the evidence, 
which he himself adduced, that they were not universally 
or uniformly experienced south of the Thukela. By his own 
account, many of the chiefdoms of the Thukela-Mvoti area 
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remained in situ under Zulu domination,231 while other 
groups, which he usually labelled as 'cannibals', survived 
in parts of the midlands and of the Thukela-Mzinyathi 
area. 232 A different interpretation of the region's 
history would have much more to say about these 
communities than Bryant does. 
Related to Bryant's portrayal of the 'depopulation' of 
Natal was his treatment of the history of the large 
numbers of 'refugee' communities which he saw as having 
streamed southward away from the Zulu menace. In Olden 
Times the region south of the Mzimkhulu river became 
something of a dumping-ground for these groups, for once 
Bryant had them across the river he tended to lose 
interest in them. Either he pushed them off further south 
to become 'Fingoes' among the Xhosa chiefdoms,233 or he 
had them involved in further rounds of internecine 
conflict. Bryant himself indicated that these struggles 
persisted in the Mzimkhulu-Mzimvubu region throughout the 
1820s,234 and it is clear even from his cursory treatment 
of them that their outcome was important for the 
subsequent history of the region north of the Mzimkhulu. 
But, again because of his Zulu-centric focus, he could 
only portray them as marginal to the conflicts with which 
he was primarily concerned. 
Because he could not conceive of the Zulu state as 
founded on anything except violence and coercion, Bryant 
was similarly obliviQUS to the import of the evidence 
which he himself recorded that, far from setting out to 
depopulate the whole region south of the Thukela, the Zulu 
leadership was active in establishing expanded tributary 
chiefdoms in the southern marches of the region over which 
it sought to exercise authority. In the region between 
231. OT, pp. 507, 511, 521, 523, 530, 540, 545. 
232. Ibid., pp. 58, 248, 271, 348, 377, 410, 551-2, 559. 
233. See for example OT, pp. 270, 349, 387. 
234. Ibid., p. 380. 
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the Thukela and the Mzinyathi, Bryant told his readers, 
Jobe kaMaphitha of the sithole set up 'a magnificent 
dukedom' under Shaka's patronage. 235 Further down the 
Thukela, Zihlandlo kaGcwabe of the Mkhize was encouraged 
by Shaka to extend his authority southwards across the 
river into the upper Mvoti region. 236 On the lower Mvoti, 
Shaka intervened in a Cele succession dispute in favour of 
Magaye, who henceforth was also able 'to bask in Shaka's 
graces,.237 These developments were all of a piece with 
Zulu expeditions, which Bryant described but whose 
political purpose he could not appreciate, to destroy 
potential rival states in the region, such as that of the 
Thembu on the Mzinyathi, of the Chunu on the Mzimkhulu, of 
the Ngwane on the upper Thukela, and of the Thuli in the 
Mngeni-Mkhomazi region. Zulu policies in the territories 
south of the Thukela were altogether far more complex than 
Bryant could allow for. 
with his focus on Zulu agency, and on militarism, 
Bryant was quite unable to place the events which he 
described in the context of the sweeping political changes 
which had been taking place across south-eastern Africa 
from at least the later 18th century onward, nor even 
against the background of the more localized conflicts 
that were taking place among the chiefdoms of the Thukela-
Delagoa Bay region. By uncritically placing himself 
within the settler tradition of writing the region's 
history, Bryant precluded any possibility of developing a 
more broadly-based analysis. His narrative ended up as a 
largely fictionalized interpretation of threadbare 
evidence. Its status as a definitive or even a reliable 
account must be rejected. 
In 1966, the same year that Omer-Cooper launched the 
notion of the mfecane into general historical discourse, 
Donald Morris wrote of Bryant's major work: 
235. Ibid., pp. 259-60. 
236. Ibid., pp. 405, 409-12. 
237. Ibid., p. 540. 
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Olden Times in Zululand and Natal ... depends primarily 
on tribal lore garnered during four decades of 
exhaustive interviews with native elders.... (I)t is 
safe to say his work will never be exceeded. Almost 
everythinq published on the subject since depends on 
h ' 238 1m ...• 
Morris's encomium exemplifies the kind of reverential 
attitude to Bryant's work which has allowed it to stand 
virtually unchallenged for sixty years. The present 
chapter has sought to collapse the notion that Bryant can 
be taken as an authority 0n the history of the upheavals 
which took place in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the 
early 19th century. with the notion of the Zulu 
'devastations' exposed as a colonial-made myth, and with 
the myth's chief empirical prop now demolished, the way is 
open for the development of a new interpretation of this 
history. This exercise will be taken up in the next two 
chapters. 
238. Morris, Washing of the Spears, 1966 ed., p. 618. 
CHAPTER 4 
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS NORTH OF THE THUKELA IN THE 
EARLY 19TH CENTURY 
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1. The intensification of conflict in the De1agoa Bay-
Thuke1a region 
Chapter 1 above described the processes of political 
change which were taking place in the valleys of the 
Thuke1a and Mzinyathi and in the territories to the south 
in the late 18th century and perhaps the first years of 
the 19th. The main developments dealt with were, first, 
the expansion of certain of the chiefdoms of the middle 
and lower Thuke1a and the upper Mzinyathi, and, second, 
the migrations from north of the Thuke1a of the Thu1i and 
theCe1e, and their establishment of two new paramountcies 
in the coastal regions. These developments, it was 
argued, were to a greater or lesser extent responses to 
the processes of political centralization and territorial 
expansion which were taking place in this period in the 
region to the north from the Thuke1a to De1agoa Bay and 
beyond. 
In the first two decades of the 19th century, political 
conflict among the newly enlarged polities of the De1agoa 
Bay-Thuke1a region greatly intensified. As has been 
argued in chapter 2 above, the repercussions as they were 
felt south of the Thuke1a have usually been described in 
the literature in terms of a series of wars, raids and 
population movements which were stimulated in the first 
instance by the expansion of the Zulu state, and which 
culminated in the early 1820s with the establishment of 
unquestioned Zulu domination over the territories between 
the Thuke1a and the Mzimkhu1u. Very little attention has 
been paid to the specifics of the political changes which 
took place in this area, or to their more immediate 
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causes: generally speaking, they are presented simply as 
the automatic result of the growth of the despotic and 
militaristic Zulu state. Virtually no notice has been 
taken of factors other than that of Zulu expansionism, 
and, even where they avoid racist stereotypes about Zulu 
bloodthirstiness and Shaka's mania for power, the vast 
majority of conventional accounts hardly begin to analyze 
the extension of Zulu power south of the Thukela in 
historical terms. If the forces which made for political 
change in this region in the 1810s and 1820s are to be 
better understood, the nature of the conflicts which were 
taking place north of the river after about 1800 needs 
first to be examined in some detail. This chapter 
presents an analysis of political developments in the 
region from Delagoa Bay to the Thukela in the early 19th 
century, with a focus on the area south of the White 
Mfolozi. 
By 1800 there were at least seven large if loosely-
structured paramountcies in the Delagoa Bay-Thukela 
region. These were the Tembe, Mabhudu, Dlamini, Ndwandwe, 
Hlubi, Mthethwa and Qwabe chiefdoms. In all of these the 
powerholding groups were attempting to consolidate and 
extend the scope of their authority, and, in the case of 
the Dlamini, Ndwandwe and Mthethwa at least, to expand the 
territories under their control. On their margins were 
numerous smaller chiefdoms whose rulers' policies were no 
doubt largely concerned with the business of trying to 
maintain as far as possible their often precarious 
independence. At Delagoa Bay, the Portuguese in their 
fortified trading post remained an important if only 
sporadically forceful presence. 
Immediately south of Delagoa Bay, in the region about 
the Maputo river, the political scene was dominated by 
continuing rivalry for control of the trade routes to the 
bay between the Tembe chiefdom and the offshoot Mabhudu 
chiefdom. The Tembe, under the rule of Muhadane since the 
early l790s, occupied the coast and its hinterland between 
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the Tembe and Maputo rivers, while the Mabhudu, who were 
ruled by Makhasane from the late 1790s onward, dominated 
the territory to the east of the Maputo and Phongolo 
rivers from the borders of Tembe southwards to about the 
region of Lake Sibayi. 1 smith sees Makhasane as having 
operated from a position of relative political weakness at 
this time; Hedges, on the other hand, depicts him as the 
leader of a strong and expanding chiefdom. 2 Certainly by 
the early 19th century the Mabhudu had developed at least 
partially militarized amabutho, which provided the ruling 
house with an important source of military and political 
power. 3 Another basis of their power continued to be the 
Delagoa Bay trade, with the Mabhudu chiefdom being well 
placed geographically for its rulers to act as 
intermediaries in the commerce with the Portuguese which 
the Mthethwa chief Dingiswayo was at this time concerned 
to expand. 4 On the basis of a few snippets of information 
in Fynn's Diary, both Smith and Hedges see Makhasane and 
Dingiswayo as having formed a military and trading 
alliance. 5 
To the west of the Mabhudu chiefdom, the intrusive 
Dlamini, who by the early 19th century were ruled by 
Ndvungunye, were trying to consolidate their rule over 
what is now southern Swaziland. At the same time they 
were seeking to shake off the suzerainty which the 
1. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 214, 223-4; Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 140, 152n, 153-4. 
2. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
p. 247; Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 140, 153. 
3. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 153-4; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 
pp. 147, 148. 
4. smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 247-8; Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
p. 187. 
5. Fynn, Diary, pp. 7, 10; Smith, 'The struggle for 
control', unpubl. thesis, p. 247; Hedges, 'Trade and 
politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 153. 
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Ndwandwe under Zwide claimed over them, and in the process 
coming more and more into conflict with their nominal 
overlords. It seems to have been at this time that the 
first Dlamini amabutho were established. 6 
For their part the Ndwandwe were also engaged in a 
process of vigorous territorial expansion and political 
consolidation. smith, citing Bryant, sees the main 
direction of their movement as having been from the 
coastal regions westward into the uplands, but he seems in 
fact to be confusing the expansion of the Ndwandwe with 
that of the Mthethwa. 7 More to the point is Hedges's 
analysis, which, read in conjunction with that of Bonner, 
suggests that in the early years of the 19th century the 
Ndwandwe were attempting to expand their power on two 
fronts from their territorial base in the Magudu-Nongoma 
region. To the north-west they were engaged in a struggle 
with the Dlamini for domination of the mid-Phongolo 
valley. To the east and south-east, in the region from 
the southern Lubombo to the west of Lake Saint Lucia, they 
were trying to extend effective control over three 
tributary chiefdoms, the Gasa, the Msane and the Jele. 
Probably because they were strategically situated on the 
trade route between Delagoa Bay and the Mthethwa country, 
these chiefdoms were, Hedges argues, able to maintain a 
considerable degree of autonomy.8 The efforts of the 
Ndwandwe to reduce it were probably an important factor in 
bringing the latter into increasing confrontation with the 
Mthethwa. 
Like the ruling groups in the other major chiefdoms of 
the region, the Ndwandwe chiefly lineage had, at least by 
6. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, pp. 24-6. 
7. smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies, p. 185, citing Bryant, Olden Times, 
p. 137, which refers to the expansion of the Mthethwa, not 
of the Ndwandwe. 
8. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 159-65. See also Bonner, Kings. Commoners and 
Concessionaires, pp. 25-6. 
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Zwide's time, established a degree of centralized control 
over the amabutho of the territory which it dominated. 9 
If Zwide's reputation as a fighter is anything to go by,10 
the Ndwandwe amabutho had a greater military inflection 
than those of their neighbours, partly because of the 
particular circumstances in which the Ndwandwe state had 
come into being in the later 18th century, and partly 
because of the rivalries which were developing in the 
early 19th century between it and its more expansionist 
neighbours. 
Chief among these was the Mthethwa state under 
Dingiswayo, who, Hedges thinks, had been ruling since the 
1790s. 11 Historians since the mid-19th century have 
presented Dingiswayo as a key figure in the political 
developments which took place north of the Thukela in the 
early years of the century; he retains this role in the 
very differently oriented analyses presented in recent 
academic studies. 12 In seeking to understand Mthethwa 
expansionism in the early 19th century, academic 
historians have come up with a range of different 
explanations. smith suggests that Dingiswayo's prime 
imperial concern was to establish control over the trade 
route to the north as a means of strengthening the 
Mthethwa state. To this end he made an alliance with the 
Mabhudu, and also sought to expand Mthethwa domination 
inland over the region south of the White Mfolozi. 13 
9. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 186. 
10. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, p. 23; 
JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Luzipho, p. 354; Bryant, Olden 
Times, p. 162. 
11. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 186n, 199. 
12. The most important recent studies of Mthethwa history 
in the time of Dingiswayo are those of Hedges, 'Trade and 
politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 183-93; and Hamilton, 
'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 120-38. 
13. Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies, pp. 183-5. 
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Hedges sees Mthethwa expansion from the territory in the 
coastal lowlands south of the Mfolozi as having taken 
place in several phases, with strategic issues initially 
having been more important than the trade factor. In the 
first phase the Mthethwa extended their control into the 
hills round the sources of the Nseleni as a move to 
eliminate potential threats to the stability of the 
Mthethwa polity at a time when it was facing a challenge 
from the Qwabe state on its southern border. The 
assistance of a force of Mabhudu was decisive, Hedges 
argues, in enabling the Mthethwa to fight off the Qwabe. 14 
In the next phase, the Mthethwa sought to establish 
control across the Black Mfolozi in the territory east of 
the Mona river. This move, which brought Mthethwa power 
to the borders of the Ndwandwe sphere of influence, was 
undertaken to extend control over the northern trade 
route. 15 The final phase of Dingiswayo's expansion saw 
the Mthethwa extend their domination westward between the 
White Mfolozi and the Mhlathuze. Though Hedges describes 
this process in some detail, he offers no explanation for 
it. 16 
Like Hedges, Hamilton distinguishes several phases of 
Mthethwa expansion in Dingiswayo's reign, though her 
analysis is considerably more detailed and generally more 
nuanced than his. The first phase, in her view, was one 
of consolidation north of the Mfolozi. This she sees as 
having been undertaken for strategic reasons, and not, as 
Hedges argues, to establish control over the trade route 
to the north. 17 In the second phase, Dingiswayo moved to 
extend his control over the coastal plain from the Mfolozi 
southwards. He was motivated, Hamilton suggests, by two 
main concerns. One was to secure Mthethwa domination of 
14. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 153. 
15. Ibid., pp. 186-7. 
16. Ibid., pp. 187-90. 
17. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 123. 
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what was a region of relatively high rainfall, good 
agricultural land, and varied grazing. The rise of 
Mthethwa interests in this region reflected the shift 
which had for some time been taking place in the Delagoa 
Bay trade from ivory to cattle. 'With the shift to the 
coast', Hamilton argues, 'the Mthethwa effectively 
exchanged elephant country for cattle country,.18 
A more immediate concern of Dingiswayo's in expanding 
southwards, Hamilton argues, was to eliminate the threat 
to his position which was posed by the presence in the 
Qwabe country of one of his half-brothers, who was a rival 
claimant to the Mthethwa chiefship.19 There is some doubt 
about the validity of the tradition on which this argument 
is based,20 but there seems little doubt that from early 
in Dingiswayo's reign, if not before, the Mthethwa and 
Qwabe were increasingly coming into conflict, and that the 
immediate cause was the Mthethwa ruling house's pursuit of 
its political ambitions in the south and west. 
The third phase of Mthethwa expansion as described by 
Hamilton opened when Dingiswayo began to extend his 
chiefdom from the coastal lowlands westward into the 
interior between the white Mfolozi and the Mhlathuze. In 
contrast to Smith, who sees this move as having been 
undertaken to control the trade route to the north,21 
Hamilton regards it as having been made primarily for 
strategic reasons. It was, in her view, aimed in the 
first instance at containing the threat to the stability 
of the Mthethwa chiefdom's western borderlands which was 
posed by the expansion of the Buthelezi chiefdom in the 
region south of the mid-White Mfolozi. 22 This hypothesis 
18. Ibid., p. 126. 
19. Ibid., pp. 120, 122. 
20. Stuart, ed., uBaxoxele, pp. 22-3; OT, p. 90. See also 
the discussion in Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpabl. thesis, 
p. 145, n.69. 
21. Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies, p. 185. 
22. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 127. 
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merits attention, but the evidence in support of it is 
very meagre. All it consists of is a few passing 
references in Bryant's Olden Times to the Buthelezi's 
having defeated and oppressed the Zulu chiefdom, and 
having received the allegiance of sections of the Bisini 
and the Thembu. 23 There is nothing directly in support of 
this hypothesis to be found in the statements recorded by 
stuart. 
Hedges, for his part, maintains that before the 
intrusion of the Mthethwa, the Zulu had been dominant in 
the region, and that both the Zulu and the Buthelezi had 
been 'intermittently dominated' by the Chunu. 24 Though 
there are no references to this on the page of Olden Times 
which he cites as a source, the notion that in the early 
19th century the Chunu chiefdom, which was located about 
the upper Nsuze river, was engaged in a process of 
expansion receives support elsewhere in Olden Times and 
also in the traditions recorded by stuart. At much the 
same time, according to evidence in both Bryant and 
stuart, the Mkhize (or Mbo) chiefdom, which bordered that 
of the Chunu to the south, was also expanding. 25 
The expansion of these two chiefdoms, and possibly the 
Buthelezi as well, was probably taking place at about the 
time when, to the north, the growing power of the Ndwandwe 
was beginning to be more directly felt by their 
neighbours. It was evinced particularly by their launching 
a series of successful raids against the Dlamini. 26 In 
this situation the Mthethwa rulers sought to extend their 
control over the chiefdoms to the west in the region about 
the mid-White Mfolozi in order to pre-empt the possible 
expansion into it of the the Ndwandwe on the one hand and 
23. OT, pp. 28, 56, 114, 131, 242, 246. 
24. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 189. 
25. The evidence for the expansion of the Chunu and the 
Mkhize is considered in the next section of the chapter. 
26. Bonner, Kings, Commoners and Concessionaires, 
pp. 25-8. 
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perhaps the Chunu and the Buthelezi on the other. In a 
series of campaigns in perhaps the first half of the 
1810s, Mthethwa forces pushed inland between the White 
Mfolozi and the Mhlathuze, and forced the Langeni, 
Buthelezi, Zulu, Qungebeni, Sibiya and other chiefdoms of 
the region to submit to Dingiswayo.27 
At this point the main thrust of Mthethwa expansion was 
re-directed northwards across the White Mfolozi. The 
reasons for this move are not discussed in either the 
primary or secondary lite~ature: most probably it was 
aimed at trying to prevent the growth of Ndwandwe 
influence south of the Black Mfolozi, and perhaps even to 
push back the southern frontiers of the Ndwandwe chiefdom. 
First a section of the Mbatha was subordinated, then the 
Dlamini section of the Buthelezi, and then, in a move 
which took Mthethwa forces across the Black Mfolozi to the 
very borders of Ndwandwe territory, a section of the 
Khumalo on the isiKhwebezi river. 28 Here, for the time 
being, Mthethwa expansion seems to have come to a halt. 
The Mthethwa advance into the interior transformed the 
political scene between the White Mfolozi and the 
Mhlathuze, and sharply raised the political temperature in 
neighbouring regions. In place of the numerous small 
chiefdoms which had previously jostled for local influence 
was now a single enlarged polity, which if still very 
loosely structured, was far more powerful than any of its 
neighbours, and was under the overlordship of a 
politically ambitious and expansionist ruling group. In 
the next two sections of the chapter the impact of these 
developments on the politics of the regions to the south 
and to the north respectively of the expanded Mthethwa 
chiefdom will be considered. 
27. OT, pp. 55, 102; Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 187, 189; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 128-9. 
28. OT, pp. 28, 102, 172, 224, 420, 421; Hedges, 'Trade 
and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 189; Hamilton, 
'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 129; JSA, vol. 1, evidence 
of Jantshi, p. 182; vol. 4, evidence of Ndukwana, p. 278. 
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2. The rise of political tensions along the lower Thukela 
Although the evidence is thin, the expansion of the 
Mthethwa chiefdom under Dingiswayo in the first ten or 
fifteen years of the 19th century seems to have sharpened 
conflicts within and between the chiefdoms of the adjacent 
lower Thukela region. Depending on local circumstances, 
it served to undermine the powers of some ruling groups, 
and to buttress those of others. Among the larger 
chiefdoms which had begun to consolidate towards the end 
of the 18th century, it stimulated further attempts at 
territorial expansion. 
The impact of Mthethwa expansion was most directly felt 
among the Qwabe. In the early 19th century the Qwabe 
chiefdom, unlike the emergent states of the Mthethwa, 
Ndwandwe and Dlamini, remained essentially an alliance of 
partially autonomous groups. Where, in the other three 
polities, clear political and social distinctions were 
beginning to develop between a dominant cluster of 
notionally related lineages and a distinct group of 
subordinate chiefdoms, no such cleavage can be discerned 
among the groups which made up the Qwabe chiefdom. 29 
Though in the last years of the 18th century or the early 
years of the 19th, the paramount chief, Khondlo, had 
apparently formed at least two amabutho, and though his 
successor Phakathwayo formed at least two more,30 the 
authority of the Qwabe chiefs over subordinate groups 
seems to have been considerably less than that of their 
counterparts in polities like that of the Mthethwa. 
This was clearly illustrated in the course of the 
crisis which blew up in the Qwabe polity sometime in the 
early 19th century when the succession to Khondlo was 
29. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 160. 
30. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Khambi, p. 210; stuart, ed., 
uBaxoxele, evidence of Mashwili, p. 28; OT, pp. 99, 185, 
198. 
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contested by two of his sons, Nomo and Phakathwayo. The 
dispute did not remain restricted to the ranks of the 
chiefly house; it turned into a quarrel between, on the 
one hand, supporters of Khondlo and of his nominated heir, 
Nomo, and, on the other, a group of Qwabe notables who 
sought to curtail the scope of the chief's authority by 
resisting his choice of heir and asserting the claims of a 
rival. 31 The conflict was exacerbated, to the level of a 
virtual civil war, by the intervention of the Mthethwa. 
The nature and outcome of this intervention are not 
entirely clear: Hedges argues that the Qwabe were able to 
resist Mthethwa attempts to establish domination over 
them, while Hamilton maintains that oingiswayo succeeded 
in asserting rights of suzerainty over the victorious 
candidate, Phakathwayo.32 There is no doubt, though, that 
Mthethwa pressure was a major factor in intensifying 
internal struggles among the Qwabe, and perhaps in 
weakening still further the powers of the chief. 
A symptom of the political problems, both internal and 
external, which the Qwabe leadership was facing by this 
time can be seen in the attack which Phakathwayo made on 
the Makhanya section of the chiefdom. As previously 
described (p. 57 above), the Makhanya had crossed to the 
south bank of the Thukela a little before or after 1800, 
and lived largely autonomously of the Qwabe chief. 
Phakathwayo's attack, which was beaten off by the 
Makhanya, is presented by stuart's informant, Mbovu 
kaMshumayeli, as having been simply a cattle-raid,33 but 
more probably it represented an attempt on the part of the 
Qwabe chief to shore up his crumbling authority over one 
of the groups which in his eyes owed him allegiance. 
Though there is no evidence as to the responses made to 
the Qwabe attack by the chiefdoms which neighboured the 
31. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 160-1. 
32. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 191; 
Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 125. 
33. JSA, vol. 3, pp. 26, 35-6. 
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Makhanya to the south and west - the Cele, Somi, Nganga, 
Seleku, Maphumulo and others - their leaders were no doubt 
constrained to keep a more wary eye than ever on goings-on 
north of the Thukela. 
Another example of how increasing political pressures 
were making themselves felt among the chiefdoms of the 
lower Thukela region in the early 19th century is 
reflected in developments in the Ngcobo chiefdom, which 
was situated on the north bank of the Thukela about the 
lower Nsuze river. Though early 20th-century sources on 
the history of the Ngcobo chiefdom characterize it as 
having been a 'large' or 'great' tribe in former times,34 
their descriptions were fairly certainly all coloured by 
the success with which, in the course of the 19th century, 
some of the senior Ngcobo sections and their offshoots had 
re-established themselves south of the Thukela under Natal 
colonial rule. 35 
Like the Qwabe polity, the Ngcobo chiefdom consisted of 
a number of partially autonomous sections claiming a 
genealogical relationship to, and recognizing the ritual 
seniority of, a paramount chief, and resisting his 
attempts to assert more than a minimal degree of political 
authority. Recorded traditions give the names of a dozen 
or more sections of the Ngcobo which appear to have 
existed in the early 19th century,36 but, if anything, the 
chief of the senior section of the Ngcobo, the Nyuswa, had 
even less authority over his subordinates than did his 
Qwabe counterpart. The traditions of the various Ngcobo 
sections as synthesized by Bryant in Olden Times indicate 
that groups like the Qadi and Ngongoma acted virtually 
independently of the Nyuswa chiefs in the early 19th 
34. Fuze, Black People, p. 16; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of 
Madikane, p. 53; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 39. 
35. See Bryant, OT, ch. 46 passim. 
36. Fuze, Black People, pp. 16, 68; JSA, vol. 3, evidence 
of Mbovu, pp. 32-3, 41-2; JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Msime, 
p. 49. 
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century. 37 Even if the Ngcobo chiefdom was larger than 
some of its neighbours, like the Cube to the north and the 
Hlongwa, Ngcolosi and Khabela to the south, its size bore 
little relation to its internal cohesion. Bryant's view 
was that in the early 19th century the Ngcobo formed not a 
single polity but rather 'a family of tribes, each with 
its own separate location, its independent chief, and in 
several (cases, its own) distinguishing cognomen,.38 
As well as facing the problems of trying to maintain 
its authority over nominally subordinate groups, by the 
1810s at the latest the Nyuswa leadership was having to 
deal with unprecedented external pressures. On its 
eastern borders the Mthethwa and Qwabe were in open 
conflict, to the north the Mthethwa were looming ever 
larger, and to the north-west the Mkhize chiefdom was also 
engaged in a process of territorial expansion. One 
response of the Nyuswa chiefly house was to try to tighten 
its rule over its adherents through extending the amabutho 
system: this is suggested by a tradition that Sihayo 
kaMapholoba, who became chief probably in the later 1810s, 
had at least one ibutho. 39 Whether its members were drawn 
from the Nyuswa section alone or from other sections of 
the Ngcobo as well is not indicated. The attack which 
Sihayo is said to have made on a section of the Qadi may 
also have stemmed from the increased concern of the Nyuswa 
leaders to assert control over subordinate groups.40 
Another response on the part of the Nyuswa to the 
rising political pressures which they were experiencing is 
probably to be seen in an attack which, according to 
Funwayo, the Nyuswa made on the Hlongwa across the Thukela 
to the south.41 In the course of it the Hlongwa were 
37. OT, pp. 487-94. 
38. HZ, p. 64. 
39. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Msime, p. 49. 
4 O. OT, P . 487. 
41. Funwayo's evidence in Shepstone's notes on 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 127. 
informant is identified in Shepstone's text). 
HZ, pp. 67, 79; OT" pp. 524-5. 
Hlongwa 
(The 
See also 
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driven out of their territory. If Funwayo's account is 
correct, this event was of considerable significance, for 
here was no mere cattle raid, nor even the political 
subordination of one chiefdom by another, but the physical 
expulsion of at least part of a community from the land 
which it occupied. Even if, as is likely, it was the 
Hlongwa ruling group and its adherents who fled, rather 
than the people as a whole, its migration was a symptom of 
the degree to which political tensions were rising in the 
early 19th century on both sides of the lower Thukela. 
upstream of the Ngcobo on the northern side of the 
Thukela was the Mkhize chiefdom. In the early 19th 
century it was, in Bryant's words a 'powerful clan', with 
Zihlandlo kaGcwabe as a 'strong chief,.42 As indicated in 
chapter 1 above (p. 36), Gcwabe, who ruled in the later 
18th century, is said to have had at least four men's 
amabutho; Zihlandlo apparently formed another four. 43 
Though the evidence is patchy and contradictory, the 
Mkhize seem to have been actively trying to establish 
their domination over certain of their neighbours by 
Zihlandlo's time. According to Bryant in Izindaba 
Zabantu, the Somi, who lived across the Thukela, were 
tributary to zihlandlo; in Olden Times, though, he has 
them living on the lower Thukela and makes no mention of 
any relationship with the Mkhize. 44 Mbokodo kaSikhule-
kile, whose membership of the Mkhize chiefly house no 
doubt coloured his view of Mkhize history, told stuart 
that a section of the Mkhize had fought several times 
against the Ndlovu, and had eventually sUGceeded in 
killing their chief, Mpongo, and in bringing some of his 
people under their rule. 45 Fuze, followed by Bryant, 
claims that it was the Chunu who killed Mpongo, but Bryant 
42. HZ, p. 50. 
43. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 15. 
44. HZ, p. 52; OT, p. 535. 
45. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, p. 10. 
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goes on to state that after the death of their chief the 
Ndlovu had sought refuge with Zihlandlo. 46 
A problem that arises in interpreting this and similar 
traditions relating to the expansion of the Mkhize relates 
to the dating of the events described. As will become 
evident in the next chapter, numerous traditions recorded 
in the literature indicate that Zihlandlo subordinated 
various polities in the mid-Thukela region in the period 
before the destruction of his chiefdom by the Zulu chief 
Dingane early in the 1830s. Most of the events described 
probably took place during the reign of Shaka, when the 
Mkhize chiefdom was expanding rapidly as a client polity 
of the Zulu state, but others may well have occurred 
during the pre-Shakan period of Mkhize expansion. In some 
cases it is difficult to date the subordination of a 
particular polity securely to either phase, and it may be 
that some of the episodes in the expansion of the Mkhize 
which are ascribed to the reign of Shaka actually took 
place earlier. 'In the case of the Ndlovu, Bryant's 
account implies that they took flight to the Mkhize before 
the southward migration of the Chunu, which indicates that 
they submitted to Zihlandlo either very early in Shaka's 
reign or before it. 
Another group which seems to have been subordinated by 
Zihlandlo before the rise of the Zulu power was a section 
of the Ximba which had previously formed part of the Chunu 
chiefdom. 47 In the early 19th century the Chunu, whose 
heartland was the region about the upper Nsuze river, were 
also engaged in a process of expansion, and it is likely 
that during this period they and the Mkhize to the south 
were increasingly coming into confrontation. According to 
Mbokodo, the two chiefdoms fought each other on at least 
two occasions, apparently on more or less equal terms. 48 
46. Fuze, Black People, p. 15; OT, pp. 264-5. 
47. OT, p. 262. 
48. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, pp. 12, 18. 
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That their chiefly houses regarded each other as of equal 
standing is indicated by the tradition that Zihlandlo's 
mother was possibly a woman of the Chunu. 49 After the 
migration of the latter group, Bryant maintains in 
Izindaba Zabantu, Zihlandlo became 'suzerain' of the Cube, 
whom the author sees as a 'small and insignificant 
remnant' of the Chunu. 50 In Olden Times, however, Bryant 
is more equivocal about the genealogical relationship 
between Chunu and Cube, and says nothing about the 
latter's having submitted to Zihlandlo, who now appears in 
the guise of 'neighbour' rather than of suzerain. 51 
At some stage the Mkhize may have experienced an 
attack by the Mthethwa. Though Bryant could find no 
satisfactory evidence that the Mthethwa 'ever made the 
acquaintance or obtained the allegiance' of the Mkhize and 
other chiefdoms of the mid-Thukela region,52 Mbokodo told 
stuart, with some circumstantial detail, of a fight 
between the Mthethwa and Mkhize which had taken place when 
Shaka Zulu was in the Mthethwa army.53 The outcome of the 
battle is not recorded, but if in fact Dingiswayo ever 
claimed suzerainty over Zihlandlo, the Mkhize were 
effectively able to maintain their independence. 
statements to the effect that the Chunu chiefdom was of 
unusual size and power in the early 19th century are to be 
found in several sources. Fynn described it as having 
been a 'powerful .•• tribe' at this time. 54 'The Chunu 
clan', Fuze wrote, 'was very powerful during the reign of 
Macingwane', and subordinated several other groups at this 
time. The chief himself had a reputation for ferocity and 
49. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mandlakazi, pp. 24-5. 
50. HZ, pp. 49-50. 
51. OT, p. 415. 
52. OT, pp. 102-3, 266. 
53. JSA, vol. 3, p. 19. 
54. Fynn, Diary, p. 14. 
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cruelty. 55 Bryant's depiction of the nature of 
Macingwane's rule in Olden Times was drawn very largely 
from Fuze,56 but in his Izindaba Zabantu articles, the 
publication of which predated the publication of Fuze's 
book, he independently described the Chunu as having been 
a 'great' and 'powerful' tribe. 57 Between them, Fuze, 
Bryant, Magidigidi kaNobhebe and Mbovu kaMshumayeli list 
sixteen sections of the Chunu chiefdom, at least ten of 
which are given as claiming to be related to the chiefly 
house. 58 
Two chiefdoms are named in surviving traditions as 
having been attacked by Macingwane. One was that of the 
Ndlovu under Mpongo kaZingelwayo, who, Fuze claims, was 
killed by the Chunu. 59 The other was that of the Zulu 
under Senzangakhona kaJama. Fuze records that Macingwane 
was 'in the habit of fighting Senzangakhona and defeating 
him',60 and Baleka kaMpitikazi, Baleni kaSilwana and 
Mqayikana kaYenge respectively told stuart that Macingwane 
had 'troubled' the Zulu chief, that Senzangakhona had 
fought and defeated the Chunu, and that the two had burnt 
each other's imizi.61 There is nothing to indicate that 
the Chunu were able to establish effective domination over 
either chiefdom. The evidence suggests that the Chunu 
chiefdom was expanding through a process of incorporation 
rather than of conquest, although the degree of control 
55. Fuze, Black People, pp. 15, 23, 52-3. The quotation 
is from p. 23. 
56. OT, pp. 264-7. 
57. HZ, pp. 49, 68. 
58. Fuze, Black People, p. 15; OT, pp. 262-4; JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Magidigidi, p. 90; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of 
Mbovu, p. 39. 
59. Fuze, Black People, pp. 15, 52. Bryant, OT, pp 264-5, 
follows Fuze's account. 
60. Fuze, Black People, p. 52; also Bryant, OT, p. 266. 
61. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Baleka, p. 5; JSA, vol. 1, 
evidence of Baleni, pp. 21-2; JSA, vol. 4, evidence of 
Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 23. 
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exercised by the chiefly house over the subordinate 
sections was probably tighter than in, for example, either 
the Qwabe or the Ngcobo chiefdoms. This is indicated by 
Magidigidi's evidence to the effect that Macingwane had 
five amabutho, each of which was stationed at a particular 
chiefly umuzi. 62 Magidigidi names eight of these imizi,63 
which were probably strategically located about the 
chiefdom the better to enable the Chunu leadership to 
exercise control over the territory under its domination. 
Citing an unpublished biography of Shaka written by 
stuart, Hamilton contends that in the course of Mthethwa 
expansion into the interior Dingiswayo was able to 
establish his suzerainty over the Chunu. 64 stuart's 
information on this point was almost certainly taken from 
a detailed account of Dingiswayo's conquests given to him 
by Mashwili kaMngoye. As a grandson of Dingiswayo, and as 
chief of a section of the Mthethwa under the Natal 
colonial government, Mashwili is highly likely to have 
exaggerated the extent of Mthethwa conquests in the heyday 
of their power in the early 19th century.65 Nothing has 
been found in the rest of stuart's notes to support this 
account, and, for his part, Bryant states categorically 
that he had found no satisfactory evidence that Dingiswayo 
had obtained the allegiance of the Chunu. 66 If the 
Mthethwa chief did at some stage claim suzerainty over the 
Chunu, there is no evidence that he was able to give his 
claim any effect. 
There seems little doubt, though, that the rising level 
of conflict within and between the chiefdoms of the 
62. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Magidigidi, p. 86. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 125, 129. 
Hamilton's account contradicts itself on an important 
issue: it first states that Macingwane was obliged to 
surrender his isigodlo to Dingiswayo, and then that he was 
permitted to retain it. 
65. Mashwili's evidence was published by stuart in his 
uBaxoxele, pp. 14-42. See esp. p. 31. 
66. OT, pp. 102-3, 266. 
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Mhlathuze-Thukela region were largely a consequence of the 
Mthethwa advance into the interior between the White 
Mfolozi and the Mhlathuze. The effects of the developing 
confrontations between the major polities on both sides of 
the White Mfolozi were thus, by the mid-1S10s at the 
latest, beginning to be felt among the chiefdoms several 
removes to the south. What the consequences for the 
chiefdoms of this region would have been if Dingiswayo had 
turned his attentions southwards is a matter for 
speculation; as it was, Mthethwa concerns were much more 
with their frontiers on the Mfolozi rivers. The next 
section of the chapter deals with their attempts to 
consolidate their power in the interior, and the outcome 
of their expansion northwards. 
3. Confrontations in the mid-White Mfolozi region 
After their push into the interior, and then their rapid 
thrust northwards across the White and Black Mfolozi 
rivers, the Mthethwa paused to consolidate their hold on 
the large extent of territory which they had brought under 
their sway. Over most of this area, Hamilton argues in 
the course of the most thorough analysis yet made of the 
subject, Mthethwa rule was relatively lightly felt. 
Chiefs had to acknowledge Mthethwa paramountcy, and in 
some cases submit to a degree of superintendence by 
Mthethwa-appointed izinduna; they had to pay tribute to 
their new overlord, usually in the form of cattle or 
agricultural produce; and they had to give up their powers 
of conducting important public rituals. The more 
recalcitrant among them were put to death and replaced by 
relatives who were amenable to Mthethwa overrule. But-
crucially - tributary chiefdoms were usually left with 
enough cattle for breeding purposes, and their manpower 
was not drawn off and pressed into service of the Mthethwa 
state through the amabutho system. 67 Hamilton does not 
67. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 121-31. 
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commit herself directly on the important issue of whether 
this policy was a result of reluctance on the part of the 
Mthethwa rulers to dilute the membership of the central 
body politic, or of its inability to coerce subordinated 
chiefdoms beyond a certain point. 68 Her argument that 
Mthethwa forces had become heavily overextended during 
their advance into the interior suggests that the latter 
was the case. 69 
Certainly it was the weakness of the central Mthethwa 
state power which led its leaders to try to tighten their 
control of the more vulnerable borderlands of their newly 
acquired domain by setting up trusted adherents as local 
marchlords with considerably more powers than other 
tributary chiefs were allowed. In the north-east, where 
Mthethwa territories abutted on those of the Ndwandwe, 
Dingiswayo assisted Nqoboka kaLanga, who had lived for a 
while in exile at the Mthethwa court, to usurp the 
chiefship of the Sokhulu. In return Nqoboka was required 
to maintain and extend Mthethwa control of the region 
about the lower Mfolozi. 70 Similarly, in the west the 
Mthethwa chief helped Shaka, a son of the Zulu chief 
Senzangakhona who had spent much of his earlier career 
among the Mthethwa, to seize the Zulu chiefship from the 
designated heir on the death of his father. 71 As Bryant 
. . .'" / puts it, Shaka was set up as 'D1ng1swayo's spec1al protege 
and up-country agent', and allowed a 'special measure of 
freedom' so long as ~e was prepared to rule in the 
interests of the Mthethwa. 72 
The installation of Shaka inaugurated a new period of 
rapid political change and of sharply intensified conflict 
in the mid-White Mfolozi region. As Hamilton writes, it 
----------------
68. Ibid. , pp. 122-3, 133-5. 
69. Ibid. , pp. 132-3. 
70. Ibid. , pp. 131-2; OT, pp. 109-10. 
71. Ibid. , pp. 132-3. 
72. OT, p. 129. 
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injected 'a new military imperative into the western 
reaches of Dingiswayo's domain', with Shaka being required 
'both to remodel the existing military structures along 
the lines of the Mthethwa army, and to expand the strength 
of the armed forces at his disposal,.73 The military 
inflection of Shaka's rule was enhanced, she argues, by 
the fact that he faced strong opposition from within the 
Zulu chiefly house. To secure his position, he sought in 
the first instance to restructure the Zulu chiefdom's own 
amabutho system in a way which strengthened his control 
over his subjects. 74 
Describing the details of the process of restructuring, 
the initial stages of which were implemented with support 
from the Mthethwa, is beyond the scope of this study. The 
significant point is that it provided Shaka with the 
military means to begin bringing neighbouring chiefdoms 
under Zulu domination. In the name of the Mthethwa chief, 
but also in pursuit of his own political ambitions, he 
conducted a series of campaigns which soon made the Zulu 
the dominant force in the region between the upper 
Mhlathuze and the mid-White Mfolozi region occupied by the 
Langeni, Qungebeni, Buthelezi, Mbatha and other groups. 
Shaka was allowed by Dingiswayo to keep a portion of the 
tribute in cattle which he extracted for his Mthethwa 
overlord from the newly subordinated chiefdoms, but, 
perhaps more significantly in political terms, he was 
permitted to incorporate their men into his revamped 
amabutho, and numbers of their women into his izigodlo. 75 
within a brief space of time the Zulu chiefdom had become 
a new regional power which, though comparatively small in 
territorial terms, was politically more centralized than 
any other local polity, and thus much more capable of 
effectively mobilizing its manpower for expansionist 
purposes. 
73. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 335. 
74. Ibid., p. 335 ff. 
75. Ibid., pp. 135-6; OT, pp. 125-33, 225-7. 
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There were however limits within which Shaka had to 
operate if he was not to be judged an over-mighty Subject 
by Dingiswayo, and deposed and probably put to death. 
Zulu sub-imperialism was kept within the bounds of 
territory effectively subordinated to Dingiswayo: it does 
not at this stage seem to have been directed north of the 
White Mfolozi, west of the Babanango region, or southward 
into the Thukela valley. Dingiswayo's main strategic aim 
in assisting this satellite power into being had been to 
establish a bulwark against Ndwandwe expansion, and 
independent Zulu ventures in other directions were not to 
be tolerated, especially at a time when the Mthethwa 
leadership was planning to resume its advance to the 
northward. 
Since the pUblication of Bryant's Olden Times, the 
immediate target of Mthethwa attentions in the north has 
usually been depicted as the Ngwane chiefdom of Matiwane 
kaMasumpa, situated in what is now the Vryheid region. It 
is difficult to understand why Dingiswayo and his advisers 
should have aspired to attack a chiefdom so remote from 
the borders of their effective sphere of influence, 
especially as an expedition sent against the Ngwane would 
have been highly vulnerable to a flanking attack by the 
hostile Ndwandwe. The story that the Ngwane were attacked 
by the Mthethwa needs to be treated with caution. 
Bryant's account is, by his own acknowledgement, drawn 
from the evidence of ~ashwili kaMngoye as published by 
Stuart in uBaxoxele. 76 As indicated earlier in this 
chapter, Mashwili's treatment of Mthethwa history may 
exaggerate the extent of Dingiswayo's power. The only 
other existing statements which implicate the Mthethwa in 
an attack on the Ngwane are cursory and ambiguous. 77 
There is, in short, no convincing evidence that such an 
attack took place. 
76. OT, p. 137; Stuart, ed., uBaxoxele, pp. 29-31. 
77. See the sources cited on p. 113 above; also Fynn, 
Diary, p. 318. 
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There is however no reason to doubt that, once they had 
established a relatively secure power base in the form of 
the client Zulu chiefdom on the mid-White Mfolozi, the 
Mthethwa leaders for the first time felt able to confront 
the Ndwandwe in the interior about the Black Mfolozi. 
Whether they were seeking actively to challenge Ndwandwe 
domination of the region or, on the other hand, to pre-
empt Ndwandwe expansion, is an issue which needs further 
investigation. An important factor which shaped their 
policies in this region was, it can be postulated, the 
existence of good relations between themselves and the 
main power in the region to the west of the Ndwandwe 
state, the Hlubi chiefdom. Dingiswayo would not have 
risked an advance northward, thus exposing his western 
flank to the Hlubi, without their support or at least 
their neutrality. Although the Hlubi chiefdom had become 
weakened by internal dissensions since the death of 
Bhungane, probably in the early years of the century, it 
remained an important political force. Like the Qwabe and 
Ngcobo chiefdoms, it was not a cohesive conquest state: it 
remained an alliance of notionally related groups which, 
even if recognizing the paramountcy of the Hadebe chief, 
to a greater or lesser extent acted autonomously of him. 78 
Bhungane's successor Mthimkhulu apparently attempted to 
assert a greater degree of chiefly control over his 
adherents through both men's and women's amabutho,79 but 
he seems to have exercised even less authority over his 
subordinates than did Phakathwayo of the Qwabe. Where the 
latter had been able to drive out his main rival for the 
chiefship, Mthimkhulu proved unable to do. 80 
The Hlubi chiefdom was in essence still largely a 
defensive alliance held together by antipathy towards a 
78. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, esp. pp. 14, 16, 
17, 19, 21; Wright & Manson, Hlubi Chiefdom, pp. 9-11. 
79. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, pp. 20, 23; Wright 
& Manson, Hlubi Chiefdom, p. 11. 
80. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, p. 28; Wright & 
Manson, Hlubi Chiefdom, p. 10. 
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common set of opponents. By the 1810s, if not before, 
this antipathy was focussed primarily on the Ndwandwe 
chiefdom. It was much closer to Hlubi territory than was 
any other major power, and, if tradition is to be 
believed, its leadership had acquired a reputation for 
treating its enemies far more harshly than did, for 
instance, the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo.81 The expansion 
of the Ndwandwe chiefdom in the early 19th century is 
likely to have caused considerable apprehension among the 
Hlubi leaders, and they probably welcomed the advent of 
the Mthethwa in the interior as bringing a powerful 
potential ally within closer reach. 
with the region south of the White Mfolozi now securely 
under control, with their north-western borders safe-
guarded by a friendly power, and with close commercial 
links established with the Mabhudu to the north, the 
Mthethwa were threatening to encircle the Ndwandwe on 
three sides. To the north the Ndwandwe were engaged in a 
struggle with the Dlamini across the Phongolo river,82 and 
to the west with some of the Khumalo chiefdoms in the 
upper Mkhuze-Black Mfolozi region. 83 The response of the 
Ndwandwe to the Mthethwa challenge was to launch a series 
of counter-attacks against the more exposed chiefdoms on 
the peripheries of the Mthethwa sphere of influence. To 
the west they attacked the Khumalo under Donda, defeated 
them and killed their chief. 84 Further west, the Ntshali 
under Mlotha suffered a similar fate. 85 Then, in a fierce 
attack reminiscent of their campaigns against the Dlamini 
81. On the contrasts between Zwide's and Dingiswayo's 
styles of leadership see Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 124, 125, 126, 129, 131-2: Bonner, 'Early 
state formation among the Nguni: the relevance of the 
Swazi case', unpubl. paper, pp. 2-3, 9-10. 
82. Bonner, Kings, Commoners and concessionaires, 
pp. 27-8. 
83. OT, pp. 172-3, 42l. 
84. Ibid. , p. 172. 
85. Ibid. , p. 162: Fynn, Diary, p. 150. 
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under Sobhuza, the Ndwandwe swept down on Matiwane's 
Ngwane, with the result that the chief and many of his 
adherents abandoned their territory and made off to the 
westward. 86 Probably after these campaigns, the Ndwandwe 
fell on the Nxumalo on their south-eastern border with the 
Mthethwa and put their chief to death. 87 In the face of 
Ndwandwe aggression, Dingiswayo mobilized his forces and 
apparently launched an invasion of Ndwandwe territory. 
The outcome was that the Mthethwa chief was captured and 
killed by the Ndwandwe, and his army defeated and driven 
back in disorder. 88 
These events significantly transformed the political 
scene north of the Thukela. Some traditions state that 
Shaka had been summoned to assist the Mthethwa army with 
his own forces, but had held back from doing so.89 If 
this was a deliberate ploy to try to throw off Mthethwa 
domination, it proved successful, for, after the death of 
Dingiswayo and the defeat of the Mthethwa army, the Zulu 
chiefdom was effectively left as the strongest power 
between the Thukela and the White Mfolozi. It was, 
however, far inferior in strength to the Ndwandwe 
chiefdom, and while Shaka was no doubt concerned to 
continue expanding his chiefdom and building up his power 
as rapidly as he could, his immediate aim in the field of 
foreign policy must have been to try to establish 
peaceable relations with Zwide. But this was not to be, 
for the Zulu chiefdom was clearly the major remaining 
86. The sources on the flight of the Ngwane have been 
discussed in the previous chapter (pp. 111-13). See also 
the analyses in Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. 
thesis, p. 193; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 
136-7. 
87. OT, pp. 163-4. 
88. Fynn, Diary, p. 11; OT, pp. 164-5; Hedges, 'Trade and 
politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 193; Hamilton, 'Ideology', 
unpubl. thesis, pp. 136-7. 
89. Fynn, 'History of Godongwana' in Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, p. 65; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 
137. 
180 
obstacle to the consolidation of Ndwandwe domination over 
the former Mthethwa territories. Soon after the defeat of 
the Mthethwa, the Ndwandwe launched several raids against 
the Zulu, which the latter managed to survive only with 
heavy losses of manpower and cattle. 90 
Faced with the imminent threat of further Ndwandwe 
raids, the Zulu leadership sought urgently to recoup the 
losses which the chiefdom had suffered, and to coerce or 
cajole neighbouring chiefdoms into a defensive alliance 
against the Ndwandwe. The period that followed the first 
Ndwandwe raid saw the Zulu moving rapidly to extend and 
consolidate their domination over the region south of the 
White Mfolozi, with far-reaching effects on the politics 
of the region. 91 
4. The expansion of the Zulu chiefdom 
To understand the nature of the political changes which 
followed the Ndwandwe raids southward, it is important 
that as close a periodization as possible should be 
established. There is not enough evidence for an absolute 
chronology of events to be constructed; nevertheless, on 
the assumption that the Zulu effort to mobilize resistance 
to the Ndwandwe was shaped by 'the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the surrounding chiefdoms, their relative 
proximity to the Zulu chiefdom, and the resources which 
they could offer the Zulu',92 it is possible to suggest a 
broad sequence of developments. The main sets of events 
which are of concern here have to do with the Zulu 
90. OT, pp. 174-5, 193-5; Hedges, 'Trade and politics', 
unpubl. thesis, p. 200; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. 
thesis, p. 247; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Baleni, p. 17; 
JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mmemi, p. 270. 
91. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 247; Hedges, 
'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 200-1. 
92. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 247. 
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subordination of the Qwabe, their subordination of the 
chiefdoms of the Thukela valley to the south, and their 
defeat of the Ndwandwe. 
So far as it goes, the evidence is reasonably clear 
that the Zulu attack on the Qwabe took place before the 
final confrontation between the Zulu and Ndwandwe. There 
are several statements to this effect in Stuart's 
records,93 and as Hamilton has convincingly argued, the 
resources of men, cattle and grain obtained by the Zulu 
from the Qwabe would have been crucial in enabling Shaka 
to rebuild his army to the point where it was able to 
fight off a Ndwandwe raiding force. 94 In addition, it 
seems unlikely that the Zulu would have faced up to the 
major threat from the north without first seeking to 
eliminate or at least neutralize potential threats from 
rival chiefdoms on their other borders. For very similar 
reasons it seems that the subordination by the Zulu of the 
cluster of chiefdoms to the south must logically have 
preceded the final round of Zulu conflict with the 
Ndwandwe. 
The main question relating to the sequence of events is 
thus whether the subordination of the Qwabe preceded or 
followed that of the Thukela valley chiefdoms. There is 
no direct evidence that points to an answer, but 
circumstantial evidence suggests that the Qwabe were dealt 
with first. The most significant piece of evidence in 
this regard is provided by the traditions which indicate 
that at the time of the conflict between the Zulu and the 
Qwabe the latter were openly contemptuous of the size and 
strength of the Zulu chiefdom. 95 This, it is contended 
93. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Baleni, pp. 16-17; evidence 
of Jantshi, p. 183; vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, p. 61. 
See also JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 36, and 
evidence of Mmemi, p. 242. 
94. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 172-5. 
95. Ibid., pp. 172-4; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, 
pp. 182-3; vol. 2, evidence of Makhuza, pp. 168-9; 
evidence of Mandlakazi, pp. 177-8; vol. 3, evidence of 
Mmemi, p. 241; OT, pp. 191-2, 196. 
182 
here, would have been unlikely if the Zulu had already 
established domination over large chiefdoms like those of 
the Chunu, Mkhize and Ngcobo. The traditions also suggest 
that the Qwabe were defeated by the Zulu in a surprise 
attack for which the former were completely unprepared: 
again this would have been an unlikely scenario if the 
Qwabe had been facing an opponent who had already 
subordinated the Thukela valley chiefdoms. 
The most likely train of events is that, in the face of 
the threat from the Ndwandwe, the Zulu first struck fast 
and hard to defeat the Qwabe forces and put the chief, 
Phakathwayo, to death. Taking advantage of the deep 
dissensions in the Qwabe chiefly house, they proceeded to 
install a new chief, Nqetho, who had been in exile in the 
Zulu country, and who was prepared to acknowledge the 
overlordship of Shaka and to provide men and cattle for 
the Zulu forces. 96 After the success of this operation 
the Zulu moved to eliminate the possible threat posed by 
the existence of several large and independent chiefdoms 
on their southern borders, and to bring the region's 
resources of manpower and cattle under their control. 
They were probably also motivated by the desire to gain 
access to its resources of iron, for both the Chunu and 
their Cube neighbours had a reputation as metal-workers. 97 
There is not enough evidence to say in what sequence these 
southern chiefdoms became the focus of Zulu attention: 
the assumption here is that they were dealt with in order 
of their proximity to the Zulu heartland - first the 
Chunu, then the Mkhize, then the Ngcobo. Given the 
relative strength of the Chunu, and their position 
immediately to the south of the Zulu, it is unlikely that 
the latter would have acted against the other two 
chiefdoms without first having eliminated the threat from 
the Chunu. 
96. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 160-74; 
Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 204-5. 
97. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 258, 259-60. 
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As in the case of the Qwabe, the Zulu were able to take 
advantage of internal disputes in the Chunu chiefdom to 
obtain political leverage over it. 98 The evidence as to 
whether the Zulu actually attacked the Chunu is 
contradictory. As noted in the previous chapter (p. 121), 
Bryant first claimed that they did, then later denied that 
there was any record of their having done so. One of 
stuart's informants implies that there was no fighting 
between the two chiefdoms,99 while several others claim 
the opposite. 100 The key to resolving this contradiction 
is probably to be found in the evidence of Magidigidi, who 
indicates that an attack by the Ndawonde section of the 
Chunu chiefdom on the neighbouring Cube provoked a Zulu 
attack on the Ndawonde. Upon this, Macingwane, the Chunu 
chief took to flight southwards. 101 
The flight of Macingwane and many of his adherents has 
conventionally been interpreted as a consequence of Zulu 
aggression. No writer has thought to ask the obvious 
question: if"Zulu policy at this time was one of unbridled 
aggression, why were the Qwabe also not forced into 
flight? The answer requires a complete re-orientation of 
thinking on the nature of the Zulu state at this time, and 
of the processes by which it expanded. Far from being the 
cohesive, centralized polity under the rule of a powerful 
despot which is depicted in the stereotype, it was in 
reality a loose alliance of chiefdoms hurriedly brought 
together under the leadership of Shaka, partly by force, 
partly by persuasion, and partly by a common fear of the 
Ndwandwe. Shaka's policy at this period, as Hamilton has 
98. Ibid., p. 258. 
99. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, pp. 22, 
23. 
100. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Baleka, p. 5; vol. 1, 
evidence of Baleni, p. 18; vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, 
p. 282; vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, p. 61; evidence of 
Magidigidi, p. 85; vol. 3, evidence of Mkhehlengana, 
p. 210. 
101. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Magidigidi, p. 85. 
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demonstrated in detail,102 was predominantly to try to 
incorporate, if in varying degrees, neighbouring chiefdoms 
into the Zulu body politic rather than to eject or destroy 
them. Recalcitrant chiefs and their close relatives and 
supporters might be put to death, but the expulsion or 
destruction of the broad mass of their adherents, apart 
from probably being beyond the capacity of the embryonic 
Zulu state to achieve, would have been fundamentally 
contrary to its need to build up its resources of manpower 
and womanpower as quickly, as possible. 
From this perspective, whether or not the Zulu attacked 
the Chunu, the flight of the latter was not the intended 
result of Zulu policy. It was the result of a decision 
made by Macingwane and his advisers to avoid the option of 
submitting to Shaka, and to try to preserve their 
chiefdom's independence - and their own lives - by 
migrating. Far from signalling a victory for the Zulu, it 
was a defeat, a successful act of resistance on the part 
of the Chunu which the Zulu were unable to prevent. 
What effect the flight of the Chunu had on the Mkhize 
chiefdom immediately to the south is not recorded, but it 
was probably an important factor in the decision which the 
Mkhize chief, Zihlandlo, seems to have made to submit to 
Shaka without resistance. 103 The evidence on the fate of 
the neighbouring Ngcobo chiefdom at the hands of the Zulu 
is more difficult to interpret. Some sources indicate 
that the Zulu extended their domination over it by force 
of arms, with certain sections, including the dominant 
Nyuswa, being driven out, and others, like the Qadi, 
submitting and being left in occupation of their 
territory. 104 Other sources suggest that Shaka was able 
to establish suzerainty over the Nyuswa by intervening in 
a dispute over the succession after the death of the chief 
102. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, chs. 3, 5. 
103. OT, p. 405; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 115. 
104. HZ, pp. 65, 68-9; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, 
pp. 183, 186; vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, pp. 60, 61. 
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Mapholoba. 10S In Olden Times Bryant tried to integrate 
the two sets of traditions: first Shaka intervened in the 
succession dispute, and subsequently he attacked the 
Nyuswa, killed their chief and drove them out. 106 
Overall, Hamilton's interpretation of the evidence, to the 
effect that, in contrast to the Mkhize, the Ngcobo 
sections resisted the Zulu and were either driven out or 
forced to submit, is as close as one can get to the 
historical reality.107 
During this same period, the Zulu were also seeking to 
extend control over the chiefdoms on their eastern and 
north-eastern borders. On the White Mfolozi the Sibiya 
submitted without resistance,108 while across the river 
the strong Zungu chiefdom became the target both of Zulu 
and of Ndwandwe efforts to gain its allegiance. In the 
event, an attack by the Ndwandwe encouraged most sections 
of the Zungu to join the alliance dominated by the 
Zulu. 109 Further to the east, the remnant of the Mthethwa 
state was disintegrating rapidly after the death of 
Dingiswayo and the defeat of his army.110 The Mthethwa 
chiefly house itself was now headed by a brother of 
Dingiswayo who was acting as regent for the youthful heir, 
Somveli. lll Although there is little evidence that bears 
on the subject, it can be surmized that the chiefly 
house's authority was crumbling even within the Mthethwa 
chiefdom itself, and that, with more Ndwandwe attacks 
threatening, it had little option but to give its 
allegiance to Shaka. 
105. Fuze, Black People, p. 67; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of 
Mbovu, p. 33; vol. 3, evidence of Maziyana, p. 81; stuart, 
ed., uBaxoxele, pp. 222-4. 
106. OT, pp. 481-2. 
107. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 476. 
108. Ibid., p. 248. 
109. Ibid., pp. 248-52. 
110. Fynn, Diary, p. 15. 
111. OT, p. 202. 
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within a comparatively short space of time after the 
defeat of the Mthethwa.by the Ndwandwe, the Zulu 
leadership had succeeded in establishing a wide, if not 
particularly firm, alliance against the Ndwandwe of the 
chiefdoms between the White Mfolozi and the Thukela. Why 
the Ndwandwe allowed it time to do so can only be 
conjectured. Possibly the Ndwandwe army was itself trying 
to make good the losses which it had suffered in the 
fighting with the Mthethwa and then with the Zulu; 
possibly the Ndwandwe state was facing problems on its 
northern borders; possibly there were dissensions within 
it. Whatever the reasons, by the time the Ndwandwe forces 
renewed their raids to the south, the Zulu army was strong 
enough to confront them. Traditions record that in a 
fight near the Mhlathuze river a Ndwandwe force was 
defeated, and that subsequently the Zulu advanced into 
Ndwandwe territory and destroyed zwide'scapital. 112 
In conventional accounts of these events, most of which 
reproduce Bryant's rendering, the Ndwandwe chiefdom is 
supposed to have been broken up by the Zulu attack, with a 
small remnant under Zwide fleeing to what is now the 
eastern Transvaal. 113- It is inherently unlikely, 
however, that at this early stage in its history the Zulu 
state had anything like the strength that would have been 
necessary to destroy the well-established Ndwandwe polity. 
Evidence from one of Bonner's informants suggests that, 
far from being driven off to the eastern Transvaal, the 
Ndwandwe at first merely shifted their chiefdom's centre 
of gravity across the Phongolo into what is now southern 
swaziland. 114 Their defeat at the hands of the Zulu was 
112. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Baleni, p. 17; vol. 1, 
evidence of Dinya, p. 103; vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, 
pp. 183-6; vol. 2, evidence of Mangati, p. 209; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mmemi, pp. 270-1. See also Fuze, Black 
People, pp. 47-9. For critical comments on traditions of 
fighting between the Zulu and Ndwandwe, seeCobbing, 
'Jettisoning the mfecane', unpubl. paper, p. 13. 
113. OT, pp. 206-9. 
114. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and concessionaires, p. 29. 
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in all likelihood simply one among a number of factors 
which lay behind this move. 115 other sources indicate 
that in the period after this defeat the Ndwandwe chiefdom 
remained a cohesive and powerful entity which continued to 
play a central role in the politics of the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland (see below, pp. 338-44). 
The victory of the Zulu over the Ndwandwe is all but 
universally seen in the published literature as having 
established Shaka's undisputed sway over the region from 
the Phongolo to the Thukela. Subsequently, so the 
stereotyped view goes, Zulu armies extended his dominions 
to the Delagoa Bay region in the north, and to the 
Mzimkhulu and beyond in the south. The realities were 
very different. In the first place, Shaka and his faction 
still faced considerable if by now muted opposition from 
within the ranks of the Zulu chiefly house. Though there 
was nothing unusual in a chief's being rivalled for power 
by his close male relatives, the fact that Shaka was a 
usurper made his legitimacy as a ruler questionable in the 
eyes of a number of senior collateral lineage heads. 
Overt resistance was no doubt stilled by the success of 
his campaigns against the Qwabe and then the Ndwandwe, and 
by Shaka' s repressive measures, ,but the divisions within 
the Zulu ruling group posed a threat to Shaka's position 
throughout his reign. 116 
In addition, Shaka's hold on his newly forged power 
base south of the Mfolozi remained tenuous. Though he had 
extracted the formal submission of the Qwabe chiefdom from 
the new leadership which he had installed, and though 
Qwabe manpower had played a probably crucial role in 
helping him to beat off and then defeat the Ndwandwe, 
important sections of the chiefdom resisted the continuing 
efforts of the Zulu leadership to incorporate them more 
115. See also Cobbing's comments in 'The mfecane as 
alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), p. 506. 
116. For a discussion of these issues see Hamilton, 
'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, ch. 4. 
188 
closely into the emerging Zulu state. The attempt which 
was made to assassinate Shaka in 1824 may have been the 
work of Qwabe dissidents, and Qwabe opposition to Zulu 
domination continued into the reign of his successor, 
Dingane. 117 
Among the Mthethwa, too, resistance to Zulu overlord-
ship ran deep in some quarters, particularly among the 
sections of the chiefly house which supported Somveli's 
candidacy for the chiefship. After his victory over the 
Ndwandwe, Shaka had acted to enlarge the scope of his 
authority over the Mthethwa by killing the regent, 
Mondise, and installing as chief his own nominee and close 
ally, Mlandela. 118 That he did not put Somveli to death 
as well suggests that he did not want to alienate 
important elements among the Mthethwa if he could help it, 
which in turn lends force to the argument that the Zulu 
power was far from monolithic. The weakness of its hold 
on the Mthethwa was demonstrated by the subsequent flight 
of Somveli and a number of important supporters northwards 
into Ronga country, an event which, on the basis of a 
reference in a Portuguese document, Hedges dates to 
1821. 119 The limits on Shaka's authority were further 
shown up, if Bryant's account is to be believed, by the 
fact that the force which he sent in pursuit of Somveli 
proceeded to abscond to the Mabhudu chief Makhasane. 120 
North of the Black Mfolozi Shaka's writ did not run 
anywhere near as far as the conventional view has it. A 
detailed analysis of the development of the mfecane 
117. For a comprehensive discussion of Qwabe-Zulu 
relations in Shaka's reign see Hamilton, 'Ideology', 
unpubl. thesis, pp. 172-90. The date of 1824 comes from 
the account of the attempt on Shaka's life given by Fynn, 
who claims to have been present at the time: see his 
Diary, pp. 83 ff. 
118. OT, pp. 202-3; Fynn, Diary, p. 15. 
119. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 205. 
See also OT, pp. 84, 472-3. 
120. OT, pp. 473-4. 
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stereotype as it applies to this region is badly needed, 
but even in its absence it is clear that the extent of 
Zulu power in the north has been greatly exaggerated. 
After the retreat of the Ndwandwe leadership across the 
Phongolo, Shaka's immediate concern was to establish an 
effective presence in the territories which had previously 
acknowledged the suzerainty of Zwide. Numbers of the 
chiefs formerly tributary to the Ndwandwe paramount 
probably remained behind and made tactical submissions to 
Shaka. But the Zulu state did not have the political or 
military resources to bring their adherents under the form 
of direct rule which Shaka was seeking to impose on the 
chiefdoms of the state's core area about the White 
Mfolozi. Instead, Zulu control of the northern 
territories was exercised through a 'viceroy', Maphitha 
kaSojiyisa, the senior member of a lineage closely related 
to the Zulu chiefly house. Maphitha established his umuzi 
near the upper Mona river in the south of the region 
formerly dominated by Zwide, and, probably from the time 
of his settlement there, was able to rule with a 
considerable degree of autonomy.121 
In the conventional view, Zulu expansion northwards in 
the late 1810s and early 1820s is portrayed as having been 
reponsible for putting to flight groups like the Khumalo 
of Mzilikazi, the Gasa of Soshangane, the Jele of Zwange-
ndaba and the Msane of Nxaba. 122 These groups are almost 
invariably seen in the literature as 'refugees' from an 
all-powerful Shaka: little attempt is made to place their 
121. On the nature of Maphitha's authority in Shaka's 
reign and later see Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 219-24; Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 214-16; J. Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: 
the civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884, London, 1979, pp. 
37, 249; JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Ndukwana, pp. 278, 314, 
318, 321, 357, 358. 
122. E.g. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, pp. 3, 57, 64, 130-
1; A.K. Smith, 'The Indian Ocean zone', in D. Birmingham & 
P. Martin, eds., History of Central Africa, vol. 1, 
London, 1983, pp. 234-6. 
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migrations in the context of a broader regional politics. 
Evidence on the limitations of Zulu power in the north are 
to be found even in Bryant, one of the writers primarily 
responsible for entrenching the myth of the mighty Shaka. 
Mzilikazi, he writes, was able to beat off two Zulu 
attacks before making off to the north-west. 123 Nxaba too 
was apparently attacked by a Zulu force, but Bryant says 
nothing about any such attack on either Soshangane or 
Zwangendaba. 124 His evidence on the flight of the former 
is contradictory: at one point he indicates that 
Soshangane and his Gasa adherents fled immediately after 
the defeat of the Ndwandwe, while at another he implies 
that they did so only after the lapse of a year or two. 125 
Recently Harries has suggested that soshangane and 
Zwangendaba may have become tributary to Shaka, and that 
they hived off from the Zulu kingdom after having been 
sent northwards by Shaka on a military mission: 126 this 
notion too is consistent with a view which sees Zulu power 
in the north in Shaka's reign as having been much weaker 
than is generally accepted. 
In the literature, the movements of the Khumalo, Gasa, 
Jele and Msane are usually dramatized as long-distance 
migrations which eventually took these groups far into 
central and, in some cases, eastern Africa, where in turn 
their leaders proceeded to establish great kingdoms. 127 
In fact their initial movements were in each case over 
comparatively short distances. The Khumalo moved to the 
123. OT, pp. 422-3. 
124. Ibid., pp. 279-80, 448, 459, 460. 
125. Ibid., pp. 208, 448. 
126. P. Harries, 'History, ethnicity and the Ingwavuma 
land deal: the Zulu northern frontier in the nineteenth 
century', Journal of Natal and Zulu History, vol. 6 
(1983), p. 4; P. Harries, 'Labour migration from 
Mozambique to south Africa; with special reference to the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland, c.1862 to 1897', unpubl. Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 1983, p. 156. 
127. E.g. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, introduction & 
chs. 4, 5, 9. 
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region of the upper Vaal river in what is now the south-
eastern Transvaal;128 the Gasa and Jele moved to the 
Delagoa Bay region;129 and the Msane to eastern 
swaziland. 130 Their subsequent movements have their own 
history; they have very little, if anything, to do with 
Shaka and the Zulu. 
The solidly entrenched view is that Zulu expansion 
northwards in the first half of the 1820s brought the 
whole region as far as Delagoa Bay and even beyond under 
Shaka's sway. He was motivated, it is supposed, by the 
need to eliminate the rival polities which were emerging 
under the leadership of Soshangane and Zwangendaba, and to 
establish control of the trade to Delagoa Bay from the 
south. 131 Recently Harries has queried the notion that 
Shaka ever embarked on a policy of 'purposeful territorial 
expansion' in the region. He points out that there are no 
references in the Portuguese records to any extensive Zulu 
trading, or to any major Zulu invasion until 1828. In the 
mid-1820s, he claims, the Zulu were drawn into intervening 
in the politics of Mabhudu and Tembe in order to prevent 
the former from establishing a monopoly of the Delagoa Bay 
128. J.R.D. Cobbing, 'The Ndebele under the Khumalos, 
1820-1896', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of Lancaster, 
1976, pp. 15-16. 
129. G. Liesegang, 'Nguni migrations between Delagoa Bay 
and the Zambezi, 1821-1839', African Historical Studies, 
vol. 3 (1970), pp. 317-23; Smith, 'The struggle for 
control', unpubl. thesis, pp. 250-9. 
130. OT, p. 460. 
131. G. Liesegang, 'Dingane's attack on Lourenco Marques 
in 1833', JAH, vol. 10 (1969), pp. 570-1; Smith, 'The 
trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., African 
Societies, pp. 186-8; Smith, 'The struggle for control', 
unpubl. thesis, pp. 248-9, 260; Hedges, 'Trade and 
politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 227-30; P. Harries, 
'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extraction; the 
nature of free and unfree labour in south-east Africa', 
~, vol. 22 (1981), p. 314; Harries, 'History, ethnicity 
and the Ingwavuma land deal', Journal of Natal and Zulu 
History, vol. 6 (1983), pp. 4-5. 
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trade, but did so 'unwillingly' and on a minor scale.132 
Mahungane and Nkomuza told James stuart that Makhasane of 
the Mabhudu had paid tribute to 'the Zulu king', probably 
meaning Shaka,133 but by itself this does not mean that 
the Zulu had established political domination of the 
region. While Shaka may have claimed suzerainty over it, 
it is unlikely that he was able to wield any effective 
authority there except spasmodically by means of tribute-
collecting expeditions. Bonner's claim that the Ngwane 
under Sobhuza also became tributary to Shaka needs to be 
similarly qualified. 134 
An illustration of the weakness of Zulu power in the 
north is provided by the inability of Shaka's forces to 
subdue the section of Khumalo under Bheje which lived in 
the Ngome region. From his stronghold in the Ngome forest 
Bheje successfully beat off several attacks. It was not 
until 1827 that the Zulu were able to force him to submit, 
and then only with the help of a party of British-led 
musketeers from Port Natal. 135 The effective geographical 
limits of Zulu power to the north-west were marked by two 
royal homesteads which Shaka set up to guard this 
vulnerable frontier from raids by groups like the Swazi 
and the migrant Ndwandwe and Khumalo. These were 
ebaQulusini in what is now the Vryheid area, and 
emPangisweni near the sources of the Black Mfolozi. 136 To 
the north and north-east, effective Zulu rule probably did 
not extend beyond the Mkhuze river. 
132. Harries, 'Labour migration', unpublished thesis, 
pp. 154-6. 
133. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahungane and Nkomuza, 
pp. 143, 152. 
134. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, 
pp. 37-9. 
135. OT, pp. 420, 596-8; Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the 
mfecane', unpubl. paper, p. 13. See also pp. 347-8 below. 
136. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 219, 224-5, 
364-6; OT, p. 181; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Magidigidi, 
p. 91; vol. 4, evidence of Ndukwana, pp. 277-8, 285, 326, 
358. 
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The political forces which operated on the northern 
frontiers of the early Zulu state will not be more fully 
understood until an integrated history of the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland in the late 18th and early 19th centuries has 
been written. But the brief examination made here of the 
nature of the Zulu polity's power in its northern 
borderlands in the reign of Shaka reinforces the points 
made above about the nature of the processes by which it 
established domination over the region between the White 
Mfolozi and the Thukela. In short, the conventional view 
of Zulu expansion to north and south under Shaka needs in 
many respects to be abandoned. This argument forms one of 
the main premises of the discussion in the next chapter, 
which examines the political changes which took place 
south of the Thukela in the late l810s and 1820s. 
5. The slave trade as a factor in the politics of the 
region south of Delagoa Bay 
Before the history of the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the 
1820s can be discussed, consideration must be given to an 
aspect of the political background which has so far not 
been mentioned in this chapter - the impact on the 
conflicts described above of the rise of a trade in slaves 
at Delagoa Bay. Over the past twenty years, a handful of 
writers - smith, Liesegang, Harries - have noted the 
importance of this trade by the 1820s for the 
portuguese,137 but, with the focusses of their studies 
elsewhere, they have not been concerned, with the partial 
exception of Harries, to assess its wider political 
137. Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies,pp. 186-7; Smith, 'The struggle for 
control', unpubl. thesis, pp. 278-9, 344-6, 349-52; 
Liesegang, 'Dingane's attack', JAH, vol. 10 (1969), p. 
567; P. Harries, 'Slavery amonst the Gaza Nguni: its 
changing shape and function and its relationship to other 
forms of exploitation', in J.B. Peires, ed., Before and 
after Shaka: Papers in Nguni History, Grahamstown, 1981, 
pp. 211-14; Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and 
surplus extraction', JAH, vol. 22 (1981), pp. 312-16 (this 
is a revised version of the previous essay). 
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significance. For reasons which themselves need 
investigation, historians of southern Africa generally 
have completely overlooked the existence of this trade. 
Very recently, Julian Cobbing has taken the first step 
towards re-inserting the subject into historical 
discourse. 138 He argues that after the end of the 
Napoleonic wars the growth of the slave trade at Oelagoa 
Bay and at Inhambane, 400 kilometres further up the 
Mozambique coast, was responsible for a series of 
'unprecedented convulsion~' among the polities of south-
eastern Africa. Basing his arguments on estimates of the 
dimensions of the slave trade drawn from Harries, 139 who 
in turn takes his figures from Klein,140 Cobbing suggests 
that by the 1820s slave-raiding was widespread in the 
Oelagoa Bay hinterland, where its impact served 
dramatically to intensify the political conflicts that 
were taking place in the region at this time. 
Cobbing has not yet spelt out his argument in detail, 
and its implications for debates on the history of the 
region have as yet hardly begun to crystallize. For this 
reason, attempts to consider it in the previous sections 
of this chapter have deliberately been avoided. But even 
in outline, his notions are clearly of profound import for 
the study of the history of the region south of Oelagoa 
Bay, including the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region, and need to 
be addressed directly. A prior necessity, though, is to 
establish a clearer picture than exists at present of the 
historical development of the slave trade at Oelagoa Bay. 
If its impact in particular places at particular times is 
138. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 503-7. As Cobbing notes, the importance of the 
Oelagoa Bay slave trade was touched on as far back as 1929 
by W.M. Macmillan in his Bantu, Boer and Briton, pp. 19-
20. Later historians entirely ignored it. 
139. Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus 
extraction', JAH, vol. 22 (1981), pp. 315-16. 
140. Herbert S. Klein, The Middle Passage, Princeton, 
1978, pp. 76-7. 
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to be properly assessed, as precise a chronology as 
possible of the main features of its history needs to be 
outlined. 
Harries gives some background to the trade of the 1820s 
and after, but his account ranges indiscriminately over 
the period from the 18th to the mid-19th century, and does 
not provide a clear indication of the changing size and 
significance of the slave trade. 141 It also tends to cast 
Inhambane and Delagoa Bay together as a single trading 
zone, rather than treating them as two separate, if 
linked, regions. The distinction which smith was earlier 
at pains to draw between their respective patterns of 
commerce in the 18th and early 19th centuries is thus 
largely lost,142 and the specificities of the situation at 
Delagoa Bay become blurred. The impression which 
Harries's acount leaves is that before the 1820s the 
Delagoa Bay slave trade was well-established and of long-
standing, a picture which contrasts sharply with that 
drawn by smith, who argues that in this period the slave 
trade was small-scale, intermittent, and of minor 
consequence. 143 Harries's account, therefore, does not 
provide a firm basis from which to judge the importance or 
otherwise of the trade over time. 
Similarly, in Cobbing's assessments, both published and 
unpublished, of the growth and impact of the slave trade, 
there is no clear chronology; in consequence, a number of 
points of tension emerge in his argument. Though he dates 
the main impact of the trade to the period after 1815, the 
thrust of his exposition is to project its effects much 
further back in time into the period when, if Smith is to 
141. Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus 
extraction', JAH, vol. 22 (1981), pp. 312-18. 
142. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 149-52, 190-5, 235-43, 344-8. 
143. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 49, 71-2, 110, 154, 206, 344; Smith, 'The trade of 
Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., African Societies, 
pp. 176-7. 
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be believed, there was very little, if anything, by way of 
a slave trade at Delagoa Bay.144 In addition, in his 
treatment of the impact which the slave trade had on the 
societies of the Delagoa Bay hinterland in the 1810s and 
1820s, cobbing tends to portray it in monocausal terms as 
the main factor in the upheavals of the period, rather 
than seeing it as a factor which fed in various ways and 
to varying degrees into already existing patterns of 
conflict. To enable the impact of the trade to be placed 
more accurately in a historical context, this section of 
the chapter will first give an outline, synthesized from 
the secondary literature in English, of the history until 
the 1820s of the slave trade in south-east Africa 
generally. It will then briefly consider the possible 
role played by the Delagoa Bay trade in shaping the 
political scenarios described in the previous sections of 
the chapter. 
Before 1700 perhaps a thousand slaves a year were being 
exported from the coasts of East Africa for sale in the 
Islamic states of North Africa and south-west Asia. 145 
Further south, European slavers occasionally obtained 
cargoes from points along the coast as far as Port Natal, 
but this trade was spasmodic and on a very minor scale. 146 
The Portuguese, for their part, took perhaps five hundred 
slaves a year for sale in Portuguese India, where cheap 
labour was plentiful. 147 The expansion of the slave trade 
in south-eastern Africa dates from the 1730s and 1740s, 
144. Cobbing, 'Arguments, hypotheses, assertions etc. on 
the mfecane' , unpubl. ms., 1987, pp. 14, 16; Cobbing, 'The 
mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), p. 506 & n. 
145. M.D.D. Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambezi: 
Exploration. Land Tenure and Colonial Rule in East Africa, 
London, 1973, p. 220; P.E. Lovejoy, Transformations in 
Slavery: a History of Slavery in Africa, Cambridge, 1983, 
pp. 59-60. 
146. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
p. 41; Chase, ed., Natal Papers, part 1, p. 13. 
147. E.A. Alpers, Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa, 
London, 1975, p. 95. 
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when French settlers on the islands of Mauritius and 
Reunion began actively developing sugar and coffee 
plantations. To meet their labour needs they imported 
slaves from nearby Madagascar, and also from the 
Portuguese settlement at Mozambique Island. Though trade 
with foreign ships was officially prohibited, by mid-
century the Portuguese were exporting at least a thousand 
slaves a year, most of them drawn from the coast to the 
south as far as Inhambane. 148 
After the end of the American War of Independence and 
the re-establishment of peace between France and Britain 
in 1783, a rapid increase in the slave trade from 
Mozambique took place. By the 1790s at least 5000 slaves 
a year were being exported. 149 Most were taken by the 
French, who by now dominated the slave trade of south-
eastern Africa, to the Mascarene Islands, but some were 
exported to the French West Indian colony of San Domingo, 
and a small number was sold to Brazilian slavers. 150 
According to both Isaacman and Alpers, most of the 
slaves exported from Mozambique at this time came from the 
northern regions of the Portuguese sphere of influence, 
148. Newitt, Portuguese Settlement, p. 220; Alpers, Ivory 
and Slaves, pp. 95-6; A. Isaacman, Mozambique: the 
Africanization of a European Institution: the Zambezi 
Prazos, 1750-1902, Madison, 1972, p. 86; R. L. stein, The 
French Slave Trade in the Eighteenth century: an Old 
Regime Business, Madison, 1979, pp. 121-3; G. Shepherd, 
'The Comorians and the East African slave trade', in J.L. 
Watson, ed., Asian and African Systems of Slavery, Oxford, 
1980, p. 75; B. Benedict, 'Slavery and indenture in 
Mauritius and Seychelles', in Watson, ed., Asian and 
African Systems of Slavery, pp. 137-8. 
149. This figure is derived from estimates made in Alpers, 
Ivory and Slaves, pp. 185-6, 187; P.O. Curtin, The 
Atlantic Slave Trade: a Census, Madison, 1969, pp. 229, 
242; Newitt, Portuguese Settlement, p. 220. 
150. Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 229; Isaacman, 
Mozambique, p. 86; Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, p. 185; 
Stein, French Slave Trade, p. 124; R. Anstey, 'The slave 
trade of the continental powers, 1760-1810', Economic 
History Review, vol. 30 (1977), p. 260. 
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with few being obtained from the south. 151 A more precise 
assessment of the slave trade on the southern coast is to 
be found in smith's accounts of trade in this region in 
the later 18th century. By this time, he states, 
Inhambane was declining in importance as an ivory-trading 
centre, and was becoming an important source of slaves. 152 
Further to the south-west, at Delagoa Bay, the situation 
was different. While the ivory trade was expanding 
rapidly in the 1760s and 1770s (see also pp. 29-30 above), 
and remained important thereafter, the slave trade at this 
outlet, as he sees it, was of little consequence. 153 
Following the resumption of war between France and 
Britain in 1794, the volume of the slave trade in south-
east Africa seems temporarily to have diminished. 154 
After 1810 it rose sharply, with the biggest demand now 
coming from Brazil. Partly because of the disruption of 
commerce between the West Indies, North America and Europe 
by the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the 
market for sugar, coffee and cotton from Brazil was 
expanding rapidly,155 and, with it, Brazil's needs for 
151. Isaacman, Mozambique, p. 86: Alpers, Ivory and 
Slaves, p. 194. 
152. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, p. 
151: Smith, 'Delagoa Bay and the trade of south eastern 
Africa', in Gray & Birmingham, eds., Precolonial African 
Trade, p. 278: Smith, 'The Indian Ocean zone', in 
Birmingham & Martin, eds., History of Central Africa, vol. 
1, London, 1983, p. 228. 
153. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, p. 
346; Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies, pp. 176-7. 
154. See the figures cited in P.E. Lovejoy, 'The volume of 
the Atlantic slave trade: a synthesis', JAH, vol. 23 
(1982), p. 489; H.S. Klein, 'The trade in African slaves 
to Rio de Janeiro, 1795-1811: estimates of mortality and 
patterns of voyages', JAH, vol. 10 (1969), p. 540: Anstey, 
'Slave trade', Economic History Review, vol. 30 (1977), p. 
260; Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, pp. 188, 189. But see also 
the much higher estimates made by Liesegang and cited in 
M.D.D. Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique 1823-1831', Jnl. 
Southern Afr. Studies, vol. 15 (1988-9), p. 15n. 
155. J.C. Miller, 'Slave prices in the Portuguese southern 
Atlantic, 1600-1830', in P.E. Lovejoy, ed., Africans in 
Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade, Madison, 
1986, pp. 44, 51; J.C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant 
199 
larger and larger imports of slave labour. Another factor 
in the expansion of the Brazilian export economy at this 
time was the increase in British investment which followed 
the flight of the Portuguese court under British 
protection to Rio de Janeiro in 1808 after the French 
invasion of portugal. 156 The end of the Napoleonic wars 
in 1815 saw a spurt in demand in Europe and the United 
states for Brazilian coffee, with a rough correlation 
discernible between the number of slaves imported into Rio 
de Janeiro and the export of coffee from that port. 157 
In the 18th century Brazil had been the largest single 
slave-importing region in the world, taking an estimated 
31 per cent of all imports from Africa into the Americas 
and Caribbean. In the period 1801-10 it was importing at 
least 20 000 slaves a year, in the ensuing decade the 
figure rose to 27 000 a year, and, in the 1820s, to 32 000 
a year. 158 This sharp increase was matched by a rapid 
rise in the slave trade of south-east Africa. One of the 
main reasons' for this, was, paradoxically, the 
implementation of British policies designed to put an end 
to the Atlantic slave trade. In 1807 Britain had made 
illegal the transport'of slaves in British ships and their 
importation into British colonies, and in 1810 an Anglo-
Portuguese treaty limited the Portuguese slave trade to 
Portugal's own colonies in Africa. 159 This meant that 
Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-1830, London, 
1988, pp. 492-3. 
156. Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, p. 188: Miller, 'Slave 
prices', in Lovejoy, ed., Africans in Bondage, p. 53: 
R.E. Conrad, World of Sorrow: the African Slave Trade to 
Brazil, Baton Rouge, 1986, p. 57. 
157. Conrad, World of Sorrow, pp. 61-2. 
158. Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 207, 216, 234. In 
his review of the literature on the Brazilian slave trade, 
Conrad suggests that curtin's figures are underestimates: 
Conrad, World of Sorrow, pp. 29-33. 
159. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, pp. 135-6, 283; 
Conrad, World of Sorrow, pp. 57, 58. 
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West African sources of slaves, which had previously been 
of great importance in the trade to Brazil,160 began to be 
closed off, and Brazilian importers began to turn 
increasingly to south-east Africa for alternative 
sources. 161 This trend was reinforced by another Anglo-
Portuguese treaty in 1815, which banned Portuguese 
subjects from trading for slaves north of the equator, and 
by a further agreement in 1817 which confined the 
Portuguese slave trade in eastern Africa to the coast 
between Cape Delgado and Delagoa Bay.162 
At the same time the trade from Portuguese East Africa 
to Mauritius and Reunion was continuing. Britain had 
seized both islands from France in 1810, but the Act of 
Abolition of 1807 was not extended to Mauritius until 
1813, and smuggling of slaves from Africa to that island 
continued well into the 1820s. 163 On Reunion, which was 
restored to France in 1814, French officials did little to 
prevent the illegal slave trade from Africa. It continued 
into the 1840s, and, in the guise of the export of 
indentured labour, into the second half of the century.164 
The impact which the continuing Indian Ocean trade and 
the rapidly increasing Brazilian trade had on the level of 
slave exports from south-east Africa is reflected in the 
available statistics. By the end of the 1810s exports 
from Mozambique were running at a minimum of 10 000 slaves 
160. Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 207. 
161. Miller, 'Slave prices', in Lovejoy, ed., Africans in 
Bondage, pp. 44, 59. 
162. Alpers, Ivorv and Slaves, pp. 210-11; Lovejoy, 
Transformations in Slavery, p. 284; Conrad, World of 
Sorrow, pp. 57-8. 
163. Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, p. 214; M.V. Jackson 
Haight, European Powers and South-East Africa: a Study of 
International Relations on the South-East Coast of Africa 
1796-1856, London, 1967 ed. (1st ed. 1942), pp. 158-62; 
Benedict, 'Slavery and indenture', in watson, ed., Asian 
and African Systems of Slavery, p. 138; R.W. Beachey, The 
Slave Trade of Eastern Africa, London, 1976, pp. 27-30. 
164. Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, p. 214; Beachey, Slave 
Trade, pp. 27-8, 31-5. 
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a year. 165 In the 1820s this figure rose still higher, to 
reach possibly 15 000 or more a year by the end of the 
decade. 166 By this time large numbers of slaves were 
being exported from the subordinate ports in Portuguese 
south-east Africa, for in 1811 the Portuguese crown had 
opened them all to direct trade with Brazil. 167 By the 
second half of the 1810s Quelimane, some 500 kilometres 
south-west of Mozambique, had become a thriving slaving 
port, exporting 3000 slaves or more a year. 168 In the 
1820s this figure rose still higher as Quelimane became 
the largest slaving port in south-eastern Africa. 169 
In the same period the slave trade was also expanding 
at Inhambane and Delagoa Bay, respectively 1200 and 1600 
kilometres closer to Brazil than was Mozambique Island, as 
Brazilian slavers took to calling at these ports. 170 
French slavers from Reunion were also turning to Delagoa 
165. This figure is based on estimates in Alpers, Ivory 
and Slaves, pp. 189, 211; Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, 
p. 242; Lovejoy, 'Volume of the Atlantic slave trade', 
JAH, vol. 23 (1982), p. 489. 
166. This figure is based on estimates in Alpers, Ivory 
and Slaves, p. 215; Klein, Middle Passage, p. 77; D. 
Eltis, 'The export of slaves from Africa, 1821-1843', Jnl. 
Econ. History, vol. 37 (1977), p. 414; Liesegang as cited 
in Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique', Jnl. Southern Afr. 
Studies, vol. 15 (1988-9), p. 15n. 
167. Isaacman, Mozambique, p. 87; Alpers, Ivory and 
Slaves, pp. 215-16. 
168. Alpers, Ivory and Slaves, p. 216; Lovejoy, 'Volume of 
the Atlantic slave trade', JAH, vol. 23 (1982), p. 489; L. 
Vail & L. White, Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: 
a Study of Quelimane District, London, 1980, p. 18; 
Liesegang as cited in Newitt, 'Drought in Mozambique', 
Jnl. Southern Afr. studies, vol. 15 (1988-9), p. 15n. 
169. Vail & White, Capitalism and Colonialism, p. 18, give 
a figure of 12 000 to 15 000 slaves a year exported from 
Quelimane in the 1820s. Liesegang, as cited by Newitt, 
'Drought in Mozambique', Jnl. Southern Afr. studies, 
vol. 15 (1988-9), p. 15n, gives an estimate of a little 
over 5 000 a year, which is more consistent with the 
figures cited by other authors for Mozambique generally. 
170. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 348-50. 
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Bay as Britain sought, at first with little success, to 
curtail the export of slaves from Madagascar. 171 By the 
early 1820s, according to the reports of Owen and Fynn, 
the slave trade at this port was well established. 172 The 
only statistics of any detail so far published on the 
Delagoa Bay trade come from Klein, who records that in the 
period of four and a half years from mid-1825 to early 
1830 a total of 4 031 slaves was exported from the bay to 
Rio de Janeiro, that is, an average of 900 a year. 173 
Allowing for exports to o~her Brazilian ports, to Reunion 
and perhaps Mauritius, and for smuggling, Harries's 
conclusion that 'well over 1,000' slaves a year were 
exported from Delagoa Bay in the late 1820s seems well 
founded. 174 If pre-embarkation mortality among the slaves 
is taken into account, the numbers extracted from the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland could well have reached the figure 
of 2000 to 3000 suggested by cobbing. 175 Whether this 
figure can be projected back in time to the late 1810s, as 
he argues,176 is a matter for debate, but there can be 
little disagreement with the thrust of his argument that 
171. Ibid., p. 350; Beachey, Slave Trade, pp. 28-9; M. 
Bloch, 'Modes of production and slavery in Madagascar: two 
case studies', in Watson, ed., Asian and African Systems 
of Slavery, pp. 104-5, 110; G. Campbell, 'Madagascar and 
the slave trade, 1810-1895', JAH, vol. 22 (1981), pp. 205-
10. 
172. captain Owen, 'The bay of Delagoa', in G.M. Theal, 
ed., Records of South-Eastern Africa, vol. 2, Cape Town, 
1964 (reprint of 1st ed., Cape Town, 1898), p. 478; Mr 
Fynn, 'Delagoa Bay', in the same volume of Theal p. 487; 
Fynn, Diary, pp. 39-40, 43, 47, 48, 270; Kirby, ed., 
Andrew smith and Natal, p. 76. See also Smith, 'The 
struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, pp. 350-1; and 
Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., 
African Societies, p. 177. 
173. Klein, Middle Passage, p. 77. 
174. Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus 
extraction', JAH, vol. 22 (1981), p. 316. 
175. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 504-5. 
176. Ibid. p. 504. 
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from about 1815 the Delagoa Bay slave trade was increasing 
in size to the point where it became a major factor. in 
shaping the history of the societies of south-east 
Africa. 177 
If the main phases in the development of the slave 
trade in south-east Africa and its extension to Delagoa 
Bay can be discerned, and its rough dimensions 
established, lack of published evidence makes assessing 
its impact a matter of a different order. Even on such 
important topics as where the slaves exported from Delagoa 
Bay came from, and how they were obtained, there is very 
little that can confidently be said at this stage. 
contemporary sources indicate that in the early 1820s many 
of the slaves sold to the Portuguese were captives taken 
in wars between the local Ronga polities, particularly 
those of Madolo, Tembe and Mabhudu, and in attacks made on 
them by intrusive groups like the Gasa and Jele. 178 And, 
despite the view commonly expressed in the literature that 
the 'Nguni' 'traditionally' did not sell slaves,179 there 
is some evidence to the effect that both the Ndwandwe and 
the Zulu traded captives to the portuguese. 180 Beyond 
this, however, argument as to the sources of slaves sold 
at Delagoa Bay in the period to the mid-1820s remains 
conjectural. 
Most of the slaves exported by the Portuguese from the 
bay were probably obtained by purchase from African 
slavers rather than through raiding by the Portuguese 
177. Ibid., pp. 506-7. 
178. Fynn, Diary, pp. 39, 43, 47; Smith, 'The struggle for 
control', unpubl. thesis, p. 256; Smith, 'The trade of 
Delagoa Bay', in Thompson, ed., African Societies, p. 177; 
Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus 
extraction', JAH, vol. 22 (1981), p. 314. 
179. For example, Smith, 'The trade of Delagoa Bay', in 
Thompson, ed., African Societies, p. 186. See the 
discussion on this point in Harries, 'Slavery, social 
incorporation and surplus extraction', JAH, vol. 22 
(1981), pp. 309-11. 
180. Fynn, Diary, pp. 48, 270. 
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themselves. Cobbing asserts that 'An army of black 
musketeers with Portuguese officers existed at Lourenco 
Marques for the seizure of slaves',181 but as it stands, 
this statement fairly certainly exaggerates the ability of 
the Portuguese-led garrison to engage in independent 
slaving expeditions. Smith's research has made clear that 
in the period under discussion the garrison at Lourenco 
Marques was small and weak, and hardly able to face 
hostile forces without assistance from allies. Though the 
Portuguese were on occasion able to exert political 
leverage over chiefdoms in the region about the bay, it 
was only with the support of other chiefdoms. 182 
Illustrative of their weakness is the fact that in 1824 a 
Portuguese force, which included the governor of Lourenco 
Marques, was annihilated by a Madolo army, and soon 
afterwards the acting governor was put to death by the 
chief of Tembe. 183 Admittedly the Portuguese records 
probably hardly begin to reflect the degree of 
participatiori by the garrison in slaving activities, but, 
given the picture which Smith draws, it is difficult to 
see the garrison as having been able to embark on any but 
the most minor slave raids without support from African 
allies. Its function was not so much to seize captives as 
to hold those purchased from African slavers until the 
arrival of slave ships.184 
Whatever the precise role of the Portuguese in slaving 
activities, there seems no reason to doubt Cobbing's 
181. Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane', unpublished 
paper, p. 10. 
182. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 220-7, 242, 252, 254, 261, 262, 270-2. On the 
weakness of the Portuguese presence in the 1820s see also 
Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 230-1. 
183. Smith, 'The struggle for control', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 272-4; Harries, 'Labour migration', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 153-4. 
184. Fynn, for example, records having seen captives being 
held in the fort at Lourenco Marques in 1823: see his 
Diary, p. 39. 
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argument that by the early 1820s the expansion of the 
slave trade had made Oelagoa Bay the epicentre of waves of 
violence which reached at least to the Nkomati valley in 
the north, what is now the eastern Transvaal in the west, 
and the Mfolozi valley in the south. 185 In assessing the 
impact of this violence in any particular region, however, 
the question of precise timing becomes crucial. By and 
large, the effects of the expansion of the slave trade are 
unlikely to have been widely felt before about 1815, 
especially in regions at any distance from the bay. Thus 
the trade would not have been a factor in the conflicts 
which took place between the Tembe and the Mabhudu, and 
between the Ndwandwe and the Olamini, in the early years 
of the 19th century, nor in the early stages of Mthethwa 
expansion under Oingiswayo. But in the 1810s it 
increasingly became a factor which historians cannot 
ignore. The persistence of Ndwandwe attacks on the 
Olamini at this time may well have been, as Cobbing 
suggests,186 in part a response to the exigencies of the 
slave trade. Whether the Ndwandwe were coming under 
pressure from slaving groups from the region of Oelagoa 
Bay, or whether they were themselves beginning to raid 
slaves, are matters for further investigation. The move 
which they apparently made northwards across the Phongolo 
towards oelagoa Bay after their defeat by the Zulu 
suggests that they were seeking to become more closely 
involved in the slave trade. 
The attempts made by the Ndwandwe to tighten their 
authority over the tributary Gasa, Jele and Msane may also 
have been stimUlated by the rise of the slave trade, 
especially, if as Hedges has argued, these chiefdoms were 
in a position to exercise some control over the trade 
185. Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, p. 
10; Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 506-7. 
186. cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, 
p. 16; Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 
(1988), p. 506. 
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between the Mthethwa and Mabhudu. The expansion of a 
commerce in ivory and cattle early in Oingiswayo's reign 
predated the expansion of the slave trade, but it is quite 
possible that by the later 1810s the Mthethwa were also 
sending northwards captives taken in their wars of 
expansion in the interior. The Ndwandwe intervention may 
have represented an attempt to take control of an 
increasingly lucrative form of commerce, or else it may 
have been a strategic move made to try to prevent the 
further strengthening of the Mthethwa-Mabhudu axis. 
Either way, the role of the slave trade in intensifying 
political conflict may help explain the intensity of 
Ndwandwe conflict with the Mthethwa, and the violence of 
the raids which the Ndwandwe subsequently made into the 
region south of the White Mfolozi. Cobbing's argument 
that the collapse and dispersal of the Ndwandwe at a later 
period is attributable mainly to the effects of the 
violence associated with the slave trade is open to 
debate,187 but it is highly likely that the trade was an 
important factor in this process. It was probably also 
significant in stimulating the migrations of the Ngwane 
and the Khumalo of Mzilikazi, both of which groups, 
Cobbing suggests, were displaced by the Ndwandwe. 188 As 
for the Gasa and Jele, far from having been 'driven' 
northwards by the Zulu, they may deliberately have moved 
into the Oelagoa Bay region as slave raiders and 
traders. 189 
In discussion of the impact of the slave trade on the 
Oelagoa Bay-Thukela region, a general point raised by 
Cobbing becomes germane: to what extent were captives 
supplied to Oelagoa Bay a by-product of ongoing conflicts, 
187. Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane', unpubl. paper, 
p. 10. 
188. Ibid., p. II; Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAR, 
vol. 29 (1988), pp. 506, 507. 
189. Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane', unpubl. paper, 
p. II; Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAR, vol. 29 
(1988), p. 506. 
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and to what extent did the demand for slaves actually 
serve to stimulate new conflicts?190 A related point that 
arises out of Harries's work on slavery and servitude 
among the Gasa also needs to be considered: 191 under what 
circumstances were captives retained within the societies 
of their captors, and under what circumstances were they 
traded as commodities for export? These questions cannot 
be answered here, but they indicate some of the issues 
that need to be faced if the history of the Delagoa Bay 
slave trade and its impact is to be adequately assessed. 
until intensive research is done into the history of 
the trade, the points made here must remain largely 
conjectural. They serve, however, to suggest that by the 
late 1810s its impact was being directly felt in the 
territories south of the Phongolo. In the 1820s it may 
have become, indirectly at least, a factor in the politics 
of the region south of the Thukela. This theme will be 
taken up at the appropriate points in the remaining 
chapters. 
190. Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, 
p. 10. 
191. Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus 
extraction', JAH, vol. 22 (1981), esp. pp. 312-26. 
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CHAPTER 5 
POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS SOUTH OF THE THUKELA IN THE LATE 
1810s AND EARLY 1820s 
1. continuities with the past 
A central feature of the devastation stereotype whose 
development was analyzed in chapter 2 is that the political 
changes which were taking place north of the Thukela in the 
time of Dingiswayo and Shaka burst upon the region south of 
the river with effects which were both sudden and dramatic. 
Bryant writes of 'the flood-gates being opened upon Natal', 
and of waves of destruction 'flooding' into it. 1 Omer-
Cooper describes the period of upheaval in Natal as having 
been begun by the 'sudden eruption' into it of the Thembu. 2 
Similar notions live on in the works of more recent 
writers. 3 
While there is no doubt that the level of political 
conflict south of the Thukela increased markedly in the 
late 1810s and 1820s, over much of this area the process 
was less abrupt than the stereotype holds. The examination 
made in chapters 1 and 4 above of the forces which were 
making for political change in this region indicates that 
1. OT, pp. 252, 376. 
2. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, p. 156. 
3. For example, J.S. Bergh & A.P. Bergh, Tribes and 
Kingdoms, Cape Town, 1984, p. 20; P. Maylam, History of the 
African People of South Africa: from the Early Iron Age to 
the 1970s, Cape Town, 1986, p. 61; Edgecombe, 'The mfecane 
or difaqane', in Cameron & Spies, eds., Illustrated History 
of S.A., pp. 120-1; the present author's 'Before 
Mgungundlovu: the upper Mngeni-upper Mkhomazi region in the 
early nineteenth century', in J. Laband & R. Haswell, eds., 
Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: a New Portrait of an African 
City, Pietermaritzburg, 1988, p. 20. This latter essay 
was written at the beginning of 1987 before the author had 
begun detailed research into the roots of the devastation 
stereotype. 
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in the coastlands and in the valleys of the lower Thukela 
and the Mzinyathi, tensions had been rising since the later 
18th century. This was particularly so in the coastal 
regions, where conflict had been intensified by the 
successive intrusions in the later 18th century and early 
years of the 19th of the Thuli, the Cele and the Makhanya. 
In the lower Thukela valley, the effects of the expansion 
of the Qwabe, Ngcobo, Mkhize and Chunu chiefdoms on the 
north bank of the river were spilling over onto the south 
bank by the early years of the 19th century. Further 
inland, the expansion of the Hlubi chiefdom under Bhungane 
in the late 18th century, and the internal struggles which 
followed his death, are likely to have sent political 
ripples across wide areas on either side of the Mzinyathi. 
The upheavals which form the subject of this chapter 
need to be set against this historical background if their 
nature is to be properly understood. For half a century 
before the 1810s, the societies of the region south of the 
Thukela had had to cope with political pressures emanating 
from the northward. In the coastlands and on the upper 
Mzinyathi, numbers of people had been incorporated into 
new, enlarged polities established by invaders and 
conquerors from across the Thukela and Mzinyathi. In the 
1810s first the expansion of the Mthethwa and then the 
Mthethwa-Ndwandwe-Zulu conflicts, exacerbated by pressures 
emanating from the slaving societies round Delagoa Bay, had 
impinged more and more direcly on some, at least, of the 
polities of the region. The new series of incursions which 
began in the late 1810s, while far more disruptive, and far 
more widely felt, than anything which had gone before, was 
not unprecedented. Its impact was felt not in a 
politically static landscape, as depicted by Bryant,4 but 
in a region which for several decades had been experiencing 
an increasing tempo of political change. That the 
4. OT, ch. 8. The chapter is entitled 'The people of olden 
Zululand', but its comments apply equally well to the 
inhabitants of Natal. 
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available evidence allows the processes of change to be 
discerned only in limited parts of the region should not 
lead to underestimation of their wider impact. 
2. The incursion of the Ngwane 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the increasing 
political pressures which were being experienced by the 
1810s among the chiefdoms on the north bank of the Thukela 
river led certain of them to launch attacks on their 
neighbours across the river to the south. Instances which 
were discussed were the Qwabe attack on the Makhanya, and 
the Nyuswa attack on the Hlongwa. Similar occurrences may 
have taken place in these years further up-river as a 
consequence of the expansion of the Mkhize and Chunu 
chiefdoms, and in the Mzinyathi region as a consequence of 
the internal conflicts which were taking place in the Hlubi 
chiefdom. Events of this kind no doubt caused localized 
disruptions of social, political and economic life, but 
they were of minor import compared with the incursion of 
the Ngwane across the upper Mzinyathi which took place in 
the later 1810s. 5 
The flight of the Ngwane from their territory in the 
Vryheid region appears in the literature as the prototype 
of numerous similar migrations which, according to mfecane 
theory, took place soon afterwards allover southern 
Africa. The Ngwane are generally described as having been 
'driven out' of their lands, if not directly by the Zulu 
then as a result of Zulu expansion. They turned into a 
'horde' of fugitives which, under the leadership of the 
bloodthirsty Matiwane, cut a swathe through the chiefdoms 
of inland Natal and the highveld, pillaging, massacring and 
destroying. 6 Of the groups which feature in accounts 
5. See the discussion on pp. 110-15 above. 
6. The literary image of Matiwane's Ngwane as a horde of 
murderous savages can be traced at least as far back as the 
mid-1830s: see Godlonton's Introductory Remarks, pp. 52-3, 
204. 
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informed by mfecane theory, the Ngwane are one whose 
history urgently needs de-mythologizing. This section of 
the chapter re-examines the first phase of their migration, 
the phase which saw them move from the Vryheid region west 
and south-west through northern Natal to the valley of the 
upper Thukela. 
In chapter 4 (pp. 178-9) it was argued that the flight 
of the Ngwane followed from an attack made on them by the 
Ndwandwe at a time when violence north of the Black Mfolozi 
river was mounting to unprecedented levels. The Ndwandwe, 
who were then the central political actors in this region, 
were facing a major challenge from the expansion of the 
Mthethwa on their southern borders. At the same time they 
were in conflict with the Dlamini to the north, and were 
also beginning to feel the impact of the expansion of the 
Delagoa Bay slave trade. Why the Ngwane were 'driven out' 
by the Ndwandwe, when the Khumalo of Donda and the Ntshali 
of Mlotha, who were attacked at much the same time, were 
apparently not, is a iuestion which needs investigation. 
The notion of African groups' having violently 'driven' one 
another over the landscape during the wars of the early 
19th century recommended itself strongly to the colonial 
writers who were responsible for developing the basic 
stereotypes of mfecane theory. Like other forced 
migrations of the period, that of the Ngwane has too often 
been unproblematically portrayed as having followed 
automatically from a successful attack made by a superior 
power. Why they were not incorporated as tributaries into 
the Ndwandwe polity, whether the option of submission to 
their attackers was feasible, whether it was tried, and if 
it failed, why, are questions which writers on the subject 
have almost entirely neglected. 
Facing the kind of crisis which they did by the late 
1810s, it is likely that the Ndwandwe leaders were by this 
time more concerned with eliminating real or potential 
threats posed by the presence of independent chiefdoms on 
their borders than with bringing more tributaries under 
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their authority. It is also possible that they were 
becoming more interested in seizing captives for the 
expanding slave trade than in increasing the labour-power 
at their disposal, and hence less concerned with preserving 
the structures of newly conquered societies than with 
breaking them up. Under these conditions, as the Ngwane 
leaders would certainly have realized, the social cost of 
submission to the Ndwandwe would have been very high. 
Another factor in their calculations was their own likely 
treatment if they fell into the hands of the Ndwandwe. 
Even if Zwide had proved willing to accept the submission 
of the Ngwane generally, the killing of the Khumalo and 
Ntshali chiefs revealed in no uncertain terms the fate that 
awaited Matiwane and his immediate adherents. Making their 
submission to Zwide was for them not a feasible option. 
Some sections of the Ngwane may possibly have broken 
away and tendered their allegiance to the Ndwandwe chief, 
but, judging by the success with which Matiwane was able to 
engage in subsequent conflicts, most Ngwane accompanied him 
into flight. The Ndwandwe attack was probably ferocious 
enough to leave the various Ngwane sub-chiefs little real 
choice. Why the Ndwandwe did not proceed to follow the 
Ngwane up as persistently and aggressively as they had some 
time earlier pursued Sobhuza's Dlamini is another issue 
which needs discussion. The short answer is probably that 
in the prevailing conditions of crisis the Ndwandwe leaders 
were reluctant to commit their forces too far from their 
own territory. 
The decision of most Ngwane leaders to take to flight 
needs to be seen, then, against the background of the 
political turmoil which for some years had been mounting in 
the region north of the Black Mfolozi. Though the Ndwandwe 
attack was obviously the precipitating factor, it was no~ 
an isolated occurrence but the culminating event in a 
process which had for some years seen violence spreading 
gradually closer to the Ngwane borders. While the Ngwane 
took to flight most immediately to escape the attacking 
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Ndwandwe, a factor in their decision was the desire to put 
a greater distance between themselves and what was becoming 
a region of unprecedentedly fierce conflict. 
Though forced into flight, probably with the loss of 
most of their cattle, the Ngwane seem to have retained 
their political cohesion. The Ndwandwe had succeeded in 
defeating and displacing the Ngwane chiefdom, but had 
failed to destroy it. From this perspective, the 'driving 
out' of the Ngwane was as much a successful escape as it 
was an expulsion. Even under the extremely stressful 
conditions of flight, the Ngwane proved able to hold 
together. To describe them, as much of the literature 
does, simply as a 'horde' is tendentious and misleading; 
they are more usefully described in this phase of their 
history as constituting a chiefdom on the move. 
Nevertheless to see the Ngwane at this point as having 
been essentially a marauding group is accurate enough, for 
the loss of their cattle to the Ndwandwe left them with no 
option but to embark on a course of raiding as a matter of 
urgency. The most pressing question which faced their 
leaders after they and their adherents had made good their 
escape was where to locate and seize enough cattle to meet 
their immediate needs. The closest and most obvious target 
was the neighbouring Hlubi chiefdom to the west. The 
Ngwane leaders knew that if the various sections of Hlubi 
were given time to combine they would be more than a match 
for their own battered fighting forces. The best hope of 
defeating the Hlubi was to make a surprise attack aimed at 
destroying the ruling house under Mthimkhulu. That this is 
what happened is attested in the statements both of Ngwane 
and of Hlubi informants. 7 In a swift descent on 
7. Ngwane informants are Timango in stow 'Intrusion of the 
stronger races', unpubl. ms., pp. 196, 206; and in Scully, 
'Fragments ... IV', The State, vol. 2 (1909), p. 288; Moloja, 
'story of the "Fetcani horde"', Cape Quarterly Review, vol. 
1 (1882), p. 268; and Msebenzi kaMacingwane, History of 
Matiwane and the Amangwane Tribe, ed. N.J. van Warmelo, 
Pretoria, 1938, pp. 22, 30, 32, 126. Hlubi informants are 
Mehlomakhulu, 'statement of Mathlomahulu', Cape Monthly 
Magazine, vol. 3 (1880), p. 163; and Mabhonsa in JSA, vol. 
2, pp. 13-14, 16. See also Shepstone's unattributed notes 
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Mthimkhulu's capital, the Ngwane swept aside local 
resistance, killed the Hlubi chief, and seized numbers of 
cattle. 
Conventional accounts have it that the Ngwane then in 
turn drove the Hlubi people out of their territory and 
across the Drakensberg. The main source used for this by 
recent writers is Bryant's statement in Olden Times that, 
after falling on Mthimkhulu and his family in the night and 
massacring them all, Matiwane 'then drove the Hlubi tribe 
sauve qui peut over the mountains out of the land,.8 The 
notion that the Hlubi were 'driven out' is also found in 
some of the primary accounts recorded in the later 19th 
century. 9 While it is probable that in the original 
interviews the informants themselves used words or phrases 
which in their own languages conveyed this sense, it fed 
into, and reinforced, a colonial literary usage which, as 
described above, was already well established. 
The stereotyped notion that the Hlubi were simply 
'driven out' 'by the Ngwane obscures the more complex 
reality of their reactions to the Ngwane attack and to the 
destruction of the ruling house. According to Mabhonsa, 
who, as a Hlubi, had no reason to minimize the strength of 
the group which had overcome Mthimkhulu, the Ngwane 
chiefdom was small in comparison with that of the Hlubi. 10 
It is unlikely that Matiwane's fugitive party had anything 
like the resources of manpower which would have been needed 
to 'drive out' all the Hlubi, and to 'sweep' or 'scour' 
their large territory for cattle. 11 At another point in 
on Hlubi history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 141. 
8. OT, P . 150 . 
9. Timango in stow 'Intrusion of the stronger races', 
unpubl. ms., pp. 196, 206; Mhlanga, 'story of native wars', 
Cape Monthly Magazine, vol. 14 (1877), p. 248; Moloja, 
'story of the "Fetcani horde"', Cape Quarterly Review, 
vol. 1 (1882), p. 268. 
10. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, p. 16. 
11. The word 'sweep' is used by Scully in 'Fragments ... IV', 
The State, vol. 2 (1909), p. 289, and 'scour' by Bryant in 
OT, p. 139. 
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Olden Times, Bryant himself gives a rather differently 
nuanced account from the one cited in the previous 
paragraph. The Hlubi took to flight, he indicates, not 
simply in response to the Ngwane attack, but in part as the 
result of decisions taken by their leaders. 12 This is in 
harmony with Mabhonsa's statement to the effect that 'As 
soon as Mtimkulu was murdered the tribe dispersed, each 
prince carrying off his own section,.13 In his view the 
destruction of the Hlubi chiefdom was not so much a case of 
the people's having been 'driven out' as of their having 
'scattered,.14 As Shepstone also puts it, the Hlubi 
chiefdom 'fell to pieces',15 a phrasing which is distinctly 
different from that of the stereotype. 
These views are in accordance with what is known of the 
structure and history of the Hlubi chiefdom in the early 
19th century. Though it was a large and comparatively 
powerful polity, it was only loosely integrated. If 
anything, its central authority was becoming weaker during 
Mthimkhulu's reign as the sections under his senior male 
relatives sought to assert their autonomy. with its 
political lynch-pin destroyed by the Ngwane attack, the 
chiefdom rapidly disintegrated into its constituent parts. 
While the Ngwane were largely responsible for sending these 
parts flying in different directions, allowance must also 
be made for the consequences of the decisions made by the 
various Hlubi leaders. These decisions were in marked 
contrast to those taKen by the Ngwane sub-chiefs in 
response to the Ndwandwe attack, for where the Ngwane had 
largely held together in adversity, the Hlubi sections 
dispersed in different directions. 
Most accounts of their subsequent history focus mainly 
on the flight of a large section under Mpangazitha over the 
12. OT, p. 138. 
13. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, p. 14. 
14. Ibid., p. 13. 
15. In Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 141. 
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Drakensberg onto the highveld. 16 This focus stems mainly 
from the interest displayed from the colonial 
period to the present in the series of bloody battles which 
Mpangazitha is supposed to have fought in and about the 
Caledon valley before being defeated and killed. It 
distracts attention from the fact that after the Ngwane 
attack and the destruction of the chiefdom's central 
political authority, the various sections of Hlubi followed 
a number of different courses of action. The surviving 
members of the ruling house made off northwards towards the 
upper Phongolo region, possibly to seek refuge with the 
Ngwe, the people of Mthimkhulu's chief wife, or with the 
Shabalala, the people of his mother. 17 Other groups headed 
north-westward towards the upper Vaal. 18 Whiteside claims 
that a number of Hlubi migrated southwards over the 
Mkhomazi and eventually to the territory of the Gcaleka 
Xhosa. 19 This notion is not supported in any of the 
primary accounts, and is probably a product of the author's 
concern to establish a historical connection between the 
Hlubi of the Mzinyathi region and the 'fingoes' of the 
eastern cape. 20 
Some of these groups of Hlubi took to migration mainly 
as a means of saving or even enhancing their political 
autonomy. Others did so in order to seek refuge in regions 
of political stability. Large numbers, including three of 
Mthimkhulu's sons, made their way, possibly over a period 
of time, to the south-east to give their allegiance to 
16. See for example D.F. Ellenberger & J.C. Macgregor, 
History of the Basuto. Ancient and Modern, London, 1912, 
pp. 119-20, 124; Bryant, OT, pp. 150-3; Omer-Cooper, Zulu 
Aftermath, p. 86 ff; Wright & Manson, Hlubi Chiefdom, pp. 
17-18. 
17. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, pp. 17, 19; Wright & 
Manson, Hlubi Chiefdom, pp. 6, 16. 
18. OT, p. 150; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, p. 19. 
19. Ayliff & Whiteside, History of the Abambo, p. 9. 
20. See the argument in A.C. Webster, 'Ayliff, Whiteside, 
and the Fingo "emancipation" of 1835: a reappraisal', B.A. 
Hons. essay, Rhodes university, 1988, pp. 1-7. 
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Shaka,21 whose emergent Zulu chiefdom must have appeared as 
a haven of stability in comparison with the polities of the 
area north of the Black Mfolozi. Others apparently got as 
far as the Thuli chiefdom, the dominant power in the 
coastlands of the Mngeni-Mkhomazi region. 22 But not all 
the Hlubi took to flight. A few small groups seem to have 
remained in the upper Mzinyathi region. 23 Others, pace the 
stereotype of Matiwane as mass murderer, tendered their 
allegiance to the Ngwane chief. 24 
On the basis of information recorded by stuart from 
Mabhonsa kaSidlayi, the Ngwane attack on the Hlubi can 
roughly be dated to the end of the 1810s. According to 
Mabhonsa, Langalibalele kaMthimkhulu, who was chief of the 
Hlubi from the later 1830s until his deposition by the 
Natal colonial authorities in 1873, had been a young child 
able to run about at the time when the Hlubi had been 
attacked and put to flight by the Ngwane. Mabhonsa appears 
to have learnt this from Langalibalele himself, as also the 
fact that the Hlubi chief had been a member of his father's 
umsonganyathi ibutho, which was the age-equivalent of the 
Zulu iHlaba ibutho. 25 Both stuart and Bryant independently 
give the iHlaba as having been formed in about 1837 of 
youths who had been born in the late 1810s. 26 It is known 
that sons of chiefs were often older than other youths when 
they were placed in an ibutho; by this token, Langalibalele 
21. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, pp. 13-14; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 296. 
22. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 281. 
23. Wright & and Manson, Hlubi Chiefdom, p. 22. 
24. Moloja, 'story of the "Fetcani horde"', Cape Quarterly 
Review, vol. 1 (1882), p. 269, who indicates that Matiwane 
was joined by the amaHawula section of Hlubi; Walter Khela, 
statement in Msebenzi, History of Matiwane, p. 266. A 
confused statement by Mabhonsa in JSA, vol. 2, p. 14, also 
indicates that numbers of Hlubi gave allegiance to 
Matiwane. 
25. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, pp. 17, 19. 
26. See Stuart's estimate in JSA, vol. 1, p. 19; and OT, 
p. 645. 
218 
could have been born in the mid-1810s. This would square 
with the estimate made in 1844 by the Wesleyan missionary 
James Allison that Langalibalele was about 30 years 01d;27 
and with that made in 1852 by Robert Garden, a British 
military officer, that he was about 36 or 37. 28 By this 
measure the Ngwane attack on the Hlubi would not have taken 
place before the late 1810s. 
The wider effects of the Ngwane attack and the break-up 
of the Hlubi chiefdom had hardly begun to be felt before 
the Ngwane went pushing their way across the Mzinyathi and 
the Biggarsberg into the valley of the upper Thukela. One 
source claims that after the flight of the Hlubi the Ngwane 
proceeded to occupy their country,29 but if they did so it 
is unlikely to have been for long, for the region was too 
close for comfort to Ndwandwe territory. In his recently 
published critique of mfecane theory, Cobbing has the 
Ngwane moving directly from the Vryheid region to the Wilge 
river in the north-east Orange Free state after the 
Ndwandwe had attacked them, and says nothing about the 
possible intermediate stages of their migration. 30 It is 
contended here that a move of this kind is unlikely to have 
taken place. Not only does it ignore a number of 
traditions, recorded both from Ngwane and non-Ngwane 
informants, to the effect that the Ngwane initially made 
their way to the upper Thukela,31 but it also does not take 
27. F.J. Perkins, 'A history of Christian missions in 
Swaziland to 1910', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1974, p. 76. 
28. Garden Papers (Natal Archives), p. 523. 
29. Timango in stow 'Intrusion of the stronger races', 
unpubl. ms., p. 206; and in Scully, 'Fragments ••. IV', The 
State, vol. 2 (1909), p. 289. 
30. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), 
p. 507. 
31. Nombiba, in Shepstone's notes on Nyamvu history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 137 (the informant is identi-
fied in Bird, p. 139); Ntulo, in Shepstone's notes on zizi 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 142 (the informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 138); 
Moloja, 'story of the "Fetcani horde"', Cape Quarterly 
Review, vol. 1 (1882), p. 268; Khawulela's statement in 
Commission on Native Laws and Customs, vol. 1, p. 
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into account a point which Cobbing himself is at pains to 
stress in another context. Griqua, Kora and other mounted 
gunmen from the lower Vaal, middle Orange and north-eastern 
Cape regions were raiding widely across the plains of the 
highveld by the early 1820s, and probably before. 32 It 
seems unlikely that, having just escaped from one arena of 
conflict, the Ngwane leaders would willingly have taken 
their followers into another if they could have done 
otherwise. 
The desire to avoid the comparatively harsh environment 
of the highveld may also have been a factor in the Ngwane 
decision. In the event they followed the line of least 
resistance between the societies of the highveld to the 
west and the expanding chiefdoms - the Zulu, Chunu, Mkhize, 
and possibly the Thembu - of the Thukela-White Mfolozi 
region to the east. The only obstacles to their advance 
were a number of small Bhele and zizi chiefdoms: these they 
were easily able to overcome in detail before coming to a 
halt against the foothills of the Drakensberg in the good 
grasslands of the upper Thukela region, some 200 kilometres 
from their former territory near Vryheid. 
The stereotyped view is that the passage of the Ngwane 
through the territories of the Bhele and zizi was marked by 
little more than bloodshed and destruction. Of the fate of 
the Bhele, Bryant wrote in Izindaba Zabantu, 'Those of them 
who ... chanced to be athwart Matiwane's path were 
mercilessly burnt or butchered, infants and females, aged 
and sick alike, in true Matiwanean style, till not a body 
was any longer seen nor a foot-fall heard in erstwhile 
emaBheleni-land,.33 His account in Olden Times was couched 
166; Msebenzi, History of Matiwane, p. 20. See also JSA, 
vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 28; and 
Mabhonsa's chronologically confused statement in JSA, vol. 
2, p. 26. 
32. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH,.vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 496-9. See also J. Richner, 'The withering away of the 
"lifaqane": or a change of paradigm', unpubl. B.A. Hons. 
essay, Rhodes University, 1988, pp. 5-12. 
33. HZ, p. 35 . 
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in similar vein. 34 As for the Zizi, Matiwane's followers, 
'now transformed into a roving horde of human demons, swept 
suddenly down upon them. Against such a mad and unexpected 
onslaught the emaZizini were unable to cope; and leaving 
land and stock to their fate, they saved their own heads by 
making a precipitate retreat towards the cape ... ,.35 
There is little doubt that many sections of Bhele, 
including that headed by the senior chief, Qunta,36 took to 
flight southwards upon the advent of the Ngwane, for 
displaced Bhele groups we~e a major presence in the 
Mzimkhulu-Mzimvubu region in the 1820s (see below, 
pp. 302, 307). Others made their way to khonza Shaka,37 
and others probably ended up in other chiefdoms that lay 
within reach. Numbers of people who could not or would not 
make their escape were no doubt killed as the Ngwane set 
about seizing cattle and beating down resistance. But 
Bryant's picture is again grossly distorted. By his own 
account, numbers of Bhele remained behind under their own 
chiefs, and even if, as he claims, they had been reduced to 
poverty and some to cannibalism,38 it is likely that many 
of them sooner or later gravitated towards Matiwane's newly 
established polity as it began to reconsolidate. That 
numbers of Zizi did this is attested by Khawulela, who 
states that after the defeat of the zizi they had submitted 
to the authority of the Ngwane chief. 39 Somewhat later, 
according to the evidence of Shepstone's informant, 
Nombiba, sections of Nyamvu, Njilo, Dlanyoka and Ndlovu 
from the middle Mngeni region, which had been disturbed by 
the passage of the Chunu, Thembu and other groups, also 
34. OT, p. 139. 
35. HZ, pp. 33-4. See also OT, p. 357. 
36. OT, p. 348. 
37. HZ, p. 34. See also Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 260-2. 
38. OT, p. 347. 
39. Khawulela's statement in commission on Laws and 
Customs, vol. 1, p. 166. 
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came to give their allegiance to Matiwane. 40 The turmoil 
caused by the Ngwane in the upper Thukela region should not 
be underestimated, but what is missing from the stereotype 
is any appreciation that after an initial period of 
upheaval Matiwane's reconstituted chiefdom began to emerge 
as a major new regional focus of power and stability. 
The incu~sion of the Ngwane into the valleys of the 
upper Mzinyathi and the upper Thukela completely 
transformed the political scene in those regions, and sent 
shock waves over a much wider area. The collapse of the 
Hlubi chiefdom removed what for several decades had been 
the dominant power in the Mzinyathi valley, and for a while 
left something of a political vacuum in the region. To the 
south-west, the numerous small Bhele and zizi chiefdoms 
were either brought under Ngwane domination, or broken up 
and ejected. In their place emerged a single, much larger, 
more centralized and more militarized polity. According to 
Msebenzi, Matiwane's main umuzi, esiNyondweni, was situated 
to the east of what is now Bergville, and the territory 
under his authority extended to beyond Ladysmith. 41 
Msebenzi was himself a member of the Ngwane chiefly house, 
and his evidence on this point needs to be treated with 
caution, but his claim gains sUbstance from the statement 
of Mqayikana kaYenge, who was of the Mpumuza people, that 
Matiwane's conquests had extended at least as far as 
Estcourt. 42 It seems safe to say that his influence 
reached from the regipn of the Biggarsberg in the north to 
the upper Mtshezi (Bushman's) river and beyond in the 
south. 
40. Nombiba, in Shepstone's notes on these histories in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 137-8, 140, 146 (the 
informant is identified in Bird, p. 139, and in T. 
Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 126, 127, 145). See also 
Bryant, OT, pp. 557, 561. 
41. Msebenzi, History of Matiwane, p. 20. 
42. JSA, vol. 4, p. 28. 
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In the course of these political changes, established 
patterns of social and economic life were either destroyed 
or severely disrupted. The degree of violence involved 
should not be minimized, but neither should it be 
exaggerated in the way that the stereotype of Ngwane 
history invariably does. Where areas became emptied of 
population it was by displacement rather than by 
destruction: neither the Ngwane nor any other group had the 
capacity or the need to massacre large numbers of people. 
It is likely that fugitive groups moved off more often as 
migrant bands which retained some political cohesion and 
purpose than as the disorganized hordes of refugees which 
figure in the stereotype. While numbers of people 
permanently abandoned their home territories, numbers of 
others remained behind, if often for a time in conditions 
of extreme want. For at least a season, and possibly 
longer, in much of the area affected by the passage of the 
Ngwane, agricultural production would have been at a 
standstill. The area would also have been largely denuded 
of livestock, either through the migration of the owners or 
else through Ngwane raiding. 
As the newly re-constituted Ngwane chiefdom took root 
and began to extend its hegemony over the upper Thukela 
region, a measure of orderly existence began gradually to 
return. Once the presence of the Ngwane had ceased to be 
contested, a main concern of Matiwane's would have been to 
re-establish the conditions needed for homestead-based 
agricultural and livestock production to resume. Another 
would have been to build up his following as rapidly as 
possible by setting up formal tributary relations with the 
sections of Bhele and zizi which had remained in their 
territories, and with other groups which came to give the 
Ngwane chief their allegiance. 
Of Ngwane relations at this time with the neighbouring 
Dlamini chiefdoms to the east and south-east, and with 
other regional powers further off, like the Thembu, Mkhize, 
Chunu and Zulu, nothing is known. But there can be litle 
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doubt that the emergence of the Ngwane chiefdom as a 
significant power in the upper Thukela region injected an 
important new element into the political calculus of every 
chief from the White Mfolozi to the Mzimkhulu and beyond. 
3. Intrusions into the mid-Thukela region 
Soon after the flight of the Ngwane from the Vryheid area 
across the Mzinyathi and into the valley of the upper 
Thukela, the developing confrontation between the Ndwandwe 
and the Mthethwa came to a head. In rapid succession 
followed the death of Dingiswayo, the defeat of the 
Mthethwa army, the disintegration of the Mthethwa state, 
and the emergence of a new confrontation on the White 
Mfolozi between the Ndwandwe and a rising Zulu-dominated 
defensive alliance. In the course of urgently mobilizing 
manpower and resources from among neighbouring chiefdoms, 
the Zulu attacked and subordinated the large Qwabe polity 
to the south-east, and then proceeded to turn their 
attentions southward. 
In this region the first chiefdom to be menaced by the 
Zulu was that of the Chunu, which had for some time itself 
been engaged in a process of territorial expansion, and 
represented a potentially serious obstacle to the 
furtherance of Zulu interests in the south. A move on the 
part of one of the sections of the Chunu to assert its 
authority over the Cube precipated a pre-emptive attack 
against it on the part of the Zulu (pp. 182-3 above). 
Though the attack does not seem to have been carried 
further against the Chunu ruling house under Macingwane, 
the reaction of the Chunu leaders, with the fate of the 
Qwabe and their chief, Phakathwayo, fresh in their minds, 
was to gather their cattle, and as many of their people as 
would follow them, and to move off southwards over the 
Thukela. 
The Chunu chiefdom was not, as Bryant implies, 'driven 
out' by the Zulu. 43 It moved off of its own accord, and 
43. OT, p. 267. 
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did so not to avoid destruction at the hands of an all-
powerful conquest state but to avoid being made tributary 
to the parvenu leader of a hitherto insignificant chiefdom. 
It was not the existence of the Chunu chiefdom that was 
threatened, but rather the future of its politically 
ambitious leadership. First the expansion of the Mthethwa 
into the interior had blocked Chunu expansion northwards; 
now the military and political successes of the upstart 
Zulu chiefdom threatened Chunu independence. The external 
problems facing Macingwane were compounded, Hamilton 
suggests, by the existence of political tensions within his 
chiefdom which enabled Shaka to play one Chunu faction off 
against another. 44 
According to Bryant, once the Chunu were across the 
Thukela, they cut their way 'without parley or compunction' 
through hostile chiefdoms all the way to the Mzimkhulu 
river, where they proceeded to re-establish themselves. 45 
There are a number of reasons for doubting whether they 
covered this distance - some two hundred kilometres - in 
the course of one continuous migration. In the first 
place, there was no clear reason for them to do so. Their 
migration was undertaken essentially to preserve their 
political independence from the threat to it posed by a 
rising but still far from formidable new power. It did not 
represent a flight, as that of the Ngwane had done, to 
escape possible annihilation at the hands of an established 
state which was reso~ting to increasingly destructive 
methods to beat off external challenges and expand its 
power. A move of half the distance would still have taken 
the Chunu well outside the Zulu sphere of influence. 
In the second place there is no evidence to SUbstantiate 
the notion that the Chunu moved in one fell swoop from 
north of the Thukela to the Mzimkhulu. As noted in chapter 
3 (p. 122 above), there is a clear distinction in 
44. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 258. 
45. OT, pp. 267-70. 
225 
Shepstone's histories, which constituted Bryant's main 
source on the Chunu migration, in the degree of coverage of 
Chunu movements before and after they arrived in the 
vicinity of the Mngeni near Pietermaritzburg. Where their 
later movements are charted in some detail, there is 
virtually nothing on their migration from the Thukela to 
the Mngeni. This lacuna could be a product simply of a 
failure on Shepstone's part either to elicit information on 
the subject, or else to record it. On the other hand it 
could also indicate that the Chunu migration was made in 
two separate stages which were reflected in different ways 
in the memories of his informants. 
In the third place, there is some evidence to suggest 
that the move which brought the Chunu to the Mzimkhulu took 
place at much the same time as the southward migration of 
the Thembu (see below, pp. 244-5). As this latter event 
almost certainly took place some while after the movement 
of the Chunu across the Thukela, the Chunu 'migration' 
makes sense only if it is seen as having taken place in two 
distinct stages. The suggestion here is that their initial 
move was made across the Thukela to the upper Mvoti region, 
and that after a relatively brief stay, they moved off 
further south to the Mzimkhulu. 
Partly because the Chunu had managed to escape with most 
of their cattle,46 and partly because there were no 
polities in their way large enough to offer sUbstantial 
resistance, the first stage of their move involved 
considerably less violence than the second. Together with 
the fact that the presence of the Chunu in the Mvoti region 
was too short-lived to have much political impact, this 
meant that their advent into the region left virtually no 
trace in oral traditions, at least not in those recorded by 
Shepstone more than forty years later. Like his 
informants, Shepstone was predisposed to think in terms of 
long-distance migrations of bands of refugees flying from 
46. Bryant makes the same point: see OT, p. 267. 
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the barbarities of Shaka, and it is understandable that he 
shoud have telescoped the two separate stages of the Chunu 
migration into one. There was no reason why, another half-
century later, Bryant, and for that matter stuart, and 
their respective informants should have presented it any 
differently. For the most part, the recorded evidence 
obscures the disjunction in Shepstone's histories noted 
above, although there are several snippets of tradition, 
discussed in the next section of the chapter (pp. 242-5), 
which lend support to suggestion made here of a two-phase 
movement. 
The departure of the Chunu from the territory between 
the upper Nsuze and the Mzinyathi left the way clear for 
the Zulu to extend their domination over the region. In 
the process of doing so they came up for the first time 
against the Thembu chiefdom, which was located on the east 
bank of the lower Mzinyathi upstream of the Qudeni range. 47 
Shepstone, followed by Bryant, maintained that the Thembu 
had been tributary to the Buthelezi to the east until the 
defeat of the latter by Shaka. 48 There is nothing to 
sUbstantiate this in the testimony of stuart's two main 
informants on Thembu history, Lugubhu kaMangaliso and 
Lunguza kaMpukane. 49 Admittedly both were closely 
associated with the Thembu chiefly house,50 and were hardly 
likely to have wanted to admit that the Thembu had ever 
been tributary to the Buthelezi. But, in any event, if a 
relationship of this nature had ever existed, it was ended 
by the subjection of the Buthelezi first to the Mthethwa 
and then to the Zulu. By the time Shaka and his advisers 
47. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 281, 283, 291; 
vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, pp. 297, 298. 
48. Shepstone's unattributed notes on Thembu history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 143; Bryant, OT, pp. 242, 
243. 
49. Lugubhu's evidence appears in JSA, vol. 1, pp. 281-93, 
and Lunguza's in JSA, vol. 1, pp. 297-345. 
50. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 281, 283; 
vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, p. 297. 
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turned their attention to the Thembu chiefdom, it was 
itself engaged in a process of expansion under the vigorous 
leadership of its chief, Ngoza kaMkhubukeli. Among the 
groups which are recorded as having tendered their 
allegiance to him are the sithole and sections of the 
Mbatha which had been displaced from the White Mfolozi 
region by the expansion of the Mthethwa and the Zulu. 51 
Possibly another was a section of the Mabaso. 52 
That Ngoza actively tried to expand the scope of his 
authority over tributary chiefs is attested by Lugubhu, who 
told stuart that the Thembu chief was 'continually 
fighting' with the groups which had khonza'd to him. 53 
Hamilton sees the Thembu chiefdom at this time as 
'characterized by a proliferation of different lineage 
names indicative of an expanding polity and the development 
of a closed ruling elite,.54 This is probably to 
exaggerate the degree of centralization which its ruling 
group had been able to achieve. If anything, the power of 
the Thembu chiefly house at the time of Ngoza's succession 
is likely to have been weak, for, Lugubhu states, he became 
chief after a period during which the Thembu had been ruled 
by a regent,55 whom Bryant names as his sist~r, Mnyango. 56 
Lugubhu and Lunguza both indicate that the autonomy of the 
chiefs subordinate to the Thembu paramount extended to the 
point where they were able to hold their own umkhosi 
ceremonies. 57 But there is no doubt, as Hamilton 
51. OT, pp. 225-7, 246; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, 
pp. 281, 290. 
52. OT, p. 419. 
53. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 290. 
54. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 252-3. The 
proliferation of Thembu lineages was not as great as 
Hamilton suggests, for, of the sixteen lineages which she 
identifies as apparently having been Thembu in affiliation, 
only seven were in fact so. 
55. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 290. 
56. OT, p. 245. 
57. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 291; vol. 1, 
evidence of Lunguza, pp. 297, 315. 
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implies,58 that the Thembu chiefdom posed a major obstacle 
to Zulu expansion to the south and west after the sudden 
migration of the Chunu had left a political vacuum in the 
region. 
The existing sources make clear what the response of the 
Thembu was to the withdrawal of the Chunu and the advent of 
a Zulu presence on their own eastern and southern borders. 
Like the Chunu leaders, those of the Thembu had no wish to 
become subordinated to the Zulu. Like the Chunu, the Thembu 
proceeded to beat a retreat while they were still in a 
position to do so. collecting up their cattle, they pushed 
their way across the Mzinyathi river and into the country 
of the Khuze. 59 By contrast with the migration of the 
Chunu, that of the Thembu was strongly enough opposed to 
have been remembered in tradition. It was only in the face 
of fierce resistance on the part of the Khuze, in which 
their chief, Nomagaga, was killed, that the Thembu were 
able to establish themselves in the triangle of territory 
between the Thukela and the lower Mzinyathi. 60 
Facing as they were the threat of attacks by the 
Ndwandwe to the north, the Zulu were no more in a position 
to follow up the ThembU than they had been to pursue the 
Chunu. It is possible that a Zulu force helped expedite 
the Thembu retreat, for Lunguza claims that the Zulu made 
an attack on the Thembu while the latter were still in 
their old territory to the east of the Mzinyathi. 61 But 
for the time being, the withdrawal of the Thembu saved them 
from further Zulu attentions, and they were left alone to 
re-consolidate their chiefdom in its new location. 
58. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 253. 
59. Shepstone's notes on Thembu history in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, pp. 143-4; OT, p. 246. 
60. Shepstone's notes on Thembu history, in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 143; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, 
p. 286; vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, pp. 298-9; OT, pp. 
246-7. 
61. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, p. 298. 
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After the defeat and subjection of the Khuze, Ngoza was 
quick to begin asserting his authority over such of the 
neighbouring chiefdoms as he could. According to Bryant, 
he 'extended his borders' to include the country of the two 
Nhlangwini chiefdoms on the opposite side of the Thukela, 
as well as that of the ekuNene Dlamini and esiPhahleni 
Dlamini, both closely related to the Nhlangwini. 62 No 
other record of this has been found, which suggests that, 
if it existed at all, Thembu authority over these groups 
was established without fighting, and remained lightly 
felt. Apparently Ngoza also sought to expand his domain to 
the north-west into country occupied by groups of Bhele 
which had been weakened by the recent incursion of 
Matiwane's Ngwane. 63 Thembu expansion in this direction 
would have been restricted by fear of encroaching into the 
sphere of influence of the Ngwane, and also that of the 
Memela, the main surviving Bhele-linked chiefdom. The 
Memela occupied country along the Ndaka (Sundays) river 
above Lenge mountain: 64 that they remained a force to be 
reckoned with by their neighbours is suggested by an 
anecdote recounted by Mqayikana kaYenge to the effect that 
the Memela had raided the cattle of the Khuze while the 
latter were under attack by the Thembu. 65 
The migration of the Chunu across the Thukela, and," soon 
after, that of the Thembu across the Mzinyathi, opened the 
way for the establishment of Zulu domination over the 
remaining independent chiefdoms in the Thukela valley 
upstream of the Qwabe. Of these, the relatively large 
Mkhize chiefdom submitted to Shaka without a struggle (p. 
184 above). The Cube appear to have done the same, 
although there is some evidence that Shaka acted to 
reinforce his domination over them by killing their chief 
62. HZ, p. 44; OT, p. 248. 
63. OT, pp. 248-9; Gardiner, Narrative, pp. 185-6. 
64. OT, pp. 347, 350. 
65. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 22. 
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and replacing him with a member of the Cube chiefly house 
who was more amenable to Zulu rule. 66 Further to the west, 
the Bomvu were also brought under control with little 
trouble. 67 
Of the numerous semi-autonomous sections of the Ngcobo 
chiefdom, only the Qadi seem to have been inclined to 
submit without resistance to the Zulu. Significantly, they 
were apparently allowed to keep some of their cattle. 68 
The evidence on the relations between the Zulu and the 
Nyuswa, who were the dominant section of the Ngcobo, is 
contradictory (pp. 184-5 above). The most likely scenario 
is that Shaka took advantage of continuing rivalries over 
the succession to the Nyuswa chiefship to demand its 
submission. The response of the Nyuswa was to take to 
flight, but near the Thukela they were caught by a Zulu 
force which put their chief to death and seized their 
cattle. After this the Nyuswa were placed by Shaka under 
the authority of the Mkhize chief, Zihlandlo. 69 Of the 
other Ngcobosections, the Ngongoma broke into two groups, 
one of which took refuge with the Qadi, and the other with 
the related Fuze southwards near the Mvoti river. 70 The 
Langeni fled up the Thukela to the Bomvu chiefdom,71 and 
the Wosiyana to an unspecified locality across the 
Thukela. 72 Though the Zulu were responsible for breaking 
up the Ngcobo chiefdom, it was hardly through the process 
of 'sweeping', 'slaying' and 'obliterating' described by 
Bryant in Izindaba Zabantu. 73 The Qadi section remained in 
66. aT, 
p. 259. 
67. HZ, 
68. aT, 
69. aT, 
p. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
415; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, 
69; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mayinga, p. 251. 
493; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 183. 
482. 
7 O. aT, p . 490. 
71. Ibid., p. 483. See also JSA, vol. 2, evidence of 
Madikane, pp. 60, 61. 
72. aT, p . 497. 
73. HZ, pp. 68-9. 
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its territory, and most of the rest of the Ngcobo made 
their submission to chiefs who themselves had recently 
khonza'd to Shaka. 
Soon after the Zulu had subordinated the polities on the 
northern side of the Thukela, they began to seize cattle 
from the small chiefdoms which occupied the opposite bank 
of the river. Most, like the Ngcolosi, Khabela, Nxamalala, 
and Mpumuza, seem to have offered little or no resistance, 
and to have formally tendered their submission to Shaka. 74 
The Phephetha attempted to hold out in their stronghold on 
Phisweni mountain, but were soon overcome. (That Shaka was 
personally present on this expedition, as claimed by 
Shepstone's informant, Mnguni, and by Bryant, is extremely 
unlikely.) Numbers of them, including their chief, were 
killed, others took refuge in the surrounding bush, and 
some were taken off to the Zulu country.75 Bryant 
describes this latter category as 'captives' of the Zulu. 
The term needs to be carefully qualified: in this context 
it probably refers to individuals who were incorporated 
into the households of Zulu notables in various menial 
capacities, the women and girls as concubines and domestic 
servants, and the men and boys as cattle herds. 76 
74. Mnguni's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Ngcolosi 
history, Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 133 (the informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 107); 
Sibetshe's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Khabela history 
in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 133 (the informant is 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol 89, p. 109; 
Hlephuhlephu's evidence in shepstone's notes on 
ZondijMpumuza history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 134 
(the informant is identified in T. Shepstone papers, vol. 
89, p. 111); Nombiba's evidence in Shepstone's notes on 
Nxamalala history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 134 (the 
informant is identified in T. shspetone Papers, vol. 89, p. 
112); OT, pp. 507, 521, 523. 
75. Mnguni's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Phephetha 
history, Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 133-4 (the 
informant is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p . 110); OT, P • 513. 
76. For a useful discussion of the status of captives in 
the Gaza, Swazi and Zulu states later in the 19th century, 
see Harries, 'Slavery, social incorporation and surplus 
extraction', JAH, vol 22 (1981), pp~ 318-29. 
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Bryant sees the Zulu as having subjugated these Thukela 
chiefdoms, as well as the Mkhize, Cube and Bomvu, in the 
course of a single 'campaign,.77 This is intrinsically 
unlikely, as it implies that they were able to put a 
considerable force into the field in the south at a time 
when they were facing strong pressures on their northern 
borders. More likely is that on several different 
occasions they despatched small-scale expeditions into the 
region to demand the submission of chiefs and seize what 
cattle they could. Bryant himself writes at a number of 
points of the Thukela chiefdoms having been attacked by 
small Zulu raiding parties. 78 The willingness of the 
Phephetha to offer physical resistance to the Zulu, and the 
ability of the Khabela initially to escape from the force 
sent to subdue them,79 also speak of the small size of the 
attacking forces. Further evidence in support of this 
argument comes from one of stuart's informants, who 
indicates that the Zulu force which was sent against the 
Zondi was unable to drive them out of their stronghold. 80 
The most telling indicator of the limits which existed 
on the ability of the Zulu to establish an effective 
presence in the Thukela valley at this time is that in the 
event Shaka's authority in the region had to be sustained 
largely by proxy. While the Zulu were quite able 
periodically to mount raiding expeditions into it, to 
maintain its political submission they had to turn to the 
agency of a client polity. This was the Mkhize chiefdom of 
Zihlandlo, who, after his voluntary submission to Shaka, 
was encouraged to continue the process of expanding the 
territory under his control, although now in Shaka's name 
rather than his own. After the migration of the Chunu, 
Zihlandlo's polity was the dominant regional power between 
77. HZ, pp. 48-62, 69; OT, chs. 48, 49. 
78. OT, pp. 409, 550. 
79. Ibid., p. 511. 
80. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, pp. 6-7. 
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the Zulu chiefdom and the Thukela, and his political 
ambitions appear to have been such that, even in a 
subaltern capacity, he was prepared to operate in Zulu 
interests so long as his own authority was enhanced in the 
process. The role of Zulu 'agent' devolved on him because 
he proved himself both willing and able to take it on. The 
alternative was to take to flight as both the Chunu and 
Thembu had done, but, with the Thembu, and, further off, 
the Ngwane now dominating the region to the westward, and 
the Chunu that to the southward, any but a long-distance 
migration was becoming a less and less feasible course of 
action. 
Numerous groups are mentioned in the existing sources as 
having been attacked and subordinated by the Mkhize in the 
reign of Zihlandlo. The main source of the chiefdom's 
history at this time is the testimony given to stuart by 
Mbokodo kaSikhulekile, who was a grandson of a full brother 
of Zihlandlo, and of high rank within the chiefly house of 
one of the Mkhize sections recognized by the Natal 
colonial government. S1 His comments on the extent of 
Mkhize power in the early 19th century need to be treated 
with caution, but evidence from other sources supports the 
notion which emerges from a reading of his testimony that 
under Zihlandlo the Mkhize chiefdom expanded rapidly as a 
satellite of the Zulu polity. 
It is not always possible to identify from the evidence 
the location of groups which are named as having been 
subordinated by the Mkhize, nor to tell precisely when they 
were overcome. But, broadly speaking, three phases of 
Mkhize expansion under Zulu hegemony can be discerned. The 
first, which fell within the period when the Zulu were 
mobilizing against the Ndwandwe, saw the Mkhize extending 
their authority over neighbouring groups like the Cube (if 
Sl. Mbokodo's evidence is to be found in JSA, vol. 3, 
pp. 1-20. See also the praises which he gives of Zihlandlo 
in JSC, file 5S, notebook 23, pp. 73-9, and of Zihlandlo's 
brother, Sambela, in the same notebook, pp. 57-63. 
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they had not already done so: see p. 170 above), the Nyuswa 
and other remnants of the Ngcobo chiefdom which had been 
scattered by the Zulu, and the Bomvu. 82 It may also have 
been during this phase that a section of the Dladla Mbatha, 
probably displaced by the Zulu in the course of their 
expansion to the White Mfolozi, came to give their 
allegiance to Zihlandlo. 83 
In the second phase, Mkhize forces crossed to the 
southern bank of the Thukela and proceeded to bring under 
Zihlandlo's authority the chiefdoms which had recently been 
raided by the Zulu. This occurred either in the period 
when the Zulu were still confronting the Ndwandwe, or else 
soon after the Zulu victory over Zwide's forces, with Shaka 
now seeking to consolidate his hold on the Thukela valley 
as well as on the region north of the Black Mfolozi. In 
part, the Mkhize push across the Thukela was also a 
movement of colonization, for their forces occupied the 
territory of the Khabela, and there erected an umuzi, named 
kwaNyakenye, for Zihlandlo. 84 Further up the river they 
overcame the Phephetha, the Nxamalala, and the Zondi: 85 in 
82. On the Cube see HZ, pp. 49-50; OT, p. 415; on the 
Nyuswa, OT, p. 482; on the Bomvu, JSA, vol. 3, evidence of 
Mbokodo, p. 12; stuart, ed., uBaxoxele, pp. 187-9; Qr, pp. 
411-12, 519-20. 
83. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Ndabazezwe. p. 183; OT, pp. 
226-7. 
84. statement of Sibetshe in Shepstone's notes on Khabela 
history in Bird, ed.i Annals, vol. 1, p. 133 (the informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p. 109); OT, pp. 409, 511. On p. 511 of Olden Times Bryant 
correctly locates the kwaNyakenye umuzi in the Khabela 
country, which was in the vicinity of kwaNtunjambili 
(Kranskop) mountain. On pp. 513-14 he incorrectly locates 
it in the Phephetha country further north near Phisweni 
mountain. His error was based on a misreading of Isaacs: 
see Travels and Adventures, pp. 81-3. 
85. On the Phephetha see Mpengula Mbanda's statement in 
H. Callaway, The Religious System of the Amazulu, Cape 
Town, 1970 (reprint of 1st ed., Springvale, n.d.), p. 204; 
JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, pp. 10, 12, 18; OT, pp. 
513-14. On the Nxamalala see JSA, vol. 1, evidence of 
Khwili, p. 275; vol. 2, evidence of Mandlakazi, p. 175; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, pp. 7, 8-10. On the Zondi see 
JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, pp. 6, 12. 
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these cases the sources say nothing about occupation of 
territory. within a short time of their subordination to 
Shaka, the Mkhize dominated both sides of the Thukela 
valley from the region of the Mamba river up to the 
confluences of the Mzinyathi and the Mpofana. To the west 
they were coming up against Ngoza's expanding Thembu 
paramountcy, and to the south they were facing the 
relocated Chunu chiefdom. The third phase of their 
expansion saw Zihlandlo's authority extended southwards 
across the Mvoti: this will be discussed in the next 
section of the chapter. 
The evidence on the relationship between Zihlandlo and 
Shaka makes clear that the Mkhize chief's function in the 
Zulu scheme of things was to exercise authority over the 
southern borderlands of the Zulu sphere of influence, and 
to extract resources from his domain for the benefit of his 
overlords. Cattle obtained from his tributaries were 
forwarded to Shaka, who in turn made occasional 
presentations to Zihlandlo. 86 The region also supplied 
manpower to the Zulu. According to Nathaniel Isaacs, who 
met Zihlandlo in 1826 at Shaka's Dukuza umuzi and visited 
his country on two occasions, zihlandlo and others of 
Shaka's tributaries were required to accompany the Zulu 
chief to war,87 and Mbokodo indicates that Zihlandlo led a 
contingent in one of Shaka's fights against the Ndwandwe. 88 
The Zulu chief also took over holus bolus from him his 
Nguqa and Mpiyakhe amabutho, the latter of which was 
settled in the Zulu country.89 Isaacs records that Shaka 
had taken away all Zihlandlo's young warriors 'to complete 
his own regiments,.90 At another point he gives what is 
86. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mandlakazi, p. 175; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mbokodo, pp. 6, 13. 
87. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 78. 
88. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, p. 12. 
89. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, p. 53; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maquza, p. 237. 
90. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 83. 
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probably a more accurate description of the roles allotted 
to zihlandlo's men in the Zulu army: as amagwala, or 
'cowards' who had been subdued by the Zulu, they were not 
permitted to fight but were required to act as baggage-
carriers. 91 
Hamilton has argued that the Zulu had established a 
strong presence in Nyuswa country very early in Shaka's 
reign, even before the death of Dingiswayo.92 The 
evidence, however, is ambiguous, and it seems unlikely, 
given the weakness of the Zulu state at this time, that 
Shaka was able to station an ibutho in the region until 
later in his reign. But it is probable that Zihlandlo's 
operations in the Thukela valley were carried out under the 
supervision of Zulu izinduna,93 and Isaacs speaks of the 
contempt with which the Mkhize chief's people were regarded 
by their Zulu conquerors. 94 Nevertheless it is clear that 
Zihlandlo was able to rule his domain with a considerable 
degree of autonomy. To keep his loyalty, Shaka elevated 
him to the status of close political favourite, and allowed 
him what for a tributary were unusually wide powers, 
including the right to form his own amabutho, to keep his 
own isigodlo, and to exercise powers of life and death over 
his subordinates. 95 Bryant saw clearly that Zihlandlo had 
acted for Shaka in the role of 'trusty lieutenant', 'local 
91. Ibid., p. 78. 
92. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 370-1. 
93. See the anecdote in JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, 
pp. 8-10. The man named Manjanja whom Bryant gives as the 
leader of a force of Zulu marauders (OT, pp. 409, 491, 512, 
548, 550), may have been one of the izinduna appointed by 
Shaka to perform supervisory functions in the region. 
Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', Commission on Laws and 
Customs, vol. 2, p. 425, gives him as a 'Zulu officer' in 
charge of the Khabela chiefdom in the late 1830s. That he 
was an induna early in Shaka's reign is suggested in Fuze, 
Black People, p. 73. 
94. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 78, 90. 
95. Fuze, Black People, pp. 20, 58; JSA, vol. 2, evidence 
of Maziyana, p. 280; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, 
p. 15. 
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deputy', and 'a species of viceroy,.96 But because he was 
steeped in the conventional view of Shaka as the all-
powerful conqueror, and because of his failure to develop 
an adequate chronology of the emergence of the Zulu state, 
he was quite unable to appreciate the significance of the 
role played in its development by the Mkhize chiefdom. 
The immediate impact of the expansion of the Mkhize 
across the Thukela under Zulu aegis may have been little 
different from that of the Makhanya section of the Qwabe 
lower down the river at the beginning of the century, or, 
for that matter from that of the Thuli and Cele in the 
later 18th century. In the short term it entailed the same 
forcible subordination of groups south of the Thukela by 
conquerors from the north. Some defeated chiefs were put 
to death, numbers of people were displaced, and many cattle 
were seized. But the population was not 'massacred' or 
'driven out', and as Mkhize rule became a reality, and 
stability returned, homestead life and production were able 
to resume. The contrast with the impact of Ndwandwe 
expansion north of the Black Mfolozi at this time is 
striking. Where the Ndwandwe seem frequently to have aimed 
to eject or destroy defeated groups as an act of policy, 
the relatively weak and inchoate Zulu state was still 
seeking to incorporate them, however much it was concerned 
to reduce their status. 
But in the longer term the Mkhize expansion represented 
a new departure, for ,it entailed incorporation not simply 
into an enlarged nexus of chiefdoms, such as constituted 
the Qwabe, Thuli and Cele polities, but into an emerging if 
still loosely structured state system dominated by an 
increasingly closed Zulu elite. Tribute extracted from 
homesteads at the bottom of the political hierarchy more 
and more went to support not a reasonably accessible and at 
least partly accountable leadership but a socially and 
geographically remote aristocracy which to a greater extent 
96. HZ, p. 52; OT, pp. 409, 551. 
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maintained its dominance by force. The intrusion of the 
Mkhize into the mid-Thukela valley may have been less 
violent and disruptive than that of the Ngwane into the 
upper Thukela region, but it inaugurated the establishment, 
if in embryonic form, of a political order different in 
kind from any yet experienced south of the river. 
4. Upheavals in the midlands 
After the Zulu had defeated Zwide's forces and pushed the 
Ndwandwe ruling house across the Phongolo, their main 
concerns were to consolidate their hold on the core area of 
their polity about the White Mfolozi, and to secure the 
defence of ,their newly extended northern frontier region 
against the numerous dangers which threatened it from 
without. Far from being able to sweep forward to the 
Phongolo and Delagoa Bay, as the conventional view holds, 
they were hard-pressed to maintain their authority over 
powerful tributary chiefdoms like those of the Qwabe and 
Mthethwa, and to find the resources needed to defend the 
region north of the Black Mfolozi against possible raids 
from groups like the Khumalo, Ndwandwe, Dlamini, Gasa and 
Jele. 
The problems faced by the Zulu leaders on their southern 
borders were somewhat less pressing, although by means 
negligible. Their victory over the Ndwandwe had sent 
political shock waves throughout the region, and to some 
extent freed them to assert a more forceful presence in the 
Thukela and Mzinyathi valleys, but sUbstantial nodes of 
resistance to the extension of Zulu domination existed at 
certain points on this frontier. To the south-west, the 
newly relocated Thembu chiefdom of Ngoza, precariously 
poised between the Ngwane and the Zulu, was seeking to 
strengthen itself against its powerful neighbours. To the 
south, where the client Mkhize chiefdom was establishing 
control over the Thukela valley and beginning to expand 
towards the Mvoti, a confrontation with the displaced Chunu 
chiefdom was building up. To the south-east, the Cele and 
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Thuli chiefdoms posed no active threat to the Zulu state, 
but their existence as independent polities in close 
proximity to the still not properly subdued Qwabe chiefdom 
made the lower Thukela border potentially unstable. 
Zulu policy on the southern frontiers as it emerged in 
the early 1820s had two main aims: to eliminate real or 
potential threats to the stability of the region, and to 
set up more client chiefdoms which, like that of the 
Mkhize, would serve to maintain control over it and act as 
a first line of defence against external attacks. The 
sequence of developments cannot be determined with any 
certainty, but it is likely that one of the first steps 
taken by the Zulu leadership was to move against the 
expanding Thembu chiefdom beyond the lower Mzinyathi. 
There is some evidence that Shaka and his advisers first 
tried to secure Ngoza's voluntary submission,97 but, 
knowing full well what his fate was likely to be if he fell 
into Shaka's hands, the Thembu chief refused to make it, 
and instead set about preparing to meet the attack which 
was likely soon to follow. The extent to which Zulu 
resources were stretched at this time is indicated by the 
fact that when it came, the assault on the Thembu was 
apparently made by a single ibutho. 98 Far from proving 
invincible, as the stereotyped view describes them, Shaka's 
forces on this occasion were soundly defeated in a fight 
near the present-day village of Pomeroy. They managed, 
however, to make off with most of the Thembu cattle. 99 
Before this, Shaka might still have been prepared to accept 
the submission of the Thembu, but Ngoza's victory ensured 
that major retribution would follow. The Thembu did not 
have the power to withstand a Zulu attack in strength: the 
97. The anecdote recounted by Lugubhu in~, vol. 1, 
pp. 281-2, 284-5, admits of this interpretation. 
98. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, pp. 298-9. 
99. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 282, 285; vol. 1, 
evidence of Lunguza, pp. 298-9; Shepstone's notes on Thembu 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 144; ~, pp. 249-
50. 
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only course open to them was to take to flight. with the 
Ngwane chiefdom to the west, the Zulu to the east, and a 
country largely denuded of people and cattle to the north, 
they had no option but to head southwards. This was the 
direction which Ngoza took. with him went most of his 
Thembu adherents, and, of his tributaries, many Khuze and 
other Dlamini, the Mabaso, some Mbatha, and a section of 
the sithole. 100 A section of Nxamalala from the part of 
the Thukela valley which had already suffered raids from 
the Zulu and the Mkhize also threw in their lot with 
him. 101 Most of his Nhlangwini tributaries remained 
behind, as did the Dladla section of the Mbatha, a section 
of the Sithole, and some of the Thembu. 102 
After crossing the Thukela, Ngoza and his followers 
edged off to the south-west, possibly to avoid the Chunu in 
the upper Mvoti region. From the start their course was a 
violent one, for to recoup their losses in cattle they had 
little option but to seize livestock where they could, and 
to kill chiefs and people who sought to resist. But their 
passage was not marked by the general massacre of defeated 
groups which the stereotyped view posits. Not only did 
they not have the force to engage in such action, but, more 
pertinently, the exigencies of migration put a premium on 
the need for Ngoza to expand his fighting capacity as 
rapidly as possible by increasing the size of his 
following. Like the leaders of other migrant groups, he 
sought to break up the polities which he came up against so 
as to incorporate as many as possible of their component 
parts under his own leadership. 
100. Gayeni's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Khuze 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 143 (the informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 139): 
JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 292: OT, pp. 253, 351, 
369, 419: Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 
253. 
101. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 17. 
102. Shepstone's notes on Thembu history in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 144; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, 
p. 301; OT, pp. 253, 259, 351, 369; Hamilton, 'Ideology', 
unpubl. thesis, p. 253. 
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pushing their way relatively easily through the small 
chiefdoms of the lower Mpofana region,103 Ngoza and his 
party turned southwards towards the middle Mngeni valley 
north of present-day Pietermaritzburg. Here they met 
active opposition from the cluster of Wushe chiefdoms in 
the region, particularly from that headed by the paramount, 
Sondaba kaPhathwa. The upshot was the defeat of the Wushe 
and the absorption of Sondaba and his adherents into 
Ngoza's following. 104 There is some evidence to suggest 
that Ngoza went on to raid the chiefdoms of the upper 
Msunduze area,105 although it is possible that the source 
may be confusing these events with attacks made in the same 
region by Macingwane's Chunu either a little before or 
after the advent of the Thembu. According to Lugubhu's 
evidence, Ngoza then swung westward to the Nhlazane-Mpendle 
area, before again turning south and making his way through 
the Bulwer region and across the upper Mzimkhulu river. 106 
Here, on the margins of the Mpondo chiefdom's sphere of 
influence, like the Bhele, zizi and others before him, he 
ended his march and set about trying to reconsolidate his 
chiefdom. 
Evidence which allows these events to be tentatively 
dated to the very early 1820s was recorded by stuart from 
103. Magwaza's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Xesibe 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 135 (the informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 115); 
Thethwa's and Nyandeni's evidence in Shepstone's notes on 
Ncwabe history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 145 (the 
informants are identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p. 141); JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 286-7; vol. 
1, evidence of Lunguza, p. 299; OT, pp. 253-4. 
104. Thethwa's and Nyandeni's evidence in Shepstone's notes 
on Wushe history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 140, 141 
(the informants are identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 
89, pp. 128, 129, 132); JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, 
p. 287; vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, p. 299; OT, p. 256. 
105. Nyandeni's evidence in Shepstone's notes on the 
histories of the Nkabane and the Nqondo in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 146 (the informant is identified in T. 
Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 143, 144); OT, pp. 256-7. 
106. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 287. 
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Lunguza. The latter stated that he had been born at the 
time of the Thembu exodus to the south, that at the time of 
Shaka's death he had been a young boy capable of carrying 
babies pick-a-back, and that he had been present at the 
battle of the Ncome (Blood) river against the Boers as a 
member of an ibutho which was too young to be allowed to 
participate in the actual fighting. 107 The death of Shaka 
and the battle of the Ncome river are dated to 1828 and 
1838 respectively: on the basis of Lunguza's evidence, 
stuart calculated that he had been born in 1822 or 1823, an 
estimate which he subsequently revised to 1821 or 1822. 108 
Why the Thembu should suddenly have changed direction 
once they reached the mid-Mngeni-Msunduze region is 
something of a puzzle, for it involved making a sharp 
diversion from their previous line of march, and following 
a route which took them through more broken and difficult 
country than they would otherwise have traversed. The most 
likely explanation is that they were seeking to avoid a 
major political obstacle further to the south. A diversion 
to the east would have taken them into the sphere of 
infuence of the Thuli chiefdom; the line of least resist-
ance would have lain along the route which they in fact 
ended up taking. As to the identity of the barrier which 
they faced, the most likely candidate would have been the 
Chunu chiefdom, which had possibly preceded the Thembu to 
the southward. 
After the defeat and submission of the Qwabe by the 
Zulu, the Chunu had moved away across the Thukela to avoid 
a similar fate. Several pieces of evidence suggest that 
they did not in fact migrate all the way to the Mzimkhulu, 
as Bryant asserts,109 but rather to a locality not far 
removed from the Thukela valley. First, there is Bryant's 
statement that after the breakup of the Ngcobo chiefdom, 
107. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, pp. 307, 312-13, 
337. 
108. Ibid., pp. 307, 337. 
109. OT, pp. 267-70. 
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its Langeni section had sought refuge with the Bomvu, and 
then, a little while later, with the Chunu, who, some time 
before, 'had gone down south,.110 It is difficult to 
conceive that a small group like the Langeni would 
seriously have contemplated making its way through 
potentially hostile chiefdoms over a distance of nearly 200 
kilometres to the Mzimkhulu. More likely is that 'south' 
in this instance meant a region much closer to hand, 
probably, as suggested above, that of the upper Mvoti. 
Second is Mbokodo's statement that after participating 
in a Zulu victory over Ndwandwe forces led by Sikhunyana 
kaZwide, Zihlandlo of the Mkhize had made an attack on 
Macingwane's Chunu. 111 Sikhunyana is known to have been 
defeated by the Zulu in 1826,112 but as this was long after 
the destruction of the Chunu chiefdom and the death of 
Macingwane, it is very likely that the informant is 
confusing this defeat with Zwide's defeat at the hands of 
the Zulu in the late 1810s. By the time of this event, the 
Chunu had already migrated across the Thukela but not, it 
is here contended, as far as the Mzimkhulu, for it seems 
highly unlikely that Zihlandlo would have had the capacity , 
to mount a long-distance expedition over such a distance. 
More likely is that the attack referred to by Mbokodo took 
place when the Chunu were still in the region of the Mvoti. 
Third is another statement of Mbokodo's to the effect 
that when a section of the Mkhize was making an attack on 
the Phephetha chiefd~m, Zihlandlo's home district had been 
raided by a force of Chunu. 113 This incident could 
conceivably have taken place in the period before the 
expansion of the Zulu, when the Chunu were still on the 
upper Nsuze. It seems more likely, though, that the attack 
referred to on the Phephetha was the one already referred 
110. Ibid., pp. 483-4. 
111. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, p. 12. 
112. Fynn, Diary, pp. 122-9; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, pp. 60, 65, 71-2. 
113. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, p. 18. 
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to which took place after the submission of the Mkhize to 
Shaka (p. 234), when the Mkhize were expanding across the 
Thukela at his behest. By this time the Chunu had already 
made their move over the Thukela. It seems unlikely that 
they would have launched an attack against the Mkhize all 
the way from the Mzimkhulu region: if, on the other hand, 
they had been in the Mvoti area, they would have been well 
placed to make the attack which Mbokodo mentions. 
Fourth is Lugubhu's evidence on the nature of relations 
between the Chunu and the Thembu at the time of the Zulu 
attack on the latter. The Thembu apparently made a plea to 
the Chunu for assistance,114 something which is hardly 
likely to have happened if the Chunu had been 200 
kilometres away at the Mzimkhulu rather than perhaps 70 
kilometres away at the Mvoti. Lugubhu goes on to recount 
that instead of sending help the Chunu ran away, and that 
the event was remembered in a song sung by the Thembu which 
went: 
sasingasho ini ukuth' amaChun' ayizinja? 
Babalekile, zinyane lendlovu. 
Did we not say that the Chunu were dO~s? 
They ran away, child of the elephant. 15 
Lugubhu was a close associate of the Thembu chiefly 
house,116 and his interpretation of events of a century 
earlier needs to be treated with caution. However, the 
circumstantial detail of his anecdote reinforces the notion 
that at the time of the Zulu attack on the Thembu, the 
Chunu were not far south of the Thukela. 
Fifth is Lunguza's statement that the Chunu actually 
joined the Thembu on their flight to the south.117 One 
does not have to take this statement literally to note the 
114. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 282, 285. 
115. JSA, vol. 1, pp. 285-6; stuart, ed., uHlangakula, 
p. 10. The Zulu orthography has been modernized. 
116. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 281. 
117. Ibid., evidence of Lunguza, pp. 307-8. 
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implication that when the migration of the Thembu from the 
Thukela began, the Chunu must have been in the general 
vicinity rather than away on the Mzimkhulu. In the Mvoti 
region the Chunu would for some time have been coming under 
pressure from the expanding Mkhize chiefdom. In these 
circumstances, the Zulu attack on the Thembu, even though 
it ended in failure, was probably all that was needed to 
set the Chunu in motion once more. Sooner or later, it was 
clear, they would face a similar onslaught. Short of 
submitting to Shaka or Zihlandlo, there was no option but 
to take to flight to the southward. It is impossible to 
tell from the available evidence whether they began the 
next stage of their migration before or after the Thembu: 
all that can be said is that the two movements seem to have 
taken place at much the same period. 
Like the passage of the Thembu, that of the Chunu was 
marked by a considerable degree of violence. Though they 
retained their cohesion, the forces which threatened their 
survival as a group were much greater than they had been at 
the time of their previous move. Behind them were the 
Mkhize, backed by the power of the expanding Zulu state. 
To the east of their line of advance were the Cele and 
Thuli chiefdoms. Somewhere near at hand were the Thembu, 
who were in competition for the same resources of cattle 
and manpower. The first SUbstantial resistance faced by 
the Chunu as they moved south may have come from the Zelemu 
under Madikane who lived in the Mngeni valley below the 
related Wushe. Several sources state that this group was 
pushed or carried southwards by the impetus of the 
Chunu. 118 After raiding cattle and possibly absorbing more 
adherents in the Msunduze valley,119 Macingwane's party 
pushed on to the south-west, breaking up a number of small 
118. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, p. 60; vol. 2, 
evidence of Magidigidi, p. 85; OT, pp. 268, 374. 
119. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, p. 119; vol. 4, 
evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, pp. 23-4. 
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chiefdoms as they went. 120 In the country between the 
Mkhomazi and the Mzimkhulu they came to a halt. Here, some 
150 kilometres from the Mvoti, the Chunu leaders seem to 
have felt that they were safely out of the way of the Zulu. 
Before them lay the Mpondo sphere of influence, the 
northern marches of which were becoming the scene of rising 
conflict as intruding groups from the north like the Bhele 
and zizi struggled to establish themselves. Rather than 
pushing forward, the Chunu leaders preferred to remain 
north of the Mzimkhulu, where they set about reconstituting 
their chiefdom. 121 
Much of Macingwane's following by now probably consisted 
of groups and individuals displaced from the midlands by 
the flight of the Chunu. More no doubt came to seek 
protection from the Thembu and other groups in the troubled 
region across the Mzimkhulu. still more, like some of the 
Dlanyoka,122 came from the coastal regions where, not long 
after the relocation of the Chunu, Zulu forces were raiding 
cattle, breaking up existing chiefdoms, and establishing a 
Zulu presence (see below, p. 265). The Chunu chief may 
also have received the formal allegiance of Madikane, whose 
Zelemu following had by now been joined by numbers of Wushe 
displaced by the Thembu. 123 These groups formed the core 
of what later came to be the Bhaca chiefdom. 124 By this 
time Madikane and his following had moved to the region of 
the Mzimkhulu, where, according to Shepstone's informant, 
Nombiba, th~y were 'to some extent under Macingwane,.125 
120. Shepstone's unattributed notes on the histories of the 
Khalalo, Ntambo, Yobeni, Nomabhunga, Cekwana and Shwawu in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 147, 148; OT, pp. 268-70. 
121. OT, pp. 269, 270; JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana 
kaYenge, p. 24. 
122. OT, pp. 555, 561. 
123. HZ, p. 45. 
124. OT, pp. 154, 352, 380, 398. 
125. Shepstone's notes on Bhaca history in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 136. The informant is identified in 
T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 119. 
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Evidence broadly in support of this statement comes from 
one of stuart's informants, Mahaya kaNongqabana, who 
describes the Chunu and Bhaca as having been in league 
against a common enemy on at least two occasions. 126 With 
additions of this sort, Macingwane's re-established 
chiefdom was on the way to becoming a major new power in 
the Mkhomazi-Mzimkhulu region. Its sphere of influence 
extended southwards across the Mzimkhulu, northwards 
towards the Mngeni, and north-east to the marches of the 
Thuli chiefdom. 
The migrations of the Thembu and the Chunu left 
something of a political vacuum in the region about the 
mid-Thukela valley. The Zulu moved rapidly to fill it 
through the agency of two client chiefdoms, one already in 
existence and the other newly established. Later events 
indicate that from its recently established foothold south 
of the Thukela, the Mkhize chiefdom was encouraged to 
expand south-west towards the upper Mvoti into the area 
vacated by the Chunu (see below, pp. 251-2). At the same 
time, the Zulu were setting up a new satellite polity in 
the lower Mzinyathi region. After the defeat of the Zulu 
forces by the Thembu, ·and the flight of Ngoza and his 
party, the Zulu had sent another ibutho to assert control 
of the area. 127 Its main task seems to have been to set up 
the client chief chosen by Shaka to exercise authority for 
him in the region. This was Jobe kaMaphitha, chief of the 
section of the sithole which had remained behind when his 
overlord, Ngoza, had taken to flight. It is highly likely 
that, as Hamilton argues, Jobe had conspired with Shaka 
against Ngoza: his reward was to be given charge of the 
territory on either side of the lower Mzinyathi previously 
dominated by the Thembu. 128 Under him he had his own 
126. JSA, vol. 2, pp. 113, 118, 119. 
127. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, p. 299. 
128. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 253-4, 255; 
Shepstone's notes on Thembu history in Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, p. 144; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, 301; OT, 
p. 259. 
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Sithole following, expanded by defections from other 
sithole groups, and the Thembu who had remained in the 
region. 129 In addition, numbers of remaining Mbatha, Khuze 
and other Dlamini probably gave him their allegiance. 
Bryant and, independently, Hamilton suggest that Jobe 
himself was placed in the territory to the west of the 
Mzinyathi river, where, in Bryant's words, he was required 
to act as 'warden of the marches,.130 Lunguza's first-hand 
evidence makes clear, however, that the sithole chief was 
located by Shaka to the east of the river, and that it was 
not until Dingane's reign that he was sent in person to 
occupy the country across the Mzinyathi. 131 Nevertheless, 
it is likely that in Shaka's reign his authority extended a 
good distance across the river into the country previously 
dominated by Ngoza. 
Like Zihlandlo of the Mkhize, Jobe was given a good deal 
of autonomy by Shaka, to the extent of being allowed to put 
people to death. 132 Lunguza's statement that Shaka held 
only one call-up of men for his amabutho among Jobe's 
people suggests that the Sithole chief was permitted to 
exercise a greater degree of authority in the territory 
under his control than were chiefs in the core region of 
the Zulu state. 133 Unlike Zihlandlo, however, who was 
chief of the Mkhize by inherited right and not by 
appointment, Jobe had no wide power base among his own 
people. As Hamilton points out, he was directly dependent 
for his position on the good graces of Shaka, to whom he 
had a highly personal loyalty.134 
129. Fuze, Black People, p. 21; OT, pp. 259-60. 
130. OT, p. 259; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 255-6. 
131. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, pp. 301, 322, 334, 
336. 
132. Ibid., p. 331. 
133. Ibid., pp. 302, 308. 
134. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 255, 256. 
See also Lunguza's evidence in JSA, vol. 1, p. 332. 
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The extension of Zulu rule by proxy into the region 
about the lower Mzinyathi was probably a key factor in 
stimulating the exodus of what were by now the only 
chiefdoms of any size remaining in the valley of the middle 
Thukela and its tributaries: that of the Memela under 
Mdingi kaLanga, and those of the Nhlangwini under Baleni 
kaNongcama and Nombewu kaGasa. Under increasing pressure 
from the Ngwane to the west and the sithole to the east, 
they had the option of submitting to one or the other, or 
else of moving away. In the event they chose the latter 
course, and made off, apparently together, to the south. In 
the course of their migration they became the core group of 
what Shepstone and Bryant termed a 'confederacy' of migrant 
chiefdoms. 
The contradictions in Shepstone's and Bryant's accounts 
over the issue of whether the flight of this group took 
place before or after the migrations of the Thembu and 
Chunu have been discussed in chapter 3 (pp. 108-9, 143 ff). 
The only other attributable statement bearing on this issue 
which has been found in the sources is Mqayikana's 
statement that the 'confederacy', as stuart also calls it, 
had been formed 'two, three or more years after the flight 
of the Chunu and Thembu. 135 This statement may well have 
been influenced by stuart's comments to the informant about 
Shepstone's and Bryant's versions, and in any case by 
itself would not constitute sufficient evidence to prove 
the point. But it is very unlikely that the migration of 
the relatively small Nhlangwini and Memela groups could 
have taken place before the much larger Thembu and Chunu 
parties had proceeded southward and in the process broken 
up many of the polities which lay between the mid-Thukela 
and the mid-Mzimkhulu. 
The notion of the 'confederacy' which appears in the 
works of Shepstone and Bryant was based on the evidence 
given to the former by a single informant, Nombiba. He 
135. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 23. 
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described it as having comprised Bhele (i.e. Memela), 
Nhlangwini, Dunge, Nyamvini, Fuze, and Gwenyane/Bombo 
groups (see p. 127 above). The only supporting statement 
comes from Mqayikana, who stated that the confederacy had 
consisted of the Memela, the Nhlangwini and a section of 
his own Mpumuza people. 136 These latter groups were all 
from the mid-Thukela region, while the others named by 
Nombiba were from the upper and mid-Mvoti. It is quite 
possible that, under the increasing pressure which they 
were experiencing from th~ Mkhize chiefdom to the north, 
sections of these and other Mvoti chiefdoms joined 
themselves to the Nhlangwini-Memela group as it moved 
south. The combined party is unlikely, though, to have 
constituted what the three writers - Shepstone, Bryant and 
stuart - all termed a confederacy. The term implies an 
alliance of equals, whereas the various groups which joined 
with the Nhlangwini and Memela almost certainly did so by 
formally khonzaing a recognized leader. Of the two 
Nhlangwini chiefs, Nombewu was genealogically the 
senior,137 and it is possible that either he or Mdingi was 
nominally the leader of what was not simply a temporary 
alliance but a loose paramountcy in the making. 
In the mid-Mngeni region, the route taken by this party 
converged with those followed by the Thembu and the Chunu. 
Here the Nhlangwini, Memela and their tributaries are said 
to have attacked and defeated the Zelemu-Wushe under 
Madikane,138 an event which may have been decisive in 
influencing the latter to make off for the Mzimkhulu 
region, where, as previously described, they joined with 
the Chunu. From the mid-Mngeni, the Nhlangwini-Memela 
136. Ibid., pp. 9, 22-3. 
137. OT, pp. 367, 368. 
138. Nombiba's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Nyamvini 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 131-2 (the 
informant is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol 89, 
p. 105); JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, pp. 1, 
6, 8, 10, 22; Scully, 'Fragments: the Amabaca', The State, 
vol. 1 (1909), p. 674. 
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party seems to have followed a route which took them 
slightly to the east of the line previously taken by the 
Chunu, through the western fringes of the Thuli sphere of 
influence. On the way they raided and broke up a nUmber of 
small chiefdoms. 139 Their migration ended in the 
Mzimkhulu-Mzimvubu region,140 where they became one of the 
by now numerous groups which were struggling to 
reconstitute themselves as coherent polities and to survive 
in what was becoming an arena of rapidly mounting conflict. 
By this stage the Nhlangwini and Memela seem to have 
shed many of the smaller groups which had initially joined 
them in their migration. The Dunge, the Nyamvini and the 
Gwenyane/Bombo are said to have returned to their 
territories in the vicinity of the Mvoti,141 while the 
Mpumuza were driven out of the Mzimkhulu region by the 
Mpondo and eventually became fugitives in the forests of 
the Karkloof area. 142 All these groups thus ended up in a 
region which was being brought under the sway of 
Zihlandlo's Mkhize chiefdom. The geographical location of 
this polity made it the destination of numbers of people 
who were seeking to escape from the upheavals that were 
taking place in the areas to the south. 
At the same time Zihlandlo was actively expanding 
southwards from the bushveld of the deeply incised Thukela 
valley into the high grasslands of the Mvoti region. He 
received the submission of the Nyamvini of the middle Mvoti 
valley, and, further upstream, attacked and dispersed the 
139. Shepstone's notes on the histories of the Njilo, 
Cindaneni, Ntshele and Shangase in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 
1, pp. 146, 147, 149. The only informant identified is 
Nombiba for the Njilo history: see T. Shepstone Papers, 
vol. 89, p. 145. 
140. Gardiner, Narrative, pp. 276, 312; OT, pp. 380, 382-3. 
141. Evidence of Nombiba and Funwayo in Shepstone's notes 
on the histories of the Nyamvini and Dunge in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, pp. 131, 132. (The informants are 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 105, 106. 
142. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 23. 
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Dunge, some of whom khonza'd to him. 143 A number of other 
groups in the region - the Fuze, the Xesibe, the 
, Gwenyane/Bombo - are said to have been driven away by Zulu 
raiding parties. 144 In some cases the raiders may actually 
have been Zulu; in others they may well have been 
Zihlandlo's forces. Either way, the territories and the 
remaining inhabitants of the groups concerned would have 
been brought under the authority of the Mkhize chief. He 
also received the submission of two groups of Nyavu (or 
Nyavini: not to be confused with the Nyamvini of the Mvoti 
region) and a group of related Njilo which had abandoned 
their territories on the Mngeni. 145 He is said to have 
raided other groups beyond what is now Pietermaritzburg. 146 
By the mid-1820s the Mkhize exercised direct authority over 
a territory that probably extended south of the Mvoti, and 
dominated an area that reached to the Mngeni and beyond. 
5. The intrusion of the Zulu into the coastal regions 
The defeat and subordination of the Qwabe chiefdom by the 
Zulu suddenly and dramatically brought the conflicts which 
for some years had been building up about the mid-White 
Mfolozi to the doorstep of the chiefdoms south of the lower 
143. Evidence of Nombiba and Funwayo in Shepstone's notes 
on histories of the Nyamvini and Dunge in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 132i JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dabula, p. 
88. 
144. Evidence of Magwaza in Shepstone's notes on the 
histories of the Xesibe and Fuze, and of Nombiba in his 
notes on the history of the Gwenyane in Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, pp. 135, 136 (the informants are identified in T. 
Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 115, 116, 117); Fuze, Black 
People, p. 73; OT, pp. 254, 491-2, 507-8, 552-3. 
145. Evidence of Nombiba in Shepstone's notes on the 
histories of these chiefdoms in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, 
pp. 137-9, 146 (the informant is identified in T. Shepstone 
Papers, vol. 89, pp. 125, 145); OT, pp. 410, 559. 
146. Evidence of Nombiba in Shepstone's notes on history of 
the Njilo in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 146 (the 
informant is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 
145); JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo. pp. 13, 14-15; OT, 
p. 378. 
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Thukela. Though they had for several decades lived in the 
shadow of the much larger and more powerful Qwabe polity, 
these chiefdoms had to some extent been shielded by its 
presence from the direct impact of the struggles which were 
developing further to the north. The collapse of Qwabe 
independence opened the way for the extension of Zulu 
domination south of the river. 
The incorporation of the Qwabe chiefdom into the Zulu 
state posed a frontier problem for the Zulu leaders of a 
kind which they did not have to face to the same extent on 
any of their other borders. As has been argued in the 
previous chapter, the nature of the military and economic 
crisis which faced the Zulu leaders after the defeat of the 
Mthethwa by the Ndwandwe had made the full incorporation of 
the Qwabe into the group of chiefdoms which constituted the 
core of the emerging Zulu state a matter of urgent 
political necessity. The Qwabe chiefdom, though, lay on 
the south-eastern margins of Zulu-dominated territory. The 
Zulu leaders thus had to deal with the peculiar problems of 
trying to integrate into the political and social centre of 
the state a conquered group which was located on its 
geographical periphery, and in which resistance to Zulu 
rule ran deep. Whatever the degree of favouritism shown by 
Shaka to the party under Nqetho which he had installed as 
the powerholding group in Qwabe society, many Qwabe 
resented Zulu domination. For disaffected groups, taking 
to flight across the ,Thukela was a feasible option so long 
as this distant frontier remained uncontrolled by the Zulu 
power. If the Zulu leaders were to prevent resources of 
Qwabe manpower and cattle from haemorrhaging away 
southward, the establishment of a strong Zulu or Zulu-
linked presence on the lower Thukela was essential. 
Soon after the defeat of the Ndwandwe, Shaka moved to 
extend his authority over the chiefdoms of the coastal 
region south of the Thukela. His strategy was the same as 
the one which he was successfully employing to take control 
of the mid-Thukela valley: to set up and provide support 
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for a client chief who was allowed a comparatively large 
degree of regional authority in return for continued 
loyalty to the person of the Zulu monarch. The prime 
target of his attentions was the Cele chiefdom under 
Dibandlela. 
There is no clear evidence as to how long it was after 
the subordination of the Qwabe before the Zulu moved 
against the Cele and their neighbouring chiefdoms. That 
they were unable to do so until after the withdrawal 
northward of the Ndwandwe is suggested by evidence that 
Shaka himself accompanied the force which he sent into the 
Cele country, something which he would never have dared to 
do while the Zulu faced attack by Zwide's forces. Both 
Dinya kaZokozwayo and Melaphi kaMagaye stated to stuart 
that Shaka had crossed the Thukela in person. 147 That 
Dinya, at least, was not reproducing a mythologized 
tradition is indicated by his evidence that one of his 
informants had been present at a council of local chiefs 
held by Shaka on this occasion. 148 
Shaka's proceedings in the Cele country are recorded in 
some detail in four separate published accounts. 149 
Hamilton has interpreted the evidence to indicate that the 
threat of an impending Zulu attack caused a split in the 
Cele ruling group, with the chief, Dibandlela, advocating 
submission to the Zulu, and an opposition group, led by one 
of his sons, Mande, favouring a policy of resistance. As 
support for Mande increased, Dibandlela responded by . 
'fetching back' another son, Magaye, from where he had been 
living among the Qwabe, his mother's people, and nominating 
him as his successor. What had originally been a dispute 
147. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 115-16; vol. 3, 
evidence of Melaphi, pp. 78-9. 
148. JSA, vol. 1, p. 115. 
149. Shepstone's unattributed notes on Cele history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 124-5; JSA, vol. 1, evidence 
of Dinya, pp. 115-17; vol. 2, evidence of Mageza 
kaKwefunga, pp. 71-2; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, 
pp. 77-9. 
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over the appropriate response to the Zulu threat thus 
resolved itself into a" struggle over the succession, a 
struggle which ended only when Shaka intervened on the side 
of Magaye and put Mande to death. 150 
The interpretation favoured in the present study puts 
the emphases somewhat differently. Melaphi states that the 
struggle between Magaye and Mande had begun some years 
before the advent of the Zulu. 151 On this evidence it 
would seem to have been a classic 'succession' dispute, 
even if a particularly prolonged and bitter one, with a 
faction of subordinate chiefs espousing the claims of a 
rival to the ruling chief's designated heir in order to try 
to weaken the powers of the chiefship. Hamilton casts 
doubt on the validity of the tradition that Magaye had 
early on been designated as Dibandlela's successor,152 and 
points out that stories about 'fetching back' an heir 
constitute a device often used in oral tradition to lend 
legitimacy to a particular cause. 153 Admittedly the 
informants Mageza and Melaphi were both 'interested' 
parties, in that the former was an adherent of a chief 
descended from Magaye, and Melaphi was himself a son of 
Magaye. 154 Both might well have been inclined to depict 
Magaye as having been the legitimate heir even if this had 
not been the case. But against these considerations must 
be set the evidence from three sources that Magaye's mother 
was a daughter of the Qwabe paramount chief, Khondlo,155 
and thus of very high rank. It is more than likely that, in 
accordance with common'practice, Dibandlela and his 
150. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 469-71. 
151. JSA, vol. 3, p. 78. 
152. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 470. 
153. Hamilton, 'The amaLala in Natal', unpubl. paper, 
p. 18. 
154. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 69; 
vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, pp. 74, 93. 
155. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of uinya, pp. 97, 115, 119; 
vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 74; vol. 4, evidence of 
Mtshebhwe, p. 159. 
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advisers had publicly chosen her in advance as the wife who 
would produce the heir. Dinya stated as much in his 
evidence to stuart. 156 
Over and above this is Dinya's statement that Magaye's 
mother was a full sister to Nqetho,157 who, as described 
above, had been elevated by Shaka to the chiefship of the 
Qwabe on the death of Phakathwayo. The closeness of the 
relationship which ideally was supposed to exist in the 
societies of south-eastern Africa between a man and his 
mother's brothers is attested by ethnographers,158 and it 
is likely that, growing up as he apparently did among the 
Qwabe,159 Magaye would early on have come to the notice of 
Nqetho as a future chief whom it would be politic to take 
under his wing. When Nqetho became chief of the Qwabe, 
. , , 
Magaye may already have been one of h1S proteges. If so, 
it would have been an astute move on Shaka's part to 
espouse Magaye's claim to the Cele chiefship. The act 
would have been seen as an indication of his support for 
Nqetho, while at the same time it brought Magaye under his 
own patronage. The question of the Cele succession may 
thus have been decided by pre-arrangement well before 
Shaka's public intervention in the dispute. 
What precisely it was that precipitated the Zulu 
chief's move south is not recorded, but in the event he 
took advantage of the virtual civil war conditions which 
existed in the Cele chiefdom to invade it with the 
iziYendane ibutho. 160 He met with no resistance, and, the 
better to present him~elf as mediator rather than 
conqueror, he summoned the leaders of the warring parties, 
together with a number of chiefs from within the Cele 
156. JSA, vol. 1, p. 115. 
157. JSA, vol. 1, pp. 97, 105. 
158. Krige, Social System, pp. 26, 98. 
159. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 115; vol. 2, 
evidence of Mageza kwaKwefunga, p. 71; vol. 3, evidence of 
Melaphi, p. 77. 
160. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 79. 
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sphere of influence, to discuss the succession issue. 161 
The outcome was a foregone conclusion: Magaye was 
recognized as Dibandlela's heir, and, with his father 
either already dead or else too old to take an active part 
in affairs,162 effectively became ruler of the Cele. Most 
sources indicate that either then or a short while later 
Mande was put to death by Shaka, although Bryant states 
that he escaped, and survived into the reign of Dingane. 163 
Like Jobe of the Sithole, Magaye was brought to power by 
dint of Zulu intervention, but, unlike Jobe and like 
Zihlandlo of the Mkhize, his authority also rested on the 
legitimacy of his claim to the chiefship. Again like 
Zihlandlo, he had a close personal relationship with Shaka, 
by whom he was addressed as umnawe (younger brother) .164 
He seems to have been allowed to exercise certain powers of 
life and death over the people subject to him,165 and was 
permitted to retain control over his own fighting men. The 
names of six of his amabutho are known,166 and while it is 
not entirely clear on what basis they were formed, 
Melaphi's reference to the 'young iNjanduna regiment' 
suggests that they were organized at least in part by 
age. 167 
Magaye was expected to exercise authority on Shaka's 
behalf over a number of neighbouring chiefdoms which were 
161. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 115-16. 
162. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 115; vol. 2, 
evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 72; vol. 3, evidence of 
Melaphi, p. 93. 
163. Shepstone's notes on Cele history in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 125i JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 
116i vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga, p. 72i vol. 3, 
evidence of Melaphi, p. 79i OT, pp. 539-41. 
164. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 117: vol. 2, 
evidence of Mandlakazi, p. 192i vol. 2, evidence of Maquza, 
p. 237: vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, pp. 72, 79, 89: 
vol. 4, evic~nce of Mtshebhwe, pp. 158-9. 
165. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 117. 
166. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza kaKwefunga,p. 73: 
vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 75. 
167. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 92. 
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subdued, presumably by the iziYendane, at much the same 
time as the Cele. To the north, between the Cele and the 
Qwabe, were the Makhanya under Duze kaMnengwa. While the 
chief's fate is uncertain, his people submitted to Shaka, 
who placed them under the rule of Magaye. 168 Inland of the 
Cele in the Mvoti valley were the Somi. On the advent of 
the iziYendane they attempted to escape to the south, but 
were overtaken, and numbers of them were killed. Some 
survivors fled to the Mkhize chiefdom; others returned with 
their chief to submit to Shaka, who is said to have given 
him cattle with which to ~e-establish himself. 169 Like 
the Somi, the neighbouring Nganga also fled south, leaving 
most of their cattle to their conquerors. Some went off to 
join the Thembu under Ngoza south of the Mzimkhulu; others 
returned with their chief and gave their allegiance to 
Shaka. 170 Following Lewis Grout, Bryant states that 
numbers of their young men were taken off as 'captives' to 
be drafted into the Zulu forces. 171 
Further up the Mvoti, the Maphumulo submitted to Shaka's 
forces, who again took off cattle and young men. 172 The 
168. Shepstone's unattributed notes on Makhanya history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 152; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of 
Dinya, p. 116; vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 186; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maquza, p. 237; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, 
pp. 295-6; vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, pp. 26, 31, 35. 
169. Shepstone's unattributed notes on Somi history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 128; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of 
Maziyana, p. 296; OT, pp. 535-6. 
170. Evidence of Mnguni in Shepstone's notes on Nganga 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 130 (the informant 
is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 103); 
Shepstone's unattributed notes on Phemvu history in Bird, 
ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 152; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of 
Baleka, p. 11; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 296. 
171. Lewis Grout's evidence on Nganga history in his 
statement to the Harding Commission, published in Natal 
Govt. Gazette, no. 215, 18 January 1853; OT, p. 545. 
172. Grout's evidence on Maphumulo history, NGG, no. 215, 
18 Jan. 1853.; Shepstone's unattributed notes on Maphumulo 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p 149; JSA, vol. 1, 
evidence of Baleka, p. 11; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 
296; OT, p. 530. 
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Seleku section of the Maphumulo went off to the 
southward,173 while some sections of the related Hlongwa 
and Shinga (or Ndelu) did the same. 174 Other groups said 
to have broken up by the 'Zulu' in the Mvoti region are the 
Bane, the Nzobe and the Tshibi. 175 The iziYendane do not 
seem to have penetrated inland of the Maphumulo territory, 
for further to the west the country was being brought under 
the domination of the Mkhize. On the south-western and 
southern borders of the Cele chiefdom, the iziYendane 
raided a number of other small groups, most of which had 
probably been under the suzerainty of Dibandlela. Among 
them were the Hloko, or Nhloko, the Nkulwini, the Lumba, or 
Lumbi, the Ndwayana, and a section of the Ndlovini. Some 
sections of these chiefdoms fled; others were brought under 
the rule of Magaye. 176 
ultimately the territory controlled by the Cele chief 
extended from the Thukela to the vicinity of the 
Thongati,177 and from the sea inland for forty or fifty 
173. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 187; OT, p. 531. 
174. Grout's evidence on histories of the Hlala, Langa, 
Luleka, Ndelu, and ekuNene, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853; 
Funwayo's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Hlongwa history 
in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 127, 131 (the informant 
is identified in Bird, p. 128); OT, pp. 525, 532. 
175. Grout's evidence, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853. 
176. Grout's evidence on the histories of the Hloko, 
Nkulwini, and Ndwayana, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853; 
Nombiba's ~vidence i~ Shepstone's notes on Nkulwini history 
in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 140 (the informant is 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 130); 
Shepstone's unattributed notes on the histories of the 
Lumbi and Ndlovini in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 129; 
JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 296; vol. 3, 
evidence of Melaphi, pp. 79, 81; OT, p. 554. 
177. The southernmost outposts of the Cele chiefdom in 1824 
seem to have been on the Thongati: see Fynn, Diary, p. 63; 
Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 32. These outposts were 
in the charge of a chief whom Isaacs names as 'osingale'. 
Bryant, OT, p. 536, identifies him as Singila of the Somi 
people. Much more likely is that he was the person named 
Sinqila whom Dinya (JSA, vol. 1, p. 96), Maquza (JSA, 
vol. 2, p. 233), and Melaphi (JSA, vol. 3, p. 93) identify 
as either a son or a close relative of the Cele chief 
Magaye. 
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kilometres. His capital, eMdlazi, was situated near the 
Mhlali river. 178 To oversee Zulu interests in the region, 
Shaka appointed Mbikwana, a senior member of the Langeni 
chiefly house and a close relative of the Zulu chief on his 
mother's side. In 1824, when Fynn encountered him, he was 
living some fifteen kilometres north of the Thongati, and 
wielded considerable influence in the eele chiefdom. 179 
Unlike Zihlandlo and Jobe, the other two satellite chiefs 
set up by Shaka on the southern borders of the Zulu state, 
Magaye had a Zulu ibutho quartered in his territory. This 
was the iziYendane, which, once its initial raiding 
operations were over, was established in an ikhanda named 
eziYendaneni near the Mvoti river under the command of 
Nonzama. 180 
It is significant that this unit was not one of the 
'main line', partially age-based amabutho whose members 
were drawn from the core chiefdoms of the Zulu state. It 
was composed of men from the large group of Hlubi and 
related peoples which had sought protection from the Zulu 
after the Ngwane incursion. 181 For Shaka to have placed 
one of the newly formed amabutho from the Zulu heartland 
into this remote outpost would have short-circuited the 
urgent efforts which the Zulu leadership was then making to 
178. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mageza, p. 73; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maquza, p. 235; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, 
p. 75. 
179. Fynn, Diary, pp. 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72. Bryant, OT, 
p. 569, gives Mbikwana as an Mthethwa, but four of stuart's 
informants give him as of the Langeni: see JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Mayinga, p. 247; vol. 3, evidence of Mmemi, p. 
268; vol. 3, evidence of Mkhando, p. 159; vol. 4, evidence 
of Ndlovu, pp. 203, 216, 224, 225, 226, 230. Fynn, Diary, 
p. 65, gives Shaka as the nephew of Mbikwana, which is 
consistent with the evidence of stuart's informants. 
180. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 103; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 296; vol. 2, evidence of 
Socwatsha, p. 296; vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 45. 
181. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mabhonsa, pp. 13-14, 20; vol. 
2, evidence of Magidigidi, p. 96; vol. 2, evidence of 
Maziyana, pp. 277, 296. 
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foster their cohesion and their loyalty to the Zulu chiefly 
house. 182 From both a political and a military 
perspective, it made better sense at this time where 
possible to turn men from one periphery of the Zulu state 
against the inhabitants of another. 
The functions of the iziYendane seem to have been to 
raid cattle from the chiefdoms which still survived in the 
regions to the south and south-west of Cele territory, 
perhaps to stiffen Magaye's authority as he sought to 
consolidate his newly won position as paramount chief, and 
to defend this far-flung corner of the Zulu domain against 
outsiders. Where, further inland, the Sithole and Mkhize 
satellite chiefdoms both bordered on regions where 
political organization had been disrupted or destroyed by 
the migrations of the Ngwane, Bhele, Thembu, Chunu and 
other groups, the Cele polity had as its southern neighbour 
the large Thuli chiefdom. 
There is no way of telling whether Shaka had in mind 
even before the Zulu subordination of the Cele the 
extension of his suzerainty still further to the south. 
But once the Cele chiefdom had been brought under his 
authority the days of Thuli independence were numbered, for 
it was unlikely that the Zulu leaders would long tolerate 
the existence of an autonomous and relatively strong polity 
on the edges of their sphere of influence. By contrast 
with the Cele case, there is very little evidence on the 
fate of the Thuli at the hands of the Zulu state. This is 
partly because the chief house under Ntaba was so 
thoroughly broken up that much of its history was lost to 
record, and also because, in the colonial period, the Natal 
administration seems to have followed a policy of favouring 
the interests of the subsidiary section under the 
182. Much the best existing analysis of Shaka's reorgan-
ization of the amabutho system in the early years of his 
reign is that in Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 
335-50. 
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descendants of Mabona (Manti).183 Bryant's account of 
Thuli history in the early 19th century is notably thin, 
and stuart's two main informants on the subject, Mcothoyi 
kaMnini and Maziyana kaMahlabeni, who were both of Mabona's 
section, had very little to say on the history of the main 
house after its dispersal. Either they were ignorant of 
it, or else reluctant to reveal much about it to stuart for 
fear of undermining their own section's standing in the 
eyes of the Natal colonial government. 
Bryant's account in Olden Times suggests that the Thuli 
chiefdom was broken up in the course of one of a series of 
invasions of the region south of the Thukela by an army 
sent from the Zulu heartland. 184 Maziyana's evidence 
indicates that the reality was rather different. The Thuli 
and neighbouring chiefdoms were attacked by forces composed 
of detachments of the iziYendane and of men summoned from 
the minor chiefdoms which had been placed under Magaye. 185 
Although Maziyana claimed that these forces operated 
without special instructions, in the the case of the Thuli 
they probably had clear orders to make sure that the 
chiefdom'S senior house was overthrown. The establishment 
of Zulu domination was facilitated by the tensions that had 
long existed between the various sections of the senior 
house. According to Mcothoyi, Ntaba was put to death by a 
rival faction whose protection he had sought against 
Shaka 's forces. Other members of the rul ing ho:, a were 
killed by the latter, and the line of succession broken. 186 
The genealogies of the Thuli senior section given by 
Maziyana are notable for the number of individuals whom he 
describes as having been killed at this time, and for the 
number of survivors who did not marry or produce issue. 187 
183. See the comments of Mbovu on the dispute between 
Bhoshongweni and Mnini in JSA, vol. 3, pp. 25-7, 40, 41. 
184. OT, p. 503. 
185. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 296. 
186. Ibid., p. 300; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, 
p. 53. 
187. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 283-91. 
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Not only the senior house but the chiefdom as a whole lost 
most of its cattle, either during the first iziYendane 
attack or during subsequent raids. 188 
That Nonzama's forces did not have things all their own 
way is indicated in the first-hand account given by one of 
Lewis Grout's informants, Jodile, himself a Thuli. 
According to this source, some of the Thuli were able to 
regroup near the Mkhomazi, drive off a 'Zulu' raiding 
party, and recapture their cattle. 189 This evidence is 
consistent with that of Shepstone and of Maziyana to the 
effect that, though their central political authority had 
been destroyed, numbers of people remained in the Thuli 
territory. 190 Many of them probably gravitated within a 
short time to Mabona's section of Thuli, which occupied the 
Bluff and the territory to the south of the bay at Port 
Natal. Though it too had lost most of its cattle, it seems 
to have remained in occupation of its territory, and to 
have retained its leadership structures. 'My father 
Mahlabeni never ran away from these parts,' Maziyana told 
stuart. 'He always remained with Mabona, Mnini and 
Mathubane.,191 
Mabona himself had died some time before the advent of 
Shaka's forces,192 leaving his young heir, Mnini, under the 
guardianship of a close relative, Dlemula. 193 The latter 
188. Grout's evidence on Thuli history, NGG, no. 215, 
18 Jan. 1853; Shepstone's notes on Thuli history in Bird, 
ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 130 (possibly based on the evidence 
of Funwayo, to whom reference is made in this source); JSA, 
vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 293, 302. 
189. Grout's evidence on Thuli history, NGG, no. 215, 18 
Jan. 1853. The anecdote given by Bryant in Olden Times, 
p. 503, is taken from this source. 
190. Shepstone's notes on Thuli history in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 130; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, 
p. 275. 
191. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 296. 
192. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 293, 296. 
193. Ibid., p. 285; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, 
p. 60; also Robert Garden's notes on Thuli history in the 
Garden Papers (Natal Archives), p. 62. 
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was regent at the time of the iziYendane attack, but he 
thereafter came to be superseded by a relative, Mathubane 
kaJombela, who had early on khonza'd Shaka and found favour 
with him. 194 (Bryant gives the name Mathubane as an alias 
for Fica, a member of the Thuli senior house, but the 
genealogical information given by Maziyana, Mbovu and 
Mcothoyi makes clear that Mathubane and Fica were two 
different persons. 195 ) Shaka recognized Mathubane's 
position by presenting him with cattle. 196 The Zulu chief 
also seems to have allowed him to keep a number of armed 
men under his command. 197 By 1825, when Nathaniel Isaacs 
visited him, Mathubane was effectively chief of this 
section of the Thuli. 198 Like other local chiefs in this 
peripheral region of the Zulu state, he was subordinate to 
Shaka's client, Magaye of the Cele. 199 
At much the same time as the Thuli senior house was 
broken up, Shaka's forces also raided the chiefdoms 
tributary to it or within its sphere of influence. 
Following Grout and Shepstone, Bryant regards these forces 
as having been composed of 'Zulus', who devastated the 
lower Mngeni valley in the course of a single campaign. 200 
Again it is much more likely that they consisted of men of 
the iziYendane and of local recruits, and that they 
conducted a series of raids rather than a single campaign 
against the polities which still survived on the coast and 
194. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 297; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 65; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, 
p. 85. 
195. OT, pp. 503-6; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, 
pp. 284, 288; vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 25; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, pp. 60, 61. 
196. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 270, 296. 
197. Ibid., p. 293. 
198. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 26. See also JSA, 
vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana. pp. 266, 297; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mbovu, p. 25. 
199. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 266. 
200. OT, pp. 555-7. 
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in its hinterland. On the north side of the lower Mngeni, 
they attacked the Khanyawo and a section of Zelemu. 201 
Further inland, they raided as far as the area about the 
confluence of the Mngeni and the Msunduze, in the process 
breaking up chiefdoms like the Nkulwini, Dlanyoka, Njilo, 
Nyavu, Dlanyawo and Ndlovini. 202 Numbers of 'captives' as 
well as cattle were taken off from most of these groups. 
Only the Nyavu, who lived in the broken country near the 
confluence of the Mngeni and Msunduze were able to hold on 
to their territory and retain their political cohesion. 
After a time, to escape attacks from bandits, they moved 
off to join Matiwane's adherents on the upper Thukela. 203 
To the south, Nonzama's raiding parties reached as far 
as the lower Mkhomazi, where, as noted above, one of them 
was beaten back by a force of Thuli. It is unlikely that 
at this stage they penetrated much further, for to the west 
the large Chunu chiefdom of Macingwane was busy 
consolidating in its new territory between the middle 
Mkhomazi and the Mzimkhulu. To the south were lesser but 
well-organized groups like the Nhlangwini, Memela and 
Bhaca, each of which would have been well able to resist 
attacks by the relatively small forces which were all that 
the iziYendane commander could have sent against them. 
South of the Thukela, Shaka's suzerainty was felt in the 
201. Grout's evidence on the histories of the Khanyawo, 
Zelemu and Hlungele, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853; evidence 
of Funwayo in Shepstone's notes on Khanyawo history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 129-30 (the informant is 
identified on p. 129); Shepstone's unattributed notes on 
Zelemu history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 130; JSA, 
vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 276. 
202. Grout's evidence on the histories of the Hlanga, 
Langa, Ndlovini and Nyavu, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853; 
Nombiba's evidence in Shepstone's notes on the histories of 
the Dlanyawo, Dlanyoka, Ndlovini, Njilo and Nyavu in Bird, 
ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 137, 139-40, 141, 146 (the 
informant is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
pp. 125, 126, 134, 144, 145, 146). 
203. Nombiba's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Nyavu 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 137; OT, p. 557. 
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territories subject to Magaye: beyond these his writ was 
carried only spasmodically. 
6. An overview 
In the late 1810s and early 1820s the political map of the 
Thukela-Mzinyathi region changed with dramatic suddenness, 
not once but twice, as the struggles for domination among 
the states to the northward played themselves out. The 
first phase of change was largely a product of the 
intensifying conflicts between the Ndwandwe and the 
Mthethwa, and then the Ndwandwe and the Zulu. An early 
casualty of these conflicts was Matiwane's Ngwane chiefdom 
in the area round the sources of the White Mfolozi. On 
being attacked by the Ndwandwe, its leaders chose to try to 
retain the chiefdom's independence by abandoning their 
territory and cattle and taking to flight. To acquire more 
cattle, which were essential for social, political and 
economic survival, they atacked the neighbouring Hlubi 
chiefdom, killed its chief, and broke up its ruling house. 
Loosely structured and deeply divided as it was, the Hlubi 
chiefdom fell apart, with its constituent sections going 
their several ways, some moving off to the west and north, 
some going to khonza Shaka of the Zulu chiefdom, some 
subordinating themselves to Matiwane, and some remaining in 
the Hlubi territory. 
From the upper Mzinyathi the Ngwane proceeded south-
westward through the'territories of several Bhele and zizi 
chiefdoms, raiding cattle and sweeping aside resistance as 
they went. In the valley of the upper Thukela they came to 
a halt and set about trying to reconstitute their chiefdom. 
Numbers of Bhele and Zizi moved off southwards with their 
leaders: others came to give their allegiance to Matiwane. 
within a short space of time the Ngwane chiefdom, though 
still hardly more than a loose amalgamation of disparate 
groups, was the dominant power in the basin of the upper 
Thukela. 
Not long after these events, a series of major 
disturbances began to be felt among the chiefdoms of the 
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mid-Thukela valley. The proximate cause was the further 
expansion of the Zulu chiefdom, which had already achieved 
the status of a regional power under Mthethwa hegemony. 
After the defeat of the Mthethwa by the Ndwandwe, the Zulu, 
facing imminent destruction at the hands of Zwide's forces, 
hurriedly sought to force into existence a defensive 
alliance of the chiefdoms south of the White Mfolozi. In 
the process they extended the area which they dominated, 
directly or indirectly, southwards to the Thukela valley. 
In the south-east they subordinated the Qwabe. In the 
south they sought to subordinate the large Chunu chiefdom, 
but failed when the Chunu moved away over the Thukela and 
re-established themselves in the region of the Mvoti. 
After breaking up the Nyuswa paramountcy and subduing the 
neighbouring chiefdoms of the Thukela valley, the Zulu set 
up the Mkhize chiefdom as their controlling agency in the 
region. In the south-west, an incipient confrontation 
between the Zulu and the Thembu chiefdom, which was also 
seeking to expand at this time, caused the latter to 
withdraw from the east to the west bank of the lower 
Mzinyathi. After overcoming the Khuze, into whose 
territories they had intruded, the Thembu then sought to 
bring other local chiefdoms under their domination. 
In the space of a few years the nature of the political 
order in the regions to the south and west of the Thukela-
Mzinyathi valley had been transformed. In the north the 
previously dominant Hlubi power had been destroyed, and in 
the north-west the intrusive Ngwane chiefdom was 
establishing its supremacy round the upper Thukela. East 
of the Ngwane, the intrusive Thembu chiefdom was engaged in 
a similar process. In the upper Mvoti-mid-Thukela area, a 
third intrusive chiefdom, that of the Chunu, was competing 
for hegemony with the expanding Mkhize polity, which was 
backed by the emerging Zulu power. On the lower Thukela, 
the Cele chiefdom was now confronted by a Qwabe chiefdom 
which had lost its independence and was being incorporated 
into the Zulu state. Between them, the three intrusive 
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powers of the interior - the Ngwane, Thembu and Chunu 
chiefdoms - and the two established ones in the coastlands 
- the Cele and Thuli - now dominated the political scene 
between the Thukela and Mzimkhulu. Only in the central and 
southern areas did small-scale chiefdoms continue to 
maintain an independent existence. 
The new order had hardly begun to consolidate when much 
of it was overturned in a second phase of rapid change. 
Again the main forces involved emanated from north of the 
Thukela. After their defeat of the Ndwandwe, the leaders 
of the enlarged Zulu state had two immediate concerns. One 
was to consolidate their precarious hold on the core region 
- i.e. the area about the White Mfolozi, together with the 
awkwardly appended Qwabe chiefdom to the south-east - of 
the territories which they now dominated. The other was to 
establish a ring of protective dependencies round the core, 
partly to defend it against external enemies, and partly to 
prevent secession by disaffected elements. On their more 
vulnerable northern and western borders they sought to 
achieve this end by establishing military settlements 
headed by members of the Zulu chiefly house or, in the case 
of the Mandlakazi, the head of a closely related lineage. 
The resources of the Zulu state were stretched too thin 
for this strategy to be possible in the south, where in any 
case problems of defence were less urgent. Here the policy 
which evolved was to break up chiefdoms which were 
perceived as a threat to the stability of the Zulu 
borderlands and to sub-contract responsibility for policing 
and defence to partially autonomous client chiefdoms. 
These latter were encouraged to expand their territories at 
the expense of the smaller chiefdoms on their borders, and 
to seize cattle and manpower for the Zulu state. The first 
such chiefdom to be set up, probably even before the defeat 
of the Ndwandwe, was that of the Mkhize under Zihlandlo. 
Its encroachment southwards was probably a major factor in 
the decision of the Chunu to move off and re-establish 
. 
their chiefdom between the Mkhomazi and the Mzimkhulu. 
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Further up the Thukela, Zulu menaces caused the Thembu 
under Ngoza to embark on a migration which eventually took 
them over the Mzimkhulu. As ruler over much of the 
territory and many of the people that the Thembu had 
dominated, Shaka established Jobe of the Sithole. At much 
the same time, he extended Zulu suzerainty over the Cele 
and other chiefdoms south of the lower Thukela, and set up 
Magaye as a satellite chief to keep guard, with the help of 
a Zulu ibutho, over the sensitive south-eastern border of 
the Zulu state. The ruling house of the rival Thuli 
paramountcy was broken up, and, under a new chief who owed 
his position to Shaka, the Thuli were brought within the 
ambit of Magaye's authority. 
The major powers between the Thukela and the Mzimkhulu 
were now the three Zulu satellite chiefdoms - the Sithole, 
the Mkhize and the Cele - together with the Ngwane in the 
north-west and the relocated Chunu in the south. Between 
them they dominated the whole of the region. The 
independent small chiefdoms of the midlands and the coast 
had either taken to flight southwards, or had khonza'd to 
one or other of the emerging powers, or had been broken up 
and dispersed. 
In the stereotyped version of the region's history in 
the 1810s and early 1820s, the prime cause of change is 
seen as the 'invasions' of the Zulu. In fact the only 
territories invaded by the Zulu were the Thembu country 
west of the lower Mzinyathi, the south bank of the mid- and 
lower Thukela, and the northern coastlands. The Zulu state 
was also ultimately responsible for the expansion of the 
client Mkhize chiefdom into the northern midlands. But it 
had nothing at all to do with the incursion of the Ngwane 
into the north-western part of the region, and was only 
indirectly responsible for the migrations of the Thembu and 
Chunu from the Zulu borderlands. still less was it 
responsible for the migrations of groups like the Memela, 
Nhlangwini and Bhaca. All these events had their own 
dynamics, in which pressures exerted by the Zulu were only 
one factor, if often a very important one. 
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The stereotyped view disregards the fact that much of 
the region had a history of heightened political conflict 
which went back several decades before the rise of the Zulu 
state. It fails to appreciate that in these years the 
newly emerged Zulu state was still largely inchoate, and 
facing severe internal and external threats to its 
existence, and that it did not have the capacity to mount 
large-scale invasions beyond its borders. And it 
completely overlooks local trajectories of change and the 
political agendas of local leaders. 
Another major source of distortion in the stereotype is 
its overwhelming exaggeration of the violence and 
destruction which took place in this period. Certainly the 
degree of violence should not be minimized, but there is 
nothing in the evidence to indicate that large numbers of 
people were indiscriminately massacred - this notion was 
injected into the literature by settler ideologues. 204 The 
violence which accompanied the changes described above was 
a product largely not of 'massacres' but of fights over 
cattle, which were an absolutely essential resource for 
leaders who were trying to maintain or increase the size 
and cohesion of their "followings, and of attempts on the 
part of expanding chiefdoms to destroy the leadersnip 
structures of subjected groups. 
Both kinds of conflict need to be seen in clearer 
perspective than the stereotype allows for. The fights 
which took place when communities resisted the seizure of 
their cattle were no doubt widespread and fierce, but they 
would have involved relatively few numbers of men at any 
one time, and would have been relatively short-lived. While 
numbers of people were killed in them, it is doubtful if 
204. The persistence of this kind of thinking, outside as 
well as inside south Africa, is reflected by Ballard's 
recent repetition of the charge that 'between .5 and 1 
million people perished in the wake of the Zulu conquest' -
this in a reputable American academic journal. See 
Ballard, 'Drought and economic distress', Jnl. of 
Interdisciplinary History, vol. ·17 (1986-7), p. 374. 
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they produced very large casualties. And if established 
political leaders and their close adherents were often 
deliberately put to death by their conquerors, this was not 
an invariable practice. Evidence has long existed which 
runs counter even to the stereotype of Shaka as murderous 
tyrant. As far back as the 1830s, Andrew Smith recorded 
the information, probably derived from Henry Fynn, that 
Shaka 'was always very considerate towards strangers and 
the people of conquered nations,.205 In his evidence to 
the Harding Commission of 1852-3, Grout cited a letter 
written by a missionary colleague, Newton Adams, in the 
early 1840s, to the effect that had Shaka had treated 
subordinates in a conciliatory manner. 206 In 1864 
Shepstone noted that Shaka had allowed some of the chiefs 
of the Thukela valley to live and rule as his 
tributaries. 207 In 1903 Jantshi put the point clearly when 
he told Stuart, 'Tshaka did not put to death the kings or 
kinglets he defeated if, when he proceeded against them, 
they ran away and did not show fight,.208 
Numbers of people, particularly in areas where social 
and economic disruption were severe, also perished from 
starvation and debilitation. 209 But the strongly 
entrenched view that whole populations were 'wiped out' by 
marauding 'hordes ' can be rejected: it fails to take into 
account that it was in the direct interest of political 
leaders to incorporate subjected peoples into their own 
followings rather than annihilate them. Even if they had 
had the physical capacity to kill off large numbers of 
205. Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith and Natal, p. 80. 
206. NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853. 
207. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', in Commission on Laws 
and Customs, vol. 2, p. 425. 
208. JSA, Vol. 1, p. 187. 
209. See the group histories in Grout's evidence to the 
Harding Commission, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853: and the 
sources on 'cannibals' in notes 218-21 below. Mqayikana 
kaYenge also comments on the want of food which some groups 
experienced in these times: JSA, vol. 4, p. 9. 
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people, which the great majority did not, it would have 
been politically senseless for leaders to have done so in 
place of allowing or, if necessary, forcing, them to 
khonza. 
Violence, then, was effected by conquering groups not so 
much to destroy populations as to seize the resources and 
destroy the political organization of defeated groups. In 
the process, a number of small chiefdoms, particularly in 
the south, where the paths of a number of the larger 
migrant groups converged, were so thoroughly broken up that 
they ceased to exist as political entities. 210 Many, 
probably most, of their members, though, survived to give 
their allegiance, either as individuals or in groups, to 
other chiefs. outside the south, most chiefdoms seem to 
have been able to retain a degree of cohesion, even if many 
lost some of their component sections through secession. 
Generally speaking, for smaller groups there were three 
main strategies of survival: to migrate as an independent 
unit; to remain in situ and wait for dangers to subside; 
and to khonza a new leader who could offer effective 
protection. Numbers of groups may have followed all three 
courses at different stages. Comparatively few had the 
resources needed for successfully pursuing the first and 
second courses, and over time most ended up taking the 
third. 
The history of the period was characterized not so much 
by the destruction of peoples as by two other kinds of 
process, which were linked to each other: the displacement 
and migration of populations, and the fragmentation of 
political units and their re-aggregation into new, enlarged 
entities. The numerous small polities which had existed 
only a few years before were replaced by a handful of much 
210. See the statements to this effect in some of the group 
histories outlined by Grout in his evidence to the Harding 
Commission, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853, and by Shepstone in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 124-53; also Shepstone, 
'Historic sketch', Commission on Laws and Customs, vol. 2, 
p. 420. 
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larger chiefdoms, the cores of which were formed either by 
intruding groups - the Ngwane, Sithole, Mkhize, Chunu - or 
by local groups which, under varying circumstances, managed 
to maintain their cohesion - the Memela, Nhlangwini, 
Zelemu-Wushe (or Bhaca), and Cele. 
Political re-aggregation was accompanied by demographic 
concentration. The conventional view holds that if the 
inhabitants of the Natal were not mostly massacred in the 
violence of the period, they were driven out, either onto 
the highveld or southward~ across the Mzimkhulu. The 
available evidence inJicates clearly that this was not so. 
Numbers of groups did migrate out of the region (including 
some which made off to the Zulu chiefdom,211 pace the 
notion of the Zulu as destroyers), and there may have been 
a temporary drop in the overall population as a result. 
But most of the previous inhabitants remained within the 
region, and a fall-off of population would to some extent 
have been offset by the advent of intruding groups like the 
Ngwane and the Mkhize. As significant as migrations inward 
or outward across what are in any case rather arbitrarily 
determined boundaries were the internal movements which 
took place. 
As numbers of people shifted into the territories 
dominated by the larger and more stab~e chiefdoms to find 
security, so ~hese regions became relatively more 
populated, while other areas ~ecame relatively denuded of 
inhabitants. As far back as 1864 this phenomenon was noted 
by Shepstone, who wrote of the increase in population which 
had taken place during Shaka's reign in the lower Thukela 
valley as a direct result of the influx of 'refugees' from 
other areas. 212 other regions in which concentrations of 
211. The cases of the Hlubi and Bhele have already been 
mentioned. See also the evidence of Nombiba and Funwayo in 
Shepstone's notes on Dunge history, Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 
1, p. 132 (the informants are identified in T. Shepstone 
Papers, vol. 89, p. 106); JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana 
on Thuli history, p. 298. 
212. Shepstone, 'Historic sketch', Commission on Laws and 
customs, pp. 419, 425. 
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population formed were very likely the territories 
dominated by the Ngwane in the north-west, the Cele south 
of the lower Thukela, and the Chunu and other large 
chiefdoms about the Mzimkhulu. The intervening regions -
the area between the Mzinyathi and Ndaka rivers, the 
central midlands, the southern coastlands - probably 
experienced a drop in population. It was one of these 
areas, the southern coastlands, which was later reported by 
Fynn to have been almost devoid of inhabitants when he 
traversed it in 1824,213 a claim which was seized upon by 
numerous later writers and generalized to apply to the 
whole of Natal. Few, if any, took into account the 
cautionary note sounded in 1866 by William Holden, one of 
the earliest settler historians, to the effect that he was 
'by no means disposed to think that the number of these 
aborigines was so small as has often been represented'. As 
Holden was aware, numbers of small groups clung on in the 
more broken or forested parts. 214 They lived largely by 
gathering and hunting, and probably kept cUltivation and 
keeping of livestock to a minimum to avoid attracting the 
attention of larger groups. Others took advantage of the 
breakdown of previously established authority structures to 
turn to banditry.215 
213. Fynn's evidence to the Harding Comission, NGG, 
no. 220, 22 Feb. 1853. The relevant passage was reprinted 
in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 103. It should be 
compared with two other statements made by Fynn on this 
subject, one also to the Harding Commission (NGG, no. 221, 
1 March 1853; reprinted in Bird, p. 123), and the other in 
one of his manuscripts, first published in Bird, p. 69 
(reprinted in Fynn's Diary, p. 22). See also the extracts 
supposedly from Francis Farewell's journal of 1825 
published in P.R. Kirby, ed., Andrew smith and Natal, Cape 
Town, 1955, pp. 64-5. 
214. Holden, Past and Future, p. 137. 
215. See the group histories in Grout's evidence to the 
Harding Commission, NGG, no. 215, 18 Jan. 1853; Nombiba's 
evidence in Shepstone's notes on Nyavu history, Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 137 (the informant is identified in T. 
Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, p. 105); JSA, vol. 2, evidence 
of Maziyana, pp. 277, 298; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, pp. 
80-1; vol. 3, evidence of Mkhando, p. 162. For two 
personalized accounts of life in these marginal regions see 
Nombiba's description of the experiences of Nomsimekwana in 
275 
The members of most of the communities described as 
'cannibals' in the settler-influenced literature were 
probably bandits. The literary stereotype about the 
widespread existence of cannibalism in Natal in 'Shaka's 
time' was very much a product of settler ideology and its 
exaggeration of a handful of recorded eye-witness accounts 
and traditions. 216 This evidence cannot simply be 
dismissed, for it is likely that in areas where agriculture 
and livestock production had collapsed, some people took to 
cannibalism to stay alive. But in regard to traditions of 
cannibalism, the comments made by Delius in his study of 
the history of the Pedi chiefdom of the eastern Transvaal 
are highly pertinent. such traditions, he suggests, 
functioned to show 'the dire consequences of the 
destruction of properly constituted authority'. They were 
thus liable to exaggeration in African society as well as 
by white commentators, and need to be treated with caution. 
Close investigation of his sources, Delius argues, shows 
that cannibai groups were 'principally distinguished by the 
fact that they secured their sUbsistence almost exclusively 
through raiding, and were thus seen as living on their 
fellows,.217 The scraps of evidence which exist suggest 
that south of the Thukela-Mzinyathi valley such groups 
emerged in precisely those regions which had been most 
Shepstone's notes on Nyavu history in Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, pp. 138-9; JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana 
kaYenge, pp. 1, 8-9. 
216. The making of this stereotype needs detailed research 
in its own right. Early writers like Gardiner (Narrative, 
pp. 185-6) and Isaacs (Travels and Adventures, p. 78) 
mention the practice of cannibalism in the Natal region in 
passing, but it was not until the later 19th century that 
writers like Shepstone ('Early history of the Zulu-Kafir 
race', in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 159-60) began to 
portray it as a major consequence of 'Shaka's wars'. In 
the early 20th century Bryant took delight in further 
embellishing the stories of Shepstone's informants about 
cannibals: see OT, pp. 58, 248, 348, 377, 410, 504, 552, 
558-9. 
217. Delius, The Land Belongs to Us, p. 24. 
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heavily raided by larger chiefdoms and had been partially 
denuded of population. Several traditions indicate that in 
the north the country between the Mzinyathi and the Ndaka 
rivers was one such region. 218 Others were the territory 
near the upper Mvoti formerly inhabited by the Dunge,219 
the broken country of the mid-Mngeni valley,220 and the 
coastlands from the Mngeni southward. 221 
The stereotyped view that in the 1810s and early 1820s 
the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region was deliberately devastated by 
the Zulu totally fails to capture the complexity of the 
period's history. While it was certainly a time of rapid 
and often violent political transformation, the notions 
that the processes at work involved nothing but 
'devastation', that the Zulu state was the only significant 
agency of change, and that the Zulu had the power to 
intervene more or less at will in the region's affairs, are 
products of ideological interpolation rather than of 
historical analysis. Though by the early 1820s the 
emerging Zulu state was certainly the most powerful 
political actor south and west of the Thukela-Mzinyathi 
218. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dunjwa, p. 126; vol. 1, 
evidence of Lunguza, pp. 301, 302, 336; vol. 2, evidence of 
Mabhonsa, pp. 14, 15, 24, 31; vol. 2, evidence of Mangathi, 
p. 202; vol. 3, evidence of Mkhando, p. 161. See also 
Gardiner, Narrative, pp. 185-6. 
219. Evidence of Nombiba and Funwayo in Shepstone's notes 
on Dunge history, Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 132 (the 
informants are identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p. 106); JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dabula, p. 90. 
220. Nombiba's evidence in Shepstone's notes on the 
histories of the Nyavu, Dlanyoka and Ndlovu, Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, pp. 138-9, 140, 146 (the informant is 
identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, pp. 125, 126, 
145); JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, pp. 26, 27. 
221. Funwayo's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Khanyawo 
history, Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 129-30 (the 
informant is identified on p. 129 of the text); JSA, vol. 
2, evidence of Mahaya, p. 113; vol. 2, evidence of 
Maziyana, p. 277; vol. 3, evidence of Dinya, p. 81; Fynn, 
Diary, p. 22 (see also Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 69); 
Fynn's evidence to the Harding Commission, ~, no. 221, 1 
March 1853 (see also Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 123). 
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line, it was not until the mid-1820s that it succeeded in 
establishing domination over what is now the Natal region. 
Even then the physical presence of the Zulu for the most 
part remained confined to the northern coastlands. The 
establishment of, and the limits to, Zulu domination will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZULU DOMINATION SOUTH OF THE THUKELA 
1. The expansion of the Zulu presence 
In the previous chapter it was argued that in the late 
1810s and 1820s, to safeguard and police its southern 
flank, the emerging Zulu state established the Sithole, 
Mkhize and Cele chiefdoms as client polities. The belt of 
territory which it thus brought under its suzerainty 
reached west and south across the lower Mzinyathi and the 
middle and lower Thukela. Soon afterwards, the Zulu 
leadership began to extend its domination still further in 
these directions, and to transform the nature of the role 
played by the peripheral coastland region across the 
Thukela in the political economy of the state. The Zulu 
attacked and drove out the Ngwane chiefdom on the upper 
Thukela, and destroyed the Chunu chiefdom on the middle 
Mzimkhulu. By 1824 they were raiding across the 
Mzimkhulu, and establishing a number of cattle posts in 
the coastlands between the Thukela and the bay of Port 
Natal. 
In conventional accounts of the expansion of the Zulu 
state there is virtually nothing which recognizes, let 
alone elucidates, this sequence of developments. In all 
but a handful of works the extension of Zulu domination 
south of the Thukela is seen as following 
unproblematically from military conquest, and as repre-
senting the CUlmination of the process of Zulu territorial 
expansion which had begun after the defeat of the 
Ndwandwe. 
The earliest writings on the 'Zulu invasions' of Natal 
attributed them to little more than the bloodlust of the 
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tyrant Shaka, or to his greed for cattle. 1 Later and more 
historically oriented accounts explained them in terms of 
Shaka's political ambitions, and of his need to destroy 
any possibility of resistance to his rule in regions 
within reach of his armies. 2 By the early 20th century 
this idea had developed into the notion that Shaka had 
sought deliberately to destroy political organization 
across the Thukela in order to create a buffer zone or 
cordon sanitaire to the south and west of the Zulu state. 3 
In the 1960s and 1970s this notion was picked up by 
Africanist writers, and spread rapidly to become something 
of an orthodoxy among academic historians of southern 
Africa. 4 As Slater has noted, it provided historians who 
were developing the notion of Zulu 'nation-building' with 
a rational explanation of what settler ideologues had 
often portrayed as irrational destruction. 5 Why the Zulu 
did not create a similar buffer zone on their far more 
vulnerable northern borders was left unexplained. 
Alongside this idea there developed a number of other 
explanations of the Zulu conquest of Natal: that Shaka had 
intervened in the region to put an end to the 'chaos' 
1. For example Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 148, 
152; Champion, Journal, p. 15. 
2. Holden, Past and Future, p. 25; Shepstone, 'The early 
history of the Zulu-Kafir race', in Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, p. 158; OPe cit., extract from Fynn's papers, 
p. 66. 
3. Scully, 'Fragments ... IV', The State, vol. 2 (1909), 
p. 290; Ayliff & Whiteside, History of the Abambo, p. 10. 
4. E.V. Walter, Terror and Resistance: a Study of 
Political Violence, London, 1969, pp. 138-9; Thompson, 
'Co-operation and conflict: the Zulu kingdom and Natal', 
in wilson & Thompson, eds., Oxford History, vol. 1, p. 
346; B. Sansom, 'Traditional rulers and their realms', in 
w.o. Hammond-Tooke, ed., The Bantu-speaking Peoples of 
Southern Africa, London, 1974, p. 279; Sh.M. (Shula' 
Marks), article on southern African history in Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, 1974 ed., vol. 17, p. 281; Edgecombe, 
'The Mfecane or Difaqane', in Cameron & Spies, eds., 
Illustrated History of S.A., p. 121. 
5. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, pp. 327-8. 
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there;6 or to seize its cattle in order to sustain the 
amabutho system;7 or to establish it as 'an area of 
settlement for a growing Zulu population,.8 
Some of these explanations are simplistic, or simply 
speculative; others contain the germs of useful analysis. 
None of them, however, breaks away from the triumphalist 
and stereotyped notion that Zulu power in the region 
across the Thukela was more or less absolute. None of 
them is concerned with delineating the changes in the 
political context within which Zulu interventions south of 
the Thukela took place. A step towards a more 
historically rooted explanation was taken by Slater, who 
argued that in the 1820s and 1830s the relationship 
between the Zulu state and its periphery south of the 
Thukela passed through two broad phases. The first was a 
period of predation which yielded cattle, labour-power and 
grain for the state at a time when it was a suffering from 
a shortage of these resources because of the struggles 
which it was waging on its northern borders. Over time, 
as had frequently happened in the development of other 
imperial systems, this kind of relationship had given way 
to more ordered forms of exploitation, with the Zulu state 
establishing a 'protectorate' over the zone to the south 
whose resources it was extracting. 9 Unlike its 
predecessors, this argument had the great merit of 
recognizing that the nature of Zulu interests in the 
region south of the Thukela changed over time, but, 
largely because the author was in the end unable to break 
firmly with the devastation stereotype, he was not 
concerned to provide an explanation for the transition 
which he discerned. 
6. Ritter, Shaka Zulu, pp. 108, 228; Bonner, Kings. 
Commoners and Concessionaires, p. 37. 
7. J. Omer-Cooper, 'The Nguni outburst', in J. Flint, ed., 
Cambridge History of Africa, vol. 5, Cambridge, 1976, 
pp. 332-3; Ballard, House of Shaka, p. 20. 
8. Ballard, House of Shaka, p. 20. 
9. Slater, 'Transitions,' unpubl. thesis, pp. 328-30. 
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Hamilton is the first writer to have recognized that 
significant changes took place in the nature of Zulu 
interests south of the Thukela in the 1820s, and at the 
same time to have pointed towards an explanation of those 
changes. She distinguishes three phases of Zulu expansion 
in the coastal regions. In the first, the Zulu leaders 
intervened in the Cele civil war, and placed Magaye in the 
chiefship. In the second, they set about establishing a 
number of cattle posts in the Cele domain, and subjugated 
the Thuli. In the third, they moved their capital from 
Bulawayo to Dukuza near the Mvoti river, and established 
more cattle posts as far south as the Mzimkhulu. 10 
Hamilton does not make clear the reasons for the initial 
Zulu intervention in the Cele country: she seems to imply 
that it was made in order to seize cattle. 11 But she 
adduces a persuasive explanation for the second and third 
phases. These, she argues, were responses primarily to 
the development of a political crisis in the Zulu state, 
with mounting opposition to Shaka's rule in its core 
territories leading him to seek greater security for herds 
of royal cattle and for his own person in the Zulu-
dominated territories south of the Thukela. 12 with 
certain elaborations, this line of argument forms one of 
the bases of the analysis that follows. 
There was nothing in the establishment of the Sithole, 
Mkhize and Cele chiefdoms as satellites of the Zulu state 
which necessarily entailed further Zulu expansion towards 
the west and south. But within a year or two, political 
developments within the heartland and on its northern 
borders made the southern peripheries of the state of 
increasing strategic importance to Shaka and his party of 
supporters. The first demonstration of this came with 
Shaka's shift of his administrative capital, Gibixhegu 
10. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 358-60, 
469-74. 
11. Ibid., pp. 358, 359-60, 473. 
12. Ibid, pp. 361-2. 
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(later renamed Bulawayo), together with the bulk of his 
amabutho, from the old Zulu chiefdom's territory near the 
middle White Mfolozi south-eastwards into the Qwabe 
territory south of the Mhlathuze river. 13 The particular 
reasons for this move are not clear, but, as Hamilton has 
argued, a major factor was very probably the persistence 
of strong resistance within the state, particularly among 
the Qwabe, to Zulu rule. 14 The transfer of the Zulu 
capital and many amabutho was thus in part a move to 
suppress dissidence within the powerful and politically 
important Qwabe chiefdom. 
This development needs to be seen against the 
background of events on the Zulu northern frontiers, which 
in the early 1820s were under constant threat of attack 
from the turbulent regions further to the north. Hedges 
and Hamilton have seen the major menace as having been the 
Ndwandwe polity.15 More recently, Cobbing has argued that 
the political pressures which were coming to bear on the 
Zulu northern frontiers at this time were primarily a 
product of the rapid contemporaneous expansion of the 
Delagoa Bay slave trade. 16 cobbing states his thesis too 
baldly: the expansion of slaving in the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland does not by itself explain, as he implies, the 
southward shift of the Zulu state's political centre of 
gravity. There can be litle doubt, however, that by the 
early 1820s it was a major factor in creating political 
instability in the regions which abutted on the Zulu 
borderlands. Cobbing's position and that of Hedges and 
Hamilton are not mutually exclusively: both serve to 
emphasize the importance of the 'northern factor' in Zulu 
13. Ibid., pp. 350-7. 
14. Ibid., pp. 184-6, 355, 361-2. 
15. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 201-2, 214-15; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 221-2. 
16. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 506-7; 'Jettisoning the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, 
p. 13. 
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politics at this time. Much more research into the 
history of the early state is needed before an 
understanding can be reached of how this factor combined 
with the growth of internal resistance to Shaka's rule to 
exacerbate political tensions within the Zulu state. What 
is germane here is that one of the consequences was 
Shaka's decision to move his capital to the Qwabe country. 
This development in turn served to focus the attentions of 
the Zulu rulers more closely on the territories across the 
Thukela. 
Not long after the subordination of the Cele, Thuli and 
neighbouring chiefdoms, the Zulu leaders began to develop 
an active interest in extending their territorial 
domination further southward. In part this may have been 
a product of their apprehensions about the stability of 
the state's southern borderlands at a time when they were 
facing increasing problems both in the core region and on 
the northern frontiers. The outposts of the Ngwane and 
Chunu chiefdoms, which were in the process of re-
establishing themselves on the upper Thukela and the mid-
Mzimkhulu respectively, were only eighty kilometres or so 
from those of the Zulu polity. Though both were far less 
powerful than the latter, and were probably concerned much 
more with internal consolidation than with external 
expansion, in the eyes of the Zulu leadership they seem to 
have represented a major threat. 
But Shaka and his advisers were concerned with more 
than simply eliminating possible sources of instability on 
the southern frontiers of the Zulu state. Their interests 
also lay in extending their domination over regions from 
which cattle could be extracted. Hamilton has demon-
strated that a rapid expansion of the number and size of 
Zulu amabutho was taking place at this time, and in part 
the concerns of the Zulu leaders were to find new sources 
of the cattle which were essential for provisioning them 
and for distributing as largesse. 17 Adding urgency to 
17. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 350-7, 
474-5. 
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their search were possibly the effects of a prolonged 
drought on the size of the Zulu herds. In the early 1820s 
the eastern Cape and adjoining territories, together with 
much of the interior north of the Orange, experienced 
severe drought;18 it may have affected the areas east of 
the Drakensberg as well. Given the existence of a number 
of large and powerful chiefdoms to the north of the Zulu 
state, it was logical for its rulers to look to the more 
vulnerable territories to the south and south-west as 
potential raiding grounds. 
To secure unimpeded access to these regions, it was 
necessary for the Zulu first of all to eliminate the two 
powers which stood in the way, the Ngwane and Chunu 
chiefdoms. At some stage in the early 1820s both were 
attacked by Zulu forces. Bryant indicates that the Ngwane 
were assailed first,19 but there is nothing in his source, 
Shepstone's notes on the history of the Dlanyoka chiefdom, 
to bear this out. 20 Nor is there any evidence to indicate 
whether the two chiefdoms were attacked in the course of a 
single expedition or on two separate occasions, or what 
interval of time separated the Zulu onslaughts. What is 
clear is that the Ngwane chiefdom was broken up, and 
Matiwane and many of his adherents driven over the 
Drakensberg onto the highveld. 21 As for the Chunu, they 
18. G.E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa, vol. 2, London, 
1926, pp. 160-1; J. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, 
vol. 29 (1988), p. 499. 
19. OT, p. 561. 
20. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 139-40. 
21. Timango in stow, 'The intrusion of the stronger 
races', unpubl. ms., pp. 197, 207, and in Scully, 
'Fragments ... IV', The State, vol. 2 (1909), pp. 290-1; 
Mehlomakhulu, 'Statement of Mathlomahulu', Cape Monthly 
Magazine, vol. 3 (1880), p. 163; Moloja, 'Story of the 
"Fetcani horde"', Cape Quarterly Review, vol. 1 (1882), 
p. 268; Khawulela's evidence in Commission on Laws and 
Customs, vol. 1, p. 166; Msebenzi, History of Matiwane, 
pp. 20, 22; Feni Qongqo's statement in Msebenzi, History 
of Matiwane, p. 261; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of 
Mabhonsa, p. 17. 
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fled before their Zulu attackers across the Mzimkhulu to 
Nsikeni mountain, where numbers of them were caught and 
killed, and the chiefdom's cattle seized. The chief, 
Macingwane, is said to have escaped, but to have 
disappeared soon afterwards. 22 Numbers of his adherents 
eventually made their way back across the Thukela and 
submitted to Shaka. 23 
On both these occasions, it seems, the aim of the Zulu 
was not simply to break up political structures and to 
seize cattle, but also to prevent any possibility of the 
revival of these chiefdoms. The Ngwane and Chunu were not 
minor polities that could simply be absorbed as trib-
utaries of the Zulu state, but powerful chiefdoms which 
rivalled it for domination of the region south and west of 
the Thukela-Mzinyathi line. Zulu policy towards them 
closely parallelled that pursued a few years earlier by 
the Ndwandwe state when faced by threats from rival 
polities. Seen in these terms, the Zulu attack on the 
Ngwane was not entirely successful. Although the Zulu 
were probably able to capture most of the Ngwane cattle, 
they were not able to prevent the chief and his people 
from making their escape. Within a short space of time 
the Ngwane chiefdom was emerging as an important actor in 
the politics of the southern highveld. 24 By contrast, the 
expedition against the Chunu was a complete success. 
Their polity was completely shattered, and its leadership 
structures destroyed. 
The attacks made by Shaka's forces on the Ngwane and 
the Chunu, particularly the latter, represent the closest 
that the Zulu came to acting in the way in which the 
22. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Magidigidi, p. 85; vol. 2, 
evidence of Mahaya, p. 114; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, 
p. 296; vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, pp. 24, 26; 
Fuze, Black People, p. 23. 
23. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Magidigidi, p. 85; vol. 4, 
evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 26. 
24. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', J~H, vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 507~8. 
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devastation stereotype supposes them to have acted for 
most of Shaka's reign. Certainly numbers of people were 
killed in the attack on the Chunu, and it is probable that 
the territories occupied by the two chiefdoms remained for 
a while largely empty of population. But, contrary to the 
claims of the stereotype, these attacks were exceptional 
events in the process by which the Zulu extended ascend-
ancy over the region south of the Thukela and west of the 
Mzinyathi. After the destruction of the two chiefdoms, 
the Zulu dominated the territories from the Mzinyathi to 
the Drakensberg, and from the Thukela to the Mzimkhulu. 
As far as the evidence goes, they did not mount a series 
of 'invasions' of this region, nor for some time did they 
seek to establish any effective occupation of it outside 
the belt of territory which they already controlled. For 
reasons which will be discussed in the next section of the 
chapter, their concerns were not so much to colonize these 
territories as to extract cattle from them, and to tighten 
their hold on the satellite chiefdoms on their southern 
and south-western borders. 
On their south-western periphery, the Zulu may possibly 
have established a number of cattle posts at this time in 
the Sithole domains. According to Mayinga, Shaka built a 
post called umNkangala in the Msinga region between the 
lower Mzinyathi and the Thukela. 25 He gives no indication 
of when this event took place, but it is unlikely to have 
been before the overthrow of the Ngwane polity further up 
the Thukela. It is possible that this post, and perhaps 
others in the vicinity, were stocked with cattle taken 
from the Ngwane. Further to the south, Shaka may also 
have been encouraging Zihlandlo of the Mkhize chiefdom to 
extend his rule in the region between the upper Mvoti and 
the Mngeni (see pp. 251-2 above). But it is clear that 
the main focus of Zulu interest lay in the coastlands. 
The region ruled by the client Cele chief, Magaye, lay 
25. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mayinga, p. 249. 
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conveniently across the Thukela from Shaka's new capital, 
and was well situated as a base from which raids could be 
launched on cattle-holding groups further to the south. 
In the vicinity of the lower Mzimkhulu, numbers of 
small groups, some of them recently ejected by the 
iziYendane and their local auxiliaries from the coast lands 
further north, still clung on to a tenuous independence. 26 
After the destruction of the Chunu chiefdom, there was 
little to stop Shaka's forces from extending their raids 
into this region. 27 Magaye was encouraged by Shaka to do 
the same, in return, it seems, for a share of the cattle 
which he seized. 28 It was fairly certainly the 
accumulation of cattle taken from the Chunu and from the 
smaller groups along the coast which enabled Shaka to 
establish a number of cattle posts in the Cele country at 
this time. The major one was built near the Mdloti river, 
and placed in the charge of Magaye's iNjanduna ibutho, 
which was thus appropriated by Shaka to his own service. 29 
There may well have been other posts erected at the same 
time, although their names have not survived in the 
recorded traditions. 
Within a short space of time there can have been few 
cattle left for the Zulu to seize in the coastal regions 
north of the Mzimkhulu. If raiding in this direction was 
to be continued, expeditions would have to be sent still 
26. For the names of groups which occupied the coast and 
its hinterland in this region, many of which are said to 
have been 'destroyed' by the 'Zulu', see Shepstone's 
histories in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 148, 149, 151; 
Grout's list of chiefdoms in his evidence to the Harding 
Commission, Natal Government Gazette, no. 215, 18 Jan. 
1853; Perrin's list of chiefdoms in Garden Papers, 
pp. 826-81; Bryant, OT, pp. 561-2. 
27. See JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 296. 
28. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 92. 
29. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, p. 53; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maquza, p. 236; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, 
pp. 268, 296, 297; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 92; 
vol. 4, evidence of Mtshebwe, pp. 159, 160. See also 
Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 360, 472. 
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further south. The region across the river was at this 
stage dominated by the comparatively large and powerful 
chiefdoms of the Mpondo, the Bhaca, the Memela-Bhele and 
the Nhlangwini (see below, pp. 306 ff), and by themselves 
the iziYendane and Magaye's forces were nowhere near 
strong enough to take them on. There was no alternative 
but for the Zulu state to take a more direct hand in the 
business of accumulation. A force of amabutho was 
therefore mobilized by Shaka, and sent off to raid the 
territories south of the Mzimkhulu. 
Conventionally this expedition is dated to 1824 on the 
basis of evidence left by Henry Fynn. According to his 
published Diary, he encountered the Zulu force on its 
return journey soon after his arrival at Port Natal in the 
middle of that year. 30 His description of its size seems 
heavily exaggerated, for it is difficult to credit that 
Shaka could have sent southward an army of the magnitude 
described by Fynn when the Zulu state was facing constant 
threats on its northern borders. Justifiably wary of 
settler propaganda of the period, Cobbing has expressed 
doubts that the expedition took place at all. 31 There is 
good reason to mistrust Fynn's writings as a reliable 
source of evidence in many respects, but that a Zulu raid 
south of the Mzimkhulu took place at about this period 
seems reasonably well authenticated by the evidence from a 
number of different sources. 32 The notion that it did 
30. Fynn, Diary, pp. 61-4. 
31. Cobbing, 'Jettisoning the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, 
p. 12. 
32. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 282-3, 287; 
vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 272-3; vol. 3, evidence 
of Mbovu, p. 43; vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 55; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mkhehlengana, p. 217; Shepstone's 
notes on Ndelu history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, 
p. 127; C.R. Maclean, 'Loss of the brig Mary at Natal, 
with early recollections of that settlement', Nautical 
Magazine, Jan. 1854, p. 28. (Charles Rawden Maclean was 
the real name of the person usually referred to as John 
Ross in the literature. See B. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, 
London, 1974, p. 118; S. Gray, 'South African fiction and 
a case history revised: an account of research into 
retellingsof the John Ross story of early Natal', unpubl. 
paper, University of the witwatersrand, 1988, esp. 
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take place accords with the argument, which Cobbing 
himself accepts, that the Zulu state's centre of gravity 
was shifting southwards in the course of the 1820s. 
Precisely which groups were the intended targets of the 
Zulu raid is not clear. Maziyana claimed that its purpose 
was to attack Madikane of the Bhaca, an idea which is also 
expressed in notes on Bhaca history which were published 
by Scully in 1913. 33 Scully's account, though, 
contradicts in several respects articles which he had 
written on the subject a few years earlier,34 and cannot 
be regarded as reliable. Moroever, both his and 
Maziyana's informants may have been confusing the Zulu 
campaign of 1824 with either of two others which were 
launched specifically against the Bhaca by Dingane in 1830 
and 1833 respectively.35 This argument is reinforced by 
the nature of the contradictions which emerge between the 
various sources as to the route taken by the Zulu force. 
Lugubhu claims that it went along the coast, while three 
other informants state that it took an inland route. 36 
The statements of these latter may again be reflecting a 
confusion with the expedition of 1833, which, settler 
records indicate, passed through the upcountry regions. 37 
The main aim of the Zulu force was probably to seize 
whatever cattle it could from the groups which lived in 
pp. 13-14.) 
33. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 272; 
W.C. Scully, Further Reminiscences of a South African 
Pioneer, London, 1913, pp. 262-4. 
34. Scully, 'Fragments. The Amabaca', The State, vol. 1 
(1909), pp. 676-8; and w. Scully, 'Fragments of native 
history. The Amabaca. II', The state, vol. 2 (1909), 
p. 90. 
35. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 185, 187, 193; 
Stuart's historical epilogue in Fynn, Diary, pp. 221-2; 
OT, pp. 398-9. 
36. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, p. 282; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 272,; vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, 
p. 43; vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 55. 
37. Stuart's historical epilogue in Fynn's Diary, 
pp. 221-2. 
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the vicinity of the Mzimvubu river. In this it seems to 
have been only partially successful. According to two 
informants, the force ran out of provisions and had to 
resort to eating amabhece melons to survive; subsequently 
the expedition was referred to as that of the amabhece. 38 
In the Mpondo country, a section of Zulu was cut off and 
severely mauled by Faku's forces before reinforcements 
came to its rescue. 39 Lugubhu's opinion was that the Zulu 
attack on the Mpondo 'was not pushed in any way', and 
Maziyana stated that Shaka's force failed to seize many 
cattle. 40 
Those cattle which the expedition succeeded in 
capturing were, it seems, placed at two new posts which 
Shaka established in the Thuli country near the bay of 
Natal. The more important one was built by his 
inDabenkulu ibutho, which was sent specially for the 
purpose and then returned to the country north of the 
Thukela. This kwaNdabenkulu post, at which only oxen were 
kept, was run, at Shaka's behest, by Thuli married men, 
who were required to leave their families behind. Linked 
with it was another post, named kwaKhayisa, which was 
built by Mathubane, the Thuli regent, at what was later 
known as the Bluff at the bay of Natal. Here the work of 
herding was done by Thuli youths. 41 As with the Cele, 
Shaka was requiring more and more by way of labour service 
from the Thuli under his authority. To retain the loyalty 
of Mathubane, and to buttress his position as de facto 
chief of the Thuli, Shaka presented him with a number of 
the cattle seized on the amabhece campaign. 42 
38. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 272, 273; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mkhehlengana, p. 217. 
39. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 273. 
40. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 282-3; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 272. 
41. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 293, 294; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 66. 
42. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 270. 
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The records left by some of the British hunter-traders 
who visited or settled at Port Natal in the period 1823-25 
help flesh out the picture of conditions in the coastlands 
at this time as derived from oral tradition. Evidence 
from Fynn and Isaacs indicates that Magaye's domain 
extended as far south as about the Thongati river, and was 
relatively well populated both near the coast and fUrther 
inland. 43 Established in it were several of Shaka's 
'barracks', and numbers of cattle posts manned by young 
men of his amabutho. 44 Some of the earliest descriptions 
written by King and Farewell of the region round Port 
Natal as they found it in 1823-24 have been adverted to in 
chapter 2 above (p. 62). Their comments on the abundance 
of grain and fish and the easy availability of cattle are 
echoed in Maclean's memoirs, written long afterwards. 45 
They contrast sharply with the propagandistic statements 
which Fynn made at a later stage about the destitution 
which the Thuli had been in by 1824 as a result of the 
raids of the Zulu. 46 
There is a similar contradiction in Fynn's various 
statements on the state of the region to the south of Port 
Natal as he had found it in the mid-1820s. In one source 
he states that on his early journeys to the south he had 
found 'neither kraals, huts, Kafirs, nor corn' in the 
coastal region as far as the Mpondo country near the ' 
Mzimvubu. Apart from a few 'stragglers', the whole area 
43. Fynn, Diary, pp. 63-4, 70; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, pp. 32, 63. 
44. Fynn, Diary, p. 70; Maclean, 'Loss of the brig Mary', 
Nautical Magazine, Nov. 1853, p. 570. 
45. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, King to 
Bathurst, 10 July 1824, p. 41; op. cit., Farewell to 
Somerset, 6 sept. 1824, p. 38; Maclean, 'Loss of the brig 
Mary', Nautical Magazine, Feb. 1853, p. 76, and April 
1853, p. 200. 
46. Fynn's evidence to Harding Commission, Natal Govt. 
Gazette, no. 221, 1 March 1853 (the relevant portion of 
his evidence is reproduced in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, 
p. 124); Fynn, Diary, p. 60n. 
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was empty of population. 47 In another, he indicates that 
in ·1824 there were 'six thousand unhappy beings' living 
along the coast between Port Natal and the Mthatha 
river. 48 In his published Diary, the evidence is that, 
even if they were in considerable poverty, in 1824-25 
there were numerous small groups living along the coast. 49 
The overall picture which emerges from a critical 
treatment of the evidence from his and other traders' 
accounts is that in the domains of Magaye and Mathubane, 
social, political and economic organization in the mid-
1820s were well established. In the coastlands south of 
Port Natal, the population was thinner and more scattered, 
and existence more precarious. 
That Shaka's hold on these peripheral regions of his 
kingdom in this period was not as absolute as is usually 
thought is suggested by Maziyana's testimony that numbers 
of cattle seized on 'official' raids by the iziYendane 
were appropriated by their izinduna. It was not until the 
aftermath of the campaign against the Chunu, or perhaps of 
that against the Mpondo, that Shaka had a force available 
to take steps against them. Numbers of iziYendane, 
including the chief induna, Nonzama, were put to death, 
while many others fled to seek refuge among the Xhosa and 
Sotho. Nonzama's cattle were given to Mathubane. 50 It is 
not clear if this was the end of the iziYendane's presence 
in the coastlands. If it was, many of them may have 
remained settled there, for Fynn later listed the Hlubi as 
one of the 'tribes' which he had encountered between the 
47. Fynn's evidence to Harding Commission, Natal Govt. 
Gazette, no. 220, 22 Feb. 1853. The relevant portion of 
his evidence is reprinted in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, 
p. 103. See also the extract from Fynn's papers published 
in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 74. 
48. Extract from Fynn's papers published in Bird, ed., 
Annals, vol. 1, p. 69; also in Fynn, Diary, p. 22. 
49. Fynn, Diary, pp. 91, 92, 95, 96-7, 98, 99, 100, 107-8. 
50. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 296, 297. 
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Thukela and the Thongati rivers on his arrival in 1824. 51 
Another indication that Shaka's herds south of the 
Thukela were not immune to theft comes from traditions 
about the reivings of Gcugcwa of the Wosiyana section of 
the Ngcobo. He and others are said to have made off with 
cattle from the Zulu herds in the coastlands, and to have 
driven them to a hideout far up the Thukela valley before 
being tracked down by Shaka's forces and put to death. 52 
But if Shaka dealt severely with robbers of his cattle, 
his policies towards 'bandits' in the peripheral regions 
south of the Thukela were more flexible than the two cases 
previously mentioned might suggest. Melaphi recounts that 
he gave an amnesty to people, probably of the Makhanya 
chiefdom, who, after a Zulu attack, had taken to the 
bushes and begun to steal cattle from the Cele. 53 Another 
similar case concerned a former office-bearer in one of 
Shaka's amabutho named Lukhilimba, whom the Zulu chief had 
sent into exile. After establishing himself as the leader 
of a group of Hlongwa and others near the lower Mzimkhulu, 
he had acquired a reputation as a cattle-raider. Shaka's 
way of eliminating this source of disturbance on his 
southern borders was "to pardon Lukhilimba, present him 
with cattle, and resettle him in Magaye's territory.54 
This is not to say that Zulu rule did not lie heavily, 
probably increasingly so, on the inhabitants of the region 
south of the Thukela. Men and youths were required to 
serve as herders at the Zulu cattle posts, and, unlike the 
members of the state's amabutho, had little prospect of 
51. Fynn's evidence to Harding Commission, Natal 
Government Gazette, no. 220, 22 Feb. 1853. 
52. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 201; vol. 3, 
evidence of Melaphi, p. 81; vol. 3, evidence of Mmemi, 
pp. 245-6. 
53. JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, pp. 80-1. 
54. Funwayo's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Hlongwa 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 127-8 (the 
informant is identified in the text); JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Mahaya, pp. 112, 126; vol. 2, evidence of 
Maziyana, pp. 269-70, 273, 275. 
294 
winning honours or reward in the service of the Zulu (see 
pp. 317-18 below). Most homesteads in the Cele and Thuli 
chiefdoms probably held few, if any, cattle at this 
period, and personal experiences of rule at the hands of 
the new overlords were often harsh. Maziyana tells how 
Shaka ordered Mathubane to put two Thuli herdboys to 
death, and threatened him with the same fate, for an 
apparently minor transgression. 55 According to Fynn, Zulu 
warriors in transit through the Cele country were 
accustomed to pillaging the homesteads and fields of 
Magaye's people as they passed by.56 
By the mid-1820s the Zulu state had extended the bounds 
of the area which it dominated a hundred and fifty 
kilometres or more west and south to the Drakensberg and 
the Mzimkhulu. Domination had not, though, led to an 
expansion of territory actually occupied by the Zulu 
themselves or by their satellite chiefdoms, except perhaps 
by .the Mkhize in the upper Mvoti-middle Mngeni region. In 
the northern coastlands the Zulu had established a 
stronger and more visible presence. From this territorial 
base they were busy extracting cattle from a region which 
now extended beyond the Mzimkhulu, using, as before, armed 
parties from Magaye's domains, but also, when necessary, 
their own amabutho. These cattle were grazed at posts 
located in the Cele and Thuli countries and manned by 
adherents of Magaye and Mathubane, who carried ultimate 
responsibility for them. 
2. Conflicts in the Mzimkhulu region 
By driving away the Ngwane chiefdom from the upper Thukela 
and destroying the Chunu chiefdom on the middle Mzimkhulu, 
the Zulu had removed the main obstacles to their further 
expansion to the west and south. But there is no 
indication that they sought to establish any effective 
55. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 293-4. 
56. Fynn, Diary, pp. 64, 64n, 70n. 
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occupation of the territories thus vacated. Their failure 
to do so was due primarily to the reluctance of the Zulu 
leaders to colonize a geographically distant region at a 
time when their hold on state power was still largely 
unconsolidated, and when they were faced with violent 
conflicts all round the sphere of influence which they had 
created. On its northern borders, the Zulu state faced 
major threats to its security, and possibly to its very 
existence, from some of the polities which were contending 
for domination in a region which extended far beyond 
Delagoa Bay. Zones of instability also existed on the 
highveld to the west, and beyond the Mzimkhulu to the 
south. In the early and mid-1820s, the policy followed by 
Zulu leaders on their state's western and southern borders 
was to avoid further territorial expansion, while 
maintaining security by supporting client chiefdoms in the 
Thukela-Mzinyathi valley, and by acting to eliminate major 
polities within reach of Zulu armies. This latter aspect 
involved not so much 'depopulating' the adjacent regions, 
as writers who have invoked the notion of a cordon 
sanitaire have implied, as of destroying organized 
communities of a size which the Zulu leaders regarded as 
politically dangerous. 
There is no doubt that in the 1820s the highveld was 
the scene of considerable violence and of social and 
political upheaval. The established explanation of this 
phenomenon is that it was caused primarily by the 
irruptions of groups ejected from the territories to the 
east by the explosive expansion of the Zulu state. 
According to this view, the main agents for disorder north 
of the Vaal were Mzilikazi's Khumalo, and, south of that 
river, Matiwane's Ngwane. Originally set out in the late 
19th century by Theal, and revamped in the 1960s by 
writers like Omer-Cooper and Lye, this view has become a 
deeply entrenched orthodoxy.57 Recently, though, its 
57. Theal, History of S.A. since 1795, vol. 1, chs. 14, 
15; Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, chs. 6, 9; Lye, 'The 
Difaqane', JAH, vol. 8 (1967), pp. 107-31. 
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fundamentals have been challenged by Cobbing. In his 
view, the violence on the highveld in the 1820s was a 
product not of Zulu expansion but of the intersection of 
two other sets of forces. In the north-east, the 
expansion of the Oelagoa Bay slave trade after 1815 sent 
shock waves deep into the interior of southern Africa. In 
the south, the British settlement of 1820 in the eastern 
Cape greatly intensified the long-standing demand for more 
labour in the colony. This is turn stimulated a rapid 
increase in slave-raiding, in the territories beyond the 
colony's northern frontiers by bands of mounted gunmen 
from the middle Orange-lower Vaal region. These groups -
Griqua, Kora, Xhosa and whites - had long been raiding to 
the north-east for slaves for the Cape market and for 
cattle: after 1820 they penetrated further and further 
across the highveld in search of these items. 58 
Cobbing's hypothesis exists at present only in outline, 
and a great deal more research is needed to establish it 
on a firm footing. But, in identifying bands of raiders 
equipped with horses and firearms as prime agents of 
violence on the southern highveld in the 1820s, he has 
opened the way for a radical re-interpretation of the 
early 19th-century history not only of this region but of 
the neighbouring territories as well. Support for 
Cobbing's notions has come from Richner's survey of the 
published sources bearing on the history of the highveld 
in the 1820s and early 1830s. 59 On the basis of his and 
Cobbing's arguments, it is safe to say that from at least 
the early 1820s the activities of mounted and armed 
raiders on the highveld would have been a cause of concern 
to political rulers over much of the region south of the 
Limpopo. That the Zulu had first-hand experience of them 
58. Cobbing, 'The myth of the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, 
pp. 26-9; 'The mfecane as alibi', JAR, vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 492-500; 'Jettisoning the mfecane' unpubl. paper, 
pp. 7-8. 
59. Richner, 'The withering away of the "lifaqane"', 
unpubl. essay, chs. 2-4. 
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is evidenced by Isaacs, who, in March 1827, recorded the 
return of a party of Shaka's men from a raid which the 
Zulu king had launched to the west. Near a large river, 
which was probably the Vaal, they had encountered 'yellow 
people on horses, who compelled them to return,.60 Fear 
of these groups was very probably a major factor in 
keeping Shaka and his advisers from establishing cattle 
posts in the territory from which the Zulu had driven the 
Ngwane. 
Similar considerations prevented them from extending 
their occupation of the coastlands much beyond the lower 
Mngeni region. Though the threat, real or potential, 
posed by the existence of the Chunu had been eliminated, 
beyond the Mzimkhulu was a number of comparatively large 
and unstable groups, newly displaced from the territories 
further north, which survived largely by raiding one 
another and the established chiefdoms further to the 
south. The history of the region in which they 
operated, which extended from the Mzimkhulu to the Mbashe 
and beyond, is still largely a blank. Theal regarded the 
area about the Mzimvubu as having been 'a continued scene 
of pillaging and butchering' in the 1820s, but felt that 
an investigation of its history would be 'a waste of 
time,.61 Bryant's attitude was similar. Though he paid 
some attention to the histories of the individual groups 
which had migrated southwards across the Mzimkhulu in the 
late 1810s and early 1820s, he was not concerned to set 
out the region's history systematically. For him it was a 
'general cock-pit',62 into which refugees from the 
'depopulated' zone to the north conveniently disappeared 
from view. 'Impossible were it for us to convey to the 
reader's mind', he wrote, 'any vivid visualization of the 
social and political pandemonium in which both clans and 
60. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 100. 
61. Theal, History of S.A. since 1795, vol. 2, p. 354. 
62. Bryant, OT, p. 487. 
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individuals now found themselves in this small strip of 
land betwixt the Mzimkulu and Mzimvubu'. As so often in 
his work, in place of a historical overview he sUbstituted 
a generalized and lurid picture of 'tribal tumult' and the 
collapse of political and social order. 63 
Soga included fragments of Mpondo, Mpondomise, Bomvana 
and Thembu history in his compilation, but his 
interpretations of them are idiosyncratic and 
contradictory, and need to be treated with caution. 64 
More recently, Hammond-Tooke, Beinart and Wagenaar have 
briefly synthesized some of the sources on the early 19th-
century history of the Bhaca, Mpondo and Thembu 
respectively,65 but there is a good deal of primary 
material still to be worked through before a comprehensive 
account of the history of the region as a whole can be 
given. ~n the absence of such a study, it is difficult to 
gra~p the full nature of the forces which, in the early 
1820s, served to inhibit Zulu expansion south of Port 
Natal. In the rest of this section, an attempt will be 
made to outline the nature of the conflicts which were 
taking shape at this time in the region about the 
Mzimkhulu and to the south. 
Much of the existing literature, especially that 
written from a Zulu-centric perspective, tends to see the 
63. Bryant, OT, pp. 381-2. 
64. J.H. Soga, The south-Eastern Bantu, Johannesburg, 
1930, esp. chs. 19, 20, 24. 
65. W.J Beinart, 'Production, labour migrancy and the 
chieftaincy: aspects of the political economy of 
Pondoland, ca.1860-1930', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University 
of London, 1979, pp. 10-36; W. Beinart, The Political 
Economy of Pondoland 1860 to 1930, Johannesburg, 1982, 
pp. 9-14; E.J.C. Wagenaar, 'A forgotten frontier zone -
settlements and reactions in the stormberg area between 
1820-60', in Archives Year Book for South African History, 
1982, vol. 2, Pretoria, 1984, ch. 1; E.J.C. Wagenaar, 'A 
history of the Thembu and their relationship with the 
Cape, 1850-1900', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Rhodes University, 
1988, pp. 1-10; W.O. Hammond-Tooke, The Tribes of Mount 
Frere District, Department of Native Affairs Ethnological 
publications no. 33, Pretoria, 1956, pp. 32-44; W.O. 
Hammond-Tooke, Bhaca Society, Cape Town, 1962, pp. 2-7. 
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region south of the Mzimkhulu in the 1820s as little more 
than a conduit for refugee groups fleeing from the Zulu 
towards the Thembu and Xhosa chiefdoms further south. 
According to the conventional view, most of these groups 
ended up as clients of the Thembu and Xhosa, or as so-
called Fingoes in the eastern Cape colony. The notion 
that the Fingoes, or Mfengu as they have been dubbed in 
recent Africanist literature, emanated from regions far to 
the north or north-east of the colony goes back to the 
early and mid-1820s, when groups of displaced and socially 
marginalized people first began appearing in any numbers 
on the Cape eastern frontier. 66 Some commentators 
maintained that these groups were refugees from what is 
now Natal,67 but this idea probably did not spread widely 
among Europeans at the Cape until after 1835. In that 
year, under circumstances which still need critical 
investigation, large numbers of Fingoes were encouraged by 
the Cape authorities to settle in the colony's frontier 
districts, where, it was hoped, they would serve as a 
reservoir of labour for the region's European settlers. 68 
To give this operation the appearance of altruism, the 
colonial authorities, together with settler ideologues 
like Godlonton, sought to caste the Fingoes as victims, 
first, of devastations caused in Natal by Shaka, or 
alternatively Matiwane of the Ngwane, and, second, of 
Xhosa exploitation. 69 
66. For early documentary references to 'Fingoes' see 
Andrew Smith Papers, vol. 3 ('Kaffir Notes'), pp. 129-30; 
G.E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa, vol. 3, London, 1919, 
p. 162n; Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, pp. 164-5; Webster, 
'Ayliff', unpubl. essay, pp. 5-6. 
67. See Webster, 'Ayliff', unpubl. essay, p. 6. 
68. The most detailed academic account of these events is 
given in R. Moyer, 'A history of the Mfengu of the eastern 
Cape 1815-1865', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of 
London, 1976, ch. 2. Moyer takes his sources too much at 
face value, and his account leaves room for a radically 
different interpretation. 
69. See Godlonton, Narrative, reprint of official notice 
of 3 May 1835, esp. p. 248. 
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Their arguments were based in the first instance on 
statements apparently made by a number of Fingo leaders, 
who indicated, among other things, that their people had 
been driven from the Natal region some ten or twenty years 
before. 70 This information meshed neatly with, and served 
to reinforce, the notion which was then becoming 
established in colonial discourse that Shaka had been a 
destroyer of tribes far and wide (see chapter 2 above). 
From that time on, the idea became dominant in the 
literature that the Fingoes were originally refugees who 
had migrated southward to escape destruction at the hands 
of the Zulu, or of the Ngwane, who were themselves fleeing 
from the Zulu. 71 It survives today virtually unchallenged 
in the work of academic historians. 72 
Once again Cobbing has been the first historian 
seriously to call this orthodoxy into question. The 
Fingoes as a category of dispossessed people were, he 
argues, the products not so much of upheavals in Natal as 
of a long series of British cattle raids and land seizures 
across the eastern frontier of the Cape. stories that 
they had fled from the Zulu and become virtual slaves of 
the Gcaleka were to a large extent evolved by the colonial 
authorities to cover their seizure of large numbers of 
70. See for example captain Alexander's notes on the 
Fingoes, Jnl. of the Royal Geographic Society, vol. 5 
(1835), pp. 318-19. According to Moyer, 'History of the 
Mfengu', unpubl. thesis, p. 34, these notes were taken 
almost verbatim from a letter written by the missionary 
John Ayliff and published in the Grahamstown Journal (of 
which Godlonton was editor) of 17 August 1835. 
71. See for example Gardiner, Narrative (1836), p. 313; 
Holden, Past and Future (1866), p. 133; Shepstone, 'Early 
history of the Zulu-Kafir race' in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 
1 (1888), p. 158; C.P. Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kafir 
Life and History, ed. C Saunders, Pietermaritzburg, 1977 
(reprint of 1916 ed., 1st publ. Lovedale, 1896), p. 79. 
72. See for example Moyer, 'History of the Mfengu', 
unpubl. thesis (1976), ch. 1; J.B. Peires, The House of 
Phalo: a History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their 
Independence, Johannesburg, 1981, pp. 41, 87-8, 105. 
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Fingo captives in the war of 1834-35. 73 
In important respects, Cobbing's hypothesis is 
supported by Webster's recent study of the historical 
mythology surrounding the 'emancipation' of the Fingoes in 
1835,74 and in arguing that the category of Fingoes, or 
amamfengu, as they were called in Xhosa society, were in 
large part the product of colonial violence he has put his 
finger on a major unexamined aspect of Cape frontier 
history. But he goes too far in portraying accounts of 
Fingo migrations from Natal as more or less entirely the 
invention of colonial officials. This is very much a 
simplistic and 'top-down' view of the processes by which 
representations of the past are produced. It takes no 
account of the probability that in creating an officially 
sanctioned history of the Fingoes these officials were 
selectively drawing on stories and traditions which were 
current among the various Fingo groups. Nor does it take 
account of the probability that some of these stories and 
traditions may have reflected a historical reality, albeit 
one which was distorted by the concern of Fingo spokesmen 
to present to the colonial authorities information about 
their past which was consonant with their own particular 
political agendas. Critical examination of recorded Fingo 
traditions would fairly certainly yield a version of the 
past in which stories about the migrations of certain 
groups from Natal turned out to have a factual base. 
Nevertheless Cobbing's arguments serve to point up the 
necessity for thorough research into the history of the 
region south of the Mzimkhulu through which many of the 
migrant groups which became Fingoes are supposed to have 
passed. 
From a Natal-centric perspective, there is little doubt 
that numbers of groups displaced by the upheavals of the 
late 1810s and early 1820s migrated across the Mzimkhulu. 
73. Cobbing, 'The myth of the mfecane' , unpubl. paper, 
pp. 21-3; 'Jettisoning the mfecane', unpubl. paper, p. 13. 
74. Webster, 'Ayliff', unpubl. essay, passim. 
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But, contrary to the stereotype contained in the 
literature on Fingo history, most of these groups 
apparently aimed to re-establish themselves between that 
river and the Mzimvubu rather than move on fUrther south. 
What seems to have been the first major group to migrate 
across the Mzimkhulu in this period, one consisting 
largely of Bhele from the territories south of the 
Biggarsberg, is a good case in point. Following 
Shepstone, Bryant implies at one point in Olden Times that 
the Bhele migrated directly to the Cape frontier. 75 His 
substantive account of their history, on the other hand, 
has them settling just south of the Mzimkhulu, where their 
chief, Qunta, died and was given an elaborate burial. 76 
Similar treatment is accorded by Bryant to the zizi and 
the Tolo. Again following Shepstone, Bryant at one point 
unproblematically has both of these groups as having made 
their way directly from the foothills of the Drakensberg 
across the Mzimkhulu to the Cape frontier. 77 At other 
points he indicates that they in fact remained in the 
Mzimkhulu-Mzimvubu region. 78 
If it is accepted that these and other migrant groups 
settled, or attempted to settle, in this region, an 
explanation is needed as to why they should have come to a 
halt in this particular area. The main reason is probably 
that, after a relatively unopposed passage through 
territories occupied by very small polities, they found 
themselves entering the sphere of influence of the much 
larger and more powerful Mpondo paramountcy. This was 
located on either side of the lower Mzimvubu, and since 
1820 or before had been ruled by Faku, son of 
75. Bryant, OT, . p. 357; Shesptone's notes on Bhele 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 142. 
76. Bryant, OT, p. 348. 
77. Ibid., p. 357; Bryant, HZ, p. 34; Shepstone's notes on 
Zizi and Tolo history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, 
pp. 142, 147. 
78. Bryant, OT, pp. 358, 382. 
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Ngqungqushe. 79 To the south-west across the Mthatha were 
various groups of Thembu, most of which acknowledged the 
paramountcy of the Hala section under Ngubencuka, or 
Vusani. Though the polity under his authority seems to 
have been more loosely constituted than that of Faku,80 it 
would still have represented a major obstacle for the 
migrant groups which were making their way south across 
the Mzimkhulu before and after 1820. 
For these groups, the choices were to make their 
submission to established and relatively powerful rulers 
like Faku and Ngubencuka, to fight them for dominance, or 
to attempt to re-establish themselves on the edges of the 
Mpondo sphere of influence. In the first instance most of 
the larger migrant groups seem to have chosen the latter 
course. To the extent that they attempted to resuscitate 
an economy based on agriculture and cattle-keeping, 
environmental factors would have tended to channel them 
into a comparatively narrow band of territory in the 
lower- lying regions, for the high inland plateau of what 
is now East Griqualand, with its long frost season and 
sourveld grazing, was unfavourable for year-round 
settlement. Conflicts among these groups over cattle 
would thus have been intensified by competition for 
relatively scarce resources of good agricultural and 
grazing land. 
Soon after the advent of the Bhele, the comparatively 
powerful groups of Macingwane's Chunu and Ngoza's Thembu 
arrived on the scene at much the same time. That the 
Chunu were probably in advance of the Thembu is suggested 
by the fact that they proceeded to appropriate for 
themselves the region to the north of the middle 
Mzimkhulu, well away from the Mpondo sphere of influence. 
79. Beinart, 'Production', unpubl. thesis, pp. 10-11; 
Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, pp. 303-5; Peires, House of 
Phalo, p. 86. 
80. Peires, House of Phalo, pp. 84-6; Wagenaar, 'History 
of the Thembu', unpubl. thesis, pp. 1-4. 
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The Thembu, following after, had little option but to 
continue further southward, into a position where they 
were faced by the Mpondo on one side and Macingwane's 
Chunu on the other. Somewhere in the vicinity were also 
the recently arrived Bhele. Not long afterwards, the 
Nhlangwini of Nombewu, together with the Memela of Mdingi, 
also pushed their way across the lower Mzimkhulu. A 
little way inland, the Bhaca under Madikane apparently 
moved into the developing Chunu sphere of influence, and 
made their sUbmission to Macingwane. 
Besides these larger groupings, and the fragments of 
other polities which adhered to them, numbers of smaller 
parties also made their way southward across the 
Mzimkhulu. The zizi and Tolo have already been mentioned; 
others named in the records are the Nxasane (or Cekwana) 
and the Shwawu, who retreated from the Mzimkhulu on the 
arrival of the Chunu,8l and the Hlongwa and Shinga 
(Ndelu), who moved off from the middle Mvoti to avoid Zulu 
domination. 82 Drawing on the evidence of Magwaza, 
Shepstone gives the Xesibe as having migrated from the 
middle Thukela region towards the Mpondo country.83 There 
were no doubt numerous other small parties, whose separate 
identities subsequently became submerged, which made their 
81. Shepstone's unattributed notes on the histories of the 
Cekwana and Shwawu in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 148; 
Bryant, OT, pp. 269-70. 
82. Funwayo's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Hlongwa 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 127-8, 131 (the 
informant is identified in the text); Bryant, OT, pp. 525, 
532. 
83. Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 135 (Magwaza is identi-
fied as the informant in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p. 115). See also Bryant, OT, p. 254. Soga, South-
Eastern Bantu, pp. 349-51, draws on Bryant in trying to 
mesh three separate sets of Xesibe traditions, one linking 
them to the Dlamini of the middle Thukela region, another 
to the Mpondo, and a third to the Qwathi. See also Jojo's 
evidence on Xesibe history in Brownlee, ed., Transkeian 
Native Territories, esp. p. 105; M. Ndima, 'A history of 
the Qwathi people from earliest times to 1910', unpubl. 
M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1988, pp. 1-6. 
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way southward and khonza'd either to the Mpondo or to one 
or other of the larger intrusive groups. 
The sudden influx of dislocated groups into the 
Mzimkhulu valley and the area to the south inaugurated a 
long period of political instability and violence in the 
region. What little is known of its history in the 1820s 
is largely about fights and raids. Of the previously 
established chiefdoms, that of the imiThwana, which was 
located on the coast a little way north of the Mzimkhulu, 
is said to have been broken up in an assault by several of 
the intrusive groups.84 The Xolo, who lived on the lower 
Mzimkhulu, were raided by the Nhlangwini,85 and the 
Mbotho, who lived at the Bisi river, were attacked by the 
Chunu and Bhaca. 86 The first major conflict of the period 
was probably that between the Mpondo and Ngoza's Thembu. 
The difficulties of assessing Shepstone's and Bryant's 
accounts of the circumstances in which the confrontation 
between them took place have been touched on above (see 
pp. 120-1). In the event, the Mpondo defeated the Thembu 
in battle, killed Ngoza, and broke up his chiefdom. While 
numbers of his people probably khonza'd to local chiefs, 
many of them eventually made their way back northward and 
submitted to Shaka. 87 Not long afterwards the Zulu made 
the first of a series of interventions in the politics of 
the region. As already described, they attacked and 
destroyed the Chunu chiefdom. The chief, Macingwane, 
disappeared, and numbers of his people returned to make 
their submission to Shaka. 
It is significant that, contrary to what mfecane theory 
would lead one to expect, the remnants of the Thembu and 
84. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, pp. 112-13, 126. 
85. Bryant, QI, p. 562. 
86. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, pp. 113, 119. 
87. Ibid.; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Lugubhu, pp. 282, 287; 
vol. 1, evidence of Lunguza, p. 299; vol. 2, evidence of 
Mahaya, pp. 119-20; vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 32; 
Fynn, Diary, p. 321. 
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Chunu retraced their footsteps to the north and gave their 
allegiance to Shaka rather than continuing further to the 
south. Several other groups also returned northwards from 
the Mzimkhulu region at this time. The Hlongwa, together 
with the associated Shinga (Ndelu) eventually settled near 
Port Natal. 88 A section of Mpumuza from the middle 
Thukela valley, which had accompanied the Memela and 
Nhlangwini southward, returned to seek refuge in the 
forests of the Karkloof region north ~f the upper 
Mngeni. 89 A party of Nxa~alala, which had left the middle 
Thukela valley to join the migration of the Thembu under 
Ngoza, made its way back to its former territory after the 
latter's defeat and death. 90 All these groups, it seems, 
preferred to join Shaka or to try to maintain an 
independent existence under difficult conditions rather 
than to remain in the zone of intensified conflict which 
was emerging in the south. 
The destruction of the Thembu and Chunu powers marked 
the end of one phase of conflict in the Mzimkhulu-Mzimvubu 
region, and the beginning of another. In this, the main 
protagonists were the Bhaca under Madikane, the group of 
Memela and others under Mdingi, and the Nhlangwini under 
Nombewu. In the wings to the south were the Mpondo and 
the Thembu of Ngubencuka. From the north, raiding parties 
from the Zulu domains made occasional forays into the 
coastlands south of Port Natal and, eventually, as 
described in the previous section of the chapter, over the 
Mzimkhulu. 
Most active among these groups seem to have been the 
Bhaca. Their leader, Madikane, was another of those 
88. Shepstone's unattributed notes on Ndelu history in 
Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 127; Funwayo's evidence in 
Shepstone's notes on Hlongwa history in Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, pp. 127-8 (the informant is identified in the 
text); Brayant, OT, pp. 526, 532. 
89. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, 
pp. 1, 8-9. 
90. Ibid., p. 17. 
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figures who, in mfecane literature, are cast in the same 
mould as Shaka. As Scully puts it, 'Among the many 
notable leaders who emerged from the debacle occasioned by 
Tshaka, Madikane was one of the most remarkable,.91 
Bryant describes him as a 'fighting-chief' who performed 
'fierce deeds of daring,.92 The evidence on his 
following's history in the 1820s is very thin and patchy, 
and difficult to interpret, but it seems that after trte 
defeat of the Chunu, to whom they had briefly been allied, 
the Bhaca moved away to the south-west and eventually 
settled in the valley of the middle Mzimvubu. 93 According 
to Bryant, in the process they attacked and defeated the 
Nhlangwini of Nombewu and the party led by Mdingi. The 
latter's original Memela following had been augmented by 
numbers of Bhele who had joined him after the death of 
their chief, Qunta. 94 
After a time the Bhaca shifted still further to the 
south-west across the Mthatha and Mbashe rivers into 
country occupied by Ngubencuka's Thembu. According to 
scully, this move was a direct consequence of an attack 
made on them by Shaka's forces during the Zulu expedition 
across the Mzimkhulu in 1824. 95 The Bhaca advance into 
Thembu territory brought forth an alliance of Thembu, 
Gcaleka and Mpondomise to oppose them. In the Gqutyini 
area, north-west of present-day Engcobo, they attacked the 
91. scully, 'Fragments. The Amabaca. II', The State, 
vol. 2 (1909), p. 93. 
92. Bryant, OT, pp. 374, 375. 
93. Andrew Smith Papers (S.A. Museum), vol. 4 'Africa 
vol. I', p. 152; Scully, 'Fragments. The Amabaca' , The 
State, vol. 1 (1909), p. 675; Scully, Further 
Reminiscences, pp. 261-2; Bryant, OT, p. 384. 
94. Bryant, OT, pp. 382-4. 
95. Scully, Further Reminiscences, pp. 262-5. In an 
earlier account, Scully had dated this attack to 1828: 
'Fragments, The Amabaca', The State, vol. 1 (1909), pp. 
676-8; 'Fragments. The Amabaca. II', The State, vol. 2 
(1909), p. 90. See also the discussion on p. 289 
above. 
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Bhaca, defeated them, and seized their cattle and numbers 
of women and children. 96 On the basis of an unattributed 
story which indicated that the fight took place on the day 
of an eclipse of the sun, Theal, followed by Scully and 
Bryant, dated it to 20 December 1824. 97 That an eclipse 
visible in the region took place on that day is confirmed 
by modern scientific calculations;98 whether this 
particular battle can be associated with it needs to be 
established by further research. 
The sources disagree as to whether or not Madikane was 
killed in this fight, but, whatever the chief's fate, it 
is clear that after their defeat the main body of Bhaca 
gravitated back to the valley of the Mzimvubu. From 
there, under the leadership either of Madikane or of his 
son and effective succesor, Ncaphayi, they raided widely 
over the territories to the east and south. 99 For their 
part, groups like Mdingi's Memela-Bhele and Nombewu's 
96. Nombiba's evidence in Shepstone's notes on Bhaca 
history in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, p. 136 (the 
informant is identified in T. Shepstone Papers, vol. 89, 
p. 119); evidence of Vete kaMziziba, as recorded by F.P. 
Gladwin, in Commission on Laws and Customs, vol. 2, p. 404 
(also in Brownlee, ed., Transkeian Native Territories, p. 
113); Ndima, 'History of the Qwathi', unpubl. thesis, pp. 
36-9; Andrew smith Papers (S.A. Museum), vol. 4, 'Africa 
vol. I', p. 152. 
97. Theal, History of S.A. since 1795, vol. 1, p. 390; 
Scully, Further Reminiscences, p. 265 (where he revises 
his earlier dating of 20 December 1828: see Scully, 
'Fragments. The Amabaca. II', The State, vol. 2 (1909), p. 
92); Bryant, OT, p. 384. See also Mahaya's statement in 
JSA, vol. 2, p. 118, that on the day of the fight 
'darkness came over the land'. 
98. R. Gray, 'Annular eclipse maps', JAH, vol. 9 (1968), 
p. 156. 
99. Nombiba's evidence as cited in note 96 above; Mehloma-
khulu, 'statement of Mathlomahulu', Cape Monthly Magazine, 
vol 3 (1880), p. 163; Scully, 'Fragments. The 
Amabaca. II', The State, vol. 2 (1909), pp. 94-5; 
w.c. Scully, 'Fragments of native history. The Amabaca. 
III', The State, vol. 2 (1909), p. 194-5; Bryant, OT, pp. 
154, 385-7; Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, pp. 308-9, 372; 
Fynn, Diary, pp. 320-1. 
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Nhlangwini may also have been living largely by predation 
on their more settled neighbours at this time. 
The disruptions caused in the territories south of the 
Mzimkhulu in the early and mid-1820s by the intrusion of 
groups from the north were compounded by the effects of 
the conflicts and confrontations which were taking place 
at this time on the Cape eastern frontier and also on the 
southern highveld. It is an extraordinary feature of the 
relatively large corpus of work on the history of the 
eastern Cape region that there is still no study which 
comprehensively assesses the impact of British policies 
and the British presence on the African societies beyond 
the colonial boundary. Several recent works have touched 
on the traumatic impact on the westernmost Xhosa 
chiefdoms of the expulsion of large numbers of people from 
the Zuurveld west of the Fish river in 1811-12, and from 
the so-called Ceded Territory between the Fish and 
Keiskamma in 1819. They have also hinted at the 
destabilizing effects of large-scale, officially 
sanctioned cattle raids conducted by British forces across 
the colonial boundary in the 1810s and 1820s. 100 But none 
of these works goes much beyond Macmillan's study of sixty 
years ago in attempting to confront the question of how 
these events affected the politics of the broader region 
northwards and eastwards from the Fish river. 101 Nor is 
there any work which does much to recognize, let alone to 
analyze, the overall impact on this region of raids and 
threats of raids from the other side of the Orange 
river. 102 In the absence of such studies, the most that 
100. Peires, House of Phalo, pp. 65-8, 79-84; J. Milton, 
The Edges of War: a History of the Frontier Wars (1702-
1878), Cape Town, 1983, pp. 60-75, 79-80, 86-94; B. 
Maclennan, A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the 
Cape's Eastern Frontier, Johannesburg, 1986, chs. 14-25 
passim. 
101. Macmillan, Bantu. Boer and Briton, pp. 31-4, and 
chs. 5 & 6. 
102. Exceptions are cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, 
vol. 29 (1988), pp. 500-1; Richner, 'The withering away of 
the "lifaqane"', unpubl. essay, pp. 22-3. 
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can be said here is that the interactions between 
established chiefdoms like those of the Mpondo, 
Mpondomise, Thembu and others and intrusive groups from 
north of the Mzimkhulu were shaped, in ways which badly 
need research, by pressures which they were all coming 
under from the south and from the north-west. 
This, in rough outline, was the situation which faced 
the Zulu leaders on the southern borders of their sphere 
of influence in the mid-1820s. Though they had the 
military capacity to mount large-scale raids into the 
region, they did not have the power to intervene 
effectively in its politics, let alone establish the 
domination which the literature on the mfecane supposes 
them to have maintained over it. While no doubt keeping a 
wary eye on the struggles for supremacy which were taking 
place beyond the Mzimkhulu, they were constrained to leave 
the coastlands south of Port Natal uncolonized. 
3. The shaping of new political identities 
Most writers have seen the domination which the Zulu 
exercised over subordinate chiefdoms, including those 
south of the Thukela, as having been maintained almost 
entirely by force. 103 until very recently, they paid 
virtually no attention to the role played by ideological 
factors in sustaining Zulu power. The first author to 
accord any major significance to the subject was Hedges, 
who recognized the centrality of the ideology of kinship 
in the processes by which the Zulu incorporated newly 
subordinated groups into the polity which they ruled. 104 
He failed, however, to appreciate the significance of the 
103. This section of the chapter draws heavily in places 
on Hamilton & Wright, 'The making of the Lala', unpubl. 
paper, pp. 6 ff, and on the revised version which is due 
for publication in 1990 in the South African Historical 
Journal. 
104. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 22-4, 63-4, 77-83, 98-9, 207-9. 
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point, previously made by Slater, that these groups were 
incorporated differentially, with several 'broadly 
concentric zones of Zulu power' having developed, each of 
which was 'characterized by different kinds of 
relationship to the apex,.105 Slater, for his part, 
completely neglected the role of ideology, and so failed 
to perceive that the three zones which he distinguished -
the 'heartland', the 'provinces', and the 'protectorates' 
- did not simply stand in different relationships to the 
centre of power, but were occupied by groups which, in one 
way or another, came to acquire new socio-political 
identities. 
The pioneering work in the identification of the new 
political categories which began to be formed in the early 
years of the Zulu kingdom, and in the elucidation of the 
particular historical circumstances in which they came to 
be created, has been done by Hamilton in her seminal 
thesis on the role of ideology in the formation of the 
Zulu state. The crucial distinction which she makes is 
between the peoples of the Zulu kingdom's heartland, who 
collectively came to be known as amantungwa, and the more 
heavily oppressed and exploited peoples of the kingdom's 
peripheries, who came to be designated by a variety of 
derogatory terms. Of these peoples, she focusses her 
attention on those who lived south of the Thukela river 
and who came to be called amalala. 
The amantungwa chiefdoms were, without exception, those 
which were incorporated into the emerging Zulu state in 
the very earliest phase of its expansion. 106 At this 
time, as has been argued above (pp. 179 ff), Shaka's still 
unstable regime was facing a serious threat from the raids 
of the Ndwandwe, and was seeking urgently to mobilize a 
military and political alliance against them. To give 
cohesion to the alliance, the chiefdoms which were drawn 
105. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, p. 298. 
106. This paragraph is based on Hamilton, 'Ideology', 
unpubl. thesis, ch. 5. 
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or forced into it were closely assimilated into the body 
politic of what was in effect an emergent state. Most of 
the peoples who were thus relatively suddenly brought 
together under the domination of the Zulu were 
genealogically quite unrelated: identifiable descent links 
could therefore not serve as a basis for social cohesion. 
The Zulu leadership was therefore constrained deliberately 
to fabricate a new collective identity for these peoples 
which was based on a generalized, non-specific notion of 
kinship. They propagated the idea that these groups were 
linked to one another and to the Zulu by virtue of sharing 
a common origin, the nature of which was purposely left 
unspecified. That this idea was cast in the familiar 
idiom of descent made it comprehensible to the groups 
concerned, even if they remained unable to demonstrate 
direct genealogical links with one another. This enabled 
leaders of subordinated groups who, for their own 
particular reasons, wanted to establish closer political 
ties with the Zulu more easily to make the idea acceptable 
to their adherents, and to engage in the process of 
reformulating the traditions of origin of their own groups 
so as to make them harmonize with those of the Zulu. The 
result was the gradual emergence of a common identity as 
amantungwa among the heterogeneous chiefdoms of the Zulu 
heartland. (The origins of the term itself are not 
entirely clear: a possible explanation has been advanced 
by Hamilton. 107 ) 
The chiefdoms of the southern peripheries were 
incorporated into the Zulu kingdom on a different basis 
from those of the heartland. As a result, their members 
came to acquire identities which distinguished them from 
the amantungwa. Hamilton and the present writer have 
previously argued that the peoples of these southern 
chiefdoms were all incorporated into the Zulu kingdom on 
essentially similar lines, and that from the start all 
107. Ibid., pp. 289-90. 
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were designated by their new overlords as amalala. 108 The 
evidence adduced in the present study makes clear, 
however, that there were major differences in the ways in 
which certain of these chiefdoms - the Mkhize ,on the one 
hand, and the chiefdoms of the coastlands on the other -
were incorporated. As a result, it is argued here, they 
would have acquired different political identities. Only 
later, after the end of Shaka's reign, did the distinction 
begin to be lost and the amalala identity become more 
general south of the Thukela. 
The incorporation of the relatively powerful Mkhize 
chiefdom under Zihlandlo into the Zulu polity took place 
at a time when the latter was still relatively weak, and 
unable to establish the degree of control over its 
southern peripheries which it had done over its heartland. 
Authority over the chiefdoms of the Thukela valley was 
perforce entrusted by Shaka to Zihlandlo, who, by 
submitting without resistance to the Zulu, had established 
himself as a favoured subordinate. with Shaka's backing, 
the Mkhize chief was able rapidly to expand his domination 
over a wide area on either side of the Thukela. In the 
process, it is suggested here, he was able to win 
recognition from the Zulu leadership of the primacy of the 
Mkhize claim to be regarded as 'abaMbo'. 
The precise historical connotations of the designation 
'abaMbo' (the 'Mbo' people), or 'abaseMbo' (the people 
from 'Mbo'), are no longer known, but there is evidence 
that it had long had a strong resonance over much of what 
/ is now Natal-Zululand. The survivors of the Sao Thome, 
which foundered off the coast of Zululand in 1589,109 
108. Hamilton & Wright, 'The making of the Lala', unpubl 
paper, pp. 12, 14, 17; Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl 
thesis, pp. 474-7. 
109. For bibliographic information on Portuguese accounts 
of its sinking and of the experiences of its survivors, 
see Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa 1488-1600, 
p. 222; and Boxer, ed., Tragic History, pp. 37-42. 
English translations of one of these accounts are to be 
found in Boxer, pp. 53-104; and Theal, ed., Records of 
South-Eastern Africa, vol. 2, pp. 188-224. On the 
location of the region where the survivors reached land 
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reported that to the southward, in the region which they 
called 'Natal', was the kingdom of 'Vambe' or 'Bambe,.110 
Commentators have agreed that this was a reference to the 
'abaMbo', though there is no unanimity among them as to 
the nature of the group so designated. 111 Survivors from 
the Stavenisse, which was wrecked somewhere near the 
Mzimkhulu in 1686, reported that the people of the region 
were called 'Semboes' (abaseMbo) or 'Emboas' (from the 
locative form, eMbo).112 In the 1820s, Andrew Smith 
recorded that the Xhosa designated certain peoples who 
lived to the north of them as 'Mbos,.113 A similar 
meaning was noted by Henry Fynn some time later. 114 
certain groups of migrants from the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region which tendered their allegiance to Xhosa chiefs in 
the 1820s and 1830s at some stage thereafter came to 
see Axelson, p. 219; Willcox, Shipwreck and Survival, pp. 
18-19; Bell-Cross, 'Portuguese shipwrecks', in Axelson, 
ed., Dias and His Successors, p. 56. 
110. Boxer, ed., Tragic History, p. 70. 
111. Theal, History of S.A. before 1795, vol. 1, pp. 359, 
390, sees the Abambo as a recently arrived horde of 
immigrants from the north-west. H.A. Junod, 'The 
condition of the natives of south-east Africa in the 
sixteenth century', S.A. Jnl. of Science, vol. 10 (1914), 
p. 150n, disputes Theal's identification, as does Boxer, 
Tragic History, p. 70n. Bryant, Olden Times, pp. 9, 232, 
288-9, 312-15, gives the Mbo as one of his streams of 
'Nguni' immigrants. On the basis of this single 
reference, Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, pp. 87-
8, 146, 160, 192, 193, 239, 267, postulates that a 'Vambe' 
paramountcy dominated much of the Natal region for several 
centuries. No other evidence for its existence can be 
found. 
112. Moodie, ed., The Record, part I, documents on the 
wreck of the Stavenisse, pp. 426, 431. See also Bird, 
ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 41 (where 'Temboes' should 
presumably read 'Semboes', as in Moodie) & 47. 
113. Andrew Smith Papers, vol. 3, 'Kaffir Notes', p. 23. 
P.R. Kirby indicates that these notes were made by Smith 
in 1824-5: see the introduction to his edition of 
A. Smith, The Diary of Dr. Andrew Smith, vol. 1, Cape 
Town, 1939, p. 11. 
114. H.F. Fynn Papers (Natal Archives), note in File 29. 
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designate themselves collectively as abaMbo. 115 Several 
of the informants interviewed by James Stuart in the early 
20th century stated that 'abaMbo' was the name used by the 
Mpondo for the peoples of Natal. 116 Bryant recorded that 
the Xhosa also used the term in this way.117 
The evidence supports Hedges's conclusion that the term 
'Vambe', as recorded by the Sao Thome party at the end of 
the 16th century, referred to peoples of the Natal region 
in a general sense rather than to a specific political 
unit. 118 Hamilton has argued that the designation 
'abaMbo' was specifically one sh~red by those peoples who 
spoke tekela dialects of what is now called Zulu, and who 
had traditions of having originated in the coastal 
lowlands to the north-east. 119 Whatever its precise 
connotations, they seem to have been prestigious enough 
for the Mkhize who came under Shaka's rule to seek to 
reserve the term exclusively for themselves as one of 
their izithakazelo, or forms of polite address. 120 Though 
firm evidence on the subject is lacking, their main 
concern was very probably to provide themselves with an 
identity which was clearly distinct from the denigratory 
115. Hence the title of Ayliff & Whiteside's Historv of 
the Abambo (1912), which, in the interests of missionary 
enterprise among these peoples, sought to reinforce their 
identity as abaMbo. 
116. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mahaya, pp. 126, 129; 
vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 274; vol. 3, evidence of 
Mbokodo, p. 19. 
117. Bryant, 'Sketch', in his Dictionary, p. 24*; Bryant, 
HZ, pp. 16-17. 
118. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 105. 
119. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, pp. 269-70. 
The term still survives strongly in Swaziland among those 
groups which preserve a tradition that their ancestors 
migrated across the Lubombo mountains from the coastal 
areas to the east (personal communication from carolyn 
Hamilton, 24 April 1986). 
120. On the ways in which izithakazelo were subject to 
manipulation in the processes by which traditions of 
origin were reshaped, see Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 273-7. 
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amalala identity which the Zulu were seeking to impose on 
other subordinated peoples of their kingdom's southern 
peripheries. As a means of strengthening Mkhize support 
for his regime, Shaka seems to have been prepared to allow 
them to have their way. It was only in the 1830s, after 
Shaka's successor, Dingane, had killed Zihlandlo and 
broken up the Mkhize paramountcy,121 that the Mkhize too 
began to be regarded by the Zulu, if not by themselves, as 
amalala. 
The argument above is admittedly partly speculative, 
but it is based on the notion that there would logically 
have been a clear distinction of identities between the 
relatively powerful Mkhize, who were in a position to 
resist being thrust to the bottom of the social and 
political scale in the Zulu-dominated order, and the 
relatively weak chiefdoms of the coastlands, which were 
not. By conceptualizing the categories of abaMbo and 
amalala as historically created identities, rather than as 
the names of primordial sub-divisions of people termed the 
'Nguni', as Bryant does,122 it points towards an 
121. On the destruction of the Mkhize polity, see Isaacs, 
Travels and Adventures, pp. 204, 251-2; JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Mandlakazi, pp. 191-2; vol. 2, evidence of 
Mangati, p. 205; vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, pp. 7, 
17-18; Fuze, Black People, pp. 73-4; Bryant, OT, 
pp. 412-14. 
122. Bryant's uncertaintles about the meanings of these 
terms are reflected ~n the variations which took place 
over time in his system of classifying the peoples of the 
Thukela-Mzimkhulu region. In his 'Sketch' of 1905, he 
designated the peoples of Natal generally as 'Lala', among 
whom the 'Mbo' were an important clan (Dictionary, 
p. 24*). He retained this usage in his Izindaba Zabantu 
articles of 1910-13 (see HZ, p.16). By 1919 he was 
referring to these peoples as Tonga-Ngunis or Lala ('The 
origin of the Zulus', Native Teachers' Journal, vol. 1, 
no. 1 (1919), p. 14). In Olden Times (1929), he 
classified them as Tekela-Nguni, whom he sub-divided into 
the Mbo and Tonga-Nguni, with the Lala now as sub-group of 
the latter (OT, p. 7). In The Zulu People, published in 
1949, he distinguished between the Mbo, who had occupied 
up-country Natal, and the Lala, who had settled the rest 
of the region (Zulu People, p. 10). 
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explanation of a subject which puzzled both Bryant and 
stuart: why, by the early 20th century, it was the Mkhize 
alone of the peoples of Natal who were designated by the 
once widespread name of abaMbo. 123 The contradictions 
inherent in Bryant's usage of the terms 'Mbo' and 'Lala' 
will only be fully understood when the meanings of these 
terms as they developed from the 1830s onward have been 
investigated: what the present work seeks to do is to 
specify the meanings which they acquired when the Zulu 
were establishing domination of the territories south of 
the Thukela in the 1820s. 
The creation of an identity as amalala for the Cele, 
Thuli and neighbouring chiefdoms is better attested than 
is the acquisition of the isithakazelo 'abaMbo' by the 
Mkhize. Like the latter process, the former was also a 
product of particular historical circumstances. Where the 
Mkhize had submitted to Shaka in the early stages of Zulu 
expansion, when his regime was still relatively weak, the 
chiefdoms of the coastlands south of the Thukela were 
subordinated after the Zulu had defeated the Ndwandwe, and 
made themselves the dominant power between the Thukela and 
the Black Mfolozi. with Shaka's authority over the 
chiefdoms of the Zulu kingdom's heartland now somewhat 
more firmly established, the Zulu leadership was able to 
assert tighter political and ideological controls over the 
chiefdoms of the south-eastern coastlands than it had been 
able to do over the Mkhize. The more effectively to 
maintain its domination and to exploit the region's 
resources of cattle and labour-power, it sought to impose 
on the local peoples the notion that they were amalala. 
The evidence strongly suggests that in the early 19th 
century the term amalala meant something like 'menial', 
123. Bryant, 'Sketch', in his Dictionary, p. 24*; Bryant, 
OT, p. 403; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo on the name 
'Embo',p. 19, presumably in answer to a specific question 
from stuart. 
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and carried a heavy stigma of social inferiority.124 It 
served to demarcate those peoples on the southern 
peripheries of the Zulu kingdom whom the Zulu leadership 
wished to exclude from the category of amantungwa, and so 
to prevent them from making the claims on their new 
overlords to which, in terms of kinship ideology, 
membership of this category would have entitled them. 
Though the leaders of the amantungwa peoples were required 
to yield tribute and service in various forms to the Zulu 
king, they could in return expect to benefit from his 
periodic redistribution of accumulated 'surplus', and also 
to be allowed to participate in the Zulu state's decision-
making processes. To render the peoples of the southern 
peripheries open to a greater level of exploitation, it 
was essential for the Zulu leadership to prevent them from 
aspiring to join the category of amantungwa peoples. They 
sought to do this by ascribing to them the identity of 
amalala, which in effect reduced them to the status of 
despised outsiders. 
The amalala peoples were distinguished from the 
amantungwa by differences in dialect, custom and supposed 
origin. Their new identity did not develop solely through 
imposition 'from above': it was almost certainly helped to 
take root though its acceptance by leaders such as Magaye 
of the Cele and Mathubane of the Thuli, who owed their 
positions directly to Zulu intervention. To some extent, 
it seems, the dominant Cele group was able to avoid the 
full effects of Zulu oppression and exploitation by 
deflecting them onto the other peoples of the coastlands 
whom the Zulu had subordinated and placed under Magaye's 
authority. These chiefdoms came to be designated as 
inyakeni, a term which carried connotations of ignorance 
and slovenliness. The effects of this categorization 
124. The passages which follow draw on Hamilton & Wright, 
'The making of the Lala', unpubl. paper, pp. 10-17; and on 
the revised version due for publication in 1990 in the 
South African Historical Journal. 
would have been to stratify the chiefdoms of the 
coastlands still further, and make them yet more 
vulnerable to exploitation by the Cele on behalf, 
ultimately, of the Zulu power. 
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The establishment by the Zulu of physical domination 
over the chiefdoms south of the Thukela was thus accom-
panied by an ideological restructuring which saw the 
emergence of new political identities among the peoples of 
the region. In the Thukela valley, the Mkhize were able 
to assert an exclusive claim to the isithakazelo 'abaMbo', 
which reflected the position of local dominance that they 
were able to achieve by dint of being Shaka's 
'favourites'. In the coastlands, by contrast, the Cele, 
Thuli and other peoples came to be designated by the 
insulting appellations of amalala and inyakeni, which 
reflected the positions which they occupied at the bottom 
of the Zulu-dominated social and political order. 
Zulu hegemony over the territories south of the Thukela 
was still in the process of being consolidated when, from 
the mid-1820s, a completely new set of factors began to 
affect the dynamics of power and conflict in the region. 
These factors stemmed from the settlement at Port Natal 
from 1824 onward of parties of British traders and hunters 
from the Cape colony. The background to the advent of 
these groups, together with their impact on the politics 
of the region in the second half of the 1820s, will form 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ADVENT OF BRITISH HUNTER-TRADERS AND THE UNDERMINING OF 
ZULU POWER SOUTH OF THE THUKELA 
1. The coming of British hunter-traders to Port Natal 
The history of the trading posts which were established at 
Port Natal from 1824 onward by Cape-based entrepreneurs has 
long formed part of the mythology by which English-speaking 
whites in Natal justify their presence in the region and 
the political domination which they exercise over its black 
inhabitants. Very soon after the establishment of Natal as 
a colony of European settlement in the late 1840s and early 
1850s, the arrival of British traders at Port Natal a 
generation earlier was coming to be portrayed as the event 
which marked the advent of civilization in the area. 1 The 
first histories of the colony were, however, ambiguous in 
their treatment of this prefatory period of its history. 
While their writers were pleased to highlight the role 
played by the traders as protectors of 'refugees' from 
Shaka, they were embarrassed by the irrefutable evidence 
that, far from from having been instrumental in spreading 
'civilized' values, numbers of these 'adventurers' had in 
fact ended up 'going native'. Their response was to 
downplay this period of Natal's history, and to focus on 
the processes by which Natal had become a British colony, 
and on its 'progress' since. 2 
It was not until the late 19th century, when Natal's 
white settlers were in the process of acquiring self-
1. Proceedings and Report of the Commission Appointed to 
Inquire into the Past and Present State of the Kafirs in 
the District of Natal (1853), p. 6. 
2. Holden, History of the Colony of Natal (1855), 
pp. 41-8; R.J. Mann, ed., The Colony of Natal, London, n.d. 
(1859), pp. 14-15; H. Brookes & R.J. Mann, Natal: a History 
and Description of the Colony, London, 1876, pp. 206-9. 
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government, and, with it, a greater self-consciousness 
about their collective historical pedigree, that their 
historians began incorporating the now sufficiently distant 
period of precolonial settlement more fully into their 
accounts. By this time the British traders of 1824 and 
after were beginning to be seen less as 'adventurers' than 
as 'pioneers' and 'settlers', the forerunners of the 
founding fathers of the 1840s and 1850s. 3 Similar 
treatment was accorded to them in Theal's influential his-
tories, although, in keeping with his southern Africa-wide 
focus, and with his anti-imperial sentiments, he saw the 
early Natal traders as having opened the way for the coming 
of the Voortrekkers rather than for the establishment of 
British rule. 4 
The 1920s saw the centenary of the arrival of the first 
British traders at Port Natal. By this time Natal's 
English-speaking community had come to feel firmly enough 
rooted for its settler-descended families to be able to 
indulge in a" certain nostalgia for the 'old days'. This 
was evinced in the publication in 1930 of Mackeurtan's The 
Cradle Days of Natal, a long and romanticized narrative of 
Europeans' activities· in the region from the time of Vasco 
da Gama's voyages in the 1490s to the establishment of 
British colonial rule in the 1840s. 5 Its treatment of the 
early Port Natal traders, which was much the most 
substantial yet produced, cast them both as pioneers and as 
adventurers. It is noteworthy that the book was first 
published by Longmans, Green and Co., the firm which, the 
3. Russell, Natal (1891 ed.), pp. 127-33; P.A. Barnett & 
G.W. Sweeney, Natal: the State and the Citizen, London, 
1904, p. 24; Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, 
Twentieth Century Impressions of Natal (place of 
publication not stated), 1906, p. 17; A.H. Tatlow, ed., 
Natal Province: Descriptive Guide and Official Handbook, 
Durban, 1911, p. 4. 
4. G.M. Theal, History of South Africa since 1795, vol. 2, 
London, 1908, pp. 296-302. 
5. G. Mackeurtan, The Cradle Days of Natal, Durban, 1972 
reprint (1st publ. London, 1930), esp. chs. 6 & 7. 
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year before, had published Bryant's Olden Times. What 
Bryant did to provide a detailed reference work on the 
precolonial history of the region's African people, 
Mackeurtan did for its English-speaking whites. Like Olden 
Times, Cradle Days remained the standard work of reference 
on its subject into the 1970s. 
In the 1950s and 1960s a new crop of popular and 
academic works on the history of Natal and Zululand in the 
19th century made its appearance. In so far as they dealt 
with the Port Natal settlement of the 1820s and 1830s, few 
of them moved much, if at all, beyond Mackeurtan. 6 A 
partial exception was Watt's fictionalized biography of 
Francis Farewell, but this too remained firmly within the 
orthodoxies of the settler approach to Natal history.7 
Though Bulpin pioneered an important innovation by setting 
the establishment of the settlement in the context of a 
regional 'Natal' history,8 his successors preferred to 
continue to place it within the history of Shaka's Zulu 
kingdom. 9 
The currents of Africanist history that were flowing 
strongly in the 1960s and early 1970s left little 
impression on treatment of the history of the Port Natal 
settlement. 10 It was left to Roberts's The Zulu Kings, a 
popular work on the reigns of Shaka and Dingane published 
6. For example, A.F. Hattersley, The British Settlement of 
Natal, cambridge, 1950, ch. 1; Bulpin, Shaka's Country, 
chs. 3, 4; and To the Shores of Natal, Cape Town, n.d. 
(1953), chs. 4, 5; Brooks & Webb, A History of Natal, ch. 
3; Morris, The Washing of the Spears, pp. 71-116; Thompson, 
'Co-operation and conflict: the Zulu kingdom and Natal', in 
Wilson & Thompson, eds., Oxford History of S.A., vol. 1, 
ch. 8. 
7. E.P. Watt, Febana, London, 1962. 
8. Bulpin, To the Shores of Natal, pp. 20-7. 
9. See the references to Brookes & Webb, Morris and 
Thompson in note 6 above. 
10. Partial exceptions were Thompson's account cited in 
note 6 above, and F. Okoye, 'Tshaka and the British traders 
1824-1828', Transafrican Journal of History, vol. 2 (1972), 
pp. 10-32. 
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in 1974, to take the first major step beyond Mackeurtan's 
account. 11 Roberts used archival sources to make some 
penetrating reinterpretations of the relations which had 
existed betwen the traders and Shaka, and among the traders 
themselves. His book was - as it remains - the longest and 
best account of the settlement's history yet published. 
Its conventional conceptualization of the internal dynamics 
of the Zulu kingdom prevented it, though, from making a 
comprehensive breakthrough in its treatment of the subject. 
The first work to do this was Slater's doctoral thesis, 
completed in 1976. It placed the history of the Port Natal 
settlement firmly in the history of the political economy 
of the south-east African coastlands from pre-European 
times to the 1840s. 12 Some of the deficiencies of Slater's 
overly evolutionist analytical framework, which have been 
discussed in chapter 1 (pp. 12-13), are apparent in the 
fifty or so pages which he devotes to the history of the 
settlement in the 1820s, but his account nevertheless forms 
the most incisive study of the subject yet made. In spite 
of the obtrusion of his notion of the 'absolutist' Zulu 
state, Slater provides numerous stimulating insights into 
the nature of the forces which produced the settlement, and 
of the relations between the state and the British traders. 
It is an indictment of later writers on the subject that 
his work has not received the attention it deserves. 
Another useful if all too brief discussion of the 
relations between the Zulu kingdom and the traders was 
conducted by Hedges in his doctoral thesis on state-
formation in the Delagoa bay-Thukela region in the 18th and 
early 19th centuries. 13 Since its completion in 1978 there 
has been very little fresh analysis of the subject. A 
number of repetitive articles by Ballard break no new 
11. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, chs. 1-10. 
12. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, pp. 326-40, 351-
83. 
13. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 231-40. 
324 
ground,14 and, disappointingly, the detailed narrative 
which Cubbin provides in his doctoral thesis on the Port 
Natal settlement is almost entirely barren of 
interpretative insights. 15 
since the later 1980s, following the lead set in a 
number of public speeches by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, 
Chief Minister of Kwazulu,16 a new genre of writings on the 
Port Natal settlement of 1824 has begun to emerge. It is 
aimed primarily at 'rehabilitating' Shaka in the public 
mind through the device of denigrating those contemporary 
writers, like Fynn and Isaacs, who are seen as having been 
primarily responsible for feeding to the outside world the 
image of the Zulu king as a bloodthirsty monster. In this 
literature the traders are no longer seen as the 
enterprizing pioneers of civilization; they are regarded as 
greedy, scheming opportunists who deliberately spread lies 
about Shaka and the Zulu state for their own material 
ends. 17 While this depiction is certainly closer to the 
historical reality than is the romanticized notion of the 
14. C. Ballard, 'The role of trade and hunter-traders in 
the political economy.of Natal and Zululand, 1824-1880', 
African Economic History, no. 10 (1981), pp. 3-5; 'Natal 
1824-44: the frontier interregnum', Jnl. of Natal and Zulu 
History, vol. 5 (1982), pp. 49-56; 'Drought and economic 
distress', Jnl. of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 17 
(1986-7), pp. 375-7. 
15. A.E. Cubbin, 'Origins of the British settlement at Port 
Natal May 1824-July 1842', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University 
of the Orange Free state, 1983, chs. 1, 2. 
16. See particularly the text of Buthelezi's speech in 
commemoration of King Shaka Day given at Claremont 
township, Pinetown, 28 Sept. 1986. 
17. The major work in this genre is L. du Buisson, The 
White Man Cometh, Johanesburg, 1987. It is significant 
that Buthelezi was the guest of honour at the book's 
launching party in July 1987. See also Ballard, The House 
of Shaka, p. 13. The manuscript of this work was shown to 
Buthelezi prior to publication (see report in Natal 
Mercury, 2 Dec. 1988), and both Buthelezi and King Goodwill 
Zwelithini of the Zulu were guests of honour at its 
launching. For the incorporation of this viewpoint into a 
general history, see Reader's Digest, Illustrated History 
of South Africa, Cape Town, 1988, pp. 86-7. 
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traders as 'pioneers', it has so far not been accompanied 
by any attempt at a comprehensive reinterpretation of the 
Port Natal settlement's history. The accounts produced by 
its progenitors remain heavily dependant on the very 
sources whose authority they query. In the end these 
writers have done very little more than simply invert the 
old stereotype, with Shaka now as the hero of the piece, 
and the traders as the villains. 
A potentially far more fruitful reinterpretation of the 
conventional sources on t~e history of the settlement 
emerges from Cobbing's developing critique of mfecane-
theory. His sUb-continent-wide perspective has enabled him 
to develop insights into settler ideology which he has used 
to extract new meanings from the texts of these works. It 
also enables him to to place the history of the Zulu 
kingdom and its peripheries in a broader context than has 
been established by previous writers. Cobbing's analysis 
is weakened in some respects by its failure so far to 
grapple with the dynamics of internal conflicts within the 
Zulu state. Nevertheless, even in embryonic form it has 
provided some provocative new views on the nature of the 
relations which were coming into being from the mid-1820s 
onwards between the Zulu, the Port Natal traders, and 
settlers, officials, merchants and missionaries in the 
cape. 18 
Following the lead set by Slater, the account that 
follows sees the advent of British traders at Port Natal in 
the mid-1820s as the product of deep-seated forces which 
were rooted in the first instance in the expansion of west 
European-based commercial capital over the previous two 
centuries or more. 19 More particularly, their arrival must 
be seen against the background, first, of the establishment 
of British naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean by 1810, and 
18. See particularly Cobbing's 'Jettisoning the mfecane', 
unpubl. paper, pp. 12-14; and 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, 
vol. 29 (1988), pp. 509-13. 
19. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, p. 351. 
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second, of the growth of interest among merchants and 
investors in the Cape colony after 1815 in the economic 
potential of the sub-continent to the north. 
The gradual development of Britain's naval power in the 
Indian Ocean was the product of thirty years of intensified 
rivalry with France for command of the main maritime trade 
routes between Europe and the Orient. From the time of the 
American War of Independence, the two powers had been 
increasingly sensitive to the need for strategic bases in 
the region which extended from the Cape of Good Hope to the 
eastern coasts of Africa and the islands of the Indian 
Ocean. In 1781 the French occupied the Cape to forestall a 
British move to do so. In 1795, after the outbreak of the 
French revolutionary wars, the British in turn seized the 
Cape from the Dutch to prevent a French occupation. The 
colony was restored to the Batavian Republic in 1803, but, 
after the resumption of war in Europe, was again taken by 
the British in 1806. It was finally transferred to Britain 
by treaty in 1815. 20 
After the dramatic French attempt in 1798 to break into 
the Indian Ocean via Egypt and the Red Sea, eastern Africa 
and its seas were also turned into a zone of confrontation 
between France and Britain. Though the British defeat of 
the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar in 1805 
effectively put an end to French designs to supplant 
British power in the east, so long as the French retained 
their important naval base on Mauritius, they were 
perceived as a serious threat to British interests in 
India. 21 The French invasion of Portugal in 1807 again 
raised the possibility that the French would be able to 
seize control of Portuguese territories in India and south-
eastern Africa, and use them as bases for challenging 
20. G.S. Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean: A Study 
of Maritime Enterprise 1810-1850, Oxford, 1967, pp. 24-8, 
36-7. 
21. Ibid., pp. 26-8; Jackson Haight, European Powers and 
south-East Africa, pp. 119-32. 
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British domination in the Indian sUb-continent. For a time 
the British government considered carrying out a pre-
emptive occupation of those territories. In the event, the 
flight of the Portuguese court to Brazil, and its adherence 
to an alliance with Britain, made this move unnecessary, 
but these developments served to fix official British 
attentions firmly on south-eastern Africa for the first 
time. 22 
The capture of Mauritius by the British in 1810, 
followed by their reduction of French posts on the east 
coast of Madagascar the following year, effectively ended 
the naval war between France and Britain in the Indian 
Ocean. 23 By this time, the economic potential of eastern 
Africa was becoming a subject of interest to the British 
East India Company, and in 1810 a commercial treaty between 
Britain and Portugal nominally opened all Portuguese ports 
in the region to trade with British sujects. 24 After the 
Napoleonic wars had come to an end in 1815, and British 
governments were beginning to look with new vigour for 
markets for the manufactured goods produced by 
industrialization,25 official interest in south-east Africa 
was maintained. A concrete expression of this was the 
decision made by the British government in 1821 to send an 
official naval expedition to survey the coast of eastern 
Africa and investigate its economic potential. The 
consequence was the despatch the following year of Captain 
William Owen's well-known expedition. 26 
22. Jackson Haight, European Powers and south-East Africa, 
pp. 149-54. 
23. Ibid., pp. 158-63; Graham, Great Britain in the Indian 
Ocean, pp. 46-54. 
24. Jackson Haight, European Powers and south-East Africa, 
pp. 155-8, 163-6. 
25. Ibid., pp. 169-70; P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, 'The 
political economy of British expansion overseas, 1750-
1914', Economic History Review, vol. 33 (1980), pp. 471-4. 
26. Jackson Haight, European Powers in south-East Africa, 
pp. 174-6; E.H. Burroughs, Captain Owen of the Africa 
Survey, Rotterdam, 1979, pp. 78-82. 
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OWen's survey co-incided with, and gave additional 
stimulus to, the launching of speculative commercial 
ventures from Cape Town along the coast of south-east 
Africa. Though the Cape had been a supplier of provisions 
to Mauritius and Reunion since the 1770s, until the end of 
the Napoleonic wars it remained more an entrepot than a 
base for the development of an export economy.27 After 
1815, however, Cape merchants were increasingly active in 
seeking to tap the resources of the region to the north of 
the colony, especially in ivory and cattle products. 28 By 
the early 1820s, after the establishment of several 
thousand commercially oriented British settlers in the 
eastern Cape, some merchants were looking to establish 
trading links with the Xhosa across the eastern frontier. 29 
Others were investing in seafaring enterprises that aimed 
to break into the established commerce of Delagoa Bay, and 
to set up trade with the Zulu kingdom. 30 
The key role in the effort to make commercial contact 
with the Zulu was played by a Cape Town-based entrepreneur 
named Francis Farewell. In 1823 he led an unsuccessful 
attempt to reach Shaka's capital via st. Lucia estuary.31 
27. R. Ross, 'The Cape of Good Hope and the world economy, 
1652-1835', in R. Elphick & H. Giliomee, eds., The Shaping 
of South African Society, 1652-1840, Cape Town, 1989, p. 
266; W.M. Freund, 'The Cape under the transitional 
governments, 1795-1814', in Elphick & Giliomee, eds., 
Shaping of S.A. Society, pp. 333, 351-2; Graham, Great 
Britain in the Indian Ocean, p. 24. 
28. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl., thesis, p. 370. 
29. Le Cordeur, Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 
p. 40; J. Peires, 'The British and the Cape 1814-1834', in 
Elphick & Giliomee, eds., Shaping of S.A. Society, pp. 
472, 475, 480, 485. 
30. Mackeurtan, Cradle Days, pp. 94, 97-101; Roberts, Zulu 
Kings, pp. 8-15; Fynn, Diary, pp. 36-45. 
31. Fynn, Diary, pp. 52, 54; Roberts, Zulu Kings, 
pp. 8-15; Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, notarial 
deed signed by James King and others, 4 Dec. 1823, pp. 19-
21; notarial deed signed by William Garrett and others, 19 
Dec. 1823, pp. 21-3; notarial deed signed by F.G. Farewell 
and others, 29 Dec. 1823, pp. 24-5; letter from King to 
Bathurst, 10 July 1824, pp. 40-42. 
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The following year he led another party which succeeded in 
making a landing at Port Natal bay, establishing overland 
contact with Shaka, and obtaining his permission to base 
itself at the bay.32 Farewell's overt intentions, as 
conveyed to the Governor of the Cape before his departure, 
were to engage in a large-scale and prolonged trading 
venture aimed at obtaining the 'produce' of the region, by 
which he presumably meant primarily ivory.33 Adverting to 
voyages which Farewell had previously made to Rio de 
Janeiro and Mauritius, Cobbing has suggested that he also 
had an eye on the possibility of trading slaves out of Port 
Natal. 34 Given the proximity of the Delagoa Bay slave 
market, and the ineffectualness of British anti-slaving 
patrols off south-east Africa at this time,35 an enterprise 
of this sort would have been quite feasible. 
Soon after his arrival at Port Natal, it became apparent 
that Farewell's longer-term plans were to set up a 
permanent establishment there, if possible with exclusive 
rights of occupation and trade reserved for the party 
under his leadership. One of his first acts was to obtain 
from Shaka his written mark on a document which purported 
to grant Farewell a large tract of territory about Port 
Natal, including the harbour itself. 36 Quite certainly 
32. Fynn, Diary, pp. 55-80; Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 15-32, 
57-65; Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, notarial 
deed signed by James Gosling and F.G. Farewell, 15 April 
1824, pp. 27-8; notarial deed signed by F.G. Farewell and 
others, 17 April 1824, pp. 28-9; Farewell to Somerset, 1 
May 1824, pp. 35-6; Farewell to Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, 
pp. 37-8. 
33. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Farewell to 
Somerset, 1 May 1824, p. 35. 
34. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAR, vol. 29 (1988), 
p. 510n; and 'Jettisoning the mfecane (with perestroika)', 
unpubl. paper, p. 13. On Farewell's trading background see 
Fynn, Diary, p. 51. 
35. Jackson Haight, European Powers and South-East Africa, 
pp. 218-30; Graham, Great Britain in the Indian Ocean, pp. 
111-16. 
36. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Farewell to 
Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, and annexure, pp. 37-40; Fynn, 
Diary, pp. 86-8. 
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Farewell would have known that the Zulu king was allowing 
him nothing more than rights of occupation. His immediate 
concern was to obtain written proof not so much of title to 
land as of his priority of occupation which he could if 
necessary wave in the face of potential rivals. His 
longer-term aim was no doubt to establish a claim to the 
land which the British authorities would find difficult to 
disregard if at some stage in the future they established 
authority over the Port Natal region. In an attempt to 
gain official recognition of his claim, he forwarded a copy 
of the deed of cession to the Cape Governor, with a request 
for him to sanction it, and also to vest Farewell with 
formal authority over the party which he had brought with 
him to Port Natal. 37 
Farewell's aims of establishing a large enterprise with 
exclusive trading rights recognized by both the Zulu state 
and the Cape government were soon dashed. Most of the 
members of his party decided to abandon the venture and 
return to the Cape; the sloop which he had chartered to 
maintain communication with the Cape was lost at sea; the 
British authorities failed to recognize his land claims; 
and towards the end of 1825 Shaka permitted a rival group 
of traders to set up at Port Natal. 38 This party was under 
the leadership of James King, who had been associated with 
Farewell in his attempt to open up trade with the Zulu 
kingdom at st Lucia in 1823, and had since been organizing 
a separate venture to Port Natal. His plans, too, quickly 
came to grief when, on arrival at the bay, his ship was 
wrecked. Because neither group was in a position to 
conduct any vigorous trade, relations between them at first 
were reasonably cordial, though both were continually 
manoeuvering for favours from the Zulu king. 39 
37. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Farewell to 
Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, pp. 37-8. 
38. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 70-88; Fynn, Diary, pp. 91, 
93, 118-21. 
39. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 75-80; Leverton, ed., Records 
of Natal, vol. 1, King to Bathurst, 10 July 1824, pp. 40-
42; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 1-30. 
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For his part, as the accounts left by the traders make 
clear, Shaka welcomed their advent and showed them abundant 
hospitality.40 The arrival of the first party in mid-1824 
would not have come as a complete surprise to him, for he 
had already received information about Farewell's trading 
ventures from one of the latter's interpreters who had been 
left on shore during his unsuccessful attempt to effect a 
landing at st Lucia the previous year. 41 Shaka's attitude 
to the traders was grounded in part in the hope that they 
would provide a source of manufactured goods to rival that 
at Delagoa Bay.42 In addition, as subsequent events made 
clear, it was grounded in his assessment of their potential 
value to him in political terms. Their access to firearms 
technology made them a force which it was important to have 
on his side in his struggles against his enemies inside and 
outside the kingdom. 43 Their links with the Cape gave them 
a position as intermediaries through whom he might 
establish diplomatic contact with the British authorities 
there. 
Through the reports of the envoys who, it can be 
assumed, regularly passed back and forth between the Zulu 
chief and his counterparts among the Xhosa polities to the 
south, Shaka would have had a good idea of the relative 
power of British arms, and knowledge of the defeats which 
they had administered to the Xhosa, and of their 
territorial conquests. A good while before the arrival of 
Farewell and King, he would have known that the British 
constituted a power with which it would be politic to have 
40. Fynn, Diary, pp. 22, 71-80; Leverton, ed., Records of 
Natal, vol. 1, Farewell to Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, p. 37; 
Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, Kings's account of his 
visit to Shaka, pp. 27-9. 
41. Fynn, Diary, pp. 73n, 75-6; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, pp. 276-8. 
42. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 231; 
Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, p. 331. 
43. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 234-5; Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, p. 337. 
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friendly rather than unfriendly relations, all the more so 
as the main direction of Zulu expansion by the early 1820s 
was to the south. The importance of this consideration in 
Shaka's political calculations was indicated by the desire 
which he expressed at one of his earliest meetings with 
Farewell in 1824 to send an embassy to the Cape 'for the 
purpose of being better acquainted with the English 
nation,.44 
The Zulu king's immediate response to the advent of 
first Farewell's and then King's parties was actively to 
assist them to establish themselves at Port Natal by making 
their leaders generous presentations of cattle. 45 At the 
same time he was concerned to make clear that the traders 
fell under his overall authority, and that they would be 
allowed to operate from Port Natal only so long as they 
remained obedient to it. In particular they were required 
to recognize the monopoly which he exercised over the 
trading of ivory.46 To give effect to his authority at the 
bay he established izinduna nearby to keep the traders 
under surveillance. 47 Though Farewell may have tried to 
pretend to the Cape government that Shaka's 'grant' of 
territory round the bay gave him exclusive authority over 
it, in his dealings with Shaka he was careful to comport 
himself as a subordinate. The presentations of goods which 
he made to the king were formal tokens of his submission. 
From the start, though, there was a clear disjunction 
between the views of Shaka and of the traders as to the 
purposes for which the individual settlements at Port 
44. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Farewell to 
Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, p. 37. See also the discussion in 
Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 238, 239. 
45. Fynn, Diary, pp. 65, 66, 80; Leverton, ed., Records of 
Natal, vol. 1, Farewell to Somerset 6 Sept. 1824, p. 37; 
Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, King's account of his visit 
to Shaka, p. 29. 
46. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 231-2. 
47. Fynn, Diary, p. 67; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 
14, 19, 40, 60, 129. 
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Natal were intended to operate. Where the Zulu king 
envisaged them essentially as forwarding agencies that 
should function under his sanction ultimately for his own 
benefit,48 the traders aimed to establish autonomous 
profit-making concerns under their own direction. From 
early on, Farewp.II sought to circumvent the restrictions 
placed on his operations by Shaka. Though he did not dare 
to flout Shaka's authority in the regions under the king's 
direct control, he was soon making plans to tap the ivory 
resources of the territories south of the Mzimkhulu which 
lay beyond the reach of effective Zulu rule. At the end of 
1824 he sent Henry Fynn, one of the leading members of his 
party, to make reconnaissances in that direction. 49 In 
1825, after establishing contact with the Mpondo chief, 
Faku, Fynn spent a protracted period setting up a trading 
station in his territory and gathering ivory from the 
region round about. Farewell's plan was to smuggle it out 
by sending his trading ship to touch on the neighbouring 
coast, but when the vessel was los~ he had no option but to 
turn to Shaka for assistance in transporting it to Natal. 
According to Fynn, Shaka complied with the request,50 but 
another contemporary account indicates that at about this 
time the Zulu king confiscated a large amount of ivory from 
Fynn for having traded without permission. 51 Fynn himself 
recorded that Shaka's reaction to his explorations in the 
48. See the discussion in Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 331, 376. 
49. Fynn, Diary, pp. 91-116. In his account of these 
operations, as in most of his published Diary, Fynn 
presents himself as acting mainly as an autonomous agent. 
It should be noted that he had come to Port Natal as one of 
Farewell's employees, and remained a member of Farewell's 
party until late 1826 or 1827, when he broke away to set up 
an independent hunting and trading operation. See below, 
p. 349. 
50. Fynn, Diary, p. 118. 
51. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, report in Cape 
Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 6 Jan. 1826, pp. 79-
80. 
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south had been hostile. 52 If it is difficult to know what 
to make of this particular episode, it is clear that, 
relying on Shaka's good will towards them, and playing on 
his respect for their supposed connections with the British 
in the Cape, the traders were from the beginning attempting 
to contest certain areas of his authority. 
This notion is at variance with the conventional view 
that Shaka exercised more or less complete power over the 
traders, as he did over his subjects generally. It is 
broadly true, as Slater argues, that before 1838 the 
traders 'had only been able to establish and maintain their 
position on the express permission of the Zulu state', and 
that they 'continued to accept, however reluctantly, their 
status as subjects of the Zulu protectorate zone,.53 But 
Slater's conception, which he shares with almost all other 
writers on the subject, that the Zulu state was 
'absolutist' allows very little room in his analysis for 
the argument that the traders may in certain ways have 
sought to resist the terms of domination which Shaka was 
concerned to impose on them, and to broaden the scope of 
the immunities allowed to them. The 'mode of survival', to 
use Slater's term, into which they were admitted by the 
state was certainly founded on adherence to Zulu laws, as 
he argues,54 but he does not allow for the possibility that 
the traders might in some respects have sought to 
circumvent those laws. Nor does he consider that in 
respect of the king's 'favourites', the laws might have 
been applied with a certain flexibility. 
. That the traders fell into the category of favourites, 
and received special dispensations from Shaka, is indicated 
by the accounts which they left. Fynn stated explicitly 
that Shaka regarded Europeans 'as his real friends, and 
made them partakers of his meals - this being considered by 
52. Fynn, Diary, pp. 93, 110. 
53. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, pp. 331-2. 
54. Ibid., pp. 338, 376. 
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him to be a high honour,.55 According to the same source, 
Shaka proclaimed to his people how proud he was to be 
visited by the subjects of King George. 56 White people, 
Isaacs wrote, had particular privileges in the land, and 
were considered as the king's 'domestics and favourites,.57 
Both writers certainly had a material interest in 
exaggerating the importance of the status which the traders 
had in Shaka's eyes. But there seems little doubt that, 
given their position as bearers of coveted manufactures, as 
potential military auxili,aries, and as potential 
intermediaries with the authorities in the Cape, the Zulu 
king would from the start have been inclined to treat the 
traders with special favour. Even though their presence at 
Port Natal was for some while a largely ineffectual one, 
Shaka seems to have thought it politic to continue to 
maintain good relations with them. 
For their part, the traders found it wise to keep their 
resistance to Shaka's authority within limits. They did so 
not simply out of fear of his power, but because for some 
time after their arrival they were heavily dependent on him 
for some of their most important material needs. In the 
early years of the settlement, observers reported wide 
fluctuations in the ability of the traders' parties to 
produce enough food to feed themselves. In times of 
shortage, they had to turn to Magaye, the Cele chief, for 
grain, and to Shaka for slaughter cattle. 58 
Though the Zulu king had made Farewell and King 
substantial presentations of cattle on their arrival, and 
55. Fynn, Diary, p. 27; see also p. 22. 
56. Ibid., p. 80. 
57. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 31, 112. 
58. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Hawes to 
Morrison, 16 May 1825, p. 50; Ope cit., report in Cape Town 
Gazette and African Advertiser, 4 June 1825, p. 51; Ope 
cit., report in Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 
28 April 1826, p. 85; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 
41, 67, 68, 70. 
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periodically thereafter,59 most of these were probably used 
not so much for food as for loaning out to members of the 
followings which they actively sought to set up under their 
patronage. The accumulation of groups of African adherents 
by the traders has been portrayed almost universally in the 
literature as the product mainly of altruism on their part. 
The traders' spokesmen were quick to give out that their 
chief concern in bringing people from round about to settle 
at Port Natal was to rescue them from the distress into 
which Shaka's wars had cast them. 60 This rationalization 
was from an early date absorbed into Natal settler 
historiography;61 it still survives in some academic 
work. 62 But, as Slater was the first to indicate, a more 
important factor was the need of the leading traders to 
augment the work-force which they had at their disposal. 63 
At the end of 1825, the white and 'coloured' employees in 
the service of Farewell and King numbered no more than 
twelve or fifteen in all. 64 They were far too few in 
number to provide the ongoing labour in the spheres of 
hunting, porterage, herding, agriculture and construction 
work which was needed if their employers were to establish 
their enterprises on a stable and long-term footing. The 
traders were sometimes able to obtain temporary labourers 
from among Mathubane's Thuli in return for payment,65 but 
did not remotely have the resources to pay a large wage-
59. Fynn, Diary, pp. 22, 65, 66, 80; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, pp. 29, 36, 57. 
60. Fynn, Diary, pp. 22, 130; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, p. 18. 
61. Mann, ed., Colony of Natal (1859), p. 15; Brooks & 
Mann, Natal: a History and Description (1876), p. 207; 
Russell, Natal: the Land and Its Story (1891), pp. 129-30. 
62. Ballard, 'Drought and economic distress', Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, vol. 17 (1986-7), p. 376. 
63. Slater, 'Transitions', unpubl. thesis, p. 334. 
64. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 72, 89. 
65. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 67, 68; Maclean, 
'Loss of the brig Mary', Nautical Magazine, July 1853, p. 
350. 
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labour force. Through the auspices of Shaka, King was able 
to obtain a certain amount of forced labour from the Thuli 
to assist his party to build a small ship.66 But this was 
only because the Zulu king had a particular interest in the 
project, in that it promised to provide a means for him to 
send an embassy to the Cape. By themselves the traders did 
not have the physical force needed to extract labour from 
neighbouring indigenous communities with any degree of 
regularity. 
Their only alternative was to tap the labour-power of 
those families which they could induce to settle at Port 
Natal under their authority. Two major forms of inducement 
were available to them. As Shaka's known 'friends', they 
were in a position to hold out the prospect of a more 
secure life to people who for some years had been living in 
conditions of pronounced insecurity. And, so long as they 
had cattle available, they could also provide the means for 
families which had lost their livestock in the upheavals of 
the previous few years to begin rebuilding their herds. 
From an early date, the traders' blandishments proved 
successful, so that by early 1826, according to two 
separate reports, three to four hundred Africans had 
settled at the bay in the service of the traders. 67 But 
even if the leading traders were able to exercise a firm 
patriarchal authority over their adherents,68 the continued 
66. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 16, 66; Maclean, 
'Loss of the brig Mary', Nautical Magazine, June 1853, p. 
300; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 267; vol. 3, 
evidence of Mcothoyi, p. 66. 
67. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, report in Cape 
Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 28 April 1826, p. 85; 
King, 'Some account of Mr Farewell's settlement', in 
Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol. 2, p. 244. See also 
Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, report in Cape 
Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 16 June 1826, p. 91; 
Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 14, 18; Kirby, ed., 
Andrew smith and Natal, extract from Farewell's journal, p. 
62. 
68. Maclean, 'Loss of the brig Mary', Nautical Magazine, 
April 1853, p. 197. 
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existence and expansion of this source of labour was 
directly contingent on Shaka's giving permission for 
individual families to establish themselves at Port Natal, 
and on his continuing to make the traders presentations of 
cattle. The power which he wielded over the traders was, 
then, that of patron as well as of overlord. 
their resistance to his authority was tempered 
dependence on him for material support. 
Accordingly, 
by their 
2. The involvement of the hunter-traders in the politics of 
the Zulu state 
In the first two years or so of the Port Natal settlement's 
existence, the traders featured very little in the public 
affairs of the Zulu kingdom. Even if their leaders were 
regarded as important figures by Shaka and his advisers, 
their presence did not, as far as the evidence goes, 
feature largely in the formulation of state policies. This 
situation began to change, however, in the second half of 
1826. Although there is very little direct evidence to 
show it, it seems that by this time internal and external 
pressures were combining in a way that made Shaka's hold on 
power more and more difficult to maintain. A key factor in 
the development of this situation was the re-emergence in 
the mid-1820s of the Ndwandwe chiefdom as a major threat to 
the existence of the Zulu state. In the middle of 1826 
Shaka made the decision to turn to the traders for 
assistance in mounting a major offensive against it. 
Since Bryant's time, writers on zulu history have 
implicitly or explicitly portrayed the campaign of 1826 
against the Ndwandwe as a defensive reaction on the part of 
the Zulu state to the threat of a Ndwandwe invasion from 
the north-west. 69 According to Bryant, the invasion was 
led by Zwide's son and successor, Sikhunyana, from the 
eastern Transvaal region, where the Ndwandwe chiefdom had 
69. Bryant, OT, pp. 588-94; Morris, Washing of the Spears, 
p. 89; Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 100-103; Hedges, 'Trade and 
politics', unpubl. thesis, pp. 201-2. 
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for some years been reconsolidating. 70 In February 1826, 
Bryant wrote, 'the whole Ndwandwe host, warriors women and 
wealth, was ... swarming into the northern districts, coming, 
as they said, to retake possession of their country. 
Indeed, so determined were the invaders and so bold, that 
before the 25th of the month their army had approached to 
within one day's march of Shaka's very capital,.71 
Bryant's view of the Ndwandwe as having in this instance 
been the aggressors derived from an uncritical reading of 
accounts left by Fynn, King, and Isaacs. 72 He did not 
consider that these writers might have been uncritically 
reflecting Shaka's view of events, or that they themselves 
might have had a vested interest in portraying the Ndwandwe 
as invaders. A closer look at the evidence in the sources 
used by Bryant reveals a picture very different from the 
one he paints. According to Isaacs, towards the end of 
March 1826 an invading Ndwandwe force was said to be camped 
within one day's march of Shaka's residence. 73 Two weeks 
later the Zulu king was still expecting to do battle with 
them. 74 Isaacs wrote no more on the subject until the 
middle of June, when an envoy from Shaka arrived at Port 
Natal to summon the traders to join the expedition which he 
was planning to send against the Ndwandwe. 75 A few days 
later the traders received the news that Shaka had 
postponed the expedition until the next full moon. 76 It 
70. OT, pp. 209-12, 588. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Bryant had access to Fynn's acount as published in 1888 
in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 1, pp. 86-90. (Essentially the 
same account appears in stuart & Malcolm's edition of 
Fynn's Diary (1950), pp. 122-8.) See also King, 'Some 
account of Mr Farewell's settlement at Port Natal', in 
Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol. 2 (1827), p. 249; 
Isaacs, Travels and Adventures (1836), pp. 45, 55. 
73. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 45. 
74. Ibid, p. 55. 
75. Ibid. p. 60. 
76. Ibid. 
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was not until August or September that the campaign was 
finally launched. 77 
It is hardly likely that, in the face of an imminent 
Ndwandwe invasion, Shaka would have delayed making a 
counter-attack for four or five months. What Isaacs's 
evidence indicates is that, while the Ndwandwe might have 
been raiding into Zulu territory early in 1826, there was 
no general 'invasion'. This argument is supported by 
evidence from the account written by Henry Fynn, who was 
one of the traders who accompanied the Zulu army which 
eventually went out against the Ndwandwe. A careful 
reading of this source indicates that when the Zulu forces 
encountered those of the Ndwandwe north of the upper 
Phongolo river, the latter were in retreat, and were 
accompanied by their womenfolk, children and cattle. 78 
North of what is now Vryheid, the Zulu army had found 
considerable quantities of grain at 'kraals deserted by the 
hostile nation,.79 It does not seem to have struck Bryant 
or later writers as odd that the members of an 'invading' 
force should have burdened themselves with their families, 
and exposed their cattle to enemy raids by bringing them on 
campaign. To these writers, the Ndwandwe were simply one 
more of the numerous migratory 'hordes' which had figured 
so often in the period's history. Because the key piece of 
evidence, to the effect that the Ndwandwe had built 
homesteads and cultivated grain, did not fit the picture of 
the Ndwandwe as invaders, it was disregarded altogether. 
When pieced together, the evidence from Fynn and Isaacs 
points to a scenario quite different from that depicted by 
Bryant. The Zulu went out to attack not a 'host' making a 
threatening advance southward from the eastern Transvaal 
region, but a chiefdom which had for some time been located 
about the upper Phongolo, with homestead life and 
77. Ibid., p. 66. 
78. Fynn, Diary, pp. 126-7. 
79. Ibid., p. 125. 
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agriculture well established. This argument is supported 
by evidence cited by Bonner to the effect that after 
several shifts of location in the eastern and south-eastern 
Transvaal, the Ndwandwe under Sikhunyana had settled near 
the Phongolo. 80 It is also in accord with the evidence 
recorded by Fynn that towards the end of 1824 the Ndwandwe 
had lived close enough for the Zulu to raid them and carry 
off a number of their cattle. 81 
Since Hedges first made the point, it has been clear 
that even after their withdrawal northwards from the region 
about the Mkhuze, the Ndwandwe had remained a threat to the 
stability and even the existence of the Zulu state. 82 The 
salience of this threat by the mid-1820s is reflected in 
Fynn's evidence that Shaka blamed the Ndwandwe for the 
attempt made to assassinate him in 1824. 83 James King 
recorded in 1826 that at the end of the previous year he 
had found Shaka anxious about the prospect of war with the 
Ndwandwe, who were said to be close at hand. 84 In the 
early 20th century, Sikhunyana was still remembered by two 
of Stuart's informants who were associated with the Zulu 
royal house as having intended to 'return' to the former 
Ndwandwe territories. 8S If, as now seems likely, the 
Ndwandwe were establishing themselves on the north-western 
borders of the Zulu chiefdom in the mid-1820s, the Zulu 
attack on them in 1826 can be seen in clearer perspective. 
It was Shaka's response not to an actual Ndwandwe invasion 
but to the threat of one, and also to the probability that 
80. Bonner, Kings. Commoners and Concessionaires, 
pp. 237-8, note 15. 
81. Fynn, Diary, pp. 88-90, 91; Kirby, ed., Andrew smith 
and Natal, extract from Fynn's notes, p. 68. 
82. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, 
pp. 201-2. 
83. Fynn, Diary, p. 85. 
84. King, 'Some account of Mr Farewell's settlement', in 
Thompson, Travels and Adventures vol. 2, pp. 246, 249. 
85. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Jantshi, p. 186; vol. 4, 
evidence of Ndukwana, p. 276. 
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Sikhunyana was giving support to his internal enemies. His 
attack on the Ndwandwe was a pre-emptive move to try to 
eliminate a growing source of insecurity for the Zulu 
state. 
In explaining why Shaka decided to go onto the offensive 
when he did, the influence of two important factors needs 
to be taxen into account. The first was the emergence of a 
succession dispute in the ranks of the Ndwandwe ruling 
house. The second was the availability to Shaka of the 
Port Natal traders with their firearms. According to 
Fynn's evidence, the Ndwandwe chief Zwide had died in late 
1824 or the first half of 1825. 86 Not long after the 
succession of Sikhunyana, the latter's main rival for the 
chiefship, a brother named Somaphunga, had made off to the 
Zulu chiefdom with a number of followers and submitted to 
Shaka. 87 There is no evidence of what degree of support 
Somaphunga had in the Ndwandwe chiefdom, but it is likely 
that his defection, which took place at some point before 
May 1826,88 at a time when sikhunyana was still seeking to 
consolidate his hold on power, would have weakened the 
Ndwandwe ruling house. For Shaka, it provided the 
opportunity to strike at the enemy before he had recovered 
his strength. 
It is arguable that in these circumstances Shaka would 
have seized his chance and attacked the Ndwandwe anyway. 
But a factor which helped him reach the decision to do so 
was very probably the presence in his domains of the 
traders, who by now had several times demonstrated to him 
the efficacy of firearms. 89 For their part, the traders 
were very probably more than willing to comply with Shaka's 
summons to assist him. Participation in the intended 
86. Fynn, Diary, p. 118. 
87. Bryant, OT, pp. 212-13; Fuze, Black People, p. 50; JSA, 
vol. 2, evidence of Maphuthwana, p. 230. 
88. Fynn, Diary, p. 122. 
89. Ibid., pp. 120-1; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, 
pp. 28, 52-3. 
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campaign held out the prospect of reward in cattle, of 
trading concessions, and of captives who could be put to 
work at Port Natal or possibly shipped out as slaves. It 
is quite likely, as Fynn, Isaacs and Farewell claim, that 
Shaka made a number of threats to ensure the traders' co-
operation,90 but even if they had little choice in the 
matter they were not reluctant participants. The 
assertions made by their spokesmen that they acted under 
duress need to be taken with a heavy pinch of salt. Like 
the efforts of these writers to portray the Ndwandwe as the 
aggressors, they were intended as a later cover-up for the 
role played by the traders in the attack. 
In the event Shaka's army was joined by a force 
consisting of Farewell, some of his employees, including 
Fynn, and a number of his African retainers who had been 
trained in the use of firearms. 91 James King was at that 
time away on a visit to the Cape in an attempt to refurbish 
his trading venture;92 whether any members of his party 
went on the expedition is not known. The Zulu army came up 
with the Ndwandwe north of the upper Phongolo at the 
izinDololwane hills, to which the latter had retreated en 
masse. In the ensuing battle the Ndwandwe were routed. 
Numbers of their women and children were killed, their 
cattle were captured, and in follow-up operations their 
homesteads and fields were destroyed. 93 As in the attacks 
some years before on the Ngwane and Chunu, Shaka seems to 
90. Fynn, Diary, , pp. 122-3; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, pp. 60, 64, 65-6; Kirby, ed., Andrew smith and 
Natal, extract from Farewell's journal, pp. 65-6. 
91. Kirby, ed., Andrew smith and Natal, extract from 
Farewell's journal, p. 66; Fynn, Diary, p. 124. 
92. King had left Port Natal for the Cape in April 1826. 
See Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, report in Cape 
Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 28 April 1826, pp. 84-
5. 
93. Fynn, Diary, pp. 125-8; Maclean, 'Loss of the brig 
Mary', Nautical Magazine, April 1853, p. 201; JSA, vol. 1, 
evidence of Jantshi, p. 186; vol. 2, evidence of Magojela, 
p. 104; vol. 3, evidence of Mbokodo, p. 12; vol. 4, 
evidence of Ndukwana, pp. 276, 279. 
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have been determined to shatter the Ndwandwe polity so 
completely as to prevent its re-emerging as any kind of 
threat to his rule. 
Farewell ends his account of the expedition at a point 
before the Zulu encountered the Ndwandwe. 94 Fynn's 
description of the actual battle and its aftermath is very 
reticent, and gives little indication of what role the Port 
Natal party played in the fighting. 95 But it is likely 
that at the very least, as Hedges argues, the presence of 
white men with firearms on Shaka's side was of great 
psychological importance in determining the outcome of the 
fight. 96 Whatever the precise nature of their involvement, 
it is clear that the campaign marked a turning-point in 
their relations with Shaka. After the return of the army 
in October, Isaacs wrote, he had found Shaka 'in better 
spirits than I had ever seen him before' in consequence of 
the destruction of the most powerful enemy he had 
encountered. 97 The king duly rewarded the traders with 
cattle. Though none of their published acounts mention the 
subject, stuart's informant Maziyana, who was closely 
associated with the Thuli chiefly house, indicates that 
Fynn, for one, had obtained a good share of the spoils. 98 
Shaka also seems to have relaxed some of his regulations 
on the extraction of ivory at this time. In December 1826, 
Isaacs travelled openly to Zihlandlo's Mkhize chiefdom to 
look for elephant ivory. By that time the traders were 
also being allowed to hunt for hippotamus ivory north of 
the Thukela. 99 But much the most important indication of 
the shift in relations between Shaka and the traders which 
took place after the defeat of the Ndwandwe was Shaka's 
94. Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith and Natal, extract from 
Farewell's journal, p. 67. 
95. Fynn, Diary, pp. 125-8. 
96. Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. thesis, p. 236. 
97. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 71. 
98. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 269. 
99. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 79-86. 
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move to colonize more actively the coastland region south 
of the Thukela whose chiefs whose had submitted to him in 
the early 1820s. The first sign of his new policy was the 
establishment of a major new ikhanda, named kwaDukuza, in 
Cele territory near the mouth of the Mvoti, some seventy 
kilometres from Port Natal. By the end of November 1826 
Shaka had taken up residence there. 100 The general view is 
that from this time on, kwaDukuza was Shaka's capital: 
Isaacs indicates, though, that the king's intention was to 
remain at kwaBulawayo and ,pay occasional visits to 
kwaDukuza, some eighty kilometres to the south. 101 It was 
not until the end of 1827 that Shaka made kwaDukuza his 
administrative centre. 102 
The building of this ikhanda marked the start of a major 
enlargement of the Zulu presence in the region. In 
December 1826 Isaacs found that a number of new imizi had 
been built in the lower Mvoti region by people attached to 
kwaDukuza. The Cele inhabitants of the area had been 
pushed further inland. 103 One of these imizi was named 
kwaShiyabantu; Bryant describes it as a cattle post. 1 04 As 
part of the process of occupying what had until this time 
been a peripheral zone of the Zulu state, Shaka seems also 
to have been asserting more direct controls over its 
chiefs. According to Maquza, one of stuart's informants, 
Shaka required Magaye, the Cele chief, to build a hut at 
kwaDukuza to use when he came to khonza. 105 The 
implication is that the Cele chief was now required to 
spend prolonged spells under the eye of his overlord. A 
similar requirement may have been imposed on Zihlandlo of 
the Mkhize, who also had a hut at kwaDukuza when Isaacs 
100. Ibid., p. 77. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Fynn, Diary, p. 137. 
103. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 84. 
104. Ibid., p. 89; OT, p. 644. 
105. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maquza, p. 237. 
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encountered him there in December 1826. 106 It may have 
been at about this time too that Shaka appointed Sotobe 
kaMpangalala of the Sibiya people, who was later described 
by one of the British traders as 'a man of great influence 
. 
with Shaka', as the induna entrusted with the task of 
maintaining supervision of Zihlandlo and his chiefdom. 107 
Shaka's motives for setting up kwaDukuza and other 
imizi south of the Thukela are not clear, but it seems 
likely that he was activated by two strong considerations. 
One was to continue implementing the line of policy which 
he had been pursuing since before 1824. This was to build 
up a power base in a region of his kingdom where the 
dominant chief, Magaye, was largely dependant on Shaka's 
support for his position, and hence likely to espouse 
Shaka's cause rather than that of his enemies. The second 
consideration, which dovetailed with the first, was to 
strengthen his links with the traders at Port Natal, and, 
through them, to establish relations with the British at 
the Cape. By an accident of geography, the one usable 
harbour on the coastline between Algoa Bay and Delagoa Bay 
happened to lie within the region where, before the arrival 
of the traders, Shaka had already been expanding his hold. 
The advent of the traders at Port Natal would have provided 
him with a further incentive to continue with this policy, 
as would their demonstrated willingness to lend him 
military support. 
The shift in Shaka's relations with the traders was 
further reinforced by their involvement in another of 
Shaka's campaigns early in 1827. This was aimed at 
enforcing the submission of Bheje, a Khumalo chief who, in 
his stronghold in the rugged Ngome region on the northern 
borders of the Zulu state, had for years held out 
successfully against Shaka's attempts to subdue him. After 
his defeat of the Ndwandwe in September or October 1826, 
106. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 78. 
107. Cape Archives, G.H. 19/3, deposition of John Cane, 
Cape Town, 10 Nov. 1828. 
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Shaka had sent off part of his army to subjugate Bheje and 
another Khumalo chief. The latter had been forced to 
submit, but Bheje had been able to beat off the Zulu 
attack. 108 
Early in 1827 Shaka issued a command for a party of 
musketeers to be sent from Port Natal to assist the re-
inforcements which he had sent against Bheje. In their 
accounts, Fynn and Isaacs are again at some pains to 
emphasize the degree of duress which Shaka applied to force 
the traders to obey his summons. 109 Roberts's judgement, 
that Isaacs's protestations are unconvincing, and that the 
traders co-operated with Shaka because they stood to gain 
much by doing so, is eminently sound. 110 In the event, ten 
or eleven men from Port Natal, including five Africans who 
could use firearms, went out on the expedition. 111 The 
majority of the party belonged to James King's settlement. 
King had returned from Cape Town with a newly chartered 
vessel in October 1826, and, with his enterprise now on a 
firmer footing, had at once sought to establish a sphere of 
operations separate from that of Farewell's party. The 
result had been a fierce quarrel between the two leaders 
and a severing of relations. 112 By participating in the 
expedition against Bheje, it can be surmised, King was 
pursuing an opportunity to acquire cattle and favours from 
Shaka as his rival had done by co-operating against the 
Ndwandwe. 
108. Fynn, Diary, pp. 128-9; Bryant, OT, pp. 596-7, 602-3. 
109. Fynn, Diary, pp. 129-30; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, pp. 86-88, 97-100. 
110. Roberts, Zulu Kings, p. 112. 
111. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 89. 
112. Ibid., pp. 69, 71, 75-6; Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 99, 
103-9; Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, deed of 
charter signed by J.R. Thomson, James King and others, 22 
July 1826, pp. 91-3. For opposing accounts of relations 
between Farewell and King see Cape Archives GH 19/3, letter 
from Farewell to Dundas, 10 sept. 1828; and Chabaud to 
Cole, 14 Nov. 1828, enclosing copy of deposition made by 
John Hutton and Nathaniel Isaacs, 24 May 1828. 
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If the role of gunmen from Port Natal in the defeat of 
the Ndwandwe is uncertain, there is little doubt that it 
was decisive in the defeat of Bheje's Khumalo. Isaacs's 
account of the assault on Bheje's stronghold, in which he 
took part, gives a graphic illustration of the psycho-
logical effects produced on both the Khumalo and the Zulu 
by the Port Natal party's use of firearms. 113 Bheje was 
required to give up his livestock, a good share of which 
was presented by Shaka to King and the members of his 
party, including Isaacs. 114 According to the latter's 
account, the Port Natal party also seized a number of young 
women from the Khumalo. 115 It is possible that many more 
captives were taken off by the traders, as well as by the 
Zulu. 
After the subjugation of Bheje, the shift in Shaka's 
attitude towards the traders which had begun with the 
defeat of the Ndwandwe became more pronounced. This was 
most clearly discernible in his further relaxation of 
controls on the production and trading of ivory. By now 
Fynn was able to proceed with impunity to hunt elephants in 
the Mzimkhulu region with a party of African retainers 
equipped with firearms. 116 Isaacs was permitted to 
purchase ivory independently in the Mlalazi river region 
north of the Thukela. 117 In addition, Shaka for the first 
time actively turned his amabutho to the business of 
producing ivory.118 
Also in this period, according to Fynn, Shaka was for 
the first time allowing the traders to receive refugees 
113. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 90-5. See also 
Fynn, Diary, p. 130. For assessments of the impact of the 
use of firearms in this engagement, see Roberts, Zulu 
Kings, p. 118; Hedges, 'Trade and politics', unpubl. 
thesis, pp. 236-7. 
114. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 95, 100. 
115. Ibid., p. 95. 
116. Fynn, Diary, p. 130. 
117. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 101. 
118. Fynn, Diary, p. 131. 
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from the Zulu kingdom itself. 119 Isaacs indicates that by 
August 1827 his patron, King, had established a new umuzi, 
called kwaSindabantu (literally, the place where the people 
are saved), peopled by refugees from Shaka. 120 The Zulu 
king's change of attitude encouraged the traders, 
particularly Fynn, to step up their recruitment of 
adherents from the territories to the south of Port Natal. 
At the time of the quarrel between King and Farewell, Fynn 
had seized the opportunity of severing his links with the 
latter, and, with the cattle which he had received from 
Shaka after the Ndwandwe campaign, had set up his own 
separate establishment near the Mlazi river south of the 
bay.121 In the course of his hunting and trading 
expeditions to the Mzimkhulu region from 1827 onwards he 
set about gathering more followers, and, by his own 
account, soon had more than 2 000 people living under his 
authority in the imizi which he proceeded to establish in 
that area. 122 One of Fynn's main aims in setting up a 
territorial base near the Mzimkhulu was very probably to 
develop a route by which he could export his ivory overland 
to the eastern Cape. He would have been encouraged to do 
so by the penetration of whites from the eastern Cape 
further and further northwards towards his area of 
operations. Traders had reached to the Mzimvubu by at 
least 1825,123 and in 1826-7 the Wesleyan Missionary 
119. Fynn's evidence to Harding Commission, Natal Govt. 
Gazette, no. 220, 22 Feb. 1853. The relevant portion of 
Fynn's evidence was reprinted in Bird, ed., Annals, vol. 
1, p. 104. 
120. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 111. 
121. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 108-9; JSA, vol. 2, evidence 
of Maziyana, pp. 269, 297. 
122. Fynn, Diary, pp. 130-1. Both Okoye, 'Tshaka and the 
British traders', Transafrican Journal of History, vol. 2 
(1972), p. 21, and Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, 
vol. 29 (1988), p. 510, read Fynn as stating that he 
already had over 2 000 adherents by 1827. Fynn's account 
makes clear that the process of accumulating large numbers 
of adherents began at about that time. 
123. Fynn, Diary, p. 116. 
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society had established the first mission station north of 
the Kei river at Butterworth among the Gcaleka. 124 
Little evidence exists as to the identity of the groups 
which gave their allegiance to the traders. Among 
Farewell's adherents were elements of Thuli from the Port 
Natal region, Khanyawo from the lower Mngeni, and Maphumulo 
from the middle Mvoti. 125 others who were early on brought 
to Farewell's settlement by Fynn from the Mzimkhulu region 
were of the Xolo and Shaba peoples. 126 One of these Shaba, 
Khofiyana kaMbengane, bec~me induna of Farewell's umuzi, 
esiNyameni, which was located on the north side of the 
bay. 127 The Shangase from the middle Thukela and the 
Ndlovini from the Mdloti who are said by Bryant to have 
joined the traders are also likely to have become adherents 
of Farewell. 128 
King's establishment on the south-eastern side of the 
bay was known as eSiHlengeni. 129 He died in september 
1828, so his occupation of it was brief. All that is known 
of his following is that his induna was one Siphongo 
(Nasapongo in Isaacs's account), who originally hailed from 
the Zulu country.130 Fynn's adherents at his imizi on the 
Mzimkhulu were probably drawn mostly from the Xolo, Shaba 
and others of the numerous small groups which survived in 
124. W.O. Hammond-Tooke, introduction to his edition of 
W. Shaw, The Journal of William Shaw, Cape Town, 1972, 
pp. 10-11. 
125. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 268. 
126. Ibid., pp. 266, 275; Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith and 
Natal, p. 82. 
127. Ibid., pp. 269, 275. Bryant. OT, pp. 496, 554, 688, 
gives Khofiyana as belonging to the Mbambo section of the 
Cele. Three of Stuart's informants give him as belonging 
to the Shaba (Shabeni, Tshabeni): see JSA, vol. 1, evidence 
of Dinya, p. 99; vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 275; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 30. 
128. OT, pp. 496, 554. 
129. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, p. 267. 
130. Ibid., p. ~97; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Maziyana, p. 
85; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 71, 78, 133. 
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the region. His induna at his eNsimbini umuzi near the 
Mlazi was Juqula kaNqawe of the Phemvu people; one of his 
leading men was Mjozingana kaMbholi, a Cele man of rank. 131 
It would have been difficult for the leading traders -
Farewell, King and Fynn - to have set up stable or 
sUbstantial imizi without wives to give them status as 
socially mature men in the eyes of their adherents. 
Farewell's domestic establishment was presided over by the 
wife whom he had marr~ed in Cape Town, and who arrived at 
Port Natal in october 1826. 132 Fynn, as is well known, 
took several African wives during his career at Port 
Natal. 133 These he probably married after 1826-1827, when 
he had acquired the cattle needed for ilobolo and was 
setting up as an independent operator. Some of Farewell's 
and King's white and coloured employees who had the 
resources to make ilobolo payments may also soon have 
married African wives and set up imizi. This is suggested 
by Isaacs's evidence to the effect that by the middle of 
1826 two of the coloured men in Farewell's party had 
'kraals', people and cattle. 134 These men, together with 
their establishments, apparently remained under the overall 
authority of their employers, for Isaacs records that 
Farewell exercised powers of flogging those of his coloured 
retainers who had broken the peace, and of confiscating 
their people and cattle. 135 
In effect, the three separate settlements at Port Natal 
were from about 1827 turning into the nuclei of so many 
African chiefdoms, with their leaders increasingly 
exercising the powers of chiefs under African customary law 
131. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 99, 110; vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, pp. 269, 297. 
132. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 69. 
133. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 111; Bryant, OT, 
pp. 373, 561; S. Bramdeow, 'Henry Francis Fynn and the Fynn 
community in Natal 1824-1988', unpubl. M.A. thesis, 
University of Natal, Durban, 1988, p. 1988, pp. 100, 168. 
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as well aS,of employers under Cape colonial law. By this 
time the respective leaders were seeking to expand their 
followings not simply to obtain labour-power for productive 
purposes but also to increase the number of armed men under 
their authority in case it became necessary to resolve 
rivalries over trade by force. It is likely, too, that 
they were aiming to make their combined force one that 
would have to be reckoned with by the Zulu leadership. It 
was no doubt with these purposes in mind, as well as the 
hunting of elephants, that they trained numbers of their 
African adherents in the use of firearms,136 and laid in 
stocks of arms and ammunition. Without indicating his 
sources, Theal claims that at one point the traders were 
able to exchange ivory for muskets and ammunition when a 
trading vessel put in at the bay.137 The context of his 
statement suggests that this was the Buckbay Packet, which 
according to Isaacs, visited Port Natal in February 
1828. 138 Isaacs of course makes no mention of a trade in 
firearms as having taken place. 
The extent of the conflict between Farewell and King was 
such that by the beginning of 1827, with Farewell 
apparently in effective possession of the Port Natal 
harbour, King was making serious efforts to find another 
port from which to operate. In January 1827 he 'annexed' 
the mouth of the Mlalazi river, and later in the year 
proceeded to make a survey of it. 139 In about May of that 
year he sent a member of his party, a boy named Charles 
Maclean (the 'John Ross' of Natal settler mythology), to 
walk to Delagoa Bay with an escort provided by Shaka. 
Maclean's purpose was ostensibly to 'fetch medicines', but 
136. On the training and arming of African musketeers see 
Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 60, 89: Fynn, Diary, p. 
130. 
137. G.M. Theal, History of S.A. since 1795, vol. 2, 
London, 1908, p. 301. 
138. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 117. 
139. Ibid., pp. 86, 105: Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 110-11. 
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a close reading of Isaacs suggests that the real purpose of 
his mission was to explore the feasibility of King's using 
the overland route to the bay to send out his ivory.140 
Nothing is known of the relations that existed at this 
time between the trading settlements and the neighbouring 
Thuli and Cele chiefdoms. Nor is there any firm evidence 
on the impact which the rivalries among the traders had on 
Shaka's policies towards them. Isaacs states only that the 
traders' collision of interests from the end of 1826 onward 
'tended much to perplex' the king. 141 What this probably 
meant was that Shaka found it difficult to pursue a 
consistent policy towards the traders when authority among 
them was divided and the different parties were making 
competing claims on him. The emergence of divisions among 
them would also have made it more difficult for him to find 
agents whom he could trust to carry out the project which 
had remained in his mind since the arrival of Farewell's 
party in 1824. This was to send an embassy to make contact 
with the British authorities in the cape. 142 From the 
middle of 1827 onward this project was looming larger and 
larger in his mind. The reasons for this, and the way in 
which it shaped the nature of relations between the Zulu 
king and the Port Natal traders will be considered in the 
next section of the chapter. 
3. The crisis of Shaka's authority 
The main factor which impelled Shaka actively to seek to 
make contact with the British from about mid-1827 onward 
was most probably the precariousness of his rule in the 
face of internal and external opposition. Though he had 
succeeded in destroying the main outside threat, in the 
form of the Ndwandwe chiefdom, in 1826, there is nothing to 
140. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 101-103. 
141. Ibid., p. 77. 
142. See Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Farewell 
to Somerset, 6 Sept. 1824, p. 37; Ope cit., report in Cape 
Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 6 Jan. 1826, p. 80. 
354 
indicate that resistance within the Zulu kingdom was 
diminishing. If anything, to judge by subsequent events, 
it was increasing. In addition, the expansion of the 
traders' settlements at Port Natal, and more particularly 
the growth of Fynn's budding chiefdom at the Mzimkhulu, 
were probably coming to be causes of concern to Shaka. 
That there was a high degree of political tension in the 
kingdom at this time is indicated by the outburst of mass 
hysteria and the widespread killings which followed the 
death of the king's mother, Nandi, in August 1827. The 
full significance of this episode still needs to be 
properly researched, but the evidence from Fynn's well-
known eyewitness account, undoubtedly exaggerated though it 
is, suggests that it had important political dimensions. 143 
In part it may have been a consequence of Shaka's 
deliberate attempts to rouse popular feeling against his 
enemies so he could rid himself of opposition elements. 
That resistance to his rule was strong in some quarters is 
indicated by the survival into the early 20th century of 
numerous traditions to the effect that Nandi had been 
killed by Shaka's own hand. 144 One does not have to 
believe these traditions, which are not supported by Fynn's 
account,145 to appreciate that they were manifestations of 
the deep-seated opposition to Shaka's rule which had 
existed in his lifetime. Though the story that Shaka had 
killed his mother probably did not gain wide public 
currency until after his assassination in 1828, it was 
probably being whispered about by his opponents soon after 
her death. 
'I am like a wolf on a flat, that is at a loss for a 
place to hide its head in,' Shaka told Isaacs a few weeks 
143. Fynn, Diary, pp. 132-5, 139. See also Isaacs, Travels 
and Adventures, pp. 108-111. 
144. The traditions to this effect as recorded by Stuart 
are too numerous to cite individually. See the indexes in 
the successive volumes of the James Stuart Archive under 
'Nandi: death'. 
145. Fynn, Diary, pp. 132-3. 
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after Nandi's death. 146 Towards the end of the year he 
left Bulawayo, and, taking large numbers of people and 
cattle with him, crossed the Thukela to go and live at 
kwaDukuza. 147 It was probably at this time that he 
established a number of new amakhanda in the adjacent 
coastlands. According to Bryant, he stationed the 
uBhekenya ibutho near kwaDukuza, the uGibabanye south of 
the Mvoti, and the umGumanqa (or uKhangela) at Port 
Natal. 148 
Several possible reasons for Shaka's move can be 
identified. In the first place, as Hamilton has suggested, 
he may have been in fear of his life. 149 KwaBulawayo was 
situated in the country of the Qwabe, many of whom were 
deeply hostile to Zulu rule. According to tradition, Shaka 
himself stated that he was moving to escape from the 
country of the izimpaka, or wildcats which were supposed to 
be used as familiars by workers of evil powers. 150 By the 
same token, he may have wanted to be closer to the Port 
Natal traders for reasons of security. In the second 
place, he may have been aiming to assert a greater degree 
of control over the traders, who occupied part of the 
region which was coming to be of increasing strategic 
importance to him. In the third place, he may have been 
aiming more actively to put in train the organization of 
his long-touted embassy to the Cape. 
In July 1827 Shaka had secretly raised the issue of 
sending a mission to the Cape with King, Isaacs, and 
146. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 113. 
147. Fynn, Diary, p. 137. 
148. Bryant, OT, p. 644. On the uGibabanye see Isaacs, 
Travels and Adventures, p. 140; on the uKhangela see JSA, 
vol. 2, evidence of Makewu, p. 161; JSA, vol. 3, evidence 
of Meseni, p. 100; and Fuze, Black People, p. 65. 
149. Hamilton, 'Ideology', unpubl. thesis, p. 186. 
150. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Ndukwana, p. 194; vol. 2, 
evidence of Makewu, p. 161; vol. 2, evidence of Maquza, 
p. 235. 
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Fynn. 151 His plans were temporarily disrupted by the 
upheavals that followed the death of his mother, but in 
September, after the end of the official mourning period, 
he again took the matter up.152 That it was King's 
employees who were building the boat on which Shaka's plans 
depended was probably the main reason why the Zulu king 
turned to him rather than to Farewell for assistance and 
advice. The role played by King's party in the defeat of 
Bheje earlier in the year was no doubt a reinforcing 
factor. 
The construction of the boat had its own politics. 
Soon after his arrival at Port Natal in October 1825, King 
had put several members of his party to work on building a 
small schooner. 153 Most writers have accepted at face 
value Isaacs's statement that King's aim in building the 
boat was to enable his party to escape from Port Natal 
after the wreck of the ship which he had chartered to bring 
it there. 154 But as Roberts has argued, the evidence 
points to a different conclusion. During his 
exploration of Port Natal in 1823, King had noted that good 
timber for ship-building was available near the harbour. 
According to a letter written by Farewell, which Roberts 
cites, King had made plans to build a boat at Port Natal 
even before setting out on his trading venture there. The 
fact that he brought with him a trained shipwright and the 
requisite tools confirms this. In addition, though the 
members of his party had several opportunities to leave 
Port Natal before the boat was finished, they did not take 
them. 155 King's initial purpose was probably to use the 
materials and labour available at Port Natal to construct 
151. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 106. 
152. Ibid., p. 113. 
153. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 16; Leverton, ed., 
Records of Natal, vol. 1, report in Cape Town Gazette and 
African Advertiser, 6 Jan. 1826, p. 79. 
154. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 16. 
155. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 80-1. 
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his own vessel in order to avoid the expense of having to 
charter a ship and the difficulties of finding financial 
backers. But as he became aware of the importance which 
Shaka attached to the idea of sending an embassy to the 
Cape, so, it seems, King began to realize that possession 
of the means of conveying Shaka's envoys would put him in a 
powerful position to extract favours from the Zulu king. 
Completion of the vessel therefore became dependent on 
Shaka's willingness to grant him concessions. 
It is difficult otherwise to explain why construction of 
the vessel was not finished till March 1828, two and a half 
years after it was begun. 156 In January 1826 King had been 
reported as expecting it to be completed within four 
months. 157 In April 1826 the ship was more than half 
finished. 158 Work on it was no doubt delayed by King's 
absence in the Cape from April to October 1826, and by 
several work stoppages on the part of its builders. 159 But 
the likelihood is that, after his return, King deliberately 
delayed progress on it until he had worked his way firmly 
into Shaka's favour. It seems too much of a co-incidence 
that at the end of 1827 Isaacs was reporting 'rapid 
progress' on the building of the ship, 160 and that in 
February 1828 Shaka made his mark on a document which in 
effect recognized King as paramount among the Port Natal 
traders. It purported to grant him possession of Port 
Natal and the surrounding territories, and exclusive 
trading rights throughout Shaka's dominions. In 
addition, it appointed him 'chief' of kwaDukuza, and placed 
156. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 117. 
157. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, report in 
Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 6 Jan. 1826, 
p. 79. 
158. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, report in 
Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 28 April 1826, p. 
85; King, 'Some account of Mr Farewell's settlement', in 
Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol. p. 245. 
159. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 101, 116. 
160. Ibid., p. 115. 
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him in charge of the embassy which the Zulu chief was about 
to send to the cape. 161 
It was not an accident that Isaacs, who signed the 
document as a witness, omitted all mention of it from his 
memoirs. The 'grant' of land supposedly obtained by King 
was much the same as that previously made by Shaka to 
Farewell, to whom, according to Isaacs, the Zulu king was 
by now exhibiting 'a cool indifference,.162 Having 
obtained his concession, fraudently or otherwise, King's 
main aim was now to get tq the Cape and lay his claims 
before the colonial government, with corroboration of their 
validity from Shaka's envoys. As will be discussed below, 
his intentions were also undoubtedly to agitate for the 
establishment of some kind of British authority at Port 
Natal to give his claims effect. In March 1828 his boat 
was launched, and at the end of April the members of 
Shaka's embassy embarked. As his envoys the Zulu king had 
chosen two of his senior izinduna, Sotobe kaMpangalala and 
Mbozamboza. 163 The party sailed on 30 April and arrived at 
Port Elizabeth on 4 May.164 
Thus did Shaka's embassy fall into the clutches of the 
man who, on his previous visit to the Cape in 1826, had 
been at pains to pUblicize the notion that Shaka was a 
'despotic and cruel monster' who had laid waste most of the 
region about his kingdom. 165 It is difficult to establish 
precisely what Shaka's intentions were in sending the 
mission. According to the report which King made to the 
Cape government after his arrival at Port Elizabeth, Sotobe 
161. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, notarial deed 
signed by J.A Chaboud, 29 July 1828, pp. 247-8. See also 
Chase, ed., Natal Papers, part 1, p. 23; Bird, ed., Annals, 
vol. 1, p. 94. 
162. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 117. 
163. Ibid., pp. 117-18. 
164. Ibid., p. 118; Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, 
vol. 1, Francis to Bell, 9 May 1828, p. 154. 
165. King, 'Some account of Mr Farewell's settlement', in 
Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol. 2, pp. 248-9. 
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was to convey to the authorities the message that Shaka was 
well disposed towards the British, and to find out what 
their attitude was to his intentions of making an attack on 
the chiefdoms near the Cape eastern frontier. Mbozamboza 
was to return from Port Elizabeth as soon as possible with 
a report on how the embassy had been received at the 
Cape. 166 No more explicit a statement of the mission's 
purpose is to be found in any of the voluminous 
correspondence, as recently published,167 which its arrival 
at the Cape engendered. Sotobe later indicated that an 
additional aim may have been to open up trading relations 
with the cape. 168 Overall, it seems, the objects of the 
mission were to establishment official contact between the 
Zulu king and the British authorities in the Cape, to 
explore the possibilities of trade links, and if possible 
to elicit a response from the colonial government which 
would clear the way for further Zulu expansion to the 
south. That the Zulu were contemplating an attack on the 
chiefdoms near the Cape frontier was, though, almost 
certainly an insinuation of King's rather than a reflection 
of Shaka's real objectives. 
In the event Shaka's embassy remained in Port Elizabeth 
for three months, while government officials there and in 
Cape Town sought to establish the bona fides of its 
members, and to find out from them precisely what the 
purpose of their mission was. Following the partisan 
account of Isaacs, who had accompanied King to Port 
Elizabeth, many writers have seen the official reception of 
the embassy as a case of bungling on the part of a 
pettifogging and obstructive bureaucracy. 169 But this is 
166. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, King to Van 
der Riet, 10 May 1828, pp. 156-7. 
167. See the extemely useful and apparently comprehensive 
set of documents published in Leverton, ed., Records of 
Natal, vol. 1, pp. 154-280 passim. 
168. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Cloete to 
Bell, 25 July 1818, p. 238. 
169. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 119-24; Bryant, 
OT, pp. 617-20; Mackeurtan, Cradle Days, p. 142; Morris, 
Washing of the Spears, pp. 102-3; Brookes & Webb, History 
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to overlook the fact that on a number of previous occasions 
the Cape authorities had demonstrated their support for the 
ventures at Port Natal, which they expressly regarded as 
having been established under the sanction of the colonial 
government. 170 Twice the government had sent a naval 
vessel to investigate the state of affairs at the port,171 
and it had supported King's enterprise to the extent of 
providing him with two cannon, arms and ammunition from 
official stores. 172 
As is clear from the official correspondence on the 
subject, the Cape authorities took Shaka's mission 
seriously. 173 From the start, though, they were highly 
suspicious of King's credentials and motives. Attempts to 
exclude him from negotiations with Shaka's two envoys were 
frustrated by their refusal to commit themselves without 
King's advice. Discussions between the various parties 
were greatly complicated by the spread of strong rumours 
from mid-June onwards that a Zulu army was advancing 
southwards towards the colonial frontier. 174 By the end of 
June both envoys were anxious to return home, and in spite 
of King's increasingly desperate attempts to find a role 
for himself as a negotiator, the Cape government decided to 
send a naval vessel to return the embassy to Port Natal. 
It left Algoa Bay on 9 August and arrived at its 
of Natal, p. 22. 
170. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Brink to 
Farewell, 5 May 1824, p. 36; Ope cit., Plasket to Cuyler, 
26 Nov. 1824, p. 44. 
171. Ibid., Hawes to Moorsom, 16 May 1825, pp. 49-50; Ope 
cit., report in Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser, 
28 April 1826, pp. 84-5. 
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174. See the correspondence in Leverton, ed., Records of 
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destination a few days later. 175 
From both Shaka's and Kings's perspectives, the mission 
to the Cape had been a failure. The latter's grandiose 
schemes to win official recognition as a figure of 
importance at Port Natal had collapsed. He returned a sick 
and broken man, and died a few weeks later. 176 For his 
part, Shaka gained nothing but a statement from the Cape 
government that while it was anxious to be on good terms 
with him, any movement southward by the Zulu which 
threatened to disturb the colony's eastern frontier would 
be opposed by force. This, at least, was the official 
message given to his ambassadors. 177 Whether they actually 
conveyed it to the king is not known; in any case, Isaacs 
did so soon after the party's return from the cape. 178 To 
some extent the failure of the embassy can be attributed to 
Shaka's having placed it in the charge of King, who was 
unable to convince the Cape authorities that he was 
anything more than a self-interested impostor. But to a 
major extent it must be attributed to the inopportune raid 
which Shaka had launched southward soon after the embassy's 
departure. 
The circumstances which led to the mounting of this 
expedition have never been properly examined, and it 
remains a problematic episode in the history of Shaka's 
reign. It will not be fully understood until a thorough 
study of the history of the early Zulu state has been made. 
Nevertheless, the analysis developed so far in this chapter 
provides the basis for a partial reassessment of previous 
arguments to be put forward. 
175. See the documentation in Leverton, ed., Records of 
Natal, vol. 1, pp. 207-80 passim. 
176. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 140, 141-2. 
177. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Cloete to 
Bell, 7 Aug. 1828, p. 255; OPe cit., Bourke to Huskisson, 
26 Aug. 1828, p. 269. 
178. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 132; Cape Archives 
GH 19/3, Isaacs to Cole, 19 Dec. 1828. 
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The first writer to have discerned a link between 
Shaka's embassy to the Cape and his raid to the south seems 
to have been Mackeurtan. 179 He made little of it, though, 
nor did Morris in his more detailed account. 180 It was not 
until Roberts produced his reassessment of the Port Natal 
settlement's history that the importance of the connection 
was recognized. 181 Roberts argues that the more or less 
simultaneous despatch of the embassy and of the expeaition 
to the south was in large part a product of James King's 
manipulations. The latter was concerned not simply to 
obtain exclusive trading rights from Shaka, but also to get 
official British protection of his venture. The first step 
towards achieving this latter aim was to bring the Zulu 
'threat' to the Cape firmly to the notice of the colonial 
authorities. King therefore, according to Roberts, 
'staged' the departure of the embassy to take place at the 
same time as the despatch of Shaka's army southward in the 
hope that he would be able to play a key role in subsequent 
negotiations between the British and the zulu. 182 Shaka, 
in Roberts's view, was ready to launch a campaign against 
the frontier chiefs in order to enable him 'to contact the 
whites in the Cape Colony,.183 
Like the other traders, King no doubt had a direct 
interest in fomenting upheavals in the regions to the south 
in order to try to draw the British northwards to Port 
Natal. And there is abundant evidence in the documentation 
on the mission which he conducted to the Cape that from the 
start he was seeking a role for himself as an intermediary 
on the Cape frontier between the British and a supposedly 
advancing Zulu army.184 But because of his focus on the 
179. Mackeurtan, Cradle Days (1930), p. 142. 
180. Morris, Washing of the Spears (1966), pp. 99-103. 
181. Roberts, Zulu Kings, chs. 8, 9. 
182. Ibid, pp. 137-8. 
183. Ibid., p. 153. 
184. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, King to Van 
der Riet, 10 May 1828, p. 157; Ope cit., King to Van der 
Riet, 24 May 1828, p. 163; Ope cit., King to Van der Riet, 
13 July 1828, pp. 219-20. 
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dynamics of the Port Natal settlement rather than on those 
of the Zulu state, Roberts takes too instrumentalist a view 
of Shaka's expedition to the south. If King was in a 
position to take the Zulu embassy to the Cape more or less 
when he chose, he did not remotely have the power to 
'stage' the sending of the expedition. And it seems highly 
unlikely that Shaka would have been politically so naive as 
to aim to 'make contact' with the British in the Cape by 
sending an army to attack the frontier chiefdoms: Roberts 
is here taking the traders' projection of Shaka's motives 
too much at face value. 
A radically different interpretation of these events 
has been put forward by cobbing. He argues that it is 
unlikely that there was any Zulu attack to the south at 
all. In mid-1828 Shaka's army was sent northwards to raid 
along the Olifants river in the eastern Transvaal; for it 
to have been campaigning southwards just previously was, in 
his view, a physical impossibility. The notion that Shaka 
made a raid to the south was a fabrication of the Port 
Natal traders, particularly Fynn, who was seeking to cover 
up a raid which he himself had made on the Mpondo with his 
own private army from·the Mzimkhulu. Fynn's raid was an 
indication of the degree to which Shaka's southern security 
system was by this stage disintegrating under the impact of 
the traders' activities. More and more Shaka was finding 
himself wedged between two fronts of white pressure, one 
emanating from Port Natal, the other from Delagoa Bay. The 
probable purpose of his mission was to make a protest about 
white destabilization of his state. 185 
Like Roberts's argument, Cobbing's is heavily trader-
centric, and takes little account of the internal dynamics 
of Zulu politics at this time. The notion that there was 
no Zulu raid southward is strongly contradicted by the 
evidence from stuart's informants. In the four volumes of 
185. cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi,' JAH, vol. 29 (1988), 
pp. 510-11. 
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the James stuart Archive so far published, sixteen 
informants of widely differing backgrounds make mention in 
one form or another of this campaign. 186 Several of them 
speak of their fathers as having participated in it,187 and 
this corpus of information cannot summarily be disregarded. 
Cobbing's comments on the activities of the traders, like 
those of Roberts, serve to underline the importance of the 
role which they were playing in Zulu politics by 1827-28, 
and to reveal the ways in which their operations were 
adding to the pressures which Shaka was facing. But both 
authors tend to portray Shaka too much as the victim of 
manipulation by the traders. The Zulu king had his own 
political agendas, and the ability of the traders to take 
advantage of him at certain times depended on the 
conjunctures of a much wider range of circumstances than 
either Roberts or Cobbing allows for. 
According to the statements of Isaacs and Fynn, Shaka 
had been planning a raid to the southward since at least 
September 1827, when the official mourning for his mother 
came to an end. 188 There seems no reason to doubt their 
evidence in this case, for it is probable that a number of 
factors were combining to make a move of this kind 
something of a political necessity for Shaka. An external 
campaign would help divert the attentions of his subjects 
from affairs of state, and if successful in terms of the 
number of cattle seized, would enable him, for a time at 
186. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Baleka, p. 6; Cane, p. 77; 
Dinya, pp. 95, 106; Jantshi, p. 187. 
JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, p. 61; Mahaya, p. 
110; Makewu, p. 163; Mayinga, p. 249; Maziyana, p. 274. 
JSA, vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 44; Mcothoyi, p. 55; 
Melaphi, p. 83; Mkhando, p. 145; Maziyana, p. 146; 
Mkhehlengana, p. 217. 
JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, p. 27; 
Mtshaphi, p. 82. 
187. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 95; vol. 2, 
evidence of Madikane, p. 61; vol. 3, evidence of Mkhehle-
ngana, p. 217; vol. 4, evidence of Mtshaphi, p. 82. 
188. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 113; Fynn, Diary, 
p. 139. 
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least, to damp down internal opposition. A show of 
strength in the Port Natal-Mzimkhulu region would serve to 
reassert his domination over the traders. To prepare the 
ground he sent out spies, among them Mathubane of the 
Thuli, and Mbozamboza, the induna who soon afterwards went 
to the Cape as one of Shaka's ambassadors. By his own 
account, as later reported by a Cape official, the latter 
reached as far as the chiefdoms near the Cape frontier. 189 
It was probably the spread of reports of the intended 
expedition which spurred King to complete the construction 
of his boat, and to begin pressuring Shaka into making him 
the concessions he sought in return for conducting his 
proposed embassy to the Cape. At the same time, he and 
other traders may well have encouraged Shaka to proceed 
with organization of his expedition by representing to him 
the favourable response that he would evoke from the 
British if he were to attack their 'enemies' on the Cape 
frontier. Certainly this was the conclusion later reached 
by the Acting Governor of the Cape, Richard Bourke. In a 
report to his superiors in London, he expressed his opinion 
that Shaka had been induced by the traders to believe that 
the colonial government would favour an invasion of the 
frontier region, and that the Zulu king's 'designs' had 
been fomented by the traders in their own interests. 190 It 
i~ unlikely that Shaka was entirely taken in by the 
asseverations of the traders, but they probably added to 
his determination to make diplomatic contact with the 
British and sound out their attitudes on frontier affairs. 
In the early months of 1828 he went ahead with arrangements 
for sending off his embassy and with preparations for his 
expedition to the south. 
189. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 113; JSA, vol. 2, 
evidence of Maziyana, p. 273; Leverton, ed., Records of 
Natal, vol. 1, Cloete to Van der Riet, 27 June 1828, p. 
186. 
190. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Bourke to 
Huskisson, 26 Aug. 1828, 
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sometime in May, shortly after the departure of the 
embassy, a Zulu army marched southwards, accompanied by 
Shaka himself. On the way it was joined by strong 
contingents from the Port Natal settlements and also from 
Fynn's establishments on the Mzimkhulu. 191 Though Fynn 
predictably indicates that his people were forced to join 
the expedition, it is likely that, as on previous 
campaigns, the traders participated with alacrity. The 
combined forces proceeded to invade the Mpondo country and 
seize large numbers of cattle. 192 By mid-June a section of 
the Zulu army seems to have reached as far as the Bomvana 
country, south of the Mthatha river, before turning 
back. 193 According to Fynn, he and Farewell remained at 
his residence near the Mzimkhulu with Shaka, and took no 
part in the raid. 194 Evidence collected soon afterwards by 
Cape frontier officials indicates otherwise. The Mpondo 
chief, Faku, reported that 'a party of armed Englishmen', 
including Fynn, had participated in the attack on him. 195 
Isaacs, who obtained his information from Fynn, indicates 
that a number of Farewell's employees had also taken 
part. 196 
Seen as a cattle raid, and as a show of force, the 
expedition to the south was a success. Numbers of the 
191. Fynn, Diary, p. 143; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, 
p. 126. 
192. Fynn, Diary, pp. 144-51; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, pp. 126-7; also the references as for note 186 
above. 
193. Fynn, Diary, p. 145; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, 
p. 126; JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana. p. 274; Kay, 
Travels and Researches, p. 293; Shaw, Journal, pp. 128-32; 
Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Brownlee to 
Campbell, 2 July 1828, p. 197; op. cit., Shaw to Somerset, 
8 July 1828, pp. 204-5. 
194. Fynn, Diary, pp. 143-9; Cape Archives GH 19/3, Fynn to 
Somerset, 9 Sept. 1828. See also Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, p. 126. 
195. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Dundas's 
report, 15 Aug. 1828, pp. 273-4; op. cit., Bourke to 
Huskisson, 26 Aug. 1828, p. 269. 
196. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 126. 
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cattle seized were sent to Shaka's existing posts near 
kwaDukuza and in the Cele and Thuli territories. others 
were placed at posts which the Zulu chief now set up along 
the coast south of Port Natal as far as the Mzimkhulu. 
These latter were in the charge of the chiefs of the Ndelu, 
Langa and other small groups.197 At first sight it seems 
surprising that Shaka should have placed these cattle in a 
region which was vulnerable to raiding from south of the 
Mzimkhulu. But with Fynn and his gunmen now well 
established on the lower reaches of that river, and, after 
Shaka's personal appearance at the head of his army, at 
least temporarily subservient to his authority, the Zulu 
king seems to have felt that he had less to fear from his 
opponents in that direction than from those north of the 
Thukela. 
But if Shaka had hoped to head off internal opposition 
by means of a successful raid, then the expedition had been 
a failure. If anything, it seems to have provided the 
opportunity for a number of his high-ranking enemies to 
plot his death. Both Dinya and Mcothoyi state that some of 
Shaka's brothers were looking for an opportunity to kill 
him in the course of the expedition, and, according to 
Mahaya, an attempt was actually made to stab him during a 
dance. 198 Cobbing has suggested that Fynn and other 
traders were party to the conspiracy.199 until recently 
this claim might have appeared startling; against the 
background of the scenario sketched out above, it appears 
justifiable. For the traders as a body, the elimination of 
Shaka would have been a means of opening the way to a 
197. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mayinga, p. 249; vol. 3, 
evidence of Melaphi, p. 83; Fynn, Diary, pp. 151, 158; 
Grout's statement on Hlongwa history in his evidence to the 
Harding Commission, Natal Govt. Gazette, no. 215, 18 
Jan. 1853. See also Bryant, OT, p. 644. 
198. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 95; vol. 2, 
evidence of Mahaya, pp. 110-11; vol. 2, evidence of 
Mcothoyi, p. 55. 
199. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol 29 (1988), 
p. 511. 
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further relaxation of the trading regulations under which 
they had to operate. 200 For Fynn, it would have meant the 
removal of a ma;or obstacle to the expansion of his 
political power in the Mzimkhulu region. For Farewell, it 
would have meant an end to the influence at court of James 
King, his main rival for control of the Port Natal trade. 
The statements made by Fynn and Isaacs that the killing of 
Shaka had long been contemplated by the king's brothers may 
indicate that they themselves had known of the conspiracy 
for some time. 201 
It is likely that Shaka had wind of the plot to kill 
him, otherwise it is difficult to explain his next move. 
Even before his army had returned from the expedition 
against the Mpondo, he issued orders for it to proceed at 
once far to the north to raid the chiefdoms of the region 
beyond Delagoa Bay.202 with it, according to Maziyana, 
went two companies of men drawn from the followings of the 
Port Natal traders. 203 The launching of a new campaign so 
soon after the conclusion of a previous one was 
unprecedented, and caused much dissension in the army, to 
the point where Shaka was said by some to have gone mad. 204 
It is best explained as a desperate attempt on the part of 
Shaka to put the conspirators at a distance pending the 
return of his embassy from the Cape with the long-hoped-for 
agreement of friendship with the British. With senior 
members of the Zulu chiefly house now actively planning his 
200. On Shaka's opposition to open commerce, see Isaacs, 
Travels and Adventures, p. 177. 
201. Fynn, Diary, p. 156; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, 
p. 143. 
202. Fynn, Diary, p. 153; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, 
p. 127, Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 145-6. See also the 
numerous references to this campaign in the James Stuart 
Archive, where it is indexed under 'Shaka: campaigns' and 
'Soshangane'. 
203. JSA, vol. 2, p. 297. 
204. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Baleka, p. 6; vol. 1, 
evidence of Jantshi, p. 187; vol. 2, evidence of Madikane, 
p. 61; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, p. 83. 
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death, and with the allegiance of the Fynn and Farewell 
parties at best dubious, Shaka's only hope of finding 
powerful allies lay in the outcome of his mission to the 
Cape. 
Shaka's raid beyond the Mzimkhulu and his occupation of 
the coastlands south of Port Natal must in part have been 
carried out in the expectation that his embassy to the Cape 
would succeed in providing the British with an 
acceptable explanation of his overall policy in the region. 
He was not in a position to know that after three frontier 
scares in as many years the Cape government was highly 
jittery about 'invasions' from the north into the 
territories on the colony's eastern and north-eastern 
frontier. In 1825, 1826, and 1827 alarms had flared up in 
certain quarters on the frontier after the spread of 
reports that hordes of marauders, usually unidentified 
except as 'fetcanie', were advancing southwards and 
threatening to send floods of Xhosa and Thembu refugees 
pouring into the colony.205 These scares still need proper 
study: it is likely that to some extent they were fomented 
by settlers and officials who wanted a more interventionist 
British policy on the frontier. The significant point here 
is that they served to make the Cape government more 
sensitive than ever to developments beyond the frontier 
which seemed to threaten the stability of the colony. 
Thus when reports reached the frontier in the middle of 
June 1828 that a Zulu army was advancing southward, the 
Cape government's response was to prepare if necessary to 
beat it back by force. 206 By early July news had arrived 
that the Zulu forces were retiring northwards, but by the 
end of the month rumours were circulating that they were 
again advancing. 207 It was against this background of 
rumours and alarms that, early in August, Shaka's 
205. See the documents in Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, 
vol. 1, pp. 56-63, 95-106, 114-51. 
206. Ibid., pp. 171, 173-89. 
207. Ibid., pp. 196-7, 250-1. 
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ambassadors were embarked on their return voyage to Port 
Natal with the official intimation that Shaka's expansion 
to the south would not be welcome to the British if it 
menaced the stability of the colonial frontier. 
The return of the embassy with the news that it had 
failed to achieve its main objectives was a heavy blow to 
Shaka. 208 Perceiving that he had been duped by King, he 
turned as a last resort to Farewell's party, and ordered 
one of its members, John Cane, to proceed at once overland 
to the Cape with another party of envoys and re-open 
negotiations with the British authorities. 209 That the 
Zulu king had to fall back on the traders for assistance 
underscores the degree to which events had made the pursuit 
of his diplomatic initiatives dependent on their co-
operation. Any attempt to send an unaccompanied Zulu 
embassy overland to the Cape at this time would very 
probably have ended in its destruction at the hands of the 
chiefdoms to the south. The members of the mission were to 
convey Shaka's desire to maintain friendly relations with 
the British, to maintain peace with the chiefdoms on the 
Cape frontier, and to open communication overland with the 
colony. In addition, they were to request the colonial 
government to send an emissary to Shaka to make known its 
policies, and to ask for a missionary to come and live in 
his country. If the British government wanted to establish 
a settlement at Port Natal, Shaka would allocate to it the 
territory from near the port southward to the Mpondo 
country. 210 
208. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 128-35. 
209. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 151-2; Isaacs, Travels and 
Adventures, p. 133; Fynn, Diary, p. 155. 
210. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 152-3, 154; and the following 
documents from Cape Archives GH 19/3: Somerset to Bell, 10 
Oct. 1828; Campbell to Bell, 10 Oct. 1828; deposition of 
John Cane, Cape Town, 10 Nov. 1828; deposition of John 
Cane, Cape Town, 13 Nov. 1828; also Papers Relative to the 
Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants of 
Southern Africa, British Parliamentary Papers, House of 
Commons no. 252, 1835 (repr. in Irish University Press 
series of British Parliamentary papers, Colonies, Africa, 
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But Shaka's new initiatives did not save him from his 
enemies. The failure of his efforts to obtain the support 
of the British in the Cape would very soon have reached the 
ears of the conspirators, and encouraged them to take 
decisive action. Judging by the fact that Dingane 
subsequently promoted him to high office, it is likely that 
Sotobe, the chief emissary on Shaka's abortive first 
mission to the Cape, belonged to the anti-Shaka party.211 
His reports may well have played a key role in deciding the 
conspirators to make thei+ move. The absence of most of 
the army was probably another important factor. In late 
September Shaka was stabbed to death at kwaDukuza by a 
party led by two of his brothers, Dingane and Mhlangana. 212 
4. The challenge from the south 
The assassination of Shaka is an event which ~as been 
heavily dramatized in the literature, but has never yet 
been properly placed in historical context. From the 
perspective taken in this study, it can be seen as a 
striking manifestation of the extent to which the affairs 
of the Zulu kingdom had by the late 1820s become 
interlocked with those of the world of European capitalism, 
imperialism, and colonialism. The main arena where the 
development of this relationship was played out was the 
coastland area between the Thukela and the Mzimkhulu. From 
being a marginal region of the Zulu state, it had within 
half a dozen years become a zone of conflict between two 
fundamentally different and opposed sets of interests. On 
the one hand, Shaka and his supporters were seeking to 
establish it as the new political centre of gravity of the 
Zulu state. On the other, the foreign traders whom he had 
211. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 173, 252; JSA, 
vol. 2, evidence of Mageza, p. 71. 
212. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 143. 
372 
encouraged to settle at Port Natal were aiming, whatever 
the rivalries among them, to establish the port and the 
region round it as an autonomous base for the unrestricted 
commercial penetration of the hinterland. To further their 
respective aims, both sets of interests sought to enlist 
the support of factions in the opposing camp, as well as of 
the British authorities in the Cape. 
On his advent to power, the first impulses of Dingane, 
Shaka's successor, were to diminish the Zulu presence in 
the coastlands south of the Thukela. He abandoned the 
cattle posts which Shaka had recently established south of 
the Cele domain. 213 He moved the Zulu capital from the 
Mvoti back to the mid-White Mfolozi area. 214 He turned the 
Zulu state's attentions back to Delagoa Bay.215 But no 
more than Shaka could he afford to relax his hold on the 
southern peripheries of his kingdom, or to weaken ties with 
the traders at Port Natal. Though no analysis of the 
politics of the Zulu state at this time has yet been 
produced, it is likely that Dingane's position as a usurper 
of the kingship remained shaky for a good while. Like 
Shaka, he needed the support of the traders, or, at the 
very least, to prevent it from going to possible rivals. 
After an initial period of uncertainty, he seems to have 
been able to establish working relations with the various 
parties of traders, and, by early 1830 at least, was 
actively courting commerce with them. 216 Later that year 
he sent John Cane once again tramping overland to the Cape 
frontier to convey a message of friendship to the Cape 
government. 217 
213. Fynn, Diary, p. 158;,Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, 
p. 144. 
214. Roberts, Zulu Kings, p. 186. 
215. Fynn, Diary, p. 175; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, 
p. 224. 
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At the same time Dingane was taking steps to assert his 
own authority over the territories south of the Thukela. 
The necessity of this was graphically underscored when, 
early in 1829, a large section of Qwabe revolted against 
his rule. Led by their chief, Nqetho, they made off 
southwards from the area between the Thukela and the 
Mhlathuze with herds which included numbers of royal 
cattle. After beating off a Zulu attempt to recapture the 
cattle, they proceeded to establish themselves between the 
Mzimkhulu and the Mzimvubu. 218 Soon afterwards, Dingane 
turned on Magaye, the Cele chief, and put him to death for 
allegedly conniving at the escape of the Qwabe. Whether 
the charges against him were true or not is not clear, but 
his position as one of Shaka's 'favourites' had made him a 
marked man from the time of Dingane's accession to power. 
In his place Dingane elevated Mkhonto, one of Magaye's 
sons. 219 
Early in 1830 the new king launched an attack on another 
of Shaka's satellite chiefdoms, that of the Mkhize, who 
dominated the area between the middle Thukela and the upper 
Mvoti. 220 On this occasion, the chief, zihlandlo, seems to 
have escaped, but it is likely that thereafter his power as 
a local ruler was much diminished. A year or two later he 
was assassinated at the instigation of Dingane, whereupon 
most of hs adherents took to flight ~cross the Thukela. 221 
At about the same time, Dingane found an excuse for putting 
to death Mathubane of the Thuli, another local chief who 
218. Fynn, Diary, pp. 165-7, 175; JSA, vol. 3, evidence of 
Mbovu, pp. 36-8; vol. 3, evidence of Melaphi, pp. 82-3; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mmemi, p. 269. 
219. JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, pp. 105-6; vol. 3, 
evidence of Melaphi, pp. 74, 82, 88; vol. 4, evidence of 
Mtshebhwe, p. 160 
220. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 204. 
221. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Mandlakazi, pp. 191-2; 
vol. 2, evidence of Mangati, p. 205; vol. 3, evidence of 
Mbokodo, pp. 7, 17-18; Fuze, Black People, pp. 73-4, 83; 
Bryant, OT, pp. 413-14. 
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owed his position largely to Shaka's support. 222 What 
happened to the Thuli chiefship is not clear. By the early 
1830s, then, Dingane had removed the key figures in the 
structures of authority set up south of the Thukela by 
Shaka, and either replaced them with his own client chiefs 
or allowed their functions to lapse. To support his 
authority in the coastlands he seems to have relied 
strongly on the presence there of the iNjanduna and 
uHlomendlini amabutho, the latter of which he had formed 
soon after his accession to power. 223 
In the first years of his reign Dingane was concerned 
not only to establish his authority over the southern 
peripheries of the kingdom, but also, like Shaka, to make a 
show of strength in the Zulu sphere of influence beyond its 
borders when he felt that circumstances demanded it. The 
flight of the Qwabe in 1829, and their embroilment in the 
conflicts of the Mzimkhulu-Mzimvubu region, provided the 
occasion for such an intervention. By this time the main 
lines of confrontation in these territories had been drawn 
between Faku of the Mpondo and Ncaphayi of the Bhaca. 
Ncaphayi, it seems, had recently routed an alliance of the 
Memela-Bhele and the Nhlangwini, sending the former fleeing 
southward towards the territories of the Thembu and 
Gcaleka, and the latter northward back across the 
Mzimkhulu. 224 The advent of the Qwabe was followed by a 
new outbreak of violence. After beating off an attack by 
some g~oups tributary to Faku, in October 1829 the Qwabe 
wiped out most of the members of a party of traders, headed 
222. JSA, vol. 2, evidence of Maziyana, pp. 272, 293, 294, 
301. According to Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 211-
12, Mathubane was still living in November 1830. 
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Travels and Adventures, pp. 191, 195. 
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by Francis Farewell, which was proceeding from the Cape to 
Port Natal. 225 Soon afterwards they raided the Bomvana 
across the Mthatha. 226 At the end of 1829 the Qwabe were 
attacked in strength by the Mpondo, and completely broken 
up. Most of their cattle fell into the hands of the 
Bhaca. 227 
This event brought a reaction on the part of the Zulu. 
In the middle of 1830 Dingane sent an expedition against 
the Bhaca to try to recover the cattle which the Qwabe had 
taken off at the time of their revolt. 228 Though the 
expedition failed in its purpose, it was an earnest of the 
Zulu state's concern to assert its position as the dominant 
power in the region which extended from its borders towards 
the Mzimkhulu. In keeping with this policy, Dingane also 
established tributary relations at about this time over the 
Nhlangwini, who, after their defeat by the Bhaca and the 
death of Shaka, had settled in the valley of the middle 
Mkhomazi. 229 
Though he had shifted the political centre of his 
kingdom back to the old Zulu heartland, Dingane was thus 
demonstrating from early on in his reign that he was 
determined to maintain Zulu domination in the territories 
south of the Thukela. But already the forces bearing down 
225. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 183-5; Fynn, Diary, pp. 167-
71; Kay, Travels and Researches, pp. 325-9; A.G. ,Bain, 
Journals of Andrew Geddes Bain, ed. M.H. Lister, Cape Town, 
1949, pp. 122-4. 
226. Kay, Travels and Researches, pp. 329-32; Missionary 
Notices (Wesleyan Missionary Society), vol. 6, extract of 
letter from W. Shepstone, 21 Oct. 1829, pp. 242, 244; Ope 
cit., letter from W. Shaw, 3 Nov. 1829, p. 244. 
227. Fynn, Diary, pp. 171-3; Kay, Travels and Researches, 
pp. 333-4; Library of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London, Methodist Missionary Society 
Papers, incoming correspondence, South Africa, box 5, W. 
Shepstone to Secretaries, 3 March 1830, enclosing extracts 
from his journal; JSA, vol. 1, evidence of Dinya, p. 105; 
vol. 3, evidence of Mbovu, p. 38. 
228. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, pp. 188, 193-4. 
229. JSA, vol. 4, evidence of Mqayikana kaYenge, 
pp. 7, 8; 19. 
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on this region from the Cape and beyond were rapidly 
growing stronger. The most dramatic manifestation of this 
development was the Cape government's despatching of a 
large military force in July 1828 to head off Shaka's 
supposedly imminent 'invasion' of the chiefdoms across the 
frontier. On finding that the Zulu had withdrawn after 
raiding the Mpondo, the force turned, for reasons that have 
never adequately been explained, against the Ngwane of 
Matiwane, who by this time had settled near the upper 
Mthatha. Aided by a larg~ army of Thembu, Gcaleka and 
Mpondo, who were drawn by the prospect of rich loot, the 
British force attacked the Ngwane at the end of August. In 
a massive display of firepower, large numbers of Matiwane's 
people were killed and his following broken up. Most of 
the Ngwane cattle were seized, and many people taken off as 
captives. 230 
In the absence of any detailed research on the subject, 
the wider impact of this attack can at present only be 
guessed at, but it seems certain that the shock waves from 
it would have been felt allover southern Africa. As 
Cobbing observes, the forces which attacked the Ngwane 
comprised one of the largest armies yet seen in the 
continent. 231 The march of the colonial troops had taken 
them some 300 kilometres into African-controlled territory, 
and more than halfway from the eastern Cape boundary to the 
Mzimkhulu. In effect the Cape authorities were giving 
violent notice that they regarded the whole region to the 
230. An outline of the official version of these events can 
be pieced together from the following documents in 
Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1: Bourke to 
Huskisson, 29 June 1828, pp. 187-8; Bourke to Huskisson, 1 
Aug. 1828, p. 251; Somerset to Bourke, 23 Aug. 1828, pp. 
265-6; Somerset to Bourke, 26 Aug. 1828, pp. 266-8; Bourke 
to Huskisson, 26 Aug. 1828, pp. 268-9; plus Somerset to 
Bourke, 29 Aug. 1828, published in Van Warmelo's edition of 
Msebenzi, History of Matiwane, pp. 252-7. For a hard-
hitting critique of the official intepretation see cobbing, 
'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988), pp. 500-503. 
231. Cobbing, 'The mfecane as alibi', JAH, vol. 29 (1988). 
p. 502. 
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borders of Zulu-dominated territory as now falling within 
their sphere of influence. More than two years later, the 
missionary William Boyce reported from the Mpondo country 
that the colonial expedition had 'left upon the minds of 
the natives a salutary impression of the power of the 
English,.232 Similar sentiments were probably being 
expressed by Europeans across the sub-continent. 
At the same time the Cape government began moving 
towards a policy of more active diplomatic intervention in 
the affairs of chiefdoms several removes from the colonial 
frontier. Its response to Shaka's first embassy was a sign 
of this, as were the activities of its officials in 
bringing together the alliance which shattered the Ngwane 
chiefdom. The arrival of Shaka's second mission on the 
eastern frontier in october 1828 provided the government 
with the opportunity to carry this policy further. After 
interviewing John Cane and the other envoys in Cape Town, 
the new Governor, Sir Lowry Cole, detailed a military 
officer to carry back to Shaka the message that the British 
desired friendship with him, and also to repeat the 
injunction that they would resist with force Zulu 
incursions which threatened the stability of the colonial 
border regions. Cole's emissary had reached the eastern 
frontier before the arrival of news of Shaka's death caused 
his mission to be abandoned. 233 
with the Cape government clearly pursuing a more 
interventionist policy beyond the colonial boundary, the 
scene was set for other colonial and colonial-linked 
interests to become more active in the territories 
bordering on the Zulu sphere of influence. Among the first 
to do so were groups of European and coloured freebooters 
232. cited in Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures, vol. 2, 
p. 269. 
233. Roberts, Zulu Kings, pp. 152-4, 175; Cory, Rise of 
S.A., vol. 2, pp. 365-6; Papers Relative to the Condition 
and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants of Southern Africa, 
House of Commons no. 252, 1835, two letters from Bell to 
Aitchison, 24 Nov. 1828, pp. 562-4. 
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from the Cape who for years had been operating in the Xhosa 
and Thembu territories. By the late 1820s, at least, some 
of them were becoming actively involved in the conflicts 
which were then racking the Mzimvubu-Mzimkhulu region,234 
where similar groups under Fynn and possibly other Port 
Natal traders were already established. The impact exerted 
by all these parties on the politics of the region is a 
subject that badly needs researching. 
The freebooters were soon followed by missionaries, on 
occasion in co-operation with them. 235 In 1823 the 
Wesleyan Missionary Society had tried to establish a 
mission at Delagoa Bay,236 and in the same year it had 
begun operations in Xhosa territory with the express 
purpose of extending a chain of mission stations towards 
the north-east. 237 In 1824, the launching of Farewell's 
venture to Port Natal encouraged the Society to consider 
setting up a mission there,238 but lack of funds 
constrained it to concentrate on its work in the eastern 
Cape. At the time of the destruction of the Ngwane, the 
furthest Wesleyan station was at Butterworth among Hintsa's 
Gcaleka. In the aftermath of that event it established a 
mission among the Bomvana in 1829, another among 
Ngubencuka's Thembu in 1830, and a third among the Mpondo 
in the same y"ear. 239 In 1829, after Shaka had made his 
request to the Cape authorities for a missionary to be sent 
to him, the Society was again planning an investigation of 
234. B. Holt, 'Nicolaas Lochenberg: freebooter, elephant-
hunter and fugitive from justice', Africana Notes and News, 
vol. 11 (1953-55), pp. 3-9; Watt, Febana, pp. 301-2; Fynn, 
Diary, p. 321. See also Bryant, OT, p. 385. 
235. Holt, as cited in the previous note, p. 6. 
236. Shaw, Memorials of South Africa, pp. 270-3. 
237. Hammond-Tooke's introduction to his edition of william 
Shaw's Journal, pp. 7-11. 
238. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Archbell & 
Whitworth to Somerset, 27 April 1824, pp. 34-5; OPe cit., 
memorial of Whitworth & Broadbent, 4 March 1825, p. 47. 
239. Hammond-Tooke's introduction to his edition of Shaw's 
Journal, pp. 11-12. 
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the mission field in the Zulu domains when a shortage of 
funds for a second time caused its plans to be 
postponed. 240 
Soon after the missionaries came the merchants. By 1829 
a wagon route had been opened from the eastern Cape via 
several mission stations to Port Natal,241 and by 1830 
traders from the Cape were beginning to use it with 
increasing frequency.242 In 1829, the Commercial Exchange 
in Cape Town endorsed a new set of plans being touted by 
Farewell for a settlement at Port Natal; support for it was 
also expressed in Britain. 243 At the same time, from 
within the group of Cape merchants and their associates 
with an interest in Port Natal, came the first formal call 
to the British government for the annexation of the 
territory of 'Natal,.244 Though the request was turned 
down on the grounds of expense,245 the imperial government 
was by this time edging towards formal involvement in the 
affairs of the region. This was evinced by its suggestion, 
made at the end of 1829, that the Cape authorities should 
consider extending the colony's criminal law over British 
subjects at the port. 246 Though the proposal was not 
immediately acted upon, it was a sign of official 
recognition that interest in the region as a field of 
240. W. Shaw, The storv of Mv Mission in South-Eastern 
Africa, London, 1860, pp. 562-3. 
241. Fynn, Diary, p. 175: Kay, Travels and Researches, pp. 
344-5; Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures, vol. 1, pp. 
282-3. 
242. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures, p. 188; Roberts, Zulu 
Kings, p. 197. 
243. R.F.M. Immelman, Men of Good Hope: the Romantic StorY 
of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, 1804-1954, Cape Town, 
1955, pp. 128-9; Watt, Febana, pp. 288-9; Bannister, Humane 
Policy, p. 239, & appendices 1, 6 & 7. 
244. Chase, ed., Natal Papers, part 1, Bannister's letter 
to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 May 1829, pp. 
23-9. 
245. Ibid., undated extract from letter from Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, pp. 29-30. 
246. Walker, History of S.A. (1928 ed.), p. 185. 
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commercial enterprise was by this stage spreading beyond 
the handful of speculators who had backed the ventures of 
Farewell and King. This development would have been 
further stimulated by the Cape government's abandonment in 
1830 of long-standing restrictions on trade across the 
colony's eastern borders. 247 
Thus was the field becoming set for a struggle between 
the Zulu state and Cape-based interests, backed ultimately 
by imperial Britain, for control of the territories about 
Port Natal. The forces which, for more than half a 
century, had operated to link the region south of the 
Thukela ever more firmly to the polities north of the river 
were now starting to be countered by forces which sought to 
pull it into the political and economic orbit of the Cape. 
A new era in its history was beginning. 
247. Peires, 'The British at the Cape 1814-1834', in 
Elphick & Giliomee, eds., Shaping of S.A. Society 1652-
1840, p. 485. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the evidence from recorded oral traditions, 
from archaeological research, and from published travel 
accounts indicates that in the mid-18th century the 
Thukela-Mzimkhulu region was occupied by several dozen or 
several score small chiefdoms. The largest among them 
probably numbered no more than a few thousand people, and 
extended over no more than a couple of thousand square 
kilometres. Their economies were based on the production 
of cereal crops and the husbandry of cattle by homesteads 
under the patriarchal authority of male elders. within 
the chiefdom, overall authority was vested in a heredi-
tary chief .. The chief's 'house' seems to have exercised a 
certain amount of political and social dominance over the 
other groups which recognized his rule, but the scope of 
his authority was restricted by the fluidity of the 
chiefdom's political structures. Over time, the size and 
composition of chiefdoms tended to fluctuate as groups 
hived off and others came to give their allegiance. In 
some areas, neighbouring chiefdoms whose rulers claimed to 
be genealogically related constituted loose clusters 
headed by paramount chiefs, but the authority exer~ised by 
these figures seems to have been mostly formal in 
character. There is no evidence for the existence at this 
period of highly centralized and stratified polities. 
Patterns of political change in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region cannot be traced before the later 18th century, 
when the effects of transformations that were taking place 
in the territories to the north of the Thukela began to 
make themselves felt. From about the third quarter of the 
century, certain chiefdoms in an area which extended from 
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south of the White Mfolozi to beyond Delagoa Bay were 
beginning to expand in size and power, and to come 
increasingly into conflict with one another and with their 
smaller neighbours. The initial dynamic, at least, for 
these developments seems to have been provided by the 
rapid expansion after about 1760 of an international trade 
in ivory at Delagoa Bay. 
Particularly significant in its import for political 
developments south of the Thukela was the expansion of the 
Mthethwa chiefdom in the area between the lower Mfolozi 
and the Mhlathuze. In what seems to have been a defensive 
reaction to the increase in Mthethwa power, the ruling 
groups in a number of chiefdoms along the lower Thukela 
sought to strengthen their polities by enlarging the 
territories which they dominated. The most successful in 
this aim ultimately seem to have been the rulers of the 
Qwabe chiefdom in the area between the Mhlathuze and the 
Thukela. Other chiefdoms which began to engage in a 
process of expansion in the later 18th century were those 
of the Nyuswa, the Mkhize and perhaps the Chunu. Further 
inland, on the upper Mzinyathi, the Hlubi chiefdom was 
responding in much the same way to the threat posed by the 
growth of the powerful Ndwandwe chiefdom to the east. 
The expansion of the Qwabe chiefdom seems to have been 
the main factor in dislodging the Thuli from the upper 
Matikhulu area, and, in about the 1770s or 1780s, sending 
them migrating south~ards across the Thukela. After 
forcing their way through a number of small coastland 
chiefdoms, the Thuli re-established themselves in what is 
now the Pinetown-Durban area. From there they proceeded 
to extend their domination over the inhabitants of a 
territory which reached perhaps fifty kilometres inland, 
and the same distance southwards to the Mkhomazi. Several 
offshoot chiefdoms set themselves up still further south 
between the Mkhomazi and the Mzimkhulu. Some time later, 
the continued expansion of the Qwabe was instrumental in 
pushing the Cele too across the lower Thukela. Their 
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ruling house settled on the lower Mvoti, and subsequently 
supplanted the Thuli as rulers of the chiefdoms of the 
coastlands as far south as the Thongati-Mdloti area. 
The Thuli and Cele paramountcies were much larger than 
any of the historically known chiefdoms which had 
previously existed in the coastlands. Though there is no 
evidence surviving on the subject, the spheres in which 
they exercised political influence probably extended well 
beyond the Mzimkhulu to the south, and deep into what are 
now the Natal midlands to the west. But in both polities 
the central authority remained weak. In neither case were 
the rulers able to establish centralized institutions of 
government which gave them the degree of control over 
their adherents that was exercised by the Ndwandwe and 
Mthethwa leaders. Both the Thuli and Cele polities 
remained loose aggregations of chiefdoms rather than 
budding states. 
In the first two decades of the 19th century, pressures 
from the northward on the polities south of the Thukela 
increased markedly as the conflicts between the emerging 
states of the Thukela-Delagoa Bay region became more 
intense. In the coastlands, the Qwabe were beginning to 
expand across the Thukela. Further up the river, the 
Nyuswa may also have been doing so. North of the 
Biggarsberg, rival sections of the Hlubi ruling house were 
competing for domination. The effects of these 
developments on the chiefdoms further to the south is not 
known; like the intrusions of the Thuli and Cele into 
the coastlands in an earlier period, they were probably 
felt over wide areas of what is now Natal. 
In the late l8l0s and early l820s, the struggles among 
the chiefdoms north of the Thukela, exacerbated by the 
impact of a rapidly increasing trade in slaves at Delagoa 
Bay, stimulated a further series of migrations into the 
territories to the south and west. In the ensuing 
upheavals, the political map of the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region was completely transformed. These upheavals are 
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conventionally seen as an aspect of the 'mfecane', a 
series of wars and migrations, allegedly set in motion by 
the explosive expansion of the Zulu state, which is 
supposed to have disrupted social and political life over 
a wide area of south-eastern Africa. Analysis of the 
literature on the subject reveals, in keeping with 
Cobbing's recent critiques of mfecane theory as a whole, 
that the notion of the mfecane as applied to the region 
south of the Thukela is an empty and profoundly misleading 
formula. Its essential elements - that the region was 
deliberately devastated by Zulu armies under Shaka - can 
be shown empirically to be based on misrepresentations 
which were originally developed for particular material 
ends by merchant interests in Natal and the Cape in the 
late 1820s and 1830s. The resultant historical stereotype 
was subsequently entrenched in the literature on southern 
African history by settler ideologues in Natal and the 
Cape. In the 20th century, academic historians of all 
shades of opinion uncritically absorbed it into their own 
work. 
The modern notion of the mfecane as it is supposed to 
have taken place south of the Thukela is based very 
largely on the historical writings of Father Alfred 
Bryant, whose Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, published 
in 1929, is still widely regarded as the undisputed 
authority on 'Zulu' history before the death of Shak" 
Bryant's work is thought to rest on the researches into 
oral traditions which he claimed to have conducted over a 
period of more than forty years. A close analysis of his 
writings on the upheavals which took place in the Thukela-
Mzimkhulu region in the 1810s and 1820s reveals that his 
ideas on the subject were in fact derived almost entirely 
from previously published sources. Much the most 
important of these were two documents - a set of brief 
notes on Natal tribal histories, and a sketch of Natal's 
history before the establishment of European rule - which 
had been researched and drawn up by Theophilus Shepstone 
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in the 1860s and published in the 1880s. In his treatment 
of the upheavals, Bryant incorporated shepstone's 
narrative framework and his empirical data without 
acknowledgement. It is not too much to say that most of 
his account of the subject was plagiarized from these two 
documents. 
Shepstone's original notes of his interviews with 
perhaps a dozen African informants do not appear to have 
survived; the tribal histories which he published are his 
own renderings of the information which he received, and 
are couched very much in terms of the stereotype of 'Zulu 
devastations'. This does not of itself invalidate them as 
sources of evidence, but it does mean that they form an 
inSUbstantial and eminently unsound base on which to erect 
a comprehensive account of political developments in the 
Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the 1810s and 1820s. Concepts 
developed in the last fifteen years or so by writers on 
the precolonial history of south-eastern Africa, together 
with the body of evidence available in the traditions 
recorded by James stuart, provide the means for producing 
an interpretation entirely different from that put forward 
by Bryant. 
The upheavals which took place in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu 
region before and after 1820 were a product not of the 
aggressions of the Zulu, as the stereotype holds, but 
ultimately of an intensification in the political 
struggles which were taking place among the emergent 
states in the territory from the Thukela to beyond Delagoa 
Bay. The expansion of the Zulu state under Shaka was a 
product of the same set of forces. That the level of 
conflict was increasing at this particular time was in 
large measure an outcome of the rapid expansion of the 
slave trade at Delagoa Bay during the 1810s. In terms of 
its impact on the politics of the region south of the 
Thukela, the most significant development was the 
emergence of a confrontation between the Ndwandwe and the 
Mthethwa chiefdoms, both of which were forcefully 
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expanding in the course of the early 19th century. In the 
late 1810s, as the struggle between them came to a head, 
some of the smaller chiefdoms caught up in it began to 
take to flight. One of the first to do so was the Ngwane 
chiefdom under Matiwane, which lay on the western borders 
of the Ndwandwe polity. After an attack by the Ndwandwe, 
who may have been in search of captives for the Delagoa 
Bay slave market, as well as of cattle, Matiwane and many 
of his adherents made off to the westward. Falling upon 
the ruling section of the Hlubi, they killed the paramount 
chief, Mthimkhulu, and seized his cattle. Upon this, the 
Hlubi polity, which was little more than a loose 
clustering of semi-autonomous chiefdoms, broke up into its 
constituent parts. Some remained in the Hlubi territory, 
some moved off to the west and north in bids to maintain 
their autonomy, some made their way to give their 
allegiance to neighbouring chiefs, and some submitted to 
Matiwane. 
To put a safe distance between themselves and the 
Ndwandwe, the Ngwane continued their migration south-
westward across the Mzinyathi and the Biggarsberg into the 
valley of the upper Tnukela. After establishing 
themselves near Bergville, they began to bring the 
neighbouring Bhele and zizi chiefdoms under their sway. 
Some of the latter sought to preserve their political 
independence by moving away southward: others, unable to 
offer resistance to the Ngwane, had no option but to 
khonza to Matiwane. within a short time the Ngwane headed 
a paramountcy which dominated the upper Thukela basin. 
At much the same time as these events were taking 
place, the Zulu chiefdom under Shaka was extending its 
domination over the polities between the mid-White Mfolozi 
and the Thukela. Shaka had been set up by Dingiswayo of 
the Mthethwa as guardian of the western marches of his 
domains: after the defeat of the Mthethwa and the death of 
Dingiswayo at the hands of the Ndwandwe, the Zulu chief 
began to use his new-found power to enlarge the 
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territories under his rule. Through a combination of 
military aggression and political manoeuvering, he brought 
the relatively powerful Qwabe chiefdom under his 
authority, and then turned his attention to the other 
chiefdoms of the lower Thukela valley. The Chunu under 
Macingwane were able to avoid the fate of the Qwabe by 
migrating across the Thukela, probably to the upper Mvoti 
region. The Mkhize under Zihlandlo submitted to Shaka 
without a struggle. The Nyuswa tried to resist, but were 
defeated by a Zulu force sent against them. To the west 
of the former Chunu territory, the Thembu under Ngoza 
sought to maintain their independence by migrating 
westward across the lower Mzinyathi. 
Zulu expansion towards the lower Thukela was primarily 
a defensive move undertaken to eliminate potential threats 
from the south, and to acquire the resources of cattle and 
manpower which were urgently needed to strengthen the new 
and relatively weak Zulu state against Ndwandwe raids from 
the north. After the Ndwandwe polity had shifted north-
wards across the Phongolo, the Zulu leadership's prime 
strategic concern was to secure the northern borders of 
the state by establishing and maintaining a strong 
military presence in the Black Mfolozi-Mkhuze region. 
contrary to the stereotyped view, it is clear that at this 
stage the Zulu polity did not have the capacity to pursue 
a policy of active expansion to the southward. Here the 
main aims of its rulers were to establish a stable and 
secure border in the valleys of the lower Thukela and 
lower Mzinyathi. To this end they sought to break up or 
drive away chiefdoms which they regarded as posing a 
threat to the stability of the region, and to set up 
client polities which would serve to maintain control over 
it. 
The sequence of developments that took place in this 
area in the late 1810s and early 1820s is impossible to 
establish with any certainty, but the overall consequences 
of Zulu intervention are clear enough. To the south-west 
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they sought to establish their authority over the Thembu, 
who, to avoid domination either by the Zulu on one side or 
by the Ngwane on the other, made off southwards through 
the Natal midlands and ultimately across the Mzimkhulu. 
To maintain control over the area on either side of the 
lower Mzinyathi, Shaka set up Jobe of the Sithole as ruler 
of a partly autonomous client polity. South of the Zulu 
heartland, Shaka set up Zihlandlo, ruler of the long-
established Mkhize chiefdom, in a similar capacity. with 
Shaka's backing, Zihlandlo expanded the area under his 
authority southwards across the Thukela towards the Mvoti, 
where the Chunu chiefdom had recently re-established 
itself. In the face of Mkhize expansion, and alarmed by 
the Zulu attack which finally triggered off the migration 
of the nearby Thembu, the Chunu once again moved off. 
After pushing their way through the small polities of the 
Natal midlands, they halted in the mid-Mkhomazi-mid-
Mzimkhulu area, and once again sought to consolidate. Not 
long afterwards, pressures exerted by the sithole and 
Mkhize to the east and the Ngwane to the west sent a large 
group of Memela, Nhlangwini and others from the northern 
midlands migrating southward. 
South of the lower Thukela Shaka set up a third client 
polity to watch over Zulu interests. Its core was formed 
by the Cele chiefdom, which had dominated the lower Mvoti 
region for several decades, and had submitted to Shaka's 
overlordship without resistance. Under the rule of 
Magaye, who had been placed in the chiefship by Shaka, the 
Cele were required to exercise dominion over the numerous 
smaller chiefdoms in the coastlands which had been forced 
to acknowledge Shaka's supremacy. To buttress Magaye's 
authority, and to enable him the more effectively to raid 
cattle from the territories further south on Shaka's 
behalf, the Zulu chief stationed a force of armed men 
known as the iziYendane in his chiefdom. within a short 
while this force had broken up the Thuli paramountcy in 
the lower Mngeni-Iower Mkhomazi area. As ruler of the 
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remnant Thuli chiefdom, Shaka elevated Mathubane, who 
belonged to one of its junior sections. Like other local 
chiefs, he came under the overall authority of Magaye. 
By the early 1820s the emerging Zulu state had 
established indirect domination over a belt of territory 
on its south-western and southern borders which extended 
from the Msinga region south-eastward between the Thukela 
and Mvoti rivers to the coast, and thence south to the 
lower Mngeni-Mlazi area. To the west, the Ngwane chiefdom 
dominated the basin of the upper Thukela. To the south, 
the Chunu were seeking to establish their power between 
the middle Mkhomazi and the Mzimkhulu. In the midlands, 
social and political organization had been heavily 
disrupted by the successive migrations of the Chunu, the 
Thembu and the Memela-Nhlangwini group. Most of the 
polities of this region had either made off independently 
to the south, or had gone to give their allegiance to one 
or other of the larger chiefdoms which now dominated the 
Thukela-Mzimkhulu region, or had been broken up. A few 
managed to hold out in the more isolated and broken areas. 
Numbers of fragmentary groups which had lost their cattle 
sought to survive on the fringes of more organized 
polities by turning to banditry. 
Though the Zulu state was by now the most powerful 
political actor south and west of the Thukela and 
Mzinyathi, it was by no means dominant in the region. To 
the west and south, the Ngwane and Chunu chiefdoms 
respectively exerted influence across considerable 
territories. There was nothing inherent in Zulu policy 
which necessarily entailed further expansion in these 
directions. But within a short space of time, political 
developments within the Zulu polity and on its northern 
borders set in train a process which saw Zulu domination 
extended westward to the Drakensberg and southward to the 
region of the Mzimkhulu. 
The precise nature of these developments will not be 
known until the history of the early Zulu state has been 
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studied in detail, but primarily they had to do with the 
growth of internal opposition to Shaka's rule at a time 
when his kingdom was facing increasing pressures from the 
north. As a usurper, Shaka had from the beginning of his 
reign faced strong, if muted, opposition from within the 
Zulu ruling house. In addition, as the Zulu state 
expanded, its rulers faced continuing resistance from 
sections of powerful subordinate chiefdoms such as those 
of the Qwabe and the Mthethwa. Exacerbating the resultant 
internal tensions was, ve~y probably, the threat of 
incursions on the part of the raiding and slaving polities 
which had established themselves in the hinterland of 
Delagoa Bay. 
One of the responses of the Zulu leaders to the 
internal and external problems of security which they 
faced was to shift their capital, kwaBulawayo, together 
with many of Shaka's amabutho, from the mid-White Mfolozi 
area south-east to the Qwabe territory between the 
Mhlathuze and the lower Thukela. The move was made to 
suppress dissidence among the Qwabe, and perhaps also to 
put a greater distance between the state's nerve-centre 
and the unstable northern borderlands. with this shift 
closer towards the lower Thukela, the territories south of 
that river became established as a zone of new strategic 
importance for the Zulu leaders. For the leadership as a 
whole, expansion to the southward presented a means of 
bringing new resources of cattle under its control. For 
Shaka and his party of supporters in particular, it also 
presented the opportunity of establishing a separate 
power-base which could be brought more directly under 
their control than was possible in the regions north of 
the Thukela where their authority was being contested. 
To secure unimpeded access to the territories beyond 
the Thukela, it was necessary for the Zulu first of all to 
eliminate the rival Ngwane and Chunu chiefdoms. At some 
point in the early 1820s both were attacked by Zulu 
forces. Though they lost many of their cattle, the Ngwane 
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succeeded in escaping across the Drakensberg and re-
establishing their chiefdom in the Caledon valley. The 
Chunu chiefdom, however, was broken up. The cattle seized 
from it were placed at new cattle posts erected by Shaka 
in the country of the Cele chief, Magaye, and guarded by 
the latter's amabutho. other posts may have been 
established in the sithole domain on the lower Mzinyathi 
for the cattle taken from the Ngwane. 
These campaigns extended Zulu power westward to the 
Drakensberg and southward to the vicinity of the 
Mzimkhulu. They were not, however, followed by effective 
occupation. While the Zulu state had the ability to mount 
occasional forays into these territories, it did not have 
the capacity to set up the permanent military presence 
which colonization would have entailed. The area west of 
the Mzinyathi was vulnerable to raids by the Griqua and 
other mounted gunmen who, by the early 1820s, were raiding 
further and further from the west and south across the 
southern highveld. Similarly, the territories about the 
Mzimkhulu were exposed to raids from the groups which, at 
this time, were struggling for domination in the region to 
the south. Chief among these after the destruction of the 
Chunu chiefdom were the intrusive Thembu of Ngoza, the 
Bhaca, the Memela, and the Nhlangwini, together with the 
established Mpondo chiefdom. 
In the face of these dangers the Zulu leaders held back 
from occupying more territory south of the Thukela. Their 
policy was instead to consolidate their hold on the 
coastland region which they already controlled by proxy 
through Magaye, and to send armed parties to raid cattle 
further and further south beyond the Mkhomazi. In 1824 a 
force of Zulu amabutho from north of the Thukela 
penetrated to the vicinity of the Mzimvubu and seized 
cattle from the Mpondo. These were placed at posts set up 
in Mathubane's territory near Port Natal, and watched over 
by men of his Thuli chiefdom. At no stage, as far as the 
evidence goes, did Zulu armies make the murderous sweeps 
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through Natal which conventionally they are supposed to 
have done. 
Zulu domination over the territories south of the 
Thukela was still being consolidated when, in the mid-
1820s, a completely new set of political factors began to 
come into play in the region. These stemmed from the 
advent at Port Natal from 1824 onward of parties of 
British traders and hunters from the Cape colony. Their 
coming, was a product of the growing interest which, after 
the end of the Napoleonic wars, merchants and officials in 
the Cape and in Britain were showing in south-eastern 
Africa as a field of commercial enterprise. With the 
backing of Cape Town merchants, and the assent of the 
colonial authorities, a small party under Francis Farewell 
established itself at Port Natal in 1824. Another under 
James King followed in 1825. 
The aims of the traders were ostensibly to open up a 
trade in ivory with the Zulu kingdom. Covertly, their 
leaders also "manoeuvered to acquire cessions of land about 
Port Natal from Shaka, and to obtain recognition of their 
claims from the Cape authorities. They may also have had 
an eye on the possibility of shipping slaves, illegal 
though the trade was, to the Oelagoa Bay market. For his 
part, Shaka welcomed the British traders as suppliers of 
manufactures who could rival the Portuguese at Oelagoa 
Bay, as potential allies against his enemies inside and 
outside the kingdom, and as intermediaries through whom he 
could establish contact with the British authorities at 
the Cape. His initial policy towards the traders was to 
assist them to establish themselves at Port Natal, but at 
the same time to try to maintain overall control of their 
interactions, commercial and otherwise, with his subjects. 
Though the traders had no option but to recognize Shaka's 
authority, they were soon seeking to evade the 
restrictions which he placed on their trading operations. 
For the first two years after their arrival, the 
traders seem to have played little part in the public 
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affairs of the Zulu kingdom. From mid-1826 onward, 
however, they were drawn further and further into its 
politics. Their initial involvement came about in 
response to Shaka's demand for military assistance against 
outside enemies. In about September 1826 a party of 
Farewell's men accompanied Shaka's army in an attack on 
the Ndwandwe chiefdom, which had recently re-established 
itself near the upper Phongolo. with the aid of the 
traders' firepower, the Zulu routed the Ndwandwe and 
destroyed their chiefdom. Numbers of cattle, and possibly 
captives as well, went to Farewell and his party as 
reward. A few months later, James King's party assisted a 
Zulu force to subdue Bheje of the Khumalo who for years 
had held out against Shaka in the northern borderlands. 
This party, too, was well rewarded in cattle and captives. 
By late 1826 Shaka seems to have relaxed some of his 
restrictions on the hunting and trading of ivory as a 
concession to the traders. A further testimony of the 
importance which by now he was attaching to their support 
was his enlargement of the Zulu presence in the coast lands 
south of the Thukela. By the end of the year he had 
established a major new ikhanda, kwaDukuza, near the lower 
Mvoti, only seventy kilometres from Port Natal, and had 
himself taken up residence there. At the same time, he 
set up numbers of other imizi and cattle posts in the 
region. 
By about this time, too, Shaka was allowing the leading 
traders to set up what were in effect new chiefdoms at 
Port Natal and in the coastlands further to the south. 
From soon after their arrival he had permitted the traders 
to receive as adherents people from the surrounding areas 
who came to give their allegiance. To begin with, the 
traders had sought to expand their followings in order to 
obtain the labour which they needed to establish their 
enterprises on a viable footing. By 1827, as bitter 
rivalries developed between them, their leaders were 
seeking to build up their followings into private armies. 
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At the same time, the heads of the two main parties, 
Farewell and King, were jockeying for influence with 
Shaka. By the latter half of 1827 he was favouring King, 
largely, it seems, because the latter was promising to 
convey an embassy from Shaka to the Cape authorities in a 
schooner which his party was building. Shaka had had in 
mind since the arrival of the first party of traders the 
notion of sending a mission to the Cape. By the middle of 
1827 he was entertaining the idea seriously, probably 
because of the continuing growth of opposition to his rule 
within the kingdom. As he seems to have seen it, the 
establishment of good relations with the Cape authorities 
would strengthen his hand against his opponents. 
By the beginning of 1828 King had manoeuvred Shaka into 
signing a document which purported to grant him possession 
of Port Natal, and exclusive trading rights throughout the 
Zulu kingdom. Soon afterwards he completed the 
construction of his boat and embarked Shaka's embassy. At 
the beginning of May 1828 the party arrived in Port 
Elizabeth. Shaka's specific aims in sending a mission to 
the Cape government seem to have been to obtain British 
sanction for the expansion of the Zulu sphere of influence 
further to the southward into what was for the colonial 
authorities a politically sensitive region, and also to 
explore the possibilities of setting up trade links with 
the Cape. In the event, the mission failed, partly 
because, in seeking to turn it to his own advantage, James 
King roused the Cape government's suspicions of the whole 
venture, and partly because, while his embassy was still 
in Port Elizabeth, Shaka inopportunely launched a major 
raid southward into the Mpondo country. 
The circumstances which led to the mounting of this 
expedition remain obscure. Shaka seems to have been 
planning it since at least late 1827. His purposes were 
possibly to try to damp down internal opposition to his 
rule by seizing cattle which he could redistribute to his 
politically important subordinates, and possibly also to 
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reassert his declining authority over the Port Natal 
traders. He was probably encouraged to proceed with his 
plans by the traders, who seem to have intimated to him 
that the British in the Cape would respond favourably to 
an attack on their 'enemies' beyond the colonial frontier 
by the Zulu. The traders knew very well that the British 
response to such a move on the part of the Zulu was likely 
to be hostile: what they were hoping for was a 
confrontation between Zulu and British which would lead 
the latter to intervene in the affairs of the Port Natal 
region, and open the way to an expansion of its commerce. 
What effect the traders' intimations had on Shaka is 
impossible to establish. In May 1828 the Zulu king 
accompanied a large Zulu force southwards to the 
Mzimkhulu, from where he launched it against the Mpondo. 
with the assistance of parties of armed men provided by 
the traders, the Zulu seized numbers of cattle from the 
territories as far south as the Mthatha. Some of these 
were taken back to Shaka's existing cattle posts in the 
coastlands north of Port Natali others were placed at 
several new posts which the Zulu king proceeded to set up 
on the coast south of·the port as far as the Mzimkhulu. 
Seen as a cattle raid and as a show of force in the 
southern borderlands of the Zulu kingdom, the expedition 
was a success. But as an act of policy it could hardly 
have been worse timed. In August 1828 Shaka's ambassadors 
returned with the message that the Cape government would 
actively resist Zulu expansion to the southward if it 
threatened the stability of the colony's eastern 
frontiers. In effect his attempt to establish friendly 
relations with the British had failed. This setback 
provided the opportunity for Shaka's enemies in the Zulu 
royal house to take steps to get rid of him. A conspiracy 
to kill him, in which some of the Port Natal traders may 
have been involved, had been building up for some time. 
The absence of most of the Zulu army, which, for reasons 
that are not entirely clear, Shaka had sent off on an 
expedition to the northward, made it easier for the 
conspirators to act. In september 1828 he was 
assassinated by some of his brothers. 
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After Shaka's death, his successor Dingane at first 
sought to reduce the Zulu presence south of the Thukela. 
He soon found, though, that he could not afford to relax 
his hold on the southern peripheries of the Zulu kingdom, 
or to weaken the monarchy's commercial and political links 
with the Port Natal traders. No more than Shaka was he 
able to avoid involvement with the outside forces which 
had brought the traders to Port Natal in 1824, and which, 
by the late 1820s, were bearing down ever more strongly on 
the Zulu domain south of the Thukela. In July and August 
1828, just after Shaka's southern expedition had begun its 
withdrawal from the Mthatha river, the Cape authorities 
made their own display of force in the area by sending a 
powerful expedition to destroy the intrusive Ngwane 
chiefdom on the upper reaches of that river. In effect 
they were opposing attempts by the Zulu to extend their 
domination further south~ards, and asserting their own 
primacy in the region that extended towards the Mzimkhulu. 
Encouraged by the growing readiness of the Cape government 
to intervene with force in the southern reaches of the 
Zulu sphere of influence, other Cape-based interests 
pressed forward towards the Port Natal region. In 1829-30 
the Wesleyan Missionary Society established three new 
stations beyond the Kei river, including one in the Mpondo 
country, and considered plans to open another at Port 
Natal. In the same period, a wagon route was opened from 
the eastern Cape to the port, and the beginnings of an 
overland commerce between the two regions was established. 
In Cape Town, merchant interests were beginning to press 
for British intervention to be extended to Port Natal and 
its hinterland. The scene was being set for a new round 
of struggles for control of the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region. 
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